Re: [xmca] Consciousness: Ilyenkov

[Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>]

You can buy it, with all Ilyenkov's essays from
http://www.erythrospress.com/ or you can get it a chapter at
a time from
http://marx.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/positive/positi.htm

it continues:

"The difference and opposition of materialism and idealism
is thus very simple, which, on the part of the idealists of
various shades, serves as the basis for reproaches directed
at materialism, such as 'primitivism', 'grade-school
sophistication', 'non-heuristic nature', 'banality', 'being
self-evident', etc. (Such a reproach was directed at Lenin
as soon as his book was published: 'In general, even if one
acknowledges as correct the materialist propositions of Mr
Ilyin about the existence of an external world and its
cognoscibility in our sensations, then these propositions
can nevertheless not be called Marxist, since the most
inveterate representative of the bourgeoisie hasn't the
least doubts about them,' wrote M. Bulgakov in his review of
Materialism and Empirio-Criticism.)"

I stopped before that because it gets rather tedious at this
point. And the point had been made already. What he is
saying is that if you try to choose a middle way between
materialism and idealism, then you find that in fact you are
continuously faced with the same choice at every step. In
other words there is no middle road. The first step you take
along what appears to be middle road immediately faces you
again with a choice to go this way or that way. Ilyenkov is
saying: take the path of materialism.

Andy

Martin Packer wrote:
> Andy,
>
> I don't have this text. It seems to me you stop too soon; Ilyenkov says 
> we have to take one of two paths, not a middle way. He is presumably 
> about to describe the alternatives. What comes next?
>
> Martin
>
> On Sep 24, 2009, at 11:52 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>
> > P. 302 of "The Ideal in Activity," by Ilyenkov:
> >
> > "Here, then, is the question: take your thought, your consciousness of 
> > the world, and the world itself, the complex and intricate world which 
> > only appears to be simple, the world which you see around you, in 
> > which you live, act and carry out your work - whether you write 
> > treatises on philosophy or physics, sculpt statues out of stone, or 
> > produce steel in a blast furnace - what is the relationship between them?
> >
> > "Here there is a parting of the ways, and the difference lies in 
> > whether you choose the right path or the left, for there is no middle 
> > here; the middle path contains within itself the very same 
> > divergences, only they branch out within it in ever more minute and 
> > discrete proportions. In philosophy the 'party of the golden mean' is 
> > the 'party of the brainless', who try to unite materialism with 
> > idealism in an eclectic way, by means of smoothing out the basic 
> > contradictions, and by means of muddling the most general (abstract, 
> > 'cellule') and clear concepts.
> >
> > "These concepts are matter and consciousness (psyche, the ideal, 
> > spirit, soul, will, etc. etc.). 'Consciousness' – let us take this 
> > term as Lenin did - is the most general concept which can only be 
> > defined by clearly contrasting it with the most general concept of 
> > 'matter', moreover as something secondary, produced and derived. 
> > Dialectics consists in not being able to define matter as such; it can 
> > only be defined through its opposite, and only if one of the opposites 
> > is fixed as primary, and the other arises from it."
> >
> >
> >
> > Andy Blunden wrote:
> > > Oh I don't doubt that the various strands of abstract empiricism and 
> > > so on are full of non-material representational systems and 
> > > non-material all-sorts-of-things. I think you are just making a point 
> > > about your not subscribing to Platonism or some dualist philosophical 
> > > system.
> > > But in the meaning *you* give to "material" aren't you making a 
> > > tautology by saying that representational systems found in history 
> > > are material? Or are there representational system which *you* say 
> > > are not material?
> > > Andy
> > > Martin Packer wrote:
> > > > Andy,
> > > >
> > > > Well, the (putative) representational systems studied by cognitive 
> > > > science, which are taken to be mental functions, properties of 
> > > > thought, which are not doubted to have a material substrate (the 
> > > > brain) but which are assumed not to be material themselves but 
> > > > ideal, in Plato's rather than  Ilyenkov's sense. Chomsky's 
> > > > generative grammar is a good example. Piaget's theory of the mental 
> > > > actions and operations going on 'inside the head' of child is another.
> > > >
> > > > Martin
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > On Sep 24, 2009, at 9:09 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > Martin, tell me a representational system which is *not* material.
> > > > >
> > > > > a
> > > > >
> > > > > Martin Packer wrote:
> > > > > > humans have evolved to use an ordered series of "representational 
> > > > > > systems." The sequence is as follows: the episodic, mimetic, 
> > > > > > mythic, and theoretic. I won't go into the details, but crucially 
> > > > > > important, I think, is that these systems are material.
> > > > >
> > > > > _______________________________________________
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> >
> > --
> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
> > Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov, Ilyenkov 
> > $20 ea
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > xmca mailing list
> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca

--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov,
Ilyenkov $20 ea


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