[Xmca-l] Re: meaning and sense

[Sungwoo Kim <sungwookim92@gmail.com>]

Larry,

Thank you for this wonderful reference. I will check the volume. Actually,
my dissertation was on a cognitive linguistic approach to second language
development. I used conceptual metaphor as a mediational tool to encourage
second language writers to reflect upon and transform their composition
practices. The impact was quite impressive, at least to me.

By the way, I am still pondering upon your previous mail. I am inclined to
conceptualize meaning as the process based on embodied cognition rather
than a kind of mental representation. So I would like to ask you whether
you are referring specifically to Vygotsky's use of the term "meaning and
sense" or a broader array of theoretical concepts in linguistics, including
the recent development in cognitive science.

-- Sungwoo


On Wed, Aug 28, 2013 at 9:00 AM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:

> Sungwoo,
> I would like to recommend a book that gives a good summary of the history
> of understanding of metaphor that puts your question in a larger context.
> The book is "Communicative Praxis and the Space of Subjectivity" by Calvin
> O Schrag.
> Chapter One is "Figures of Discourse" [pages 17 to 31].
>  Schrag is critiquing the subjectivism and emotivist BIAS which has
> dominated views on metaphor, and explores an understanding of metaphor as
> central to ways of knowing and communicating.
> Here is a sample of his approach in his commentary on Mary Hesse's book
> "Models and Analogies in Science":
> Schrag comments,
>
> "Although Hess has succeeded in freeing metaphor from its bondage to the
> noncognitive, emotive, and merely decorative, the liberation of metaphor AS
> an autonomous form of disclosure and communication has not been fully
> attained in her thought. Metaphor remains a supplement to the reductive
> MODEL of scientific explanation, achieving reference only through a
> circuitous linkage with the explanandum of the primary SYSTEM."
> My emphasis to focus on how metaphor, model, system are concepts that
> participate within communicative praxis.
>
> This chapter, "Figures AS Discourse" gives many further references and
> leads to follow if you are fascinated with the transformative power of
> metaphor.
> Larry
>
>
> On Fri, Aug 23, 2013 at 5:12 PM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > Sungwoo,
> > Thanks for participating in this online chat. I am aware of this approach
> > that says metaphors are central to our ways of thinking. I will read the
> > article you sent. My curiosity is in the question of words *carrying*
> > thought [which would imply thought comes first and is then put into the
> > chosen word that *represents* the thought [as primary], or if the word IS
> > thought. If metaphor is thought [not a way to bring our thoughts out into
> > the shared world] then metaphors of thought AS *PICTURES* [frames] in
> > contrast to metaphors of thought AS *VOICE*  actually means we are
> > participating in different KINDS of thinking [conversations externally or
> > internally]
> > Sungwoo, I am in over my head but am curious about your question. This
> > site is the place to be if you want to go deeper into this question.
> > Vygotsky's exploration of the distinction between meaning and sense leads
> > right into the heart of your question.
> > I will read your article attached as I am fascinated with the place of
> > metaphor in our modes of thinking.
> > I do believe the notion that the concept *metaphor* is itself a metaphor
> > DERIVED from the practice of *metapherein* [the verb *to transfer*] which
> > originally described a CONCRETE activity
> > This insight may be relevant.
> > The book "Rhetoric as Philosophy" by Ernesto Grassi [1980] which explores
> > Vico and his response to the *new science* may be a lead to follow.
> Shotter
> > in his book refer's to Grassi's understanding of metaphor.
> >  Others on this site have explored the relation of metaphor and thinking.
> > Larry
> >
> >
> > On Fri, Aug 23, 2013 at 11:44 AM, Sungwoo Kim <sungwookim92@gmail.com
> >wrote:
> >
> >> Dear Larry Purss
> >>
> >> This is my first time to use this mailing list. I hope this message will
> >> reach you somehow.
