[Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities

[mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>]

I agree, very clearly statements of the sense/meaning relation, along with
the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I wanted to say, and thought,
unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows."

In the quote here, I think LSV is somewhat overstating the stability of
meaning across contexts; yes relative to the microgenetic processes of
sense making capturable with
modern technologies, but not totally "context independent." Even dictionary
meanings change, as LSV was well aware from his interest in the history of
words in relation to their appearance in children's vocabularies in
ontogeny.

Keeping the simultaneous relevance of several time scales in mind in these
discussions seems really important, as hard as it is to do.
mike


On Sat, Aug 17, 2013 at 7:15 PM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:

> Here are two excerpts from Thought and Language which may support Greg's
> proposal.
> "A word acquires its sense from the context in which it appears.; in
> different contexts it changes its sense. Meaning remains stable throughout
> the changes of sense The dictionary meaning of a word is no more than a
> stone in the edifice of sense; no more than a potentiality that finds
> diversified REALIZATION in speech."[245]
>
> Here is another more specific excerpt to support Greg's proposal.
>
> "Thought is not merely expressed in words; it comes into EXISTENCE THROUGH
> them. Every thought tends to connect SOMETHING WITH SOMETHING else, to
> establish a relation between things." [218]
>
> In my reading of these two excerpts I experience a family resemblance with
> the basic *givenness* of phenomenology that thought comes into existence
> within *AS* structure. [something AS something else]
>
> Greg invites us to consider some *affinities* between these alternativeways
> of talking [which may make common *sense*] in developing the "edifice of
> sense*
> Sense AS including both perception and action mediated through *felt*
> existence.
>
> Phenomenology uses the language of primordial givenness [which may as a
> term for historical reasons produce reaction rather than resonance].
>
> Larry
>
>
>
>
> On Sat, Aug 17, 2013 at 1:44 PM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > Greg,
> > I fully endorse the *felt* understanding of this post.
> > You have summarized the possibility of integrating phenomenological
> > accounts into CHAT.
> > My understanding of *phenomenology* is the focus on *givenness*
> > Husserl tried to locate *givenness within perception. Others try to
> locate
> > *givenness in action. Still others try to locate *givenness* in events
> > [beyond agency]
> > My reading of phenomenology is they are now giving accounts of *as*
> > [something as something else] as *givenness*.
> > This reading *turns* the conversation to how we compose accounts as
> given.
> > Greg, an side the word sovereign comes from *superannus* so Freud may
> have
> > been articulating a type of character formation which made *common*
> sense*
> > in Vienna at the turn of the 19th century to the 20th.
> >
> > I also see a place for an *agency* that is partially intentional and also
> > an agency within *frames* or *windows*
> >
> > Phenomenology is NOT grounded in perception which is a secondary or
> > derived phenomena.
> > It is not grounded in language.
> > It is *grounded* in *AS* phenomena.
> >
> > Moving back to *meaning* & *sense* which is central to our accounts.
> > Meaning AS *objects* is one account. Meaning as *affinities* is an
> > alternative account.   WITHIN affinities the participants speak FROM
> WITHIN
> > common accounts [Shotter]
> > He is participating in developing a rhetorical-RESPONSIVE psychology
> which
> > he calls psychology AS *joint action*
> >
> > His turning to Vygotsky to extend his psychology may be helpful in
> > response to your proposal [and question]
> > Shorter wrote:
> > In shifting debates in psychology to the nature of our psychological
> > nature Vygostky focused on accounts AS *instructive*
> > In Shotter's words,
> > "I want to call upon aspects of Vygotsky's important account of words AS
> > *psychological tools or instruments* Words function in this instrumental
> > fashion when, for instance, others make use of various FORMS of talk, to
> > draw our attention to featurs of our circumstances that otherwise would
> > escape our notice, or, how to conduct ourselves in certain circumstances;
> > they can instruct us in HOW to manage or organize our WAYS OF perceiving
> > and acting. AS Vygotsky [1978:32] comments, in learning to coordinate
> their
> > actions linguistically with those around them, "the child begins to
> > PERCEIVE the world not only through his eyes but also THROUGH his
> speech."
