[Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities

[Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>]

Here are two excerpts from Thought and Language which may support Greg's
proposal.
"A word acquires its sense from the context in which it appears.; in
different contexts it changes its sense. Meaning remains stable throughout
the changes of sense The dictionary meaning of a word is no more than a
stone in the edifice of sense; no more than a potentiality that finds
diversified REALIZATION in speech."[245]

Here is another more specific excerpt to support Greg's proposal.

"Thought is not merely expressed in words; it comes into EXISTENCE THROUGH
them. Every thought tends to connect SOMETHING WITH SOMETHING else, to
establish a relation between things." [218]

In my reading of these two excerpts I experience a family resemblance with
the basic *givenness* of phenomenology that thought comes into existence
within *AS* structure. [something AS something else]

Greg invites us to consider some *affinities* between these alternativeways
of talking [which may make common *sense*] in developing the "edifice of
sense*
Sense AS including both perception and action mediated through *felt*
existence.

Phenomenology uses the language of primordial givenness [which may as a
term for historical reasons produce reaction rather than resonance].

Larry




On Sat, Aug 17, 2013 at 1:44 PM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:

> Greg,
> I fully endorse the *felt* understanding of this post.
> You have summarized the possibility of integrating phenomenological
> accounts into CHAT.
> My understanding of *phenomenology* is the focus on *givenness*
> Husserl tried to locate *givenness within perception. Others try to locate
> *givenness in action. Still others try to locate *givenness* in events
> [beyond agency]
> My reading of phenomenology is they are now giving accounts of *as*
> [something as something else] as *givenness*.
> This reading *turns* the conversation to how we compose accounts as given.
> Greg, an side the word sovereign comes from *superannus* so Freud may have
> been articulating a type of character formation which made *common* sense*
> in Vienna at the turn of the 19th century to the 20th.
>
> I also see a place for an *agency* that is partially intentional and also
> an agency within *frames* or *windows*
>
> Phenomenology is NOT grounded in perception which is a secondary or
> derived phenomena.
> It is not grounded in language.
> It is *grounded* in *AS* phenomena.
>
> Moving back to *meaning* & *sense* which is central to our accounts.
> Meaning AS *objects* is one account. Meaning as *affinities* is an
> alternative account.   WITHIN affinities the participants speak FROM WITHIN
> common accounts [Shotter]
> He is participating in developing a rhetorical-RESPONSIVE psychology which
> he calls psychology AS *joint action*
>
> His turning to Vygotsky to extend his psychology may be helpful in
> response to your proposal [and question]
> Shorter wrote:
> In shifting debates in psychology to the nature of our psychological
> nature Vygostky focused on accounts AS *instructive*
> In Shotter's words,
> "I want to call upon aspects of Vygotsky's important account of words AS
> *psychological tools or instruments* Words function in this instrumental
> fashion when, for instance, others make use of various FORMS of talk, to
> draw our attention to featurs of our circumstances that otherwise would
> escape our notice, or, how to conduct ourselves in certain circumstances;
> they can instruct us in HOW to manage or organize our WAYS OF perceiving
> and acting. AS Vygotsky [1978:32] comments, in learning to coordinate their
> actions linguistically with those around them, "the child begins to
> PERCEIVE the world not only through his eyes but also THROUGH his speech."
> Shorter adds,
> Vygotsky goes on to show how the ways in which others first verbally
> instruct us, can later become our own; AS they verbally instructed us, so
> we can come to verbally come to instruct ourselves.
> [in Conversational Realities:35]
>
> Greg, if phenomenology is seen as not privileging perception AS GIVEN [a
> fallacy] but rather positing {as} as *givenness* then their may be a way to
> link phenomenology as currently understood [not as Husserl posited
> perception AS *given*]
>
> This *turns* to Vygotsky exploring *sense* AS perception & action MEDIATED
> THROUGH FELT experience[as Dewey understood experience]
>
> FELT experience is the medium through which perception & action are
> mediated.
>
> Greg, I am not sure if this is clarifying [or confusing] your proposal.
> *Boundary objects* as liminal and dynamic WITHIN felt *frames* as showing
> *agency*
> Larry
>
>
>
>
