Hi,
A quick thought while I am reading the exchanges on consciousness. I
think consciousness is matter (brain cells) which become organized as a
consequence of activity, and once organized (never fully, finally, until
the moment of death) they facilitate (and that,too is an
activity) certain kinds and speeds of activity. My consciousness of the
act of writing is multi-layered, it runs ahead of the text while it also
monitors what is written, these are activities that are facilitated by
the consequences of previous, repeated, experience I now write in
English, my monitoring a text written in Hungarian is slower, I have
less current practice and thus the conscious focus required to write in
my mother tongue is differently organized, it may require a shifting
back and forth between planning and monitoring rather than the
simultaneous activities called forth if the task is in English.
The example is to serve us to think developmentally of matter, of
differently structured matter, rather than dichotomously.
Thanks for the stimulating exchanges,
Vera
----- Original Message ----- From: "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net>
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Sent: Wednesday, September 23, 2009 9:16 AM
Subject: Re: [xmca] Consciousness
THis is indeed a tricky question which inevitably generates seemingly
contradictory positions. Please recall the context. Mike raised the
problem of multiple definitions of "consciousness" among us - we who
share a lot of agreement on these questions. I responded that I didn't
think we *should* tie Cs down to a single, well-defined meaning. Then
realizing that it was unsatisfactory, to leave us in such an
open-ended, undefined position, I thought about it, and realized that
what unified all these multiplicity of legitimate definitions and
concepts of Cs was Cs as a philosophical category.
Descartes introduced us to the philosophical catgory of Cs, but he did
not at all solve the problem of the scientific study of consciouness.
Only Vygotsky solved this, but quite specifically he built on Hegel
and Marx.
If I ask you to accept that the dollar you think is in your pocket and
the dollar which is actually in your pocket (or not) are categorically
different, this is asking you to state the bleeding obvious, and does
not give you a program for the scientific study of consciousness. But
nor can a program for the scientific study of consciousness forget or
turn its back on this categorical difference between Cs and matter.
The big step that Hegel took in fact was to lay to the side the whole
issue of an absolute difference between thought and thing, between
subject and object, and to look instead at the movement of
(subject/object), with the whole idea of objectified thoughts and
internalised artifacts.
So here we have these two (as you say) completely *opposite* proposals
about how to proceed, and I am advocating *both* of them. But we can't
go all the way with Hegel. Hegel basically elided the mind/matter
distinction and this proved to be very productive. But it couldn't be
maintained, could it? Feuerbach called his bluff, and Marx agreed.
On science: I am saying that science is one of a number of possible
ways of apprehending the world (quoting Marx in the Grundrisse). It is
good for certain tasks up to a certain point. And what Kuhn means by
"ontological assumptions" is not necessarily really ontological.
Natural science does assume the existence of a material world, outside
of, independent of, and prior to consciousness. This ontology got a
bump c. 1905, but it was soon restored. But natural science is not the
only way. I don't think psychology can proceed on the same set of
ontological assumptions. If we make "Activity" a fundamental category,
we depart from natural science. And I don't believe we can proceed by
acting as if we can study the psyche on the basis of the same
metaphysical assumptions as natural science. We are part of it; we
cannot objectify the object of study.
Enough,
Andy
Martin Packer wrote:
Andy,
I am familiar with what seems to be your general line of argument. It
runs, indeed, through the philosophers you have highlighted:
Descartes, Kant, and Husserl (whose 'Cartesian mediations' was both a
criticism of Kant for being too mystical and an affirmation of the
continuity of his project with Descartes). But I am surprised that
you would follow this line for, in my reading at least, Marx and
Vygotsky took a different line, prompted in my view by Hegel's
critique of Kant.
But first, it seems to me there is a central contradiction in what
you have written, and I take this to mean that perhaps I'm not
correctly identifying your position, since you seem to affirming and
denying the same point. You write critically of natural science:
"Natural science is based on the assumption that outside of
consciousness there is a natural world, which exists independently of
consciousness and prior to consciousness"
But when you cited Lenin you explained: "Consciousness is what is
given to us; matter is what exists outside and independently of
consciousness."
Perhaps your point is that science is not *critical* of this central
assumption, which was indeed what Kant and Husserl argued? (I think
this is actually an inaccurate claim: Kuhn's work showed us that
scientists constantly question their ontological assumptions, and
also made the important point that these assumptions are embedded in
the shared, social practices of a scientific paradigm, not in the
thoughts of individual scientists.)
Where should I begin with a response to this D-K-H line? Perhaps
here: you write: "The reality is: you open your eyes, you see things,
and *then* you question whether what really exists out there (matter)
corresponds to what you think exists out there (consciousness)."
...for this is precisely the move that Descartes, Kant and Husserl
made. They each engaged in a reflective attitude of doubt,
questioning the correspondence of (inner) thought and (external)
matter, and even the existence of the latter. The problem is that
this epistemological scepticism (Is my knowledge valid?) is *always*
a sign of an underlying ontological dualism (My thoughts are inner;
matter is outer). If one starts there, it does indeed seem that only
a God's eye view would be able to resolve the problem. And with this
dualism it seems that each individual can form only mental
representations of a reality that they can never in fact be sure they
know. Precisely the representational model of human beings that
cognitive science has accepted, at least until recently.
But there is a different line of thinking about human being,
knowledge and consciousness. I first learned of it from studying
Heidegger, but it has been explored by Merleau-Ponty, Garfinkel, and
as I read them, Marx and Vygotsky. It is a line that gives priority
to practical activity rather than reflective thinking. (You can see
why I am puzzled that you would follow the former line, and why, for
example, you would write that post Heisenberg, "not concsciousness
but *activity* had to step in to provide a rational foundation for
even natural science." That seems to imply that for you consciousness
and activity are distinct.)
The central thrust of Heidegger's Being and Time was that the typical
and traditional philosophical move is mistaken and unnatural. People
in their everyday activity do *not* "question what really exists out
there." If I am digging in my garden, see a strange object and have a
question about it, I don't reflect on the adequacy of my thought
categories, I get down on my knees to take a closer look at the
object. I poke it, I pick it up. Heidegger distinguished three modes
of engagement (Tony mentioned them recently). These philosophers
operated in what Heidegger called the present-at-hand mode, in which
practical activity is completely suspended. But the more fundamental
mode is the ready-to-hand, in which we are engaged in practical
activity with artifacts, and there is no separation between subject
and object, mind and matter. For Heidegger, *this* is consciousness.
In this mode, Cs is not separate from matter.
I find it particularly helpful to think in terms of children's
development, because infants have a practical engagement in the world
without the capacity for reflective thought.
There is obviously much more I could and should say to develop the
point I'm trying to make. But if I send this message now it might
reach you before night falls.
cheers
Martin
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Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov, Ilyenkov
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