Here is a copy from my hard drive. I hope this comes through the webLarry On Tue, Dec 3, 2013 at 4:29 PM, valerie A. Wilkinson < vwilk@inf.shizuoka.ac.jp> wrote: > Larry, > Deeply interested in this Unesco work you mention. > However, am not authorized to view it. > It there any way to get a link to pdf? > Valerie > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry Purss > Sent: Tuesday, December 03, 2013 12:54 AM > To: Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: intersubjectivity and perspective taking, po russkii > > This is a direct link to the book > http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0022/002238/223830E.pdf< > https://mymail.vsb. > > bc.ca/OWA/redir.aspx?C=Y0ABaXqqBUOHY_44FHGENQ5-WDkNw9AIqBadDtF8Qdai01f0pI1LB > > C7DW77zb0q1_MeI8nlZ7so.&URL=http%3a%2f%2funesdoc.unesco.org%2fimages%2f0022% > 2f002238%2f223830E.pdf> > > Sandra has worked with Mike and been discussed on XMCA previously > > Larry > > > On Mon, Dec 2, 2013 at 7:48 AM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote: > > > Paul, > > The point may be to *see through* or go *beyond* the ideological AS > > reified *objectivity* and *return* to notions of *humanity* as > > emerging WITHIN dialogue > > > > Here is a free book that may be of interest in this regard. It > > develops a dialogical perspective on resistance in Rio > > > > > > https://mymail.vsb.bc.ca/OWA/?ae=Item&t=IPM.Note&id=RgAAAABcrMEZpb%2b8 > > RJLCMeBKJvxxBwDeh%2bQItXNbTpnLOftNk%2bwXAAAAUCKsAAB%2fylgzNh6DSbgzmJ7G > > jNoSAACiyLfjAAAJ > > > > and is published by the UN > > > > > > On Sun, Dec 1, 2013 at 9:08 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < > > pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: > > > >> Larry, > >> > >> If the ideological, via reification, becomes tantamount to the > >> ontological whats the point of and for dialogue? > >> > >> > >> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > >> President > >> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > >> www.mocombeian.com > >> www.readingroomcurriculum.com > >> > >> > >> > >> -------- Original message -------- > >> From: Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> > >> Date: 12/01/2013 2:09 PM (GMT-05:00) > >> To: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" <pmocombe@mocombeian.com> > >> Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>,Andy > >> Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> > >> Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: intersubjectivity and perspective taking, > >> po russkii > >> > >> > >> Paul, > >> Once any ideology becomes reified it becomes the *nature of reality* > >> and therefore can become an object of scientific investigations. > >> However, taking a wider perspective [bild] the ontological nature of > >> THIS transformation may come into view. Therefore any ideology is a > >> reification of this ontological *realm*when it comes into view as > >> this transformational process [dialectical, dialogical, analogical] > >> > >> Returning to the question of *intersubjectivity*, I wonder how > >> central the question of *friendship* [philia] is to this concept. I > >> am attempting to *bridge* back to the notion of *intimacy* [what the > >> medieval called *tenderness*] whichconcept has become transformed > >> into a confidence in private judgement Ardent suggests, as a > >> consequence of THIS HISTORY [transformation] philia and the common > >> good has withdrawn [dispersed] and civil society becomes transformed > >> from civic *virtues* to realms of power. > >> For the ancient Greeks the essence of philia was not solely a matter > >> of > >> *intimacy* but was fundamentally a realm of DIALOGUE. tHE CONSTANT > >> INTERCHANGE OF TALK CREATED THE COMMON GOOD. > >> > >> This is one aspect of *intersubjectivity* and the dialectic of > >> private and public realms of intersubjectivity Larry > >> > >> > >> On Sun, Dec 1, 2013 at 10:03 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < > >> pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: > >> > >>> Larry I agree with althusser because once capitalism becomes > >>> reified through ideologies and ideological apparatuses in the > >>> material world it becomes the nature of reality as such...hence the > >>> realm for scientific investigations. However, I do not believe that > >>> that