> On Sat, Aug 17, 2013 at 10:36 AM, Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com
> > wrote:
>
>> Antti and other inter-Actants,
>> I think that the notion of sensory fabric in an observational study of
>> naturally occurring interactions is NOT too far fetched. Seems like
>> something like this is absolutely needed. And I'd be interested to hear
>> how
>> you would plan to use Goodwin's Professional Vision article - it is a
>> personal favorite (so maybe offline if others aren't interested).
>>
>> Also, Antti, in your work, I like your attention to the role of the
>> physical body in making frames.
>> (see also John Rae on body posture and framing, e.g. see:
>>
>> http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1207/S15327973RLSI34-2_4#.Ug7fiJLiiM4and
>> maybe more central in this regard is Adam Kendon's work on body posture).
>>
>> I might add to this that Goffman speaks of the way in which motivations
>> are, to a certain extent, entailed by frames (yes, "to a certain extent" -
>> this does not mean the frames determine them!). Thus, frames bring with
>> them motivational relevancies as much as individuals do!
>>
>> We could speak of the way that frames create certain affordances that
>> solicit various types of behavior (whether "cognitive", "emotional", or
>> some other emically named type). When we are in certain types of
>> interactions, it suddenly becomes possible to *feel* a certain way that
>> one
>> couldn't otherwise have felt. Similarly, one can be a head taller than
>> oneself when in certain interactions. And, conversely, one can find
>> oneself
>> becoming quite smaller in others!
>>
>> I think that this role of context is important and can be easily
>> overlooked
>> if you start from the motives of individuals.
>>
>> In addition to Goffman, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty also point in this
>> direction with their notions of "calling forth" and
>> "affordances/solicitations", respectively. These approaches to
>> understanding people result in a reduction of the perceived agency of the
>> individual (and hence a reduced role for intentionality, motive, and even
>> conscious reflection), and I think many people often chafe at these ideas
>> (esp. in American where the individual is king! Sovereign Lords - all of
>> us!).
>>
>> But, imho, there is still an agent in all of these accounts - perhaps a
>> bit
>> smaller than in other accounts, but present nonetheless. And, as the
>> phenomenologists like to say, this account is truer to the phenomena. [and
>> I don't know whether this is relevant or not, but it seems to me that this
>> account accords well with my reading of Marx].
>>
>> At the end of the day, I think the central issue that all of this turns on
>> is our ontology of *the mental*. Phenomenologists like to suggest that
>> others subscribe to "a myth of the mental" (see Hubert Dreyfus's paper The
>> Return of the Myth of the Mental:
>>
>> http://www.sjsu.edu/people/anand.vaidya/courses/c2/s1/The_Return_Myth_Mental_Dreyfus-1.pdf
>> ).
>> This is a pervasive belief and perhaps there is some justification for it,
>> but I happen to find the phenomenologists' position compelling. I further
>> wonder if CHAT tends to subscribe to the myth of the mental? Do our
>> concepts of concepts involve reifications of mental processes that perhaps
>> are not warranted?
>>
>> If the phenomenologists' position hold water, and admittedly it's a lot of
>> water to swallow, then the question is really Lubomir's question of
>> whether
>> or not CHAT can integrate other perspectives, here the phenomenological
>> perspective (and it seems like some say yes, some say no), or whether you
>> will necessarily have to go somewhere else to get that perspective. So, is
>> this an ontological commitment of CHAT? Can there be some middle ground?
>>
>> It seems like Shotter and others (e.g., Martin Packer here on XMCA) have
>> been marking out this space, but perhaps what remains to be seen is
>> whether
>> or not this space falls within
>> the bounds of CHAT.
>> Who decides that?
>> -greg
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Aug 16, 2013 at 6:21 AM, Antti Rajala <ajrajala@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> > Greg,
>> >
>> > Thanks for inviting me to the discussion and for your nice introduction
>> to
>> > Goffman's work. I indeed found these reflections about the relationships
>> > between Goffman and AT very useful. My project in which I am considering
>> > using Goffman's concept of frame together with Leontjev's theory of
>> > activity is still at a very initial stage (I had to postpone this
>> project
>> > for a while to engage in another project meanwhile).
>> >
>> > My take into the discussion is that I am interested to analyze sensory
>> > aspects of students' actions (of observing birds) in bird-watching
