Oh I don't doubt that the various strands of abstract empiricism and
so on are full of non-material representational systems and non-
material all-sorts-of-things. I think you are just making a point
about your not subscribing to Platonism or some dualist
philosophical system.
But in the meaning *you* give to "material" aren't you making a
tautology by saying that representational systems found in history
are material? Or are there representational system which *you* say
are not material?
Andy
Martin Packer wrote:
Andy,
Well, the (putative) representational systems studied by cognitive
science, which are taken to be mental functions, properties of
thought, which are not doubted to have a material substrate (the
brain) but which are assumed not to be material themselves but
ideal, in Plato's rather than Ilyenkov's sense. Chomsky's
generative grammar is a good example. Piaget's theory of the mental
actions and operations going on 'inside the head' of child is
another.
Martin
On Sep 24, 2009, at 9:09 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
Martin, tell me a representational system which is *not* material.
a
Martin Packer wrote:
humans have evolved to use an ordered series of "representational
systems." The sequence is as follows: the episodic, mimetic,
mythic, and theoretic. I won't go into the details, but crucially
important, I think, is that these systems are material.
_______________________________________________
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov,
Ilyenkov $20 ea
_______________________________________________
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca