[Xmca-l] Re: meaning and sense

[Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>]

Sungwoo,
Thanks for participating in this online chat. I am aware of this approach
that says metaphors are central to our ways of thinking. I will read the
article you sent. My curiosity is in the question of words *carrying*
thought [which would imply thought comes first and is then put into the
chosen word that *represents* the thought [as primary], or if the word IS
thought. If metaphor is thought [not a way to bring our thoughts out into
the shared world] then metaphors of thought AS *PICTURES* [frames] in
contrast to metaphors of thought AS *VOICE*  actually means we are
participating in different KINDS of thinking [conversations externally or
internally]
Sungwoo, I am in over my head but am curious about your question. This site
is the place to be if you want to go deeper into this question.
Vygotsky's exploration of the distinction between meaning and sense leads
right into the heart of your question.
I will read your article attached as I am fascinated with the place of
metaphor in our modes of thinking.
I do believe the notion that the concept *metaphor* is itself a metaphor
DERIVED from the practice of *metapherein* [the verb *to transfer*] which
originally described a CONCRETE activity
This insight may be relevant.
The book "Rhetoric as Philosophy" by Ernesto Grassi [1980] which explores
Vico and his response to the *new science* may be a lead to follow. Shotter
in his book refer's to Grassi's understanding of metaphor.
 Others on this site have explored the relation of metaphor and thinking.
Larry


On Fri, Aug 23, 2013 at 11:44 AM, Sungwoo Kim <sungwookim92@gmail.com>wrote:

> Dear Larry Purss
>
> This is my first time to use this mailing list. I hope this message will
> reach you somehow.
>
> I cannot directly address your questions due to my limited knowledge in
> phenomenology, but recent work in cognitive linguistics, especially in the
> field of conceptual metaphor theory can shed some light on them.
>
> The traditional view on metaphor has regarded it as an ornamental device in
> rhetorical process. Thus it does not have direct impact upon our thinking
> process.However, a large body of work in cognitive linguistics since Lakoff
> and Johnson's seminal work *Metaphors We Live By *(1980) is showing that
> metaphor is not merely rhetorical device, but a set of thinking patterns,
> some of which are universal and some culture-specific. This means that
> using new metaphors can shape and direct our thinking processes. To put it
> another way, new metaphors can lead to new ways of thinking. For
> example, Thibodeau and Boroditsky show that different kinds of metaphor can
> have substantial impact on our reasoning. Here's part of the abstract.
>
> "The way we talk about complex and abstract ideas is suffused with
> metaphor. In five experiments, we explore how these metaphors influence the
> way that we reason about complex issues and forage for further information
> about them. We find that even the subtlest instantiation of a metaphor (via
> a single word) can have a powerful influence over how people attempt to
> solve social problems like crime and how they gather information to make
> 'well-informed decisions."
>
> http://www-psych.stanford.edu/~lera/papers/crime-metaphors.pdf
>
> This principle of "metaphor-as-tihnking-pattern" has been adopted by many
> practitioners as well as researchers. Now it is applied in many fields
> including counseling, consulting, web and application design, political
> strategy planning, marketing, and so on. (Of course there are some cautious
> voices about the power of metaphor, too. e.g.
> http://www.economist.com/blogs/johnson/2013/01/political-language)
>
> Sungwoo
>
>
> On Thu, Aug 22, 2013 at 11:12 PM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> > Andy,
> >
> > Thanks for keepin
> > Thanks for keeping this topic of sense and meaning alive.
> > Mike also is drawing our attention to the mystery of the creative process
> > with this comment: "I agree, very clearly statements of the sense/meaning
> > relation, along with the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I
> wanted
> > to say, and thought, unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows."
> > Thought, unembodied, returns to the hall of shadows.
> > I have been reflecting on the phenomenological method or *bias* to
> > prioritize *showing* as an action which brings thoughts from the shadows.
> > The concept or term "metaphor" which can itself be considered a metaphor.