>> school
>> > fieldtrip. Like Larry, I have previously worked with concepts of
>> personal
>> > sense and meaning, and now I found very interesting Leontjev's
>> explication
>> > of the structure of consciousness in terms of three dialectically
>> > interrelated elements (or moments), personal sense, meaning, and sensory
>> > fabric. Yet, Leontiev seems not to have written much that would help me
>> to
>> > analyze embodied interactions from video. I think that I need to
>> > incorporate concepts from elsewhere to capture the evolving
>> > moment-to-moment interactions. Here, I was turning to Goffman's frame
>> > analysis, and the work of his students M. and C. Goodwin may be
>> > interesting, too.
>> >
>> > I have talked to many colleagues in CHAT and so far everyone has
>> encouraged
>> > me to explore the connections between frames and Leontiev (even though a
>> > lot of work needs to be done). In this connection, I found interesting
>> > Lubomir's opinion of the incompatibility between the two. I add
>> Gutierrez
>> > to Greg's list of scholars who connect Goffman and Leontiev.
>> >
>> > Gutierrez and colleagues have used defined their well-known notion of
>> > script in terms of the notion of frame. In their article (1995, Script,
>> > counterscript and underlife in the classroom;
>> > http://lchc.ucsd.edu/mca/Paper/kris.pdf) they write: "Nevertheless, the
>> > teacher's script is hardly interrupted by student re-keyings, his script
>> > (or "frame" in Goffman's terms) has ..." (p. 460). Gutierrez and
>> colleagues
>> > also use other Goffman's concepts such as keying and underlife.
>> >
>> > One connection to Greg's reflection about motives and frames. To me, it
>> > seems that there are some connections between the notions of personal
>> sense
>> > and framing. "Sense expresses the relation of motive of activity to
>> > immediate goal of action" (Leontiev, 1978, p. 171). For a participant
>> of an
>> > activity, explication of this relation between motive and goal seems to
>> > amount to asking: "what it is that is going on here?", that is, what is
>> the
>> > frame?
>> >
>> > I would also like to ask the list, if you think that involving the
>> notion
>> > of sensory fabric in an observational study of naturally occuring
>> > interactions is too far fetched. After all, Leontiev's own studies
>> employed
>> > exprimental research methods. I am considering dropping Leontiev
>> altogether
>> > and use work like Goodwin's professional vision instead.
>> >
>> > Antti
>> >
>> >
>> > On Thu, Aug 15, 2013 at 6:22 PM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>> >
>> > > Andy,
>> > > I was hoping you could elaborate on the two terms *modes* and
>> > *archeTYPES*
>> > > when discussing collaboration within projects [activities]
>> > > *modes* seem related to *models* *media* *medium* *mediation*.
>> > > *Actions* when *operationalized* are ALWAYS WITHIN modes of
>> > collaboration.
>> > > What phenomena are not included within human processes that are beyond
>> > > activities?
>> > > Shotter, exploring social life says,
>> > > "different people in different positions at different moments live in
>> > > different realities."
>> > > In other words "reality" we must re-think "reality" as being
>> > > differentiated, consisting in different regions and moments all with
>> > > different properties to these realities.
>> > > Shotter adds,
>> > > "WE can begin to think of social reality at large as a turbulent flow
>> of
>> > > continuous social activity, containing within it [reality] two BASIC
>> > KINDS
>> > > of activity:
>> > > 1] a set of relatively stable centers of well ordered,
>> self-reproducing
>> > > activity sustained by those WITHIN them being accountable to each
>> other
>> > for
>> > > their actions ... - but with the forms of justification used being
>> > > themselves open to contest (Billig, McIntyre)
>> > > 2] with these diverse regions or moments of institutionalized order
>> being
>> > > separated from each other by zones of much more disorderly,
>> > unaccountable,
>> > > chaotic activity.
>> > > It is in these unaccountable, marginal regions - on the edge of chaos,
>> > away
>> > > from the orderly centers of social life - that the events of interest
>> to
>> > us
>> > > occur"
>> > >
>> > > Shotter is suggesting the *models* we specify to help us understand
>> the
>> > > uncertainty, vagueness, and ambiguity [REAL features of much of the
>> world
>> > > in which we live] influence the nature of our future lives together.
>> > >
>> > > To return to collaboration operating WITHIN *modes* [as archeTYPES].
>> The
>> > 3
>> > > types [master/servant - customer/provider - and collaboration per se].
>> > Can
>> > > *we* through *education* develop *dis-positions* which *turn* away
>> from
