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Re: [xmca] Consciousness



Andy,

I agree with most of what you have said; I just don't see how it follows from what Lenin wrote. In this message you write "we cannot frame a concept of matter other than derivative from consciousness." I completely agree. Earlier you wrote "matter is what exists outside and independently of consciousness." I suppose that's one concept of matter that can be framed. I just don't think that it helps us understand either matter, or consciousness.
Let me try an analogy. I suppose it would be possible to draw a  
categorical distinction between living and non-living matter. I don't  
know either the history of science or the history of philosophy well  
enough to name examples of the top of my head, but I would be willing  
to bet it's been done. One might even try to define the two: "non- 
living matter is what exists outside and independently of the life  
process," because it lacks a soul, or the life-spirit, or something.
But such a definition would hinder more than it would help, because we  
now know (from scientific investigation rather than philosophy) that  
living matter emerged from non-living matter. We may not yet be clear  
on the details of the transformation (on the surface of asteroids? in  
shallow pools? in deep-sea vents?) and we may have a tough time  
defining the transformation (is something alive when it shows growth,  
or response to stimuli, or metabolism, or reproduction, or all of the  
above?), but it's clear it occurs.
It follows, then, that non-living matter, inanimate matter, has the  
*potential* to give rise to, to transform into, life, animate matter.  
You say "if everything (even Cs) is matter, then matter is nothing."  
Would you also say "if everything (even life) is matter, then matter  
is nothing"? I don't see why. Life is a particular arrangement of  
matter, but that doesn't make matter nothing, it makes us see matter  
in a new light.
In the same way, to say that Cs is material is to invite us, or demand  
of us, that we view matter (and Cs) in a new light. LVS devoted pages  
and pages of Crisis to debunking the idea that Cs is ideal, something  
separate from matter that requires a special type of investigation,  
separate from science. Perhaps one day it will seem a truism to say  
that Cs is material, but that certainly isn't the case today.
I suspect that, as usual, we are more in agreement than disagreement,  
and are to some extent arguing past one another. Perhaps it's our  
different circadian rhythms!
Martin

On Sep 22, 2009, at 10:08 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:

The issue is not at all to draw a line between science and philosophy. I stand by my original suggestion to Mike that "consciousness" should not be tied by definition to one of its particular grades, but had to be seen as a whole process. But a process of what? What process? So in fact to do good psychology you have to be clear about what it is that you are thinking about. You can call that philosophy if you like, or just doing good science.
This means recognizing that you cannot stand outside of the world  
and look at matter and consciousness, any more than you can study  
thought under a microscope. You have to proceed from what you have:  
a thinking body.
I say that your position is taking a God's eye view, and you can  
call it the standpoint of many years of experience if you like, it  
doesn't make any difference. But the claim to *know* that matter  
existed prior to consciousness *in time* has nothing to do with the  
necessity of deriving a concept of matter from a concept of  
consciousness *at the categorical level*. What is given to you is  
consciousness. If you know something, that means that it exists in  
your consciousness. To know is to be conscious of. So we cannot  
frame a concept of matter other than derivative from consciousness.
This does not prevent us from then discovering that matter existed  
prior to consciousness and is reflected in consciousness. And it  
does absolutely nothing to prevent use from discovering exactly the  
material foundation for consciousness, and from moving on to the  
category of activity.
We had to have Descartes before we could have Kant, or Hegel or  
Marx. (BTW, "substantia" Latin for "substance" does not at all mean  
what it is commonly taken to mean, and Descartes' claim that thought  
was a substance does not at all mean that it is some kind of stuff  
just like matter).
What do you think?
Andy