> >>
> >> I cannot directly address your questions due to my limited knowledge in
> >> phenomenology, but recent work in cognitive linguistics, especially in
> the
> >> field of conceptual metaphor theory can shed some light on them.
> >>
> >> The traditional view on metaphor has regarded it as an ornamental device
> >> in
> >> rhetorical process. Thus it does not have direct impact upon our
> thinking
> >> process.However, a large body of work in cognitive linguistics since
> >> Lakoff
> >> and Johnson's seminal work *Metaphors We Live By *(1980) is showing that
> >> metaphor is not merely rhetorical device, but a set of thinking
> patterns,
> >> some of which are universal and some culture-specific. This means that
> >> using new metaphors can shape and direct our thinking processes. To put
> it
> >> another way, new metaphors can lead to new ways of thinking. For
> >> example, Thibodeau and Boroditsky show that different kinds of metaphor
> >> can
> >> have substantial impact on our reasoning. Here's part of the abstract.
> >>
> >> "The way we talk about complex and abstract ideas is suffused with
> >> metaphor. In five experiments, we explore how these metaphors influence
> >> the
> >> way that we reason about complex issues and forage for further
> information
> >> about them. We find that even the subtlest instantiation of a metaphor
> >> (via
> >> a single word) can have a powerful influence over how people attempt to
> >> solve social problems like crime and how they gather information to make
> >> 'well-informed decisions."
> >>
> >> http://www-psych.stanford.edu/~lera/papers/crime-metaphors.pdf
> >>
> >> This principle of "metaphor-as-tihnking-pattern" has been adopted by
> many
> >> practitioners as well as researchers. Now it is applied in many fields
> >> including counseling, consulting, web and application design, political
> >> strategy planning, marketing, and so on. (Of course there are some
> >> cautious
> >> voices about the power of metaphor, too. e.g.
> >> http://www.economist.com/blogs/johnson/2013/01/political-language)
> >>
> >> Sungwoo
> >>
> >>
> >> On Thu, Aug 22, 2013 at 11:12 PM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> >> wrote:
> >>
> >> > Andy,
> >> >
> >> > Thanks for keepin
> >> > Thanks for keeping this topic of sense and meaning alive.
> >> > Mike also is drawing our attention to the mystery of the creative
> >> process
> >> > with this comment: "I agree, very clearly statements of the
> >> sense/meaning
> >> > relation, along with the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I
> >> wanted
> >> > to say, and thought, unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows."
> >> > Thought, unembodied, returns to the hall of shadows.
> >> > I have been reflecting on the phenomenological method or *bias* to
> >> > prioritize *showing* as an action which brings thoughts from the
> >> shadows.
> >> > The concept or term "metaphor" which can itself be considered a
> >> metaphor.
> >> > Metaphor is derived from the verb *metapherein" which means "to
> >> transfer"
> >> > which originally described a CONCRETE reality [Ernesto Grassi].
> >> > Therefore *presenting* a new metaphor IS an argument or a reason [a
> >> showing
> >> > in phenomenological discourse]
> >> > The question is if presenting [as a showing or gesture] a metaphor is
> >> > presenting a *vehicle* or an "egg" which "carries" thoughts from
> >> speaker to
> >> > hearer [which suggests the word is then decoded and RE-presented in
> the
> >> > listener's "mind"
> >> > Or, on the other hand, is presenting a metaphor actually metapherein
> [a
> >> > verb] which "transfers" [shifts, turns] knowing in a phenomenological
> >> "aha"
> >> > moment? Metaphor AS showing or presenting [FORMING sense], not
> metaphor
> >> as
> >> > a *carrier* of thought which *represents* the sense of the speaker.
> >> > I am "over my head" in these realms and my "logic" may be faulty, but
> >> the
> >> > power of metaphor as "hinge" or "pivot" seems central.
> >> > Peter Jones made a comment on literacy and "representation"
> >> > Ernesto Grassi is making the point that presenting [showing] a new
> >> metaphor
> >> > IS an argument producing a type of knowledge [sense]