Gramscian/althusserian reification negates the ontological > >>> nature of being as such highlighted by heidegger in "being and time" > >>> the job of the social philosopher is to outline where ideology attempts > to be ontology and correct it. > >>> > >>> > >>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > >>> President > >>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > >>> www.mocombeian.com > >>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> -------- Original message -------- > >>> From: Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> > >>> Date: 12/01/2013 10:04 AM (GMT-05:00) > >>> To: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" <pmocombe@mocombeian.com>,"eXtended Mind, > >>> Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> > >>> Cc: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> > >>> Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: intersubjectivity and perspective taking, > >>> po russkii > >>> > >>> > >>> Paul, > >>> Your comment that Hegel, and Marx begin their analysis at the level > >>> of *scientific rationality* AS species-being is an interesting opening. > >>> I went to Wikipedia to search out *structural Marxism* and this is > >>> the first paragraph. > >>> > >>> :Structural Marxism arose in opposition to the humanistic > Marxism<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marxist_humanism>that dominated many > western universities during the 1970s. > >>> [*citation needed > >>> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Citation_needed>*] In > >>> contrast to Humanistic Marxism, Althusser stressed that Marxism was > >>> a science<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Science>that examined > >>> objective structures, [1] > >>> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Structural_Marxism#cite_note-1> and he > >>> believed that > >>> humanistic<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marxist_humanism>, > >>> historistic <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Historicism#Karl_Marx> and > >>> phenomenological Marxism > >>> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_Marxism>, which was based on Marx's > early works, was caught in a "pre-scientific humanistic ideology". > >>> [2] <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Structural_Marxism#cite_note-2> > >>> > >>> So scientific rationality is merely one *level* which implies other > >>> levels of rationality in EXCESS [Merleau Ponty] of the scientific > >>> level of rationality. In other words *extensions* of rationality > >>> that are not merely *scientific* but may be extended BEYOND the > >>> scientific > >>> *perspectives* to include humanistic, historical, and > >>> phenomenological/existential forms of rationality. > >>> I am in over my head and using this medium to extend my > >>> understanding of > >>> *rationality* and exploring what is dismissed as merely > >>> *pre-scientific* humanistic ideology. > >>> Your question is opening a *clearing* to imagine a *synthesis of > >>> heideggerian phenomenology AND structural Marxism. > >>> Larry > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> On Sat, Nov 30, 2013 at 8:58 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < > >>> pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: > >>> > >>>> I think hegel and marx begins their anaylsis where, as heidegger > >>>> points out, husserl does...at the level of scientific rationality. > >>>> This they impute to species-being. Heidegger's "being and time", I > >>>> believe is the proper place to start if we want to understand > >>>> intersubjectivity and empathy. The attempt should be to synthesize > >>>> heideggerian phenomenology with structural Marxism. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > >>>> President > >>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > >>>> www.mocombeian.com > >>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com > >>>> > >>>> -------- Original message -------- > >>>> From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com > >>>> Date: 11/30/2013 8:19 PM (GMT-05:00) > >>>> To: ablunden@mira.net,"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > >>>> xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> > >>>> Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> > >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: intersubjectivity and perspective taking, po > >>>> russkii > >>>> > >>>> Charles, and I. Addition to getting smith via Hegel, pretty certain > >>>> that mead would have had fairly direct contact with smith's looking > >>>> glass theory of the self (from Theory of MorAl Sentiments) from > >>>> Charles Horton Cooley (who is often cited as the origi ator of the > >>>> looking glass theory of the self). Is the looking glass theory of > >>>> the self an example of perspective taking? > >>>> Still no closer to an answer to mikes original question! > >>>> Greg > >>>> > >>>> Sent from my iPhone > >>>> > >>>> On Nov 30, 2013, at 4:14 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote: > >>>> > >>>> > Yes, Charles, it is well known that Hegel read and admired the > >>>> > work > >>>> of the political economists and he also gave prominant place to the > >>>> Scots in his History of Philosophy, namely, Reid, Beattie, Oswald > >>>> and Douglas Stewart. > >>>> > And Mead wrote in a letter that his I/Me dialectic was based on > Hegel. > >>>> > > >>>> > Andy > >>>> > > >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------- > >>>> ----- > >>>> > *Andy Blunden* > >>>> > http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > Charles Bazerman wrote: > >>>> >> Do any of you scholarly folk also know if there is a line of > >>>> influence from the Scottish moralists to Hegel's views on > >>>> perspective taking? Given the influence of the Scottish Enlightenment > on U.S. > >>>> education, I wouldn't be surprised if that work got to Mead as > >>>> well. Chuck > >>>> >> > >>>> >> ----- Original Message ----- > >>>> >> From: Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > >>>> >> Date: Saturday, November 30, 2013 1:27 pm > >>>> >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: intersubjectivity and perspective taking, > >>>> >> po > >>>> russkii > >>>> >> To: Mike Cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>, "eXtended Mind, Culture, > >>>> Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> > >>>> >> > >>>> >> > >>>> >>> Mike, > >>>> >>> Not so dumb, I would think, since this is a very central part > >>>> >>> of > >>>> Hegel's > >>>> >>> social ontology of the subject. (Too) Simply put, > >>>> self-consciousness arises > >>>> >>> from our awareness that others are subjects just like ourselves. > >>>> Here is > >>>> >>> what I take to be Hegel's description of perspective-taking: > >>>> >>> "It must cancel this its other. To do so is the sublation of > >>>> >>> that > >>>> first > >>>> >>> double meaning, and is therefore a second double meaning. > >>>> >>> First, it > >>>> must > >>>> >>> set itself to sublate the other independent being, in order > >>>> >>> thereby > >>>> to > >>>> >>> become certain of itself as true being, secondly, it thereupon > >>>> proceeds to > >>>> >>> sublate its own self, for this other is itself." > >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> This is, of course, the second paragraph in the introduction to > >>>> Hegel's > >>>> >>> Master/Slave dialectic (all 5 paragraphs of the intro are below). > >>>> In that > >>>> >>> tale, perspective-taking fails b.c. although the slave takes > >>>> >>> the perspective of the master, the master has no reason to take > >>>> >>> the > >>>> perspective > >>>> >>> of the slave. This is imperfect recognition and does not allow > >>>> >>> for > >>>> the full > >>>> >>> constitution (consummation, following Bakhtin) of the subjects > >>>> >>> as > >>>> fully > >>>> >>> self-conscious. > >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> [There is good evidence that this was part of G. H. Mead's > >>>> inspiration in > >>>> >>> his development of perspective taking (but this is both > >>>> >>> debatable > >>>> and, to > >>>> >>> my mind, of little consequence).] > >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> I also wonder if some variant of perspective taking can be > >>>> >>> found in > >>>> Marx's > >>>> >>> early concept of species being, or perhaps in the idea of the > >>>> relations of > >>>> >>> persons one to another. It would seem that Marx's writings on > >>>> >>> the > >>>> commodity > >>>> >>> fetish are precisely a problem of perspective taking - the > >>>> individual > >>>> >>> participants no longer see that there are others who are full > >>>> >>> and > >>>> rich > >>>> >>> individuals like themselves; instead, other people become tools > >>>> >>> for accomplishing MY aims. And it is this that communism is > >>>> >>> supposed to reconcile - bringing all people into a deep > >>>> >>> appreciation of not > >>>> just our > >>>> >>> deep dependence upon one another, but also of our universal > >>>> kinship, i.e. > >>>> >>> our "mutuality of being" as Rupert Stasch has so eloquently put > it. > >>>> >>> Mutuality of being requires an understanding that other people > >>>> >>> are > >>>> "just > >>>> >>> like us". > >>>> >>> Isn't that perspective taking? > >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> But I have no clue how or in what linguistic forms this would > >>>> >>> have > >>>> made its > >>>> >>> way from Hegel's and Marx's German to Vygotsky's Russian (if at > >>>> all...). > >>>> >>> -greg > >>>> >>> p.s. psychological anthropologist Doug Hollan has been > >>>> >>> seriously > >>>> looking > >>>> >>> into "empathy" along with fellow psyc anth scholar C. Jason > Throop. > >>>> One of > >>>> >>> Doug's pieces is listed in the email that just I'll forward in > >>>> >>> just > >>>> a > >>>> >>> minute to XMCA. > >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> Full text of paras 179-184 from Phenomenology of Spirit: > >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> Φ < > >>>> >>> 179 < > >>>> >>> . Self-consciousness has before it another self-consciousness; > >>>> >>> it > >>>> has come > >>>> >>> outside itself. This has a double significance. First it has > >>>> >>> lost > >>>> its own > >>>> >>> self, since it finds itself as an *other* being; secondly, it > >>>> >>> has > >>>> thereby > >>>> >>> sublated that other, for it does not regard the other as > >>>> essentially real, > >>>> >>> but sees its own self in the other. > >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> Φ < > >>>> >>> 180 < > >>>> >>> . It must cancel this its other. To do so is the sublation of > >>>> >>> that > >>>> first > >>>> >>> double meaning, and is therefore a second double meaning. > >>>> >>> First, it > >>>> must > >>>> >>> set itself to sublate the other independent being, in order > >>>> >>> thereby > >>>> to > >>>> >>> become certain of itself as true being, secondly, it thereupon > >>>> proceeds to > >>>> >>> sublate its own self, for this other is itself. > >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> Φ < > >>>> >>> 181 < > >>>> >>> . This sublation in a double sense of its otherness in a double > >>>> sense is at > >>>> >>> the same time a return in a double sense into its self. For, > >>>> firstly, > >>>> >>> through sublation, it gets back itself, because it becomes one > >>>> >>> with > >>>> itself > >>>> >>> again through the cancelling of *its *otherness; but secondly, > >>>> >>> it > >>>> likewise > >>>> >>> gives otherness back again to the other self-consciousness, for > >>>> >>> it > >>>> was > >>>> >>> aware of being in the other, it cancels this its own being in > >>>> >>> the > >>>> other and > >>>> >>> thus lets the other again go free. > >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> Φ < > >>>> >>> 182 < > >>>> >>> . This process of self-consciousness in relation to another > >>>> >>> self-consciousness has in this manner been represented as the > >>>> action of one > >>>> >>> alone. But this action on the part of the one has itself the > >>>> >>> double significance of being at once its own action and the > >>>> >>> action of that > >>>> other > >>>> >>> as well. For the other is likewise independent, shut up within > >>>> itself, and > >>>> >>> there is nothing in it which is not there through itself. The > >>>> >>> first > >>>> does > >>>> >>> not have the object before it only in the passive form > >>>> characteristic > >>>> >>> primarily of the object of desire, but as an object existing > >>>> independently > >>>> >>> for itself, over which therefore it has no power to do anything > >>>> >>> for > >>>> its own > >>>> >>> behalf, if that object does not *per se *do what the first does > >>>> >>> to > >>>> it. The > >>>> >>> process then is absolutely the double process of both > >>>> self-consciousnesses. > >>>> >>> Each sees the other do the same as itself; each itself does > >>>> >>> what it > >>>> demands > >>>> >>> on the part of the other, and for that reason