Martin Packer wrote:
Hi Andy,
I've been trying to understand Lenin better by reading Althusser's commentary (perhaps not the smartest strategy!), and like you Althusser says that Lenin was drawing a distinction between philosophical categories and scientific concepts. The concepts scientists form about matter will change - and as you said, at the time that Lenin wrote MEC that was indeed the case, I assume with the discovery of electromagnetic radiation. The philosophical categories, such as matter and Cs, will not change. So this is Lenin's position, apparently. To me it seems to draw a strange line between science and philosophy, and treat the latter as though it were timeless. This might please Hegel, who considered philosophical thinking to have reached its zenith, after which it would no longer change. It might please Kant, who considered all reason, including that of the philosopher, to be universal and timeless. It seems to me (no philosopher!) simply false. Philosophical categories can and do change, in part influenced by science. I don't think of myself as arguing from a God's eye viewpoint. I think of myself as arguing on the basis of years of research by many scientists, research which has established beyond doubt (mine, at least) a general description of the formation of stars, planets, early forms of life, and the evolution of hominids. In this evidence-based description the material world existed prior to Cs. As a solitary individual I can be sure of very little. As a participant in a scientific community I can be sure of this, at least. Of course the concept of matter has changed greatly and will continue to do so. Matter in the C19 sense *did* cease to exist in the early C20. Indeed, we *need* a concept of matter that is rich enough to allow Cs as a possible material phenomenon. My original point was simply that although Lenin's statement may have served a helpful function at the time it was made, considered performatively I don't think it is a very useful starting point today. And one plug for Foucault (just to give you a sleepless night!): he (and Bourdieu and others) have increased my recognition that embodied Cs is important, and neglected. The kind of Cs that I am depending on when I ride a bicycle is often ignored by cognitive science yet it is essential to our daily lives, and it is surely a material kind of Cs.
Martin
On Sep 21, 2009, at 11:33 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
Apologies for my time zone, Martin, aggravated by lots of domestics this morning. Usually those in Europe and America are blissfully unaware of the roundness of the world, so believe me, I appreciate your frustration.
You know, I would never quote Engels or Lenin unless I had to. As  
it happens Lenin is completely right on this point, even if he did  
boringly spin it out to sledgehammer weight. It was not without  
reason that Ilyenkov devoted a whole book to defending MEC in the  
1970s, and had great difficulty getting it published inside or  
outside of the USSR.
It is most important to recognize that what Lenin is talking about  
is consciousness as a *philosophical category*. Note that *matter*  
is simultaneously defined in the same way, and whatismore matter  
is defined as a category *derivative* of "consciousness"! How  
about that for philosophical materialism! Consciousness is what we  
are given immediately, and the idea of "matter" is derived from  
that, i.e., the conviction that something else exists. So we can't  
turn to Hegel for an answer to this question, because for Hegel  
*it is all thought*! "Being," for example, the starting point of  
the Encyclopedia, is a category of thought. Again, Hegel derives  
matter as a subcategory of Spirit, but only through the Matter/ 
Form dialectic, not the Matter/Thought dichotomy.
Nonetheless, it is absolutely ruled out that you can derive a  
"science of matter" or a "science of consciousness" (i.e. natural  
science or psychology) from these philosophical categories. Hegel  
on the other hand, tried to derive natural science from the  
concept of space, and he was wrong in that. Likewise in 1908, a  
lot of scientists and Bolsheviks were concluding that "natural  
science had proved that matter does not exist," and a whole lot of  
other rubbish which was causing havoc inside the Bolshevik Party  
suffering at the time from a period or repression and reaction.
If you want a deconstructionist response to the question, then ask  
M. Derrida or M. Foucault exactly what exists "beyond the  
text" ... if anything.
Random points.

Lenin had not read Hegel or Kant in 1908, but he had been trained by Plekhanov who had read everything. Plekhanov was his teacher in philosophy. (BTW, Plekhanov was also one of LSV's teachers in philosophy I suspect)
You say that LSV's claim that "consciousness is material"  
contradicts the claim that matter as a philosophical category is  
"that which exists independently of consciousness." The only way  
that I can interpret your meaning here is that you insist on  
interpreting the conceptual claim in "substantialist" terms. If  
you want to insist on concepts as names for things, then obviously  
clarity can never be achieved here. See Davydov.
If I make a distinction been marble and statue, does that really  
prevent me from claiming that Michelangelo's David is marble? or a  
million such examples. A categorical distinction does not divide  
the universe into two groups of stuff or things.
You are now claiming that Cs is material. OK, so my thought of the  
dollar in my pocket has no categorical difference from the dollar  
that may actually be in my pocket? Consult your Kant. Lenin was  
perfectly aware of the symmetry between his claim and Kant's and  
says that the difference, however, is that the thing-in-itself is  
continuously passing into appearance, rather than there being an  
impenetrable barrier between appearance and thing-in-itself (not  
the categories of course, but the content). Arguing here exactly  
along Hegelian lines, though it is certainly possible to argue  
with Lenin's philosophy on this as well as other points in the book.
You say: "to write that material reality is what exists  
independently of Cs is really misleading." (NB, not "material  
reality, but matter - not the same at all) And OF COURSE we add  
that "Cs does not exist independent of material reality." This is  
Lenin, the philosophical materialist remember. But you kow, you  
can't argue this from God's eye view, looking down on human life  
from the heavens. Descartes had a point: how does he (Descartes)  
know that the material world exists? Only by means of  
consciousness. Now, you can start from a truth and argue your way  
into falsehood, but if you start from a falsehood - that you know  
(??) that the material world exists even without consciousness -  
then you cannot argue your way to truth.
Enough.

It is a difficult question, and one known to often lead to acrimony!!
Andy


--
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Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov, Ilyenkov $20 ea
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Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov, Ilyenkov $20 ea
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