Thanks Andy for clarifications ! But :
I'm at the moment reading from Vygotsky :
"The understanding of 'brother' is deeply rooted in the child's
experience and passes a number of stages before arriving at the
definition made in conceptual form . "
Now , scientifically speaking , which is concrete ? 'brother' or 'the
conceptual form reached' ?
And which has more fuzzy and peripheral boundaries ? Taking into
account the idea that the child , despite all her cognition/knowledge
for her brother quite easily utters : I won't let him marry anyone
cause I want to marry him myself !
Best
Haydi
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*From:* Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
*To:* "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
*Sent:* Monday, 19 November 2012, 12:41:33
*Subject:* Re: Fwd: [xmca] A Failure of Communication
Haydi,
I do think that a concept has to be its own object, and that, by
contrast, the idea of concepts being in the head "picking out" objects
in the external material world leads to untenable contradictions.
But it is nonsense to conflate these two ideas together, so that
concepts are objects inside the head which are identical with objects
existing in the material world. It means having a concept of concept
which is both subjective and objective. If we reify the object as a
material object or relation or process of some kind, then of course
such a material object cannot be identical with something we take to
be a thought-form.
The concepts of action and activity are the key to a concept of
concept, because an action (as opposed to behaviour) is equally
subjective and objective, and as an aggregate of actions, so is an
activity.
Does that make sense?
Andy
Haydi Zulfei wrote:
> Hi Andy
> I remember having read about concepts that they are , scientifically
speaking , so coherent , strong , existentially firm maybe clear-cut
that they could ONTOLOGICALLY be considered 'identical' with or of the
same merit as the OBJECTS THEMSELVES and that , that is why they could
be worked out with as if you can fetch objects themselves in the
outside world . Is it my fantasy working ? Best
> Haydi
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> *From:* Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>
> *To:* "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
<mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>>
> *Sent:* Monday, 19 November 2012, 3:11:21
> *Subject:* Re: Fwd: [xmca] A Failure of Communication
>
> Just to clarify one point, Larry: the point about fuzzy boundaries
getting more fuzzy with increased expertise.
>
> As people get to be more "expert" with a particular concept, they
tend to have a deeper grasp of it as a true concept (rather than a
pseudoconcept), and in addition to this, with experience, what was
initially a true but abstract concept, becomes a mature concept,
sublating numerous processes of realisation the true concept has
undergone in various situations. As a mature concept, multiple paths
of development are sublated into it.
>
> Such a mature, true concept does not have clear boundaries. That is
not a fact of psychology, but is in the nature of concepts themselves.
Boundaries are features of set-theoretic realisations of a concept in
various circumstances. In my example about being on the jury in a
murder case, in every such trial (the judge has gone through many such
experiences) there are different circumstances in which the judgment
has to be realised as a yes/no verdict. This is where the boundaries
are made and every time a judgment is made they get fuzzier. Any
person experienced with use of a concept knows this through
experience. A novice, on the other hand, may naively believe that
murder (for example) is a cut-and-dry question. It isn't.
>
> For real concepts, boundaries are peripheral questions, and
therefore always tricky.
>
> Andy
>
> Larry Purss wrote:
> > Charles, Andy, Mike, and others reflecting on concepts.
> > I am finding this line of conversation generative and so I want to
continue
> > a little further down this path. I want to pull out a fragment
from 5 days
> > ago when Charles watched Andy's video on vimeo and then answered with
> > further reflections on the concept of *ideal paths of development of
> > concepts". I will add a few comments or reflections of my own
interspersed
> > with Charles' fragment . Charles wrote wrote:
> >
> > "However, to understand the social circulation and historical
development
> > of conceptual terms we need to understand a different (though
intersecting)
> > set of processes of lines of social development of concepts. Although
> > Vygotsky opens the door to this world, he was not explicit in
developing
> > the ways in which concepts emerge and gain currency in an evolving
> > socio-communicative world.
> >
> > Some of those social historical mechanisms have to do with the
loosely
> > structured semantic worlds of languages that provide orientations
for our
> > experiences, but other parts have to do with more specific language
> > practices within specific social groupings, both in their core
form and
> > their penumbra of cultural infusion into other domains. And other
parts
> > have to do with the built environment or the intentional
rearrangement of
> > the environment, which also organizes our experience and provide the
> > occasion for naming things. These different communicative and material
> > practices each have their own sets of expectations that make them
more or
> > less "disciplined" in different ways.