does what it > >>>> >>> does, > >>>> only so > >>>> >>> far as the other does the same. Action from one side only would > >>>> >>> be > >>>> useless, > >>>> >>> because what is to happen can only be brought about by means of > >>>> both. > >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> Φ < > >>>> >>> 183 < > >>>> >>> . The action has then a *double entente* not only in the sense > >>>> >>> that > >>>> it is > >>>> >>> an act done to itself as well as to the other, but also in the > >>>> sense that > >>>> >>> the act *simpliciter* is the act of the one as well as of the > >>>> >>> other regardless of their distinction. > >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> Φ < > >>>> >>> 184 < > >>>> >>> . In this movement we see the process repeated which came > >>>> >>> before us > >>>> as the > >>>> >>> play of forces; in the present case, however, it is found in > >>>> consciousness. > >>>> >>> What in the former had effect only for us [contemplating > >>>> experience], holds > >>>> >>> here for the terms themselves. The middle term is > >>>> self-consciousness which > >>>> >>> breaks itself up into the extremes; and each extreme is this > >>>> interchange of > >>>> >>> its own determinateness, and complete transition into the > opposite. > >>>> While > >>>> >>> *qua* consciousness, it no doubt comes outside itself, still, > >>>> >>> in > >>>> being > >>>> >>> outside itself, it is at the same time restrained within > >>>> >>> itself, it > >>>> exists > >>>> >>> for itself, and its self-externalization is for consciousness. > >>>> >>> *Consciousness *finds that it immediately is and is not another > >>>> >>> consciousness, as also that this other is for itself only when > >>>> >>> it > >>>> cancels > >>>> >>> itself as existing for itself , and has self-existence only in > >>>> >>> the self-existence of the other. Each is the mediating term to > >>>> >>> the > >>>> other, > >>>> >>> through which each mediates and unites itself with itself; and > >>>> >>> each > >>>> is to > >>>> >>> itself and to the other an immediate self-existing reality, > >>>> >>> which, > >>>> at the > >>>> >>> same time, exists thus for itself only through this mediation. > >>>> >>> They recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another. > >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> On Sat, Nov 30, 2013 at 10:08 AM, mike cole > >>>> >>> <lchcmike@gmail.com> > >>>> wrote: > >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> > >>>> >>>> Hi Larry-- You are almost certainly way ahead of me on these > >>>> issues. > >>>> >>> My > >>>> >>> > >>>> >>>> interest at present is on the development of social and > >>>> >>>> relational perspective taking. From, say, a Vygotskian, or > >>>> >>>> Bakhtinian point > >>>> of > >>>> >>> view > >>>> >>> > >>>> >>>> (perspective!) what are the socio-cultural contributions to > >>>> interpersonal > >>>> >>>> understanding that we associated with psychological > >>>> >>>> perspective > >>>> taking, > >>>> >>>> perhaps just the ability to "stand in someone else's shoes"? > >>>> Empathy > >>>> >>> has to > >>>> >>> > >>>> >>>> be one potential contributor, and...... (in the Russian > >>>> traditionS > >>>> >>> we often > >>>> >>> > >>>> >>>> discuss)? > >>>> >>>> > >>>> >>>> Perhaps just a really dumb question. Wouldn't be the first time!! > >>>> >>>> mike > >>>> >>>> > >>>> >>>> > >>>> >>>> > >>>> >>>> > >>>> >>>> On Sat, Nov 30, 2013 at 6:37 AM, Larry Purss > >>>> >>>> <lpscholar2@gmail.com > >>>> > > >>>> >>> wrote: > >>>> >>> > >>>> >>>>> Mike, > >>>> >>>>> I am wondering if you could expand on your question that > >>>> is > >>>> >>> referring to > >>>> >>> > >>>> >>>>> perspective taking and its possible meanings. I believe > >>>> this > >>>> >>> question of > >>>> >>> > >>>> >>>>> perspective taking is also converging with your other > >>>> >>>>> question > >>>> on > >>>> >>> *kinds* > >>>> >>> > >>>> >>>>> or *types* of persons. [personhood like childhood] > >>>> >>>>> > >>>> >>>>> I am asking for more clarity on your *bad question* which > >>>> >>>>> seems > >>>> to > >>>> >>> be > >>>> >>> > >>>> >>>>> central to the multiple discourses on *sociocultural* theory > >>>> >>>>> and > >>>> practice > >>>> >>>>> This *space* or *zone* of questioning which opens up a > >>>> clearing > >>>> >>> for the > >>>> >>> > >>>> >>>>> multiple