[Xmca-l] Re: intersubjectivity and perspective taking, po russkii

[Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>]

Paul,
The point may be to *see through* or go *beyond* the ideological AS reified
*objectivity* and *return* to notions of *humanity* as emerging WITHIN
dialogue

Here is a free book that may be of interest in this regard. It develops a
dialogical perspective on resistance in Rio

https://mymail.vsb.bc.ca/OWA/?ae=Item&t=IPM.Note&id=RgAAAABcrMEZpb%2b8RJLCMeBKJvxxBwDeh%2bQItXNbTpnLOftNk%2bwXAAAAUCKsAAB%2fylgzNh6DSbgzmJ7GjNoSAACiyLfjAAAJ

and is published by the UN


On Sun, Dec 1, 2013 at 9:08 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe <pmocombe@mocombeian.com
> wrote:

> Larry,
>
> If the ideological, via reification, becomes tantamount to the ontological
> whats the point of and for dialogue?
>
>
> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe
> President
> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc.
> www.mocombeian.com
> www.readingroomcurriculum.com
>
>
>
> -------- Original message --------
> From: Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> Date: 12/01/2013 2:09 PM (GMT-05:00)
> To: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" <pmocombe@mocombeian.com>
> Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>,Andy
> Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
> Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: intersubjectivity and perspective taking, po
> russkii
>
>
> Paul,
> Once any ideology becomes reified it becomes the *nature of reality* and
> therefore can become an object of scientific investigations.
> However, taking a wider perspective [bild] the ontological nature of THIS
> transformation may come into view. Therefore any ideology is a reification
> of this ontological *realm*when it  comes into view as this
> transformational process [dialectical, dialogical, analogical]
>
> Returning to the question of *intersubjectivity*, I wonder how central the
> question of *friendship* [philia] is to this concept.  I am attempting to
> *bridge* back to the notion of *intimacy* [what the medieval called
> *tenderness*] whichconcept has become transformed into a confidence in
> private judgement
> Ardent suggests, as a consequence of THIS HISTORY [transformation] philia
> and the common good has withdrawn [dispersed] and civil society becomes
> transformed from civic *virtues* to realms of power.
> For the ancient Greeks the essence of philia was not solely a matter of
> *intimacy* but was fundamentally a realm of DIALOGUE. tHE CONSTANT
> INTERCHANGE OF TALK CREATED THE COMMON GOOD.
>
> This is one aspect of *intersubjectivity* and the dialectic of private and
> public realms of intersubjectivity
> Larry
>
>
> On Sun, Dec 1, 2013 at 10:03 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe <
> pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote:
>
>> Larry I agree with althusser because  once capitalism becomes reified
>> through ideologies and ideological apparatuses in the material world it
>> becomes the nature of reality as such...hence the realm for scientific
>> investigations.  However, I do not believe that that Gramscian/althusserian
>> reification negates the ontological nature of being as such highlighted by
>> heidegger in "being and time"  the job of the social philosopher is to
>> outline where ideology attempts to be ontology and correct it.
>>
>>
>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe
>> President
>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc.
>> www.mocombeian.com
>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com
>>
>>
>>
>> -------- Original message --------
>> From: Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
>> Date: 12/01/2013 10:04 AM (GMT-05:00)
>> To: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" <pmocombe@mocombeian.com>,"eXtended Mind,
>> Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>> Cc: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
>> Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: intersubjectivity and perspective taking, po
>> russkii
>>
>>
>> Paul,
>> Your comment that Hegel, and Marx begin their analysis at the level of
>> *scientific rationality* AS species-being is an interesting opening.
>> I went to Wikipedia to search out *structural Marxism* and this is the
>> first paragraph.
>>
>> :Structural Marxism arose in opposition to the humanistic Marxism<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marxist_humanism>that dominated many western universities during the 1970s.
>> [*citation needed
>> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Citation_needed>*] In contrast
>> to Humanistic Marxism, Althusser stressed that Marxism was a science<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Science>that examined objective structures,
>> [1] <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Structural_Marxism#cite_note-1> and he
>> believed that humanistic <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marxist_humanism>,
>> historistic <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Historicism#Karl_Marx> and phenomenological
>> Marxism <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_Marxism>, which was based on
>> Marx's early works, was caught in a "pre-scientific humanistic ideology".