> > Metaphor is derived from the verb *metapherein" which means "to transfer"
> > which originally described a CONCRETE reality [Ernesto Grassi].
> > Therefore *presenting* a new metaphor IS an argument or a reason [a
> showing
> > in phenomenological discourse]
> > The question is if presenting [as a showing or gesture] a metaphor is
> > presenting a *vehicle* or an "egg" which "carries" thoughts from speaker
> to
> > hearer [which suggests the word is then decoded and RE-presented in the
> > listener's "mind"
> > Or, on the other hand, is presenting a metaphor actually metapherein [a
> > verb] which "transfers" [shifts, turns] knowing in a phenomenological
> "aha"
> > moment? Metaphor AS showing or presenting [FORMING sense], not metaphor
> as
> > a *carrier* of thought which *represents* the sense of the speaker.
> > I am "over my head" in these realms and my "logic" may be faulty, but the
> > power of metaphor as "hinge" or "pivot" seems central.
> > Peter Jones made a comment on literacy and "representation"
> > Ernesto Grassi is making the point that presenting [showing] a new
> metaphor
> > IS an argument producing a type of knowledge [sense]
> > Can metapherein be *seen* [picture language] as new and novel ways of
> > acting as transfering *sense* to *pictures* as a *psychological
> instrument*
> > and thus as a cultural resource? The ACT of 'transfer' as presentation
> > within metaphor [something AS something else] understood as a
> psychological
> > and cultural tool, a PRACTICAL intersubjective resource with which [and
> > THROUGH which we think, act, and perceive.
> > Sense AS perception & action mediated through felt experience which is
> > "presented" [shown] through *turning* objects to present other sides and
> > therefore to perceive other aspects. Polysemy through metepherein as one
> > *way* of knowing as argumentation.
> > This is questioning the relation between *forming* as
> presentation/showing
> > &
> > *formed* as representation of what was previously presented.
> > Merleau-Ponty's dynamic between sedimentation/spontaneityg this topic of
> > sense and meaning alive.
> >
> > Mike also is drawing our attention to the mystery of the creative process
> > with this comment: "I agree, very clearly statements of the sense/meaning
> > relation, along with the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I
> wanted
> > to say, and thought, unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows."
> >
> > Thought, unembodied, returns to the hall of shadows.
> > I have been reflecting on the phenomenological method or *bias* to
> > prioritize *showing* as an action which brings thoughts from the shadows.
> >
> > The concept or term "metaphor" which can itself be considered a metaphor.
> > Metaphor is derived from the verb *metapherein" which means "to transfer"
> > which originally described a CONCRETE reality [Ernesto Grassi].
> > Therefore *presenting* a new metaphor IS an argument or a reason [a
> showing
> > in phenomenological discourse]
> > The question is if presenting [as a showing or gesture] a metaphor is
> > presenting a *vehicle* or an "egg" which "carries" thoughts from speaker
> to
> > hearer [which suggests the word is then decoded and RE-presented in the
> > listener's "mind"
> > Or, on the other hand, is presenting a metaphor actually metapherein [a
> > verb] which "transfers" [shifts, turns] knowing in a phenomenological
> "aha"
> > moment? Metaphor AS showing or presenting [FORMING sense], not metaphor
> as
> > a *carrier* of thought which *represents* the sense of the speaker.
> > I am "over my head" in these realms and my "logic" may be faulty, but the
> > power of metaphor as "hinge" or "pivot" seems central.
> > Peter Jones made a comment on literacy and "representation"
> > Ernesto Grassi is making the point that presenting [showing] a new
> metaphor
> > IS an argument producing a type of knowledge [sense]
> > Can metapherein be *seen* [picture language] as new and novel ways of
> > acting as transfering *sense* by showing and creating metaphors
> > as *pictures* as a *psychological instrument* and thus as a cultural
> > resource? The ACT of 'transfer' as presentation within metaphor
> [something
> > AS something else] understood as a psychological and cultural tool, a
> > PRACTICAL intersubjective resource with which [and THROUGH which] we
> think,
> > act, and perceive.