> > Shorter adds,
> > Vygotsky goes on to show how the ways in which others first verbally
> > instruct us, can later become our own; AS they verbally instructed us, so
> > we can come to verbally come to instruct ourselves.
> > [in Conversational Realities:35]
> >
> > Greg, if phenomenology is seen as not privileging perception AS GIVEN [a
> > fallacy] but rather positing {as} as *givenness* then their may be a way
> to
> > link phenomenology as currently understood [not as Husserl posited
> > perception AS *given*]
> >
> > This *turns* to Vygotsky exploring *sense* AS perception & action
> MEDIATED
> > THROUGH FELT experience[as Dewey understood experience]
> >
> > FELT experience is the medium through which perception & action are
> > mediated.
> >
> > Greg, I am not sure if this is clarifying [or confusing] your proposal.
> > *Boundary objects* as liminal and dynamic WITHIN felt *frames* as showing
> > *agency*
> > Larry
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On Sat, Aug 17, 2013 at 10:36 AM, Greg Thompson <
> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com
> > > wrote:
> >
> >> Antti and other inter-Actants,
> >> I think that the notion of sensory fabric in an observational study of
> >> naturally occurring interactions is NOT too far fetched. Seems like
> >> something like this is absolutely needed. And I'd be interested to hear
> >> how
> >> you would plan to use Goodwin's Professional Vision article - it is a
> >> personal favorite (so maybe offline if others aren't interested).
> >>
> >> Also, Antti, in your work, I like your attention to the role of the
> >> physical body in making frames.
> >> (see also John Rae on body posture and framing, e.g. see:
> >>
> >>
> http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1207/S15327973RLSI34-2_4#.Ug7fiJLiiM4and
> >> maybe more central in this regard is Adam Kendon's work on body
> posture).
> >>
> >> I might add to this that Goffman speaks of the way in which motivations
> >> are, to a certain extent, entailed by frames (yes, "to a certain
> extent" -
> >> this does not mean the frames determine them!). Thus, frames bring with
> >> them motivational relevancies as much as individuals do!
> >>
> >> We could speak of the way that frames create certain affordances that
> >> solicit various types of behavior (whether "cognitive", "emotional", or
> >> some other emically named type). When we are in certain types of
> >> interactions, it suddenly becomes possible to *feel* a certain way that
> >> one
> >> couldn't otherwise have felt. Similarly, one can be a head taller than
> >> oneself when in certain interactions. And, conversely, one can find
> >> oneself
> >> becoming quite smaller in others!
> >>
> >> I think that this role of context is important and can be easily
> >> overlooked
> >> if you start from the motives of individuals.
> >>
> >> In addition to Goffman, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty also point in this
> >> direction with their notions of "calling forth" and
> >> "affordances/solicitations", respectively. These approaches to
> >> understanding people result in a reduction of the perceived agency of
> the
> >> individual (and hence a reduced role for intentionality, motive, and
> even
> >> conscious reflection), and I think many people often chafe at these
> ideas
> >> (esp. in American where the individual is king! Sovereign Lords - all of
> >> us!).
> >>
> >> But, imho, there is still an agent in all of these accounts - perhaps a
> >> bit
> >> smaller than in other accounts, but present nonetheless. And, as the
> >> phenomenologists like to say, this account is truer to the phenomena.
> [and
> >> I don't know whether this is relevant or not, but it seems to me that
> this
> >> account accords well with my reading of Marx].
> >>
> >> At the end of the day, I think the central issue that all of this turns
> on
> >> is our ontology of *the mental*. Phenomenologists like to suggest that
> >> others subscribe to "a myth of the mental" (see Hubert Dreyfus's paper
> The
> >> Return of the Myth of the Mental:
> >>
> >>
> http://www.sjsu.edu/people/anand.vaidya/courses/c2/s1/The_Return_Myth_Mental_Dreyfus-1.pdf
> >> ).