>> > the
>> > > first two archetypes and *turn* towards collaboration per se? Can we
>> also
>> > > through education envision a turn towards the *interhuman* as a
>> *model*
>> > > that is a general archetype  for understanding collaboration per se?
>> > > Is Shotter's composition of two basic KINDS of activity [sedimented
>> and
>> > > disorderly] helpful in understanding community forming within types or
>> > > modes of communication [collaboration].
>> > >
>> > > I struggle with the ambivalence of *addressing* my audience. This is a
>> > CHAT
>> > > forum and I have a tendency to *turn* the conversation. I will  close
>> by
>> > > re-focusing on the dialectic of meaning and *sense*.
>> > > Sense involves [revolves?]  perception AND action mediated THROUGH
>> felt
>> > > experience. I believe Shotter's conVERSEational "realities* as
>> > > collaborations per se may contribute to our interhuman understandings
>> as
>> > a
>> > > way to turn away from master/slave and customer/provider activity
>> > settings.
>> > > Larry
>> > > Larry
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > > Thanks Andy
>> > > On Wed, Aug 14, 2013 at 7:14 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
>> wrote:
>> > >
>> > > > Two things Greg.
>> > > >
>> > > > Firstly, most definitely the caddy and the player are involved in
>> the
>> > > same
>> > > > project or activity. Self-evidently. Each are also involved in other
>> > > > activities, and reflecting on these other activities may shed light
>> on
>> > > how
>> > > > they come to be collaborating in the shared project of the player's
>> > game.
>> > > > Like master and servant, people always collaborate in a particular
>> > mode.
>> > > > The archetypes of these modes of collaboration are master-servant,
>> > > > customer-provider and collaboration per se. It is important to
>> > recognise
>> > > > these different modes of collaboration because otherwise we tend to
>> > force
>> > > > *all* collaboration into the same mode, which may cause us to
>> > misconstrue
>> > > > some relations. The fact that different participants have different
>> > > social
>> > > > positions within a project means that they each are bound by
>> different
>> > > > sides of the same norms. That is, the norms of meaning, belief and
>> > action
>> > > > prevailing in the project mandate different meanings, beliefs and
>> > actions
>> > > > for different participants. The tensions arising from these
>> > asymmetrical
>> > > > relationships is one of the motors of change.
>> > > >
>> > > > Secondly, no, projects do not exist *between* persons, persons exist
>> > > > *between* projects. This is just another effort by you, Greg, to
>> make
>> > the
>> > > > unit of analysis the individual person. The relevants units of
>> analysis
>> > > of
>> > > > Activity Theory are operation, action and activity. :)
>> > > >
>> > > > Andy
>> > > >
>> > > > Greg Thompson wrote:
>> > > >
>> > > >> ...
>> > > >>
>> > > >>
>> > > >> "Motive" seems a slippery concept to rest too much on. Andy I'm
>> > > wondering
>> > > >> how you answer the question you put to Roland, namely whether or
>> not
>> > > master
>> > > >> and slave are participating in the same activity/project? Or, what
>> > > about a
>> > > >> golfer and caddy? And so on down to, as Phillip and Carol point
>> out -
>> > > the
>> > > >> different participants in a discussion on XMCA.
>> > > >>
>> > > >> ...
>> > > >>
>> > > >>
>> > > >> Goffman's answer is interesting in that he doesn't rely on the
>> motives
>> > > >> (motivational relevancies) of the participants, but rather creates
>> a
>> > > notion
>> > > >> of the local context as a "frame" that exists somewhere between
>> > > >> participants. No one person can dictate the frame (even dictators
>> have
>> > > to
>> > > >> deal with the possibility of duplicitousness - the word with a
>> > > side-wards
>> > > >> glance - hence irony is a powerful weapon of the weak - even if
>> James
>> > > Scott
>> > > >> didn't recognize this, Bakhtin clearly did). Frames emerge as
>> > > participants
>> > > >> take parts in the unfolding play of some event or happening, and,
>> to a
>> > > >> certain extent, without regard to alignment of the motives of the
>> > > >> participants. Every once in a while the motives of all participants
>> > > create
>> > > >> a frame may be relatively closely aligned, but it seems much more
>> > common
>> > > >> that frames are built out of a plethora of motives.
>> > > >>
>> > > >>
>> > > >
>> > > >
>> > >
>> >
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
>> Visiting Assistant Professor
>> Department of Anthropology
>> 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
>> Brigham Young University
>> Provo, UT 84602
>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
>>
>
>