> > Greg, I wonder if this showing is always volitional [under our control]
> or
> > if we spontaneously "respond" intersubjectively?
> >
> >  Sense AS perception & action mediated through felt experience which is
> > "presented" [shown] through *turning* objects to present other sides and
> > therefore to perceive other aspects. Polysemy through metepherein as one
> > *way* of knowing as argumentation. Intersubjective not subjective.
> > This is questioning the relation between
> >  *forming* as presentation/showing
> > &
> >  *formed* as representation of what was previously presented.
> >
> > Merleau-Ponty's dynamic between sedimentation/spontaneity as expressive
> > cognition.
> >
> > I hope I am making sense in my drawing attention to the relation between
> > thoughts and shadows.
> > Huw, asked if there is a question here? I would say the question is the
> > models of "sense" as presentations [showings] and representations.
> > Merleau-Ponty understood words AS GESTURES.
> > Is there any "truth" to this notion?
> > Larry
> >
> >
> > On Wed, Aug 21, 2013 at 11:24 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
> wrote:
> >
> > > I was just looking into this business about Vygotsky imputing excessive
> > > stablility to word meaning. The following key passage from Chapter 7 of
> > > "Thinking and Speech" does not, it appers to me, to imply such
> stability:
> > >
> > >    "First, in inner speech, we find a predominance of the word’s sense
> > >    over its meaning. Paulhan significantly advanced the psychological
> > >    analysis of speech by introducing the distinction between a word’s
> > >    sense and meaning. A word’s sense is the aggregate of all the
> > >    psychological facts that arise in our consciousness as a result of
> > >    the word. Sense is a dynamic, fluid, and complex formation which has
> > >    several zones that vary in their stability. Meaning is only one of
> > >    these zones of the sense that the word acquires in the context of
> > >    speech. It is the most stable, unified, and precise of these zones.
> > >    In different contexts, a word’s sense changes. In contrast, meaning
> > >    is a comparatively fixed and stable point, one that remains constant
> > >    with all the changes of the word’s sense that are associated with
> > >    its use in various contexts. Change in the word’s sense is a basic
> > >    factor in the semantic analysis of speech. The actual meaning of the
> > >    word is inconstant. In one operation, the word emerges with one
> > >    meaning; in another, another is acquired. The dynamic nature of
> > >    meaning leads us to Paulhan’s problem, to the problem of the
> > >    relationship between meaning and sense. Isolated in the lexicon, the
> > >    word has only one meaning. However, this meaning is nothing more
> > >    than a potential that can only be realized in living speech, and in
> > >    living speech meaning is only a cornerstone in the edifice of
> sense."
> > >
> > > As I read this, the stability of meaning is merely relative to that of
> > > sense, i.e., in the context of speech, rather than "teh aggregate of
> all
> > > psychological facts." He is not at all denying the fact of polysemy or
> > the
> > > cultural and historical migration of meaning.
> > >
> > > Andy
> > > mike cole wrote:
> > >
> > >> I agree, very clearly statements of the sense/meaning relation, along
> > with
> > >> the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I wanted to say, and
> > thought,
> > >> unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows."
> > >>
> > >> In the quote here, I think LSV is somewhat overstating the stability
> of
> > >> meaning across contexts; yes relative to the microgenetic processes of
> > >> sense making capturable with
> > >> modern technologies, but not totally "context independent." Even
> > >> dictionary
> > >> meanings change, as LSV was well aware from his interest in the
> history
> > of
> > >> words in relation to their appearance in children's vocabularies in
> > >> ontogeny.
> > >>
> > >> Keeping the simultaneous relevance of several time scales in mind in
> > these
> > >> discussions seems really important, as hard as it is to do.
> > >> mike
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >
> > >
> > >
> >
>
>
>
> --
>
> Peace,
> Sungwoo Kim
> Learner, Teacher, Researcher, Blogger
> Photos: *https://there.jux.com/*
> Personal: http://www.sungwookim.com
>