> >> This is a pervasive belief and perhaps there is some justification for
> it,
> >> but I happen to find the phenomenologists' position compelling. I
> further
> >> wonder if CHAT tends to subscribe to the myth of the mental? Do our
> >> concepts of concepts involve reifications of mental processes that
> perhaps
> >> are not warranted?
> >>
> >> If the phenomenologists' position hold water, and admittedly it's a lot
> of
> >> water to swallow, then the question is really Lubomir's question of
> >> whether
> >> or not CHAT can integrate other perspectives, here the phenomenological
> >> perspective (and it seems like some say yes, some say no), or whether
> you
> >> will necessarily have to go somewhere else to get that perspective. So,
> is
> >> this an ontological commitment of CHAT? Can there be some middle ground?
> >>
> >> It seems like Shotter and others (e.g., Martin Packer here on XMCA) have
> >> been marking out this space, but perhaps what remains to be seen is
> >> whether
> >> or not this space falls within
> >> the bounds of CHAT.
> >> Who decides that?
> >> -greg
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> On Fri, Aug 16, 2013 at 6:21 AM, Antti Rajala <ajrajala@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >>
> >> > Greg,
> >> >
> >> > Thanks for inviting me to the discussion and for your nice
> introduction
> >> to
> >> > Goffman's work. I indeed found these reflections about the
> relationships
> >> > between Goffman and AT very useful. My project in which I am
> considering
> >> > using Goffman's concept of frame together with Leontjev's theory of
> >> > activity is still at a very initial stage (I had to postpone this
> >> project
> >> > for a while to engage in another project meanwhile).
> >> >
> >> > My take into the discussion is that I am interested to analyze sensory
> >> > aspects of students' actions (of observing birds) in bird-watching
> >> school
> >> > fieldtrip. Like Larry, I have previously worked with concepts of
> >> personal
> >> > sense and meaning, and now I found very interesting Leontjev's
> >> explication
> >> > of the structure of consciousness in terms of three dialectically
> >> > interrelated elements (or moments), personal sense, meaning, and
> sensory
> >> > fabric. Yet, Leontiev seems not to have written much that would help
> me
> >> to
> >> > analyze embodied interactions from video. I think that I need to
> >> > incorporate concepts from elsewhere to capture the evolving
> >> > moment-to-moment interactions. Here, I was turning to Goffman's frame
> >> > analysis, and the work of his students M. and C. Goodwin may be
> >> > interesting, too.
> >> >
> >> > I have talked to many colleagues in CHAT and so far everyone has
> >> encouraged
> >> > me to explore the connections between frames and Leontiev (even
> though a
> >> > lot of work needs to be done). In this connection, I found interesting
> >> > Lubomir's opinion of the incompatibility between the two. I add
> >> Gutierrez
> >> > to Greg's list of scholars who connect Goffman and Leontiev.
> >> >
> >> > Gutierrez and colleagues have used defined their well-known notion of
> >> > script in terms of the notion of frame. In their article (1995,
> Script,
> >> > counterscript and underlife in the classroom;
> >> > http://lchc.ucsd.edu/mca/Paper/kris.pdf) they write: "Nevertheless,
> the
> >> > teacher's script is hardly interrupted by student re-keyings, his
> script
> >> > (or "frame" in Goffman's terms) has ..." (p. 460). Gutierrez and
> >> colleagues
> >> > also use other Goffman's concepts such as keying and underlife.
> >> >
> >> > One connection to Greg's reflection about motives and frames. To me,
> it
> >> > seems that there are some connections between the notions of personal
> >> sense
> >> > and framing. "Sense expresses the relation of motive of activity to
> >> > immediate goal of action" (Leontiev, 1978, p. 171). For a participant
> >> of an
> >> > activity, explication of this relation between motive and goal seems
> to
> >> > amount to asking: "what it is that is going on here?", that is, what
> is
> >> the
> >> > frame?