> >> > Can metapherein be *seen* [picture language] as new and novel ways of
> >> > acting as transfering *sense* to *pictures* as a *psychological
> >> instrument*
> >> > and thus as a cultural resource? The ACT of 'transfer' as presentation
> >> > within metaphor [something AS something else] understood as a
> >> psychological
> >> > and cultural tool, a PRACTICAL intersubjective resource with which
> [and
> >> > THROUGH which we think, act, and perceive.
> >> > Sense AS perception & action mediated through felt experience which is
> >> > "presented" [shown] through *turning* objects to present other sides
> and
> >> > therefore to perceive other aspects. Polysemy through metepherein as
> one
> >> > *way* of knowing as argumentation.
> >> > This is questioning the relation between *forming* as
> >> presentation/showing
> >> > &
> >> > *formed* as representation of what was previously presented.
> >> > Merleau-Ponty's dynamic between sedimentation/spontaneityg this topic
> of
> >> > sense and meaning alive.
> >> >
> >> > Mike also is drawing our attention to the mystery of the creative
> >> process
> >> > with this comment: "I agree, very clearly statements of the
> >> sense/meaning
> >> > relation, along with the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I
> >> wanted
> >> > to say, and thought, unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows."
> >> >
> >> > Thought, unembodied, returns to the hall of shadows.
> >> > I have been reflecting on the phenomenological method or *bias* to
> >> > prioritize *showing* as an action which brings thoughts from the
> >> shadows.
> >> >
> >> > The concept or term "metaphor" which can itself be considered a
> >> metaphor.
> >> > Metaphor is derived from the verb *metapherein" which means "to
> >> transfer"
> >> > which originally described a CONCRETE reality [Ernesto Grassi].
> >> > Therefore *presenting* a new metaphor IS an argument or a reason [a
> >> showing
> >> > in phenomenological discourse]
> >> > The question is if presenting [as a showing or gesture] a metaphor is
> >> > presenting a *vehicle* or an "egg" which "carries" thoughts from
> >> speaker to
> >> > hearer [which suggests the word is then decoded and RE-presented in
> the
> >> > listener's "mind"
> >> > Or, on the other hand, is presenting a metaphor actually metapherein
> [a
> >> > verb] which "transfers" [shifts, turns] knowing in a phenomenological
> >> "aha"
> >> > moment? Metaphor AS showing or presenting [FORMING sense], not
> metaphor
> >> as
> >> > a *carrier* of thought which *represents* the sense of the speaker.
> >> > I am "over my head" in these realms and my "logic" may be faulty, but
> >> the
> >> > power of metaphor as "hinge" or "pivot" seems central.
> >> > Peter Jones made a comment on literacy and "representation"
> >> > Ernesto Grassi is making the point that presenting [showing] a new
> >> metaphor
> >> > IS an argument producing a type of knowledge [sense]
> >> > Can metapherein be *seen* [picture language] as new and novel ways of
> >> > acting as transfering *sense* by showing and creating metaphors
> >> > as *pictures* as a *psychological instrument* and thus as a cultural
> >> > resource? The ACT of 'transfer' as presentation within metaphor
> >> [something
> >> > AS something else] understood as a psychological and cultural tool, a
> >> > PRACTICAL intersubjective resource with which [and THROUGH which] we
> >> think,
> >> > act, and perceive.
> >> > Greg, I wonder if this showing is always volitional [under our
> control]
> >> or
> >> > if we spontaneously "respond" intersubjectively?
> >> >
> >> >  Sense AS perception & action mediated through felt experience which
> is
> >> > "presented" [shown] through *turning* objects to present other sides
> and
> >> > therefore to perceive other aspects. Polysemy through metepherein as
> one
> >> > *way* of knowing as argumentation. Intersubjective not subjective.
> >> > This is questioning the relation between
> >> >  *forming* as presentation/showing
> >> > &
> >> >  *formed* as representation of what was previously presented.
> >> >
> >> > Merleau-Ponty's dynamic between sedimentation/spontaneity as
> expressive
> >> > cognition.
> >> >
> >> > I hope I am making sense in my drawing attention to the relation