>> [2] <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Structural_Marxism#cite_note-2>
>>
>> So scientific rationality is merely one *level* which implies other
>> levels of rationality in EXCESS [Merleau Ponty] of the scientific level of
>> rationality.  In other words *extensions* of rationality that are not
>> merely *scientific* but may be extended BEYOND the scientific
>> *perspectives* to include humanistic, historical, and
>> phenomenological/existential forms of rationality.
>> I am in over my head and using this medium to extend my understanding of
>> *rationality* and exploring what is dismissed as merely *pre-scientific*
>> humanistic ideology.
>> Your question is opening a *clearing* to imagine a *synthesis of
>> heideggerian phenomenology AND structural Marxism.
>> Larry
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sat, Nov 30, 2013 at 8:58 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe <
>> pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote:
>>
>>> I think hegel and marx begins their anaylsis where, as heidegger points
>>> out, husserl does...at the level of scientific rationality.  This they
>>> impute to species-being.  Heidegger's "being and time", I believe is the
>>> proper place to start if we want to understand intersubjectivity and
>>> empathy.  The attempt should be to synthesize heideggerian phenomenology
>>> with structural Marxism.
>>>
>>>
>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe
>>> President
>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc.
>>> www.mocombeian.com
>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com
>>>
>>> -------- Original message --------
>>> From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com
>>> Date: 11/30/2013  8:19 PM  (GMT-05:00)
>>> To: ablunden@mira.net,"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <
>>> xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>>> Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: intersubjectivity and perspective taking, po
>>> russkii
>>>
>>> Charles, and I. Addition to getting smith via Hegel, pretty certain that
>>> mead would have had fairly direct contact with smith's looking glass theory
>>> of the self (from Theory of MorAl Sentiments) from Charles Horton Cooley
>>> (who is often cited as the origi ator of the looking glass theory of the
>>> self). Is the looking glass theory of the self an example of perspective
>>> taking?
>>> Still no closer to an answer to mikes original question!
>>> Greg
>>>
>>> Sent from my iPhone
>>>
>>> On Nov 30, 2013, at 4:14 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>>>
>>> > Yes, Charles, it is well known that Hegel read and admired the work of
>>> the political economists and he also gave prominant place to the Scots in
>>> his History of Philosophy, namely, Reid, Beattie, Oswald and Douglas
>>> Stewart.
>>> > And Mead wrote in a letter that his I/Me dialectic was based on Hegel.
>>> >
>>> > Andy
>>> >
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> > *Andy Blunden*
>>> > http://home.mira.net/~andy/
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > Charles Bazerman wrote:
>>> >> Do any of you scholarly folk also know if there is a line of
>>> influence from the Scottish moralists to Hegel's views on perspective
>>> taking? Given the influence of the Scottish Enlightenment on U.S.
>>> education, I wouldn't be  surprised if that work got to Mead as well.  Chuck
>>> >>
>>> >> ----- Original Message -----
>>> >> From: Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>
>>> >> Date: Saturday, November 30, 2013 1:27 pm
>>> >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: intersubjectivity and perspective taking, po
>>> russkii
>>> >> To: Mike Cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>, "eXtended Mind, Culture,
>>> Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >>> Mike,
>>> >>> Not so dumb, I would think, since this is a very central part of
>>> Hegel's
>>> >>> social ontology of the subject. (Too) Simply put, self-consciousness
>>> arises
>>> >>> from our awareness that others are subjects just like ourselves.
>>> Here is
>>> >>> what I take to be Hegel's description of perspective-taking:
>>> >>> "It must cancel this its other. To do so is the sublation of that
>>> first
>>> >>> double meaning, and is therefore a second double meaning. First, it
>>> must
>>> >>> set itself to sublate the other independent being, in order thereby
>>> to
>>> >>> become certain of itself as true being, secondly, it thereupon
>>> proceeds to
>>> >>> sublate its own self, for this other is itself."
>>> >>>
>>> >>> This is, of course, the second paragraph in the introduction to
>>> Hegel's
>>> >>> Master/Slave dialectic (all 5 paragraphs of the intro are below). In
>>> that
>>> >>> tale, perspective-taking fails b.c. although the slave takes the
>>> >>> perspective of the master, the master has no reason to take the
>>> perspective
>>> >>> of the slave. This is imperfect recognition and does not allow for
>>> the full
>>> >>> constitution (consummation, following Bakhtin) of the subjects as
>>> fully
>>> >>> self-conscious.
