Re: Fwd: [xmca] A Failure of Communication

[Haydi Zulfei <haydizulfei@rocketmail.com>]

Thanks Andy for clarifications ! But :
I'm at the moment reading from Vygotsky :
"The understanding of 'brother' is deeply rooted in the child's experience and passes a number of stages before arriving at the definition made in conceptual form . " 
Now , scientifically speaking , which is concrete ? 'brother' or 'the conceptual form reached' ?
And which has more fuzzy and peripheral boundaries ? Taking into account the idea that the child , despite all her cognition/knowledge for her brother quite easily utters : I won't let him marry anyone cause I want to marry him myself !
Best
Haydi 


________________________________
 From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> 
Sent: Monday, 19 November 2012, 12:41:33
Subject: Re: Fwd: [xmca] A Failure of Communication
 

Haydi,

I do think that a concept has to be its own object, and that, by contrast, the idea of concepts being in the head "picking out" objects in the external material world leads to untenable contradictions.


But it is nonsense to conflate these two ideas together, so that concepts are objects inside the head which are identical with objects existing in the material world. It means having a concept of concept which is both subjective and objective. If we reify the object as a material object or relation or process of some kind, then of course such a material object cannot be identical with something we take to be a thought-form.


The concepts of action and activity are the key to a concept of concept, because an action (as opposed to behaviour) is equally subjective and objective, and as an aggregate of actions, so is an activity.


Does that make sense?

Andy


Haydi Zulfei wrote:

> Hi Andy

> I remember having read about concepts that they are , scientifically speaking , so coherent , strong , existentially firm maybe clear-cut that they could ONTOLOGICALLY be considered 'identical' with or of the same merit as the OBJECTS THEMSELVES and that , that is why they could be worked out with as if you can fetch objects themselves in the outside world . Is it my fantasy working ?  Best

> Haydi

> 

> ------------------------------------------------------------------------

> *From:* Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>

> *To:* "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>

> *Sent:* Monday, 19 November 2012, 3:11:21

> *Subject:* Re: Fwd: [xmca] A Failure of Communication

> 

> Just to clarify one point, Larry: the point about fuzzy boundaries getting more fuzzy with increased expertise.

> 

> As people get to be more "expert" with a particular concept, they tend to have a deeper grasp of it as a true concept (rather than a pseudoconcept), and in addition to this, with experience, what was initially a true but abstract concept, becomes a mature concept, sublating numerous processes of realisation the true concept has undergone in various situations. As a mature concept, multiple paths of development are sublated into it.

> 

> Such a mature, true concept does not have clear boundaries. That is not a fact of psychology, but is in the nature of concepts themselves. Boundaries are features of set-theoretic realisations of a concept in various circumstances. In my example about being on the jury in a murder case, in every such trial (the judge has gone through many such experiences) there are different circumstances in which the judgment has to be realised as a yes/no verdict. This is where the boundaries are made and every time a judgment is made they get fuzzier. Any person experienced with use of a concept knows this through experience. A novice, on the other hand, may naively believe that murder (for example) is a cut-and-dry question. It isn't.

> 

> For real concepts, boundaries are peripheral questions, and therefore always tricky.

> 

> Andy

> 

> Larry Purss wrote:

> > Charles, Andy, Mike, and others reflecting on concepts.

> > I am finding this line of conversation generative and so I want to continue

> > a little further down this path. I want to pull out a fragment from 5 days

> > ago when Charles watched Andy's video on vimeo and then answered with

> > further reflections on the concept of *ideal paths of development of

> > concepts".  I will add a few comments or reflections of my own interspersed

> > with Charles' fragment . Charles wrote wrote:

> >

> > "However, to understand the social circulation and historical development

> > of conceptual terms we need to understand a different (though intersecting)

> > set of processes of lines of social development of concepts. Although

> > Vygotsky opens the door to this world, he was not explicit in developing

> > the ways in which concepts emerge and gain currency in an evolving

> > socio-communicative world.

> >

> >  Some of those social historical mechanisms have to do with the loosely

> > structured semantic worlds of languages that provide orientations for our

> > experiences, but other parts have to do with more specific language

> > practices within specific social groupings, both in their core form and

> > their penumbra of cultural infusion into other domains. And other parts

> > have to do with the built environment or the intentional rearrangement of

> > the environment, which also organizes our experience and provide the

> > occasion for naming things. These different communicative and material

> > practices each have their own  sets of expectations that make them more or

> > less "disciplined" in different ways.

