The issue is not at all to draw a line between science and
philosophy. I stand by my original suggestion to Mike that
"consciousness" should not be tied by definition to one of its
particular grades, but had to be seen as a whole process. But a
process of what? What process? So in fact to do good psychology you
have to be clear about what it is that you are thinking about. You
can call that philosophy if you like, or just doing good science.
This means recognizing that you cannot stand outside of the world
and look at matter and consciousness, any more than you can study
thought under a microscope. You have to proceed from what you have:
a thinking body.
I say that your position is taking a God's eye view, and you can
call it the standpoint of many years of experience if you like, it
doesn't make any difference. But the claim to *know* that matter
existed prior to consciousness *in time* has nothing to do with the
necessity of deriving a concept of matter from a concept of
consciousness *at the categorical level*. What is given to you is
consciousness. If you know something, that means that it exists in
your consciousness. To know is to be conscious of. So we cannot
frame a concept of matter other than derivative from consciousness.
This does not prevent us from then discovering that matter existed
prior to consciousness and is reflected in consciousness. And it
does absolutely nothing to prevent use from discovering exactly the
material foundation for consciousness, and from moving on to the
category of activity.
We had to have Descartes before we could have Kant, or Hegel or
Marx. (BTW, "substantia" Latin for "substance" does not at all mean
what it is commonly taken to mean, and Descartes' claim that thought
was a substance does not at all mean that it is some kind of stuff
just like matter).
What do you think?
Andy
Martin Packer wrote:
Hi Andy,
I've been trying to understand Lenin better by reading Althusser's
commentary (perhaps not the smartest strategy!), and like you
Althusser says that Lenin was drawing a distinction between
philosophical categories and scientific concepts. The concepts
scientists form about matter will change - and as you said, at the
time that Lenin wrote MEC that was indeed the case, I assume with
the discovery of electromagnetic radiation. The philosophical
categories, such as matter and Cs, will not change.
So this is Lenin's position, apparently. To me it seems to draw a
strange line between science and philosophy, and treat the latter
as though it were timeless. This might please Hegel, who considered
philosophical thinking to have reached its zenith, after which it
would no longer change. It might please Kant, who considered all
reason, including that of the philosopher, to be universal and
timeless. It seems to me (no philosopher!) simply false.
Philosophical categories can and do change, in part influenced by
science.
I don't think of myself as arguing from a God's eye viewpoint. I
think of myself as arguing on the basis of years of research by
many scientists, research which has established beyond doubt (mine,
at least) a general description of the formation of stars, planets,
early forms of life, and the evolution of hominids. In this
evidence-based description the material world existed prior to Cs.
As a solitary individual I can be sure of very little. As a
participant in a scientific community I can be sure of this, at
least. Of course the concept of matter has changed greatly and will
continue to do so. Matter in the C19 sense *did* cease to exist in
the early C20. Indeed, we *need* a concept of matter that is rich
enough to allow Cs as a possible material phenomenon.
My original point was simply that although Lenin's statement may
have served a helpful function at the time it was made, considered
performatively I don't think it is a very useful starting point
today. And one plug for Foucault (just to give you a sleepless
night!): he (and Bourdieu and others) have increased my recognition
that embodied Cs is important, and neglected. The kind of Cs that I
am depending on when I ride a bicycle is often ignored by cognitive
science yet it is essential to our daily lives, and it is surely a
material kind of Cs.
Martin
On Sep 21, 2009, at 11:33 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
Apologies for my time zone, Martin, aggravated by lots of
domestics this morning. Usually those in Europe and America are
blissfully unaware of the roundness of the world, so believe me, I
appreciate your frustration.
You know, I would never quote Engels or Lenin unless I had to. As
it happens Lenin is completely right on this point, even if he did
boringly spin it out to sledgehammer weight. It was not without
reason that Ilyenkov devoted a whole book to defending MEC in the
1970s, and had great difficulty getting it published inside or
outside of the USSR.
It is most important to recognize that what Lenin is talking about
is consciousness as a *philosophical category*. Note that *matter*
is simultaneously defined in the same way, and whatismore matter
is defined as a category *derivative* of "consciousness"! How
about that for philosophical materialism! Consciousness is what we
are given immediately, and the idea of "matter" is derived from
that, i.e., the conviction that something else exists. So we can't
turn to Hegel for an answer to this question, because for Hegel
*it is all thought*! "Being," for example, the starting point of
the Encyclopedia, is a category of thought. Again, Hegel derives
matter as a subcategory of Spirit, but only through the Matter/
Form dialectic, not the Matter/Thought dichotomy.
Nonetheless, it is absolutely ruled out that you can derive a
"science of matter" or a "science of consciousness" (i.e. natural
science or psychology) from these philosophical categories. Hegel
on the other hand, tried to derive natural science from the
concept of space, and he was wrong in that. Likewise in 1908, a
lot of scientists and Bolsheviks were concluding that "natural
science had proved that matter does not exist," and a whole lot of
other rubbish which was causing havoc inside the Bolshevik Party
suffering at the time from a period or repression and reaction.
If you want a deconstructionist response to the question, then ask
M. Derrida or M. Foucault exactly what exists "beyond the
text" ... if anything.
Random points.
Lenin had not read Hegel or Kant in 1908, but he had been trained
by Plekhanov who had read everything. Plekhanov was his teacher in
philosophy. (BTW, Plekhanov was also one of LSV's teachers in
philosophy I suspect)
You say that LSV's claim that "consciousness is material"
contradicts the claim that matter as a philosophical category is
"that which exists independently of consciousness." The only way
that I can interpret your meaning here is that you insist on
interpreting the conceptual claim in "substantialist" terms. If
you want to insist on concepts as names for things, then obviously
clarity can never be achieved here. See Davydov.
If I make a distinction been marble and statue, does that really
prevent me from claiming that Michelangelo's David is marble? or a
million such examples. A categorical distinction does not divide
the universe into two groups of stuff or things.
You are now claiming that Cs is material. OK, so my thought of the
dollar in my pocket has no categorical difference from the dollar
that may actually be in my pocket? Consult your Kant. Lenin was
perfectly aware of the symmetry between his claim and Kant's and
says that the difference, however, is that the thing-in-itself is
continuously passing into appearance, rather than there being an
impenetrable barrier between appearance and thing-in-itself (not
the categories of course, but the content). Arguing here exactly
along Hegelian lines, though it is certainly possible to argue
with Lenin's philosophy on this as well as other points in the book.
You say: "to write that material reality is what exists
independently of Cs is really misleading." (NB, not "material
reality, but matter - not the same at all) And OF COURSE we add
that "Cs does not exist independent of material reality." This is
Lenin, the philosophical materialist remember. But you kow, you
can't argue this from God's eye view, looking down on human life
from the heavens. Descartes had a point: how does he (Descartes)
know that the material world exists? Only by means of
consciousness. Now, you can start from a truth and argue your way
into falsehood, but if you start from a falsehood - that you know
(??) that the material world exists even without consciousness -
then you cannot argue your way to truth.
Enough.
It is a difficult question, and one known to often lead to
acrimony!!
Andy
--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov,
Ilyenkov $20 ea
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Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov,
Ilyenkov $20 ea
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