> >> >
> >> > I would also like to ask the list, if you think that involving the
> >> notion
> >> > of sensory fabric in an observational study of naturally occuring
> >> > interactions is too far fetched. After all, Leontiev's own studies
> >> employed
> >> > exprimental research methods. I am considering dropping Leontiev
> >> altogether
> >> > and use work like Goodwin's professional vision instead.
> >> >
> >> > Antti
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > On Thu, Aug 15, 2013 at 6:22 PM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> >> wrote:
> >> >
> >> > > Andy,
> >> > > I was hoping you could elaborate on the two terms *modes* and
> >> > *archeTYPES*
> >> > > when discussing collaboration within projects [activities]
> >> > > *modes* seem related to *models* *media* *medium* *mediation*.
> >> > > *Actions* when *operationalized* are ALWAYS WITHIN modes of
> >> > collaboration.
> >> > > What phenomena are not included within human processes that are
> beyond
> >> > > activities?
> >> > > Shotter, exploring social life says,
> >> > > "different people in different positions at different moments live
> in
> >> > > different realities."
> >> > > In other words "reality" we must re-think "reality" as being
> >> > > differentiated, consisting in different regions and moments all with
> >> > > different properties to these realities.
> >> > > Shotter adds,
> >> > > "WE can begin to think of social reality at large as a turbulent
> flow
> >> of
> >> > > continuous social activity, containing within it [reality] two BASIC
> >> > KINDS
> >> > > of activity:
> >> > > 1] a set of relatively stable centers of well ordered,
> >> self-reproducing
> >> > > activity sustained by those WITHIN them being accountable to each
> >> other
> >> > for
> >> > > their actions ... - but with the forms of justification used being
> >> > > themselves open to contest (Billig, McIntyre)
> >> > > 2] with these diverse regions or moments of institutionalized order
> >> being
> >> > > separated from each other by zones of much more disorderly,
> >> > unaccountable,
> >> > > chaotic activity.
> >> > > It is in these unaccountable, marginal regions - on the edge of
> chaos,
> >> > away
> >> > > from the orderly centers of social life - that the events of
> interest
> >> to
> >> > us
> >> > > occur"
> >> > >
> >> > > Shotter is suggesting the *models* we specify to help us understand
> >> the
> >> > > uncertainty, vagueness, and ambiguity [REAL features of much of the
> >> world
> >> > > in which we live] influence the nature of our future lives together.
> >> > >
> >> > > To return to collaboration operating WITHIN *modes* [as archeTYPES].
> >> The
> >> > 3
> >> > > types [master/servant - customer/provider - and collaboration per
> se].
> >> > Can
> >> > > *we* through *education* develop *dis-positions* which *turn* away
> >> from
> >> > the
> >> > > first two archetypes and *turn* towards collaboration per se? Can we
> >> also
> >> > > through education envision a turn towards the *interhuman* as a
> >> *model*
> >> > > that is a general archetype  for understanding collaboration per se?
> >> > > Is Shotter's composition of two basic KINDS of activity [sedimented
> >> and
> >> > > disorderly] helpful in understanding community forming within types
> or
> >> > > modes of communication [collaboration].
> >> > >
> >> > > I struggle with the ambivalence of *addressing* my audience. This
> is a
> >> > CHAT
> >> > > forum and I have a tendency to *turn* the conversation. I will
>  close
> >> by
> >> > > re-focusing on the dialectic of meaning and *sense*.
> >> > > Sense involves [revolves?]  perception AND action mediated THROUGH
> >> felt
> >> > > experience. I believe Shotter's conVERSEational "realities* as
> >> > > collaborations per se may contribute to our interhuman
> understandings
> >> as
> >> > a
> >> > > way to turn away from master/slave and customer/provider activity
> >> > settings.