>>> >>>
>>> >>> [There is good evidence that this was part of G. H. Mead's
>>> inspiration in
>>> >>> his development of perspective taking (but this is both debatable
>>> and, to
>>> >>> my mind, of little consequence).]
>>> >>>
>>> >>> I also wonder if some variant of perspective taking can be found in
>>> Marx's
>>> >>> early concept of species being, or perhaps in the idea of the
>>> relations of
>>> >>> persons one to another. It would seem that Marx's writings on the
>>> commodity
>>> >>> fetish are precisely a problem of perspective taking - the individual
>>> >>> participants no longer see that there are others who are full and
>>> rich
>>> >>> individuals like themselves; instead, other people become tools for
>>> >>> accomplishing MY aims. And it is this that communism is supposed to
>>> >>> reconcile - bringing all people into a deep appreciation of not just
>>> our
>>> >>> deep dependence upon one another, but also of our universal kinship,
>>> i.e.
>>> >>> our "mutuality of being" as Rupert Stasch has so eloquently put it.
>>> >>> Mutuality of being requires an understanding that other people are
>>> "just
>>> >>> like us".
>>> >>> Isn't that perspective taking?
>>> >>>
>>> >>> But I have no clue how or in what linguistic forms this would have
>>> made its
>>> >>> way from Hegel's and Marx's German to Vygotsky's Russian (if at
>>> all...).
>>> >>> -greg
>>> >>> p.s. psychological anthropologist Doug Hollan has been seriously
>>> looking
>>> >>> into "empathy" along with fellow psyc anth scholar C. Jason Throop.
>>> One of
>>> >>> Doug's pieces is listed in the email that just I'll forward in just a
>>> >>> minute to XMCA.
>>> >>>
>>> >>>
>>> >>> Full text of paras 179-184 from Phenomenology of Spirit:
>>> >>>
>>> >>> Φ <
>>> >>> 179 <
>>> >>> . Self-consciousness has before it another self-consciousness; it
>>> has come
>>> >>> outside itself. This has a double significance. First it has lost
>>> its own
>>> >>> self, since it finds itself as an *other* being; secondly, it has
>>> thereby
>>> >>> sublated that other, for it does not regard the other as essentially
>>> real,
>>> >>> but sees its own self in the other.
>>> >>>
>>> >>> Φ <
>>> >>> 180 <
>>> >>> . It must cancel this its other. To do so is the sublation of that
>>> first
>>> >>> double meaning, and is therefore a second double meaning. First, it
>>> must
>>> >>> set itself to sublate the other independent being, in order thereby
>>> to
>>> >>> become certain of itself as true being, secondly, it thereupon
>>> proceeds to
>>> >>> sublate its own self, for this other is itself.
>>> >>>
>>> >>> Φ <
>>> >>> 181 <
>>> >>> . This sublation in a double sense of its otherness in a double
>>> sense is at
>>> >>> the same time a return in a double sense into its self. For, firstly,
>>> >>> through sublation, it gets back itself, because it becomes one with
>>> itself
>>> >>> again through the cancelling of *its *otherness; but secondly, it
>>> likewise
>>> >>> gives otherness back again to the other self-consciousness, for it
>>> was
>>> >>> aware of being in the other, it cancels this its own being in the
>>> other and
>>> >>> thus lets the other again go free.
>>> >>>
>>> >>> Φ <
>>> >>> 182 <
>>> >>> . This process of self-consciousness in relation to another
>>> >>> self-consciousness has in this manner been represented as the action
>>> of one
>>> >>> alone. But this action on the part of the one has itself the double
>>> >>> significance of being at once its own action and the action of that
>>> other
>>> >>> as well. For the other is likewise independent, shut up within
>>> itself, and
>>> >>> there is nothing in it which is not there through itself. The first
>>> does
>>> >>> not have the object before it only in the passive form characteristic
>>> >>> primarily of the object of desire, but as an object existing
>>> independently
>>> >>> for itself, over which therefore it has no power to do anything for
>>> its own
>>> >>> behalf, if that object does not *per se *do what the first does to
>>> it. The
>>> >>> process then is absolutely the double process of both
>>> self-consciousnesses.