> between
> >> > thoughts and shadows.
> >> > Huw, asked if there is a question here? I would say the question is
> the
> >> > models of "sense" as presentations [showings] and representations.
> >> > Merleau-Ponty understood words AS GESTURES.
> >> > Is there any "truth" to this notion?
> >> > Larry
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > On Wed, Aug 21, 2013 at 11:24 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
> >> wrote:
> >> >
> >> > > I was just looking into this business about Vygotsky imputing
> >> excessive
> >> > > stablility to word meaning. The following key passage from Chapter 7
> >> of
> >> > > "Thinking and Speech" does not, it appers to me, to imply such
> >> stability:
> >> > >
> >> > >    "First, in inner speech, we find a predominance of the word’s
> sense
> >> > >    over its meaning. Paulhan significantly advanced the
> psychological
> >> > >    analysis of speech by introducing the distinction between a
> word’s
> >> > >    sense and meaning. A word’s sense is the aggregate of all the
> >> > >    psychological facts that arise in our consciousness as a result
> of
> >> > >    the word. Sense is a dynamic, fluid, and complex formation which
> >> has
> >> > >    several zones that vary in their stability. Meaning is only one
> of
> >> > >    these zones of the sense that the word acquires in the context of
> >> > >    speech. It is the most stable, unified, and precise of these
> zones.
> >> > >    In different contexts, a word’s sense changes. In contrast,
> meaning
> >> > >    is a comparatively fixed and stable point, one that remains
> >> constant
> >> > >    with all the changes of the word’s sense that are associated with
> >> > >    its use in various contexts. Change in the word’s sense is a
> basic
> >> > >    factor in the semantic analysis of speech. The actual meaning of
> >> the
> >> > >    word is inconstant. In one operation, the word emerges with one
> >> > >    meaning; in another, another is acquired. The dynamic nature of
> >> > >    meaning leads us to Paulhan’s problem, to the problem of the
> >> > >    relationship between meaning and sense. Isolated in the lexicon,
> >> the
> >> > >    word has only one meaning. However, this meaning is nothing more
> >> > >    than a potential that can only be realized in living speech, and
> in
> >> > >    living speech meaning is only a cornerstone in the edifice of
> >> sense."
> >> > >
> >> > > As I read this, the stability of meaning is merely relative to that
> of
> >> > > sense, i.e., in the context of speech, rather than "teh aggregate of
> >> all
> >> > > psychological facts." He is not at all denying the fact of polysemy
> or
> >> > the
> >> > > cultural and historical migration of meaning.
> >> > >
> >> > > Andy
> >> > > mike cole wrote:
> >> > >
> >> > >> I agree, very clearly statements of the sense/meaning relation,
> along
> >> > with
> >> > >> the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I wanted to say, and
> >> > thought,
> >> > >> unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows."
> >> > >>
> >> > >> In the quote here, I think LSV is somewhat overstating the
> stability
> >> of
> >> > >> meaning across contexts; yes relative to the microgenetic processes
> >> of
> >> > >> sense making capturable with
> >> > >> modern technologies, but not totally "context independent." Even
> >> > >> dictionary
> >> > >> meanings change, as LSV was well aware from his interest in the
> >> history
> >> > of
> >> > >> words in relation to their appearance in children's vocabularies in
> >> > >> ontogeny.
> >> > >>
> >> > >> Keeping the simultaneous relevance of several time scales in mind
> in
> >> > these
> >> > >> discussions seems really important, as hard as it is to do.
> >> > >> mike
> >> > >>
> >> > >>
> >> > >>
> >> > >>
> >> > >
> >> > >
> >> > >
> >> >
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> --
> >>
> >> Peace,
> >> Sungwoo Kim
> >> Learner, Teacher, Researcher, Blogger
> >> Photos: *https://there.jux.com/*
> >> Personal: http://www.sungwookim.com
> >>
> >
> >
>



-- 

Peace,
Sungwoo Kim
Learner, Teacher, Researcher, Blogger
Photos: *https://there.jux.com/*
Personal: http://www.sungwookim.com