> >> > > Larry
> >> > > Larry
> >> > >
> >> > >
> >> > >
> >> > > Thanks Andy
> >> > > On Wed, Aug 14, 2013 at 7:14 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
> >> wrote:
> >> > >
> >> > > > Two things Greg.
> >> > > >
> >> > > > Firstly, most definitely the caddy and the player are involved in
> >> the
> >> > > same
> >> > > > project or activity. Self-evidently. Each are also involved in
> other
> >> > > > activities, and reflecting on these other activities may shed
> light
> >> on
> >> > > how
> >> > > > they come to be collaborating in the shared project of the
> player's
> >> > game.
> >> > > > Like master and servant, people always collaborate in a particular
> >> > mode.
> >> > > > The archetypes of these modes of collaboration are master-servant,
> >> > > > customer-provider and collaboration per se. It is important to
> >> > recognise
> >> > > > these different modes of collaboration because otherwise we tend
> to
> >> > force
> >> > > > *all* collaboration into the same mode, which may cause us to
> >> > misconstrue
> >> > > > some relations. The fact that different participants have
> different
> >> > > social
> >> > > > positions within a project means that they each are bound by
> >> different
> >> > > > sides of the same norms. That is, the norms of meaning, belief and
> >> > action
> >> > > > prevailing in the project mandate different meanings, beliefs and
> >> > actions
> >> > > > for different participants. The tensions arising from these
> >> > asymmetrical
> >> > > > relationships is one of the motors of change.
> >> > > >
> >> > > > Secondly, no, projects do not exist *between* persons, persons
> exist
> >> > > > *between* projects. This is just another effort by you, Greg, to
> >> make
> >> > the
> >> > > > unit of analysis the individual person. The relevants units of
> >> analysis
> >> > > of
> >> > > > Activity Theory are operation, action and activity. :)
> >> > > >
> >> > > > Andy
> >> > > >
> >> > > > Greg Thompson wrote:
> >> > > >
> >> > > >> ...
> >> > > >>
> >> > > >>
> >> > > >> "Motive" seems a slippery concept to rest too much on. Andy I'm
> >> > > wondering
> >> > > >> how you answer the question you put to Roland, namely whether or
> >> not
> >> > > master
> >> > > >> and slave are participating in the same activity/project? Or,
> what
> >> > > about a
> >> > > >> golfer and caddy? And so on down to, as Phillip and Carol point
> >> out -
> >> > > the
> >> > > >> different participants in a discussion on XMCA.
> >> > > >>
> >> > > >> ...
> >> > > >>
> >> > > >>
> >> > > >> Goffman's answer is interesting in that he doesn't rely on the
> >> motives
> >> > > >> (motivational relevancies) of the participants, but rather
> creates
> >> a
> >> > > notion
> >> > > >> of the local context as a "frame" that exists somewhere between
> >> > > >> participants. No one person can dictate the frame (even dictators
> >> have
> >> > > to
> >> > > >> deal with the possibility of duplicitousness - the word with a
> >> > > side-wards
> >> > > >> glance - hence irony is a powerful weapon of the weak - even if
> >> James
> >> > > Scott
> >> > > >> didn't recognize this, Bakhtin clearly did). Frames emerge as
> >> > > participants
> >> > > >> take parts in the unfolding play of some event or happening, and,
> >> to a
> >> > > >> certain extent, without regard to alignment of the motives of the
> >> > > >> participants. Every once in a while the motives of all
> participants
> >> > > create
> >> > > >> a frame may be relatively closely aligned, but it seems much more
> >> > common
> >> > > >> that frames are built out of a plethora of motives.
> >> > > >>
> >> > > >>
> >> > > >
> >> > > >
> >> > >
> >> >
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> --
> >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> >> Visiting Assistant Professor
> >> Department of Anthropology
> >> 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> >> Brigham Young University
> >> Provo, UT 84602
> >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> >>
> >
> >
>