Re: Fwd: [xmca] A Failure of Communication

[Haydi Zulfei <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>]

Hi Andy
I remember having read about concepts that they are , scientifically speaking , so coherent , strong , existentially firm maybe clear-cut that they could ONTOLOGICALLY be considered 'identical' with or of the same merit as the OBJECTS THEMSELVES and that , that is why they could be worked out with as if you can fetch objects themselves in the outside world . Is it my fantasy working ?  
Best
Haydi


________________________________
 From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> 
Sent: Monday, 19 November 2012, 3:11:21
Subject: Re: Fwd: [xmca] A Failure of Communication
 

Just to clarify one point, Larry: the point about fuzzy boundaries getting more fuzzy with increased expertise.


As people get to be more "expert" with a particular concept, they tend to have a deeper grasp of it as a true concept (rather than a pseudoconcept), and in addition to this, with experience, what was initially a true but abstract concept, becomes a mature concept, sublating numerous processes of realisation the true concept has undergone in various situations. As a mature concept, multiple paths of development are sublated into it.


Such a mature, true concept does not have clear boundaries. That is not a fact of psychology, but is in the nature of concepts themselves. Boundaries are features of set-theoretic realisations of a concept in various circumstances. In my example about being on the jury in a murder case, in every such trial (the judge has gone through many such experiences) there are different circumstances in which the judgment has to be realised as a yes/no verdict. This is where the boundaries are made and every time a judgment is made they get fuzzier. Any person experienced with use of a concept knows this through experience. A novice, on the other hand, may naively believe that murder (for example) is a cut-and-dry question. It isn't.


For real concepts, boundaries are peripheral questions, and therefore always tricky.


Andy


Larry Purss wrote:

> Charles, Andy, Mike, and others reflecting on concepts.

> I am finding this line of conversation generative and so I want to continue

> a little further down this path. I want to pull out a fragment from 5 days

> ago when Charles watched Andy's video on vimeo and then answered with

> further reflections on the concept of *ideal paths of development of

> concepts".  I will add a few comments or reflections of my own interspersed

> with Charles' fragment . Charles wrote wrote:

> 

> "However, to understand the social circulation and historical development

> of conceptual terms we need to understand a different (though intersecting)

> set of processes of lines of social development of concepts. Although

> Vygotsky opens the door to this world, he was not explicit in developing

> the ways in which concepts emerge and gain currency in an evolving

> socio-communicative world.

> 

>  Some of those social historical mechanisms have to do with the loosely

> structured semantic worlds of languages that provide orientations for our

> experiences, but other parts have to do with more specific language

> practices within specific social groupings, both in their core form and

> their penumbra of cultural infusion into other domains. And other parts

> have to do with the built environment or the intentional rearrangement of

> the environment, which also organizes our experience and provide the

> occasion for naming things. These different communicative and material

> practices each have their own  sets of expectations that make them more or

> less "disciplined" in different ways.

> 

> [LP] This last sentence focuses on *each* and *different* ways of

> idealizing paths of development.  Each path has its own *sets* of

> expectations, that makes them more or less *disciplined* in DIFFERENT

> ways.  Andy has articulated a position which suggests that as a person

> becomes more *expert* and *skillful* at using tools and concepts the

> boundaries actually become more *fuzzy*. In other words by becoming more

> *disciplined* by entering a discipline the trajectory is toward developing

> awareness of the *fuzzy* boundaries of ideal paths of development. For

> example, as Charles categorized *socio-communicative action* [as an

> abstract concept] into 3 distinct ways of understanding THIS concept, [EACH

> as a different *type*] the boundaries of each type are moving towards

> *closure*.  The socio-communicative *world* is forming ideal paths of

> development through disciplines which *constrain* with rules of

> organization.

> However, as Andy documents, this ideal path of theory construction [with

> its tendency towards *closure*] is ideal and therefore while focusing on

> SOME ideal aspects of the socio-communicative *world* other aspects which

> INEVITABLY will contradict the move towards closure will create *fuzzy

> boundaries* For example the boundaries between the ideal types [each with

> its own *set* of characteristics] will come into *question*. It with

> developing expertise and skill, as one navigates this terrain that the

> boundaries become fuzzier and more ambiguous."

> 

>   [CHARLES] (BTW, I agree that spectrum was the wrong term as the variation

> is much greater than on a single dimension--rather each has its own set of

> characteristics.)

> [LP] See above comment

> 

> Further, the action and communicative worlds are not purely of either ideal

> type and our lines of development are not either of those idealized typical

> paths. For the purposes of my article, you could say that I worked from two

> idealized typical paths of social development--first the open social

> processes of language development and then the more restricted ones of

> academic disciplinary discussion.  But then I put the first idealized path

> aside to focus on the other as the more easily analyzed, and then focused

> in an even more idealized way on the emergence and circulation of highly

> visible "concept terms." That was a heuristic move.

> 

> [LP] This reflective analysis of HOW to proceed comes with developing

> expertise and aquiring a *dis-position* to proceed with THIS type of

> practice.  As CHARLES stated, the "action and communicative worlds are NOT

> PURELY of either ideal type". The boundaries are more ambiguous and *fuzzy*

> 

>   [CHARLES] In any event what I am attempting in this piece to do is to set

> out some of the social, historical and communicative mechanisms for social

> lines of conceptual development, and then locate the individual experience

> within these social, historical, communicative trajectories.

> 

> [LP]  In setting out the social, historical, and communicative *mechanisms*

> is the term *mechanism* code for *causal*?  I'm in over my head at this

> point, but I want to explore further if *causal* or *mechanical* genres are

> just that -- genres??  However, the term *mechanisms* does invite this

> question. The other fascinating concept is *trajectories*.  This implies

> FROM a previous position towards an anticipated position in the future. Now

> is this trajectory causal or is it an interpretive process?? What is moving

> this trajectory into the future. Charles, my bias is to say the movement

> develops within effective history as this INTER *play* of theory and

> discourse we are discussing in this thread.

> 

> [CHARLES] Finally, before I go back to my paid work, the reason I did not

> use the word projects for the work of academic disciplines is that

> disciplines involve institutional histories and structures that may at any

> time include people with a variety of objects and projects, though the

> disciplinary field does align them to some degree.

> 

> [LP] The word *some* degree once again circles back to *fuzzy* boundaries

> within socio-communicative *worlds* implicated within effective history.

> In summary, the question of how central to "ideal" lines of development*

> within PARTICULAR SITUATIONS is the concept of *genres* or *literacy* as

> the process underlying concept formation?  The relation BETWEEN *ideal

> types* and *genres* may not be a *strict* dialectcal process and may

> actually be an *interpretive* dialectic with *fuzzy boundaries* that

> involve *fictional" AS IF structures.

> 

> Charles, thank you once again for allowing me listen in to your

> conversation with Andy and then  think out loud as I try to interweave the

> dialogue between you and Andy within my ZPD on this fascinating theme.  My

> inquiry is circling around the notion of *romantic science* as impicating

> *fuzzy* boundaries which become MORE ambiguous as we become more *expert*

> in our uses of concepts.  EACH particular ideal type moving towards

> *closure* and the contradictions embedded in the *nature* of this movement

> which are then *openned* for further dialogue.

> Andy uses the term *overflowing* to capture this dance of conceptual

> development.  OVERFLOWING as the NATURE of concepts [and theories and

> methods] when they are used in the wild.

> 

> Larry

>  


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