Hi Andy
I remember having read about concepts that they are , scientifically
speaking , so coherent , strong , existentially firm maybe clear-cut
that they could ONTOLOGICALLY be considered 'identical' with or of the
same merit as the OBJECTS THEMSELVES and that , that is why they could
be worked out with as if you can fetch objects themselves in the
outside world . Is it my fantasy working ?
Best
Haydi
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*From:* Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
*To:* "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
*Sent:* Monday, 19 November 2012, 3:11:21
*Subject:* Re: Fwd: [xmca] A Failure of Communication
Just to clarify one point, Larry: the point about fuzzy boundaries
getting more fuzzy with increased expertise.
As people get to be more "expert" with a particular concept, they tend
to have a deeper grasp of it as a true concept (rather than a
pseudoconcept), and in addition to this, with experience, what was
initially a true but abstract concept, becomes a mature concept,
sublating numerous processes of realisation the true concept has
undergone in various situations. As a mature concept, multiple paths
of development are sublated into it.
Such a mature, true concept does not have clear boundaries. That is
not a fact of psychology, but is in the nature of concepts themselves.
Boundaries are features of set-theoretic realisations of a concept in
various circumstances. In my example about being on the jury in a
murder case, in every such trial (the judge has gone through many such
experiences) there are different circumstances in which the judgment
has to be realised as a yes/no verdict. This is where the boundaries
are made and every time a judgment is made they get fuzzier. Any
person experienced with use of a concept knows this through
experience. A novice, on the other hand, may naively believe that
murder (for example) is a cut-and-dry question. It isn't.
For real concepts, boundaries are peripheral questions, and therefore
always tricky.
Andy
Larry Purss wrote:
> Charles, Andy, Mike, and others reflecting on concepts.
> I am finding this line of conversation generative and so I want to
continue
> a little further down this path. I want to pull out a fragment from
5 days
> ago when Charles watched Andy's video on vimeo and then answered with
> further reflections on the concept of *ideal paths of development of
> concepts". I will add a few comments or reflections of my own
interspersed
> with Charles' fragment . Charles wrote wrote:
>
> "However, to understand the social circulation and historical
development
> of conceptual terms we need to understand a different (though
intersecting)
> set of processes of lines of social development of concepts. Although
> Vygotsky opens the door to this world, he was not explicit in developing
> the ways in which concepts emerge and gain currency in an evolving
> socio-communicative world.
>
> Some of those social historical mechanisms have to do with the loosely
> structured semantic worlds of languages that provide orientations
for our
> experiences, but other parts have to do with more specific language
> practices within specific social groupings, both in their core form and
> their penumbra of cultural infusion into other domains. And other parts
> have to do with the built environment or the intentional
rearrangement of
> the environment, which also organizes our experience and provide the
> occasion for naming things. These different communicative and material
> practices each have their own sets of expectations that make them
more or
> less "disciplined" in different ways.
>
> [LP] This last sentence focuses on *each* and *different* ways of
> idealizing paths of development. Each path has its own *sets* of
> expectations, that makes them more or less *disciplined* in DIFFERENT
> ways. Andy has articulated a position which suggests that as a person
> becomes more *expert* and *skillful* at using tools and concepts the
> boundaries actually become more *fuzzy*. In other words by becoming more
> *disciplined* by entering a discipline the trajectory is toward
developing
> awareness of the *fuzzy* boundaries of ideal paths of development. For
> example, as Charles categorized *socio-communicative action* [as an
> abstract concept] into 3 distinct ways of understanding THIS
concept, [EACH
> as a different *type*] the boundaries of each type are moving towards
> *closure*. The socio-communicative *world* is forming ideal paths of
> development through disciplines which *constrain* with rules of
> organization.
> However, as Andy documents, this ideal path of theory construction [with
> its tendency towards *closure*] is ideal and therefore while focusing on
> SOME ideal aspects of the socio-communicative *world* other aspects
which
> INEVITABLY will contradict the move towards closure will create *fuzzy
> boundaries* For example the boundaries between the ideal types [each
with
> its own *set* of characteristics] will come into *question*. It with
> developing expertise and skill, as one navigates this terrain that the
> boundaries become fuzzier and more ambiguous."
>
> [CHARLES] (BTW, I agree that spectrum was the wrong term as the
variation
> is much greater than on a single dimension--rather each has its own
set of
> characteristics.)
> [LP] See above comment
>
> Further, the action and communicative worlds are not purely of
either ideal
> type and our lines of development are not either of those idealized
typical
> paths. For the purposes of my article, you could say that I worked
from two
> idealized typical paths of social development--first the open social
> processes of language development and then the more restricted ones of
> academic disciplinary discussion. But then I put the first
idealized path
> aside to focus on the other as the more easily analyzed, and then
focused
> in an even more idealized way on the emergence and circulation of highly
> visible "concept terms." That was a heuristic move.
>
> [LP] This reflective analysis of HOW to proceed comes with developing
> expertise and aquiring a *dis-position* to proceed with THIS type of
> practice. As CHARLES stated, the "action and communicative worlds
are NOT
> PURELY of either ideal type". The boundaries are more ambiguous and
*fuzzy*
>
> [CHARLES] In any event what I am attempting in this piece to do is
to set
> out some of the social, historical and communicative mechanisms for
social
> lines of conceptual development, and then locate the individual
experience
> within these social, historical, communicative trajectories.
>
> [LP] In setting out the social, historical, and communicative
*mechanisms*
> is the term *mechanism* code for *causal*? I'm in over my head at this
> point, but I want to explore further if *causal* or *mechanical*
genres are
> just that -- genres?? However, the term *mechanisms* does invite this
> question. The other fascinating concept is *trajectories*. This implies
> FROM a previous position towards an anticipated position in the
future. Now
> is this trajectory causal or is it an interpretive process?? What is
moving
> this trajectory into the future. Charles, my bias is to say the movement
> develops within effective history as this INTER *play* of theory and
> discourse we are discussing in this thread.
>
> [CHARLES] Finally, before I go back to my paid work, the reason I
did not
> use the word projects for the work of academic disciplines is that
> disciplines involve institutional histories and structures that may
at any
> time include people with a variety of objects and projects, though the
> disciplinary field does align them to some degree.
>
> [LP] The word *some* degree once again circles back to *fuzzy*
boundaries
> within socio-communicative *worlds* implicated within effective history.
> In summary, the question of how central to "ideal" lines of development*
> within PARTICULAR SITUATIONS is the concept of *genres* or *literacy* as
> the process underlying concept formation? The relation BETWEEN *ideal
> types* and *genres* may not be a *strict* dialectcal process and may
> actually be an *interpretive* dialectic with *fuzzy boundaries* that
> involve *fictional" AS IF structures.
>
> Charles, thank you once again for allowing me listen in to your
> conversation with Andy and then think out loud as I try to
interweave the
> dialogue between you and Andy within my ZPD on this fascinating
theme. My
> inquiry is circling around the notion of *romantic science* as
impicating
> *fuzzy* boundaries which become MORE ambiguous as we become more
*expert*
> in our uses of concepts. EACH particular ideal type moving towards
> *closure* and the contradictions embedded in the *nature* of this
movement
> which are then *openned* for further dialogue.
> Andy uses the term *overflowing* to capture this dance of conceptual
> development. OVERFLOWING as the NATURE of concepts [and theories and
> methods] when they are used in the wild.
>
> Larry
>
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