notions of the concept *intersubjectivity* and its > >>>> convergence > >>>> >>>>> with the concept of *perspective-taking* and how this topic > >>>> >>>>> is > >>>> explored > >>>> >>>> in > >>>> >>>> > >>>> >>>>> Russian translation is a topic I want to explore further. > >>>> >>>>> > >>>> >>>>> I wanted to offer a quote which I found interesting > >>>> exploring > >>>> >>> notions of > >>>> >>> > >>>> >>>>> *identity* AS KINDS [categories] > >>>> >>>>> > >>>> >>>>> Oakeshott argues that "This distinction, then, between > 'goings-on' > >>>> >>>>> identified as themselves > >>>> >>>>> > >>>> >>>>> exhibitions of intelligence and 'goings-on' which may be made > >>>> >>>> intelligible > >>>> >>>> > >>>> >>>>> but are not themselves > >>>> >>>>> > >>>> >>>>> intelligent, is not a distinction between mental and physical > >>>> >>>>> or > >>>> between > >>>> >>>>> minds and bodies regarded > >>>> >>>>> > >>>> >>>>> as entities. It is a distinction within the engagement of > >>>> understanding, > >>>> >>>> a > >>>> >>>> > >>>> >>>>> distinction between > >>>> >>>>> > >>>> >>>>> 'sciences' (that is, ideal characters) and the identities > >>>> with > >>>> >>> which they > >>>> >>> > >>>> >>>>> are concerned. And in > >>>> >>>>> > >>>> >>>>> calling it a categorial distinction what is being asserted is > >>>> that > >>>> >>> the > >>>> >>> > >>>> >>>>> understanding of identities > >>>> >>>>> > >>>> >>>>> recognized as themselves exhibitions of intelligence cannot > >>>> >>>>> be > >>>> 'reduced' > >>>> >>>>> to the understanding of > >>>> >>>>> > >>>> >>>>> identities no so recognized", *On Human Conduct*, pp. 14-15. > >>>> >>>>> > >>>> >>>>> > >>>> >>>>> I was intrigued by Oakeshott's understanding of *sciences* > >>>> >>> [multiple] AS > >>>> >>> > >>>> >>>>> RESPRESENTING IDEAL KINDS [categorical distinctions]. This > >>>> realm > >>>> >>> of KINDS > >>>> >>> > >>>> >>>>> AS perspective taking moves the question of intersubjectivity > >>>> >>>>> to > >>>> converge > >>>> >>>>> with *culture* and *history*. > >>>> >>>>> > >>>> >>>>> I will pause, but this topic is endlessly fascinating. > >>>> >>>>> > >>>> >>>>> Larry Purss > >>>> >>>>> > >>>> >>>>> > >>>> >>>>> > >>>> >>>>> > >>>> >>>>> On Fri, Nov 29, 2013 at 10:21 AM, mike cole > >>>> >>>>> <lchcmike@gmail.com> > >>>> wrote: > >>>> >>>>> > >>>> >>>>> > >>>> >>>>>> Dear Russian experts on XMCA > >>>> >>>>>> > >>>> >>>>>> I have been reading about the development of > >>>> >>>>>> intersubjectivity > >>>> and > >>>> >>>>>> perspective taking, including an article by scholars who say > >>>> they > >>>> >>> are > >>>> >>> > >>>> >>>>>> working in the "sociocultural perspective." It got me > >>>> to > >>>> >>> wondering how > >>>> >>> > >>>> >>>>>> Russian scholars discuss these topics. No Russians are cited > >>>> >>>>>> in > >>>> the > >>>> >>>> work I > >>>> >>>> > >>>> >>>>>> am reading, but Mead and > >>>> >>>>>> Piaget. > >>>> >>>>>> > >>>> >>>>>> When looking at suggested translations into Russian from > >>>> English > >>>> >>> for > >>>> >>> > >>>> >>>> these > >>>> >>>> > >>>> >>>>>> terms, the cognate > >>>> >>>>>> perspectiv seems to appear almost everywhere. The phrase > >>>> for > >>>> >>> "point of > >>>> >>> > >>>> >>>>>> view" is literally that, > >>>> >>>>>> tochka-point zreniya-seeing, genetive case. > >>>> >>>>>> > >>>> >>>>>> I figure I am blind to something obvious here, but darned if > >>>> I > >>>> >>> know what > >>>> >>> > >>>> >>>>>> it > >>>> >>>>>> is. Any help out there?? > >>>> >>>>>> mike > >>>> >>>>>> > >>>> >>>>>> P > >>>> >>>>>> S-- Eugene wrote an interesting article in MCA a while back > >>>> >>>>>> on intersubjectivity and there are Vygotsky refs but they do > >>>> >>>>>> not seem to go to the question I am > >>>> asking. > >>>> >>> Perhaps its > >>>> >>> > >>>> >>>>>> just my bad question! > >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> -- > >>>> >>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >>>> >>> Visiting Assistant Professor > >>>> >>> Department of Anthropology > >>>> >>> 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >>>> >>> Brigham Young University > >>>> >>> Provo, UT 84602 > >>>> >>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >>>> > > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >> > > > > >
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