Andy, I think whether or not signs have a material substrate is irrelevant to Peirce, as to Pragmatists in general. Why argue about when you can never really know one way or the other anyway. The only thing we actually engage with in human action are the signs. Sort of a Willie Sutton type thing - "Why do you rob banks - because that's where the money is" "Why do you concentrate on signs and not argue about where they come from - because that's where human action is." This use to drive realists like Russell nuts (and actually still does if you raise the point to any realists or positivists). Michael ________________________________ From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden Sent: Fri 9/25/2009 11:49 AM Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [POSSIBLE SPAM] Re: [xmca] Consciousness: Ilyenkov You are pointing to the form/matter distinction, is that right, Tony? I suspect that there may be a trap in this. Not sure. But the form/matter distinction is a different one from the consciousness/matter distinction. http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sl/slessenc.htm#SL129 The idea is that we can describe something as a distinct form of matter because although made of the same stuff, it is put together differently. OR, we can say the two things are made of different stuff. EG the different types of Carbon are all made of carbon atoms, likewise ice and water; but oxygen cannot be turned into carbon. I think this is a slightly different question. Cs rests on certain forms and not a distinct matter, but it is not itself a form of matter. CS Peirce has that all signs have to have a material substrate, doesn't he, whatever the form. Andy Tony Whitson wrote: > On Fri, 25 Sep 2009, Martin Packer wrote: >> >> <We agree with Spinoza, who considered thinking to be a capability of >> certain kinds of material bodies. Bodies with this capacity can adjust >> their activities with respect to other material bodies. This is to say >> that one of the attributes of substance (matter) is thinking.> > > I think it would help a lot to recognize the formal determinations of > things (substances?) as well as their material determinations. > > What is reproduced in the mirror is not the matter, but the form. > Thought is the activity of sign-relations in*formed by physical and > semiosic relations within and among the objects of thinking. > -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/ Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov, Ilyenkov $20 ea _______________________________________________ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
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