> >

> > [LP] This last sentence focuses on *each* and *different* ways of

> > idealizing paths of development.  Each path has its own *sets* of

> > expectations, that makes them more or less *disciplined* in DIFFERENT

> > ways.  Andy has articulated a position which suggests that as a person

> > becomes more *expert* and *skillful* at using tools and concepts the

> > boundaries actually become more *fuzzy*. In other words by becoming more

> > *disciplined* by entering a discipline the trajectory is toward developing

> > awareness of the *fuzzy* boundaries of ideal paths of development. For

> > example, as Charles categorized *socio-communicative action* [as an

> > abstract concept] into 3 distinct ways of understanding THIS concept, [EACH

> > as a different *type*] the boundaries of each type are moving towards

> > *closure*.  The socio-communicative *world* is forming ideal paths of

> > development through disciplines which *constrain* with rules of

> > organization.

> > However, as Andy documents, this ideal path of theory construction [with

> > its tendency towards *closure*] is ideal and therefore while focusing on

> > SOME ideal aspects of the socio-communicative *world* other aspects which

> > INEVITABLY will contradict the move towards closure will create *fuzzy

> > boundaries* For example the boundaries between the ideal types [each with

> > its own *set* of characteristics] will come into *question*. It with

> > developing expertise and skill, as one navigates this terrain that the

> > boundaries become fuzzier and more ambiguous."

> >

> >  [CHARLES] (BTW, I agree that spectrum was the wrong term as the variation

> > is much greater than on a single dimension--rather each has its own set of

> > characteristics.)

> > [LP] See above comment

> >

> > Further, the action and communicative worlds are not purely of either ideal

> > type and our lines of development are not either of those idealized typical

> > paths. For the purposes of my article, you could say that I worked from two

> > idealized typical paths of social development--first the open social

> > processes of language development and then the more restricted ones of

> > academic disciplinary discussion.  But then I put the first idealized path

> > aside to focus on the other as the more easily analyzed, and then focused

> > in an even more idealized way on the emergence and circulation of highly

> > visible "concept terms." That was a heuristic move.

> >

> > [LP] This reflective analysis of HOW to proceed comes with developing

> > expertise and aquiring a *dis-position* to proceed with THIS type of

> > practice.  As CHARLES stated, the "action and communicative worlds are NOT

> > PURELY of either ideal type". The boundaries are more ambiguous and *fuzzy*

> >

> >  [CHARLES] In any event what I am attempting in this piece to do is to set

> > out some of the social, historical and communicative mechanisms for social

> > lines of conceptual development, and then locate the individual experience

> > within these social, historical, communicative trajectories.

> >

> > [LP]  In setting out the social, historical, and communicative *mechanisms*

> > is the term *mechanism* code for *causal*?  I'm in over my head at this

> > point, but I want to explore further if *causal* or *mechanical* genres are

> > just that -- genres??  However, the term *mechanisms* does invite this

> > question. The other fascinating concept is *trajectories*.  This implies

> > FROM a previous position towards an anticipated position in the future. Now

> > is this trajectory causal or is it an interpretive process?? What is moving

> > this trajectory into the future. Charles, my bias is to say the movement

> > develops within effective history as this INTER *play* of theory and

> > discourse we are discussing in this thread.

> >

> > [CHARLES] Finally, before I go back to my paid work, the reason I did not

> > use the word projects for the work of academic disciplines is that

> > disciplines involve institutional histories and structures that may at any

> > time include people with a variety of objects and projects, though the

> > disciplinary field does align them to some degree.

> >

> > [LP] The word *some* degree once again circles back to *fuzzy* boundaries

> > within socio-communicative *worlds* implicated within effective history.

> > In summary, the question of how central to "ideal" lines of development*

> > within PARTICULAR SITUATIONS is the concept of *genres* or *literacy* as

> > the process underlying concept formation?  The relation BETWEEN *ideal

> > types* and *genres* may not be a *strict* dialectcal process and may

> > actually be an *interpretive* dialectic with *fuzzy boundaries* that

> > involve *fictional" AS IF structures.

> >

> > Charles, thank you once again for allowing me listen in to your

> > conversation with Andy and then  think out loud as I try to interweave the

> > dialogue between you and Andy within my ZPD on this fascinating theme.  My

> > inquiry is circling around the notion of *romantic science* as impicating

> > *fuzzy* boundaries which become MORE ambiguous as we become more *expert*

> > in our uses of concepts.  EACH particular ideal type moving towards

> > *closure* and the contradictions embedded in the *nature* of this movement

> > which are then *openned* for further dialogue.

> > Andy uses the term *overflowing* to capture this dance of conceptual

> > development.  OVERFLOWING as the NATURE of concepts [and theories and

> > methods] when they are used in the wild.

> >

> > Larry

> > 

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-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------

*Andy Blunden*

Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/

Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts

http://ucsd.academia.edu/AndyBlunden


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