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Re: [xmca] Consciousness
- To: <ablunden@mira.net>, "eXtended Mind, Culture,Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
- Subject: Re: [xmca] Consciousness
- From: "Vera Steiner" <vygotsky@unm.edu>
- Date: Wed, 23 Sep 2009 17:48:12 -0600
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- Reply-to: Vera Steiner <vygotsky@unm.edu>, "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
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Hi,
A quick thought while I am reading the exchanges on consciousness. I think
consciousness is matter (brain cells) which become organized as a
consequence of activity, and once organized (never fully, finally, until the
moment of death) they facilitate (and that,too is an activity)certain kinds
and speeds of activity. My consciousness of the act of writing is
multi-layered, it runs ahead of the text while it also monitors what is
written, these are activities that are facilitated by the consequences of
previous, repeated, experience I now write in English, my monitoring a
text written in Hungarian is slower, I have less current practice and thus
the conscious focus required to write in my mother tongue is differently
organized, it may require a shifting back and forth between planning and
monitoring rather than the simultaneous activities called forth if the task
is in English.
The example is to serve us to think developmentally of matter,of differently
structured matter, rather than dichotomously.
Thanks for the stimulating exchanges,
Vera
----- Original Message -----
From: "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net>
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Sent: Wednesday, September 23, 2009 9:16 AM
Subject: Re: [xmca] Consciousness
THis is indeed a tricky question which inevitably generates seemingly
contradictory positions. Please recall the context. Mike raised the
problem of multiple definitions of "consciousness" among us - we who share
a lot of agreement on these questions. I responded that I didn't think we
*should* tie Cs down to a single, well-defined meaning. Then realizing
that it was unsatisfactory, to leave us in such an open-ended, undefined
position, I thought about it, and realized that what unified all these
multiplicity of legitimate definitions and concepts of Cs was Cs as a
philosophical category.
Descartes introduced us to the philosophical catgory of Cs, but he did not
at all solve the problem of the scientific study of consciouness. Only
Vygotsky solved this, but quite specifically he built on Hegel and Marx.
If I ask you to accept that the dollar you think is in your pocket and the
dollar which is actually in your pocket (or not) are categorically
different, this is asking you to state the bleeding obvious, and does not
give you a program for the scientific study of consciousness. But nor can
a program for the scientific study of consciousness forget or turn its
back on this categorical difference between Cs and matter.
The big step that Hegel took in fact was to lay to the side the whole
issue of an absolute difference between thought and thing, between subject
and object, and to look instead at the movement of (subject/object), with
the whole idea of objectified thoughts and internalised artifacts.
So here we have these two (as you say) completely *opposite* proposals
about how to proceed, and I am advocating *both* of them. But we can't go
all the way with Hegel. Hegel basically elided the mind/matter distinction
and this proved to be very productive. But it couldn't be maintained,
could it? Feuerbach called his bluff, and Marx agreed.
On science: I am saying that science is one of a number of possible ways
of apprehending the world (quoting Marx in the Grundrisse). It is good for
certain tasks up to a certain point. And what Kuhn means by "ontological
assumptions" is not necessarily really ontological. Natural science does
assume the existence of a material world, outside of, independent of, and
prior to consciousness. This ontology got a bump c. 1905, but it was soon
restored. But natural science is not the only way. I don't think
psychology can proceed on the same set of ontological assumptions. If we
make "Activity" a fundamental category, we depart from natural science.
And I don't believe we can proceed by acting as if we can study the psyche
on the basis of the same metaphysical assumptions as natural science. We
are part of it; we cannot objectify the object of study.
Enough,
Andy
Martin Packer wrote:
Andy,
I am familiar with what seems to be your general line of argument. It
runs, indeed, through the philosophers you have highlighted: Descartes,
Kant, and Husserl (whose 'Cartesian mediations' was both a criticism of
Kant for being too mystical and an affirmation of the continuity of his
project with Descartes). But I am surprised that you would follow this
line for, in my reading at least, Marx and Vygotsky took a different
line, prompted in my view by Hegel's critique of Kant.
But first, it seems to me there is a central contradiction in what you
have written, and I take this to mean that perhaps I'm not correctly
identifying your position, since you seem to affirming and denying the
same point. You write critically of natural science:
"Natural science is based on the assumption that outside of consciousness
there is a natural world, which exists independently of consciousness and
prior to consciousness"
But when you cited Lenin you explained: "Consciousness is what is given
to us; matter is what exists outside and independently of consciousness."
Perhaps your point is that science is not *critical* of this central
assumption, which was indeed what Kant and Husserl argued? (I think this
is actually an inaccurate claim: Kuhn's work showed us that scientists
constantly question their ontological assumptions, and also made the
important point that these assumptions are embedded in the shared,
social practices of a scientific paradigm, not in the thoughts of
individual scientists.)
Where should I begin with a response to this D-K-H line? Perhaps here:
you write: "The reality is: you open your eyes, you see things, and
*then* you question whether what really exists out there (matter)
corresponds to what you think exists out there (consciousness)."
...for this is precisely the move that Descartes, Kant and Husserl made.
They each engaged in a reflective attitude of doubt, questioning the
correspondence of (inner) thought and (external) matter, and even the
existence of the latter. The problem is that this epistemological
scepticism (Is my knowledge valid?) is *always* a sign of an underlying
ontological dualism (My thoughts are inner; matter is outer). If one
starts there, it does indeed seem that only a God's eye view would be
able to resolve the problem. And with this dualism it seems that each
individual can form only mental representations of a reality that they
can never in fact be sure they know. Precisely the representational model
of human beings that cognitive science has accepted, at least until
recently.
But there is a different line of thinking about human being, knowledge
and consciousness. I first learned of it from studying Heidegger, but it
has been explored by Merleau-Ponty, Garfinkel, and as I read them, Marx
and Vygotsky. It is a line that gives priority to practical activity
rather than reflective thinking. (You can see why I am puzzled that you
would follow the former line, and why, for example, you would write that
post Heisenberg, "not concsciousness but *activity* had to step in to
provide a rational foundation for even natural science." That seems to
imply that for you consciousness and activity are distinct.)
The central thrust of Heidegger's Being and Time was that the typical and
traditional philosophical move is mistaken and unnatural. People in their
everyday activity do *not* "question what really exists out there." If I
am digging in my garden, see a strange object and have a question about
it, I don't reflect on the adequacy of my thought categories, I get down
on my knees to take a closer look at the object. I poke it, I pick it up.
Heidegger distinguished three modes of engagement (Tony mentioned them
recently). These philosophers operated in what Heidegger called the
present-at-hand mode, in which practical activity is completely
suspended. But the more fundamental mode is the ready-to-hand, in which
we are engaged in practical activity with artifacts, and there is no
separation between subject and object, mind and matter. For Heidegger,
*this* is consciousness. In this mode, Cs is not separate from matter.
I find it particularly helpful to think in terms of children's
development, because infants have a practical engagement in the world
without the capacity for reflective thought.
There is obviously much more I could and should say to develop the point
I'm trying to make. But if I send this message now it might reach you
before night falls.
cheers
Martin
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Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov, Ilyenkov $20
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