>>> >>> Each sees the other do the same as itself; each itself does what it
>>> demands
>>> >>> on the part of the other, and for that reason does what it does,
>>> only so
>>> >>> far as the other does the same. Action from one side only would be
>>> useless,
>>> >>> because what is to happen can only be brought about by means of both.
>>> >>>
>>> >>> Φ <
>>> >>> 183 <
>>> >>> . The action has then a *double entente* not only in the sense that
>>> it is
>>> >>> an act done to itself as well as to the other, but also in the sense
>>> that
>>> >>> the act *simpliciter* is the act of the one as well as of the other
>>> >>> regardless of their distinction.
>>> >>>
>>> >>> Φ <
>>> >>> 184 <
>>> >>> . In this movement we see the process repeated which came before us
>>> as the
>>> >>> play of forces; in the present case, however, it is found in
>>> consciousness.
>>> >>> What in the former had effect only for us [contemplating
>>> experience], holds
>>> >>> here for the terms themselves. The middle term is self-consciousness
>>> which
>>> >>> breaks itself up into the extremes; and each extreme is this
>>> interchange of
>>> >>> its own determinateness, and complete transition into the opposite.
>>> While
>>> >>> *qua* consciousness, it no doubt comes outside itself, still, in
>>> being
>>> >>> outside itself, it is at the same time restrained within itself, it
>>> exists
>>> >>> for itself, and its self-externalization is for consciousness.
>>> >>> *Consciousness *finds that it immediately is and is not another
>>> >>> consciousness, as also that this other is for itself only when it
>>> cancels
>>> >>> itself as existing for itself , and has self-existence only in the
>>> >>> self-existence of the other. Each is the mediating term to the other,
>>> >>> through which each mediates and unites itself with itself; and each
>>> is to
>>> >>> itself and to the other an immediate self-existing reality, which,
>>> at the
>>> >>> same time, exists thus for itself only through this mediation. They
>>> >>> recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another.
>>> >>>
>>> >>>
>>> >>> On Sat, Nov 30, 2013 at 10:08 AM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>> >>>
>>> >>>
>>> >>>> Hi Larry-- You are almost certainly way ahead of me on these
>>> issues.
>>> >>> My
>>> >>>
>>> >>>> interest at present is on the development of social and relational
>>> >>>> perspective taking. From, say, a Vygotskian, or Bakhtinian point
>>> of
>>> >>> view
>>> >>>
>>> >>>> (perspective!) what are the socio-cultural contributions to
>>> interpersonal
>>> >>>> understanding that we associated with psychological perspective
>>> taking,
>>> >>>> perhaps just the ability to "stand in someone else's shoes"?
>>> Empathy
>>> >>> has to
>>> >>>
>>> >>>> be one potential contributor, and...... (in the Russian
>>> traditionS
>>> >>> we often
>>> >>>
>>> >>>> discuss)?
>>> >>>>
>>> >>>> Perhaps just a really dumb question. Wouldn't be the first time!!
>>> >>>> mike
>>> >>>>
>>> >>>>
>>> >>>>
>>> >>>>
>>> >>>> On Sat, Nov 30, 2013 at 6:37 AM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com
>>> >
>>> >>> wrote:
>>> >>>
>>> >>>>> Mike,
>>> >>>>> I am wondering if you could expand on your question that is
>>> >>> referring to
>>> >>>
>>> >>>>> perspective taking and its possible meanings. I believe
>>> this
>>> >>> question of
>>> >>>
>>> >>>>> perspective taking is also converging with your other question
>>> on
>>> >>> *kinds*
>>> >>>
>>> >>>>> or *types* of persons. [personhood like childhood]
>>> >>>>>
>>> >>>>> I am asking for more clarity on your *bad question* which seems
>>> to
>>> >>> be
>>> >>>
>>> >>>>> central to the multiple discourses on *sociocultural* theory and
>>> practice
>>> >>>>> This *space* or *zone* of  questioning which opens up a
>>> clearing
>>> >>> for the
>>> >>>
>>> >>>>> multiple notions of the concept *intersubjectivity* and its
>>> convergence
>>> >>>>> with the concept of *perspective-taking* and how this topic is
>>> explored
>>> >>>> in
>>> >>>>
>>> >>>>> Russian translation is a topic I want to explore further.
