Re: [xmca] Consciousness: Ilyenkov

[Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu>]

On Sep 25, 2009, at 10:45 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:

> He means that if you deny the categorical difference between your  
> consciousness and the world outside your consciousness, then you are  
> an idealist. The fact that you do so by saying your thoughts are  
> matter rather than by saying that the sun and the moon are thoughts,  
> makes no difference.
> Andy
Andy,

I've copied below more paragraph from Ilyenkov's text (thanks for the  
link) with my gloss interposed (in the style of Steve). You'll see  
that, on my reading, Ilyenkov agrees with Spinoza that thinking is one  
of the attributes of substance (matter).
Martin
============

Lenin's position isn't formulated here very precisely. It doesn't  
consist in the simple acknowledgment of 'the existence of an external  
world and its cognoscibility in our sensations', but in something  
else: for materialism, matter – the objective reality given to us in  
sensation, is the basis of the theory of knowledge (epistemology), at  
the same time as for idealism of any type, the basis of epistemology  
is consciousness, under one or another of its pseudonyms (be it the  
'psychical', 'conscious' or 'unconscious', be it the 'system of forms  
of collectively-organised experience' or 'objective spirit', the  
individual or collective psyche, individual or social consciousness).
<Lenin shouldn't be interpreted as saying merely that matter exists  
and we can perceive and know it. His position was that matter is the  
*basis* for knowledge. For idealism, the basis of knowledge is taken  
to be Cs, but this is an error>
The question about the relationship of matter to consciousness is  
complicated by the fact that social consciousness ('collectively- 
organised', 'harmonised' experience, cleansed of contradiction) from  
the very beginning precedes individual consciousness as something  
already given, and existing before, outside, and independent of  
individual consciousness. just as matter does. And even more than  
that. This social consciousness – of course, in its individualised  
form, in the form of the consciousness of one's closest teachers, and  
after that, of the entire circle of people who appear in the field of  
vision of a person, forms his consciousness to a much greater degree  
than the 'material world'.
<Social Cs comes before and forms individual Cs, much more than  
experience of the material world does.>
But social consciousness (Bogdanov and Lunacharsky take precisely this  
as the 'immediately given', as a premise not subject to further  
analysis and as the foundation of their theory of knowledge),  
according to Marx, is not 'primary', but secondary, derived from  
social being, i.e. the system of material and economic relations  
between people.
<But this social Cs is not basic; it itself is based on something more  
fundamental: social *being*, the system of material and economic  
relations among people.>
It is also not true that the world is cognised in our sensations. In  
sensations the external world is only given to us, just as it is given  
to a dog. It is cognised not in sensations, but in the activity of  
thought, the science of which is after all, according to Lenin, the  
theory of knowledge of contemporary materialism.
<We are *given* the world in sensation. But it is in thought that the  
world is *cognised.* If we want to understand the basis for human  
knowledge,  we will need to consider the character of thought.>
... Spinoza. He understands thinking to be an inherent capability,  
characteristic not of all bodies, but only of thinking material  
bodies. With the help of this capability, a body can construct its  
activities in the spatially determined world, in conformity with the  
'form and disposition' of all other bodies external to it, both  
'thinking' and 'non-thinking'. Spinoza therefore includes thinking  
among the categories of the attributes of substance, such as  
extension. In this form it is, according to Spinoza, characteristic  
also of animals. For him even an animal possesses a soul, and this  
view distinguishes Spinoza from Descartes, who considered that an  
animal is simply an 'automaton', a very complex 'machine'.
<We agree with Spinoza, who considered thinking to be a capability of  
certain kinds of material bodies. Bodies with this capacity can adjust  
their activities with respect to other material bodies. This is to say  
that one of the attributes of substance (matter) is thinking.>
Thought arises within and during the process of material action as one  
of its features, one of its aspects, and only later is divided into a  
special activity (isolated in space and time), finding 'sign' form  
only in man.
<Thought arises in material activity, even in animals. In humans it  
takes a more advanced form, in which activity is adjusted to signs.>
[...] If one proceeds from individual experience, making it the point  
of departure and basis of the theory of knowledge, then idealism is  
inevitable. But it is also inevitable if one relies on 'collective  
experience', if the latter is interpreted as something independent of  
being, as something existing independently, as something primary.
<It is a mistake to try to understand human knowledge in terms of  
individual consciousness or experience. But it is also a mistake to  
try to understand knowledge in terms of *social* consciousness. As we  
have said, social *being* - collective practical activity is primary.   
Nonetheless, we can learn a lot from Hegel...:>
[...]The collective psyche of mankind (spirit), which has already been  
developing for thousands of years, is actually primary in relation to  
every separate 'psychic molecule', to every individual consciousness  
(soul). An individual soul is born and dies (in contrast to Kant,  
Hegel caustically and ironically ridiculed the idea of the immortality  
of the soul), but the aggregate – 'total' – spirit of mankind lives  
and has been developing for thousands of years already, giving birth  
to ever newer and newer separate souls and once again swallowing them  
up, thereby preserving them in the make-up of spiritual culture, in  
the make-up of the spirit. In the make-up of today's living spirit  
live the souls of Socrates, Newton, Mozart and Raphael – herein lies  
the meaning and essence of Hegel's – dialectical – interpretation of  
the immortality of the spirit, notwithstanding the mortality of the  
soul. One comes into being through the other. Through its opposite.
<Hegel recognized how an individual's Cs is based on the collective.  
Individuals come and go, but humankind as a whole has been developing  
for many thousands of years and in this sense is immortal. The  
individual soul is mortal, but the human spirit endures, and gives  
rise to one individual after another. At the same time, it is  
individuals who make up the collective psyche.>
With all that, Hegel always remains inside the sphere of the spirit,  
within the bounds of the relationship of the soul to the spirit. All  
that lies outside this sphere and exists completely separate from it  
the material world in general – interests him just as little as it  
interests Mach or any other idealist. But his idealism is much more  
intelligent, much broader, and for that reason much more dialectical,  
than the petty, vulgar and narrow idealism of Mach.
<But Hegel remained thoroughly idealist, and phased all this in the  
idealist terminology of 'soul,' 'spirit,' etc. He tried to explain the  
character and development of consciousness without reference to the  
material world.>_______________________________________________
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