Andy,
Well, the (putative) representational systems studied by cognitive
science, which are taken to be mental functions, properties of thought,
which are not doubted to have a material substrate (the brain) but which
are assumed not to be material themselves but ideal, in Plato's rather
than Ilyenkov's sense. Chomsky's generative grammar is a good example.
Piaget's theory of the mental actions and operations going on 'inside
the head' of child is another.
Martin
On Sep 24, 2009, at 9:09 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
Martin, tell me a representational system which is *not* material.
a
Martin Packer wrote:
humans have evolved to use an ordered series of "representational
systems." The sequence is as follows: the episodic, mimetic, mythic,
and theoretic. I won't go into the details, but crucially important,
I think, is that these systems are material.
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