>>> >>>>>
>>> >>>>> I wanted to offer a quote which I found interesting
>>> exploring
>>> >>> notions of
>>> >>>
>>> >>>>> *identity* AS KINDS [categories]
>>> >>>>>
>>> >>>>> Oakeshott argues that "This distinction, then, between 'goings-on'
>>> >>>>> identified as themselves
>>> >>>>>
>>> >>>>> exhibitions of intelligence and 'goings-on' which may be made
>>> >>>> intelligible
>>> >>>>
>>> >>>>> but are not themselves
>>> >>>>>
>>> >>>>> intelligent, is not a distinction between mental and physical or
>>> between
>>> >>>>> minds and bodies regarded
>>> >>>>>
>>> >>>>> as entities. It is a distinction within the engagement of
>>> understanding,
>>> >>>> a
>>> >>>>
>>> >>>>> distinction between
>>> >>>>>
>>> >>>>> 'sciences' (that is, ideal characters) and the identities
>>> with
>>> >>> which they
>>> >>>
>>> >>>>> are concerned. And in
>>> >>>>>
>>> >>>>> calling it a categorial distinction what is being asserted is
>>> that
>>> >>> the
>>> >>>
>>> >>>>> understanding of identities
>>> >>>>>
>>> >>>>> recognized as themselves exhibitions of intelligence cannot be
>>> 'reduced'
>>> >>>>> to the understanding of
>>> >>>>>
>>> >>>>> identities no so recognized", *On Human Conduct*, pp. 14-15.
>>> >>>>>
>>> >>>>>
>>> >>>>> I was intrigued by Oakeshott's understanding of *sciences*
>>> >>> [multiple] AS
>>> >>>
>>> >>>>> RESPRESENTING IDEAL KINDS [categorical distinctions]. This
>>> realm
>>> >>> of KINDS
>>> >>>
>>> >>>>> AS perspective taking moves the question of intersubjectivity to
>>> converge
>>> >>>>> with *culture* and *history*.
>>> >>>>>
>>> >>>>> I will pause, but this topic is endlessly fascinating.
>>> >>>>>
>>> >>>>> Larry Purss
>>> >>>>>
>>> >>>>>
>>> >>>>>
>>> >>>>>
>>> >>>>> On Fri, Nov 29, 2013 at 10:21 AM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>> >>>>>
>>> >>>>>
>>> >>>>>> Dear Russian experts on XMCA
>>> >>>>>>
>>> >>>>>> I have been reading about the development of intersubjectivity and
>>> >>>>>> perspective taking, including an article by scholars who say
>>> they
>>> >>> are
>>> >>>
>>> >>>>>> working in the "sociocultural perspective." It got me to
>>> >>> wondering how
>>> >>>
>>> >>>>>> Russian scholars discuss these topics. No Russians are cited in
>>> the
>>> >>>> work I
>>> >>>>
>>> >>>>>> am reading, but Mead and
>>> >>>>>> Piaget.
>>> >>>>>>
>>> >>>>>> When looking at suggested translations into Russian from
>>> English
>>> >>> for
>>> >>>
>>> >>>> these
>>> >>>>
>>> >>>>>> terms, the cognate
>>> >>>>>> perspectiv seems to appear almost everywhere. The phrase
>>> for
>>> >>> "point of
>>> >>>
>>> >>>>>> view" is literally that,
>>> >>>>>> tochka-point  zreniya-seeing, genetive case.
>>> >>>>>>
>>> >>>>>> I figure I am blind to something obvious here, but darned if
>>> I
>>> >>> know what
>>> >>>
>>> >>>>>> it
>>> >>>>>> is. Any help out there??
>>> >>>>>> mike
>>> >>>>>>
>>> >>>>>> P
>>> >>>>>> S-- Eugene wrote an interesting article in MCA a while back on
>>> >>>>>> intersubjectivity and there are Vygotsky
>>> >>>>>> refs but they do not seem to go to the question I am
>>> asking.
>>> >>> Perhaps its
>>> >>>
>>> >>>>>> just my bad question!
>>> >>>
>>> >>> --
>>> >>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
>>> >>> Visiting Assistant Professor
>>> >>> Department of Anthropology
>>> >>> 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
>>> >>> Brigham Young University
>>> >>> Provo, UT 84602
>>> >>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
>>> >
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>
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