> >
> > [LP] This last sentence focuses on *each* and *different* ways of
> > idealizing paths of development. Each path has its own *sets* of
> > expectations, that makes them more or less *disciplined* in DIFFERENT
> > ways. Andy has articulated a position which suggests that as a person
> > becomes more *expert* and *skillful* at using tools and concepts the
> > boundaries actually become more *fuzzy*. In other words by
becoming more
> > *disciplined* by entering a discipline the trajectory is toward
developing
> > awareness of the *fuzzy* boundaries of ideal paths of development. For
> > example, as Charles categorized *socio-communicative action* [as an
> > abstract concept] into 3 distinct ways of understanding THIS
concept, [EACH
> > as a different *type*] the boundaries of each type are moving towards
> > *closure*. The socio-communicative *world* is forming ideal paths of
> > development through disciplines which *constrain* with rules of
> > organization.
> > However, as Andy documents, this ideal path of theory construction
[with
> > its tendency towards *closure*] is ideal and therefore while
focusing on
> > SOME ideal aspects of the socio-communicative *world* other
aspects which
> > INEVITABLY will contradict the move towards closure will create *fuzzy
> > boundaries* For example the boundaries between the ideal types
[each with
> > its own *set* of characteristics] will come into *question*. It with
> > developing expertise and skill, as one navigates this terrain that the
> > boundaries become fuzzier and more ambiguous."
> >
> > [CHARLES] (BTW, I agree that spectrum was the wrong term as the
variation
> > is much greater than on a single dimension--rather each has its
own set of
> > characteristics.)
> > [LP] See above comment
> >
> > Further, the action and communicative worlds are not purely of
either ideal
> > type and our lines of development are not either of those
idealized typical
> > paths. For the purposes of my article, you could say that I worked
from two
> > idealized typical paths of social development--first the open social
> > processes of language development and then the more restricted ones of
> > academic disciplinary discussion. But then I put the first
idealized path
> > aside to focus on the other as the more easily analyzed, and then
focused
> > in an even more idealized way on the emergence and circulation of
highly
> > visible "concept terms." That was a heuristic move.
> >
> > [LP] This reflective analysis of HOW to proceed comes with developing
> > expertise and aquiring a *dis-position* to proceed with THIS type of
> > practice. As CHARLES stated, the "action and communicative worlds
are NOT
> > PURELY of either ideal type". The boundaries are more ambiguous
and *fuzzy*
> >
> > [CHARLES] In any event what I am attempting in this piece to do
is to set
> > out some of the social, historical and communicative mechanisms
for social
> > lines of conceptual development, and then locate the individual
experience
> > within these social, historical, communicative trajectories.
> >
> > [LP] In setting out the social, historical, and communicative
*mechanisms*
> > is the term *mechanism* code for *causal*? I'm in over my head at
this
> > point, but I want to explore further if *causal* or *mechanical*
genres are
> > just that -- genres?? However, the term *mechanisms* does invite this
> > question. The other fascinating concept is *trajectories*. This
implies
> > FROM a previous position towards an anticipated position in the
future. Now
> > is this trajectory causal or is it an interpretive process?? What
is moving
> > this trajectory into the future. Charles, my bias is to say the
movement
> > develops within effective history as this INTER *play* of theory and
> > discourse we are discussing in this thread.
> >
> > [CHARLES] Finally, before I go back to my paid work, the reason I
did not
> > use the word projects for the work of academic disciplines is that
> > disciplines involve institutional histories and structures that
may at any
> > time include people with a variety of objects and projects, though the
> > disciplinary field does align them to some degree.
> >
> > [LP] The word *some* degree once again circles back to *fuzzy*
boundaries
> > within socio-communicative *worlds* implicated within effective
history.
> > In summary, the question of how central to "ideal" lines of
development*
> > within PARTICULAR SITUATIONS is the concept of *genres* or
*literacy* as
> > the process underlying concept formation? The relation BETWEEN *ideal
> > types* and *genres* may not be a *strict* dialectcal process and may
> > actually be an *interpretive* dialectic with *fuzzy boundaries* that
> > involve *fictional" AS IF structures.
> >
> > Charles, thank you once again for allowing me listen in to your
> > conversation with Andy and then think out loud as I try to
interweave the
> > dialogue between you and Andy within my ZPD on this fascinating
theme. My
> > inquiry is circling around the notion of *romantic science* as
impicating
> > *fuzzy* boundaries which become MORE ambiguous as we become more
*expert*
> > in our uses of concepts. EACH particular ideal type moving towards
> > *closure* and the contradictions embedded in the *nature* of this
movement
> > which are then *openned* for further dialogue.
> > Andy uses the term *overflowing* to capture this dance of conceptual
> > development. OVERFLOWING as the NATURE of concepts [and theories and
> > methods] when they are used in the wild.
> >
> > Larry
> >
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--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Andy Blunden*
Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/>
Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts
http://ucsd.academia.edu/AndyBlunden
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