[Xmca-l] Re: intersubjectivity and perspective taking, po russkii

[Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>]

This is a direct link to the book
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0022/002238/223830E.pdf<https://mymail.vsb.bc.ca/OWA/redir.aspx?C=Y0ABaXqqBUOHY_44FHGENQ5-WDkNw9AIqBadDtF8Qdai01f0pI1LBC7DW77zb0q1_MeI8nlZ7so.&URL=http%3a%2f%2funesdoc.unesco.org%2fimages%2f0022%2f002238%2f223830E.pdf>

Sandra has worked with Mike and been discussed on XMCA previously

Larry


On Mon, Dec 2, 2013 at 7:48 AM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:

> Paul,
> The point may be to *see through* or go *beyond* the ideological AS
> reified *objectivity* and *return* to notions of *humanity* as emerging
> WITHIN dialogue
>
> Here is a free book that may be of interest in this regard. It develops a
> dialogical perspective on resistance in Rio
>
>
> https://mymail.vsb.bc.ca/OWA/?ae=Item&t=IPM.Note&id=RgAAAABcrMEZpb%2b8RJLCMeBKJvxxBwDeh%2bQItXNbTpnLOftNk%2bwXAAAAUCKsAAB%2fylgzNh6DSbgzmJ7GjNoSAACiyLfjAAAJ
>
> and is published by the UN
>
>
> On Sun, Dec 1, 2013 at 9:08 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe <
> pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote:
>
>> Larry,
>>
>> If the ideological, via reification, becomes tantamount to the
>> ontological whats the point of and for dialogue?
>>
>>
>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe
>> President
>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc.
>> www.mocombeian.com
>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com
>>
>>
>>
>> -------- Original message --------
>> From: Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
>> Date: 12/01/2013 2:09 PM (GMT-05:00)
>> To: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" <pmocombe@mocombeian.com>
>> Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>,Andy
>> Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
>> Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: intersubjectivity and perspective taking, po
>> russkii
>>
>>
>> Paul,
>> Once any ideology becomes reified it becomes the *nature of reality* and
>> therefore can become an object of scientific investigations.
>> However, taking a wider perspective [bild] the ontological nature of THIS
>> transformation may come into view. Therefore any ideology is a reification
>> of this ontological *realm*when it  comes into view as this
>> transformational process [dialectical, dialogical, analogical]
>>
>> Returning to the question of *intersubjectivity*, I wonder how central
>> the question of *friendship* [philia] is to this concept.  I am attempting
>> to *bridge* back to the notion of *intimacy* [what the medieval called
>> *tenderness*] whichconcept has become transformed into a confidence in
>> private judgement
>> Ardent suggests, as a consequence of THIS HISTORY [transformation] philia
>> and the common good has withdrawn [dispersed] and civil society becomes
>> transformed from civic *virtues* to realms of power.
>> For the ancient Greeks the essence of philia was not solely a matter of
>> *intimacy* but was fundamentally a realm of DIALOGUE. tHE CONSTANT
>> INTERCHANGE OF TALK CREATED THE COMMON GOOD.
>>
>> This is one aspect of *intersubjectivity* and the dialectic of private
>> and public realms of intersubjectivity
>> Larry
>>
>>
>> On Sun, Dec 1, 2013 at 10:03 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe <
>> pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Larry I agree with althusser because  once capitalism becomes reified
>>> through ideologies and ideological apparatuses in the material world it
>>> becomes the nature of reality as such...hence the realm for scientific
>>> investigations.  However, I do not believe that that Gramscian/althusserian
>>> reification negates the ontological nature of being as such highlighted by
>>> heidegger in "being and time"  the job of the social philosopher is to
>>> outline where ideology attempts to be ontology and correct it.
>>>
>>>
>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe
>>> President
>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc.
>>> www.mocombeian.com
>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> -------- Original message --------
>>> From: Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
>>> Date: 12/01/2013 10:04 AM (GMT-05:00)
>>> To: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" <pmocombe@mocombeian.com>,"eXtended Mind,
>>> Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>>> Cc: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
>>> Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: intersubjectivity and perspective taking, po
>>> russkii
>>>
>>>
>>> Paul,
>>> Your comment that Hegel, and Marx begin their analysis at the level of
>>> *scientific rationality* AS species-being is an interesting opening.
>>> I went to Wikipedia to search out *structural Marxism* and this is the
>>> first paragraph.
>>>
>>> :Structural Marxism arose in opposition to the humanistic Marxism<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marxist_humanism>that dominated many western universities during the 1970s.
>>> [*citation needed
>>> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Citation_needed>*] In contrast
>>> to Humanistic Marxism, Althusser stressed that Marxism was a science<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Science>that examined objective structures,
>>> [1] <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Structural_Marxism#cite_note-1> and
>>> he believed that humanistic<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marxist_humanism>,
>>> historistic <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Historicism#Karl_Marx> and phenomenological
>>> Marxism <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_Marxism>, which was based on
>>> Marx's early works, was caught in a "pre-scientific humanistic ideology".
>>> [2] <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Structural_Marxism#cite_note-2>
>>>
>>> So scientific rationality is merely one *level* which implies other
>>> levels of rationality in EXCESS [Merleau Ponty] of the scientific level of
>>> rationality.  In other words *extensions* of rationality that are not
>>> merely *scientific* but may be extended BEYOND the scientific
>>> *perspectives* to include humanistic, historical, and
>>> phenomenological/existential forms of rationality.
>>> I am in over my head and using this medium to extend my understanding of
>>> *rationality* and exploring what is dismissed as merely *pre-scientific*
>>> humanistic ideology.
>>> Your question is opening a *clearing* to imagine a *synthesis of
>>> heideggerian phenomenology AND structural Marxism.
>>> Larry
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sat, Nov 30, 2013 at 8:58 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe <
>>> pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> I think hegel and marx begins their anaylsis where, as heidegger points
>>>> out, husserl does...at the level of scientific rationality.  This they
>>>> impute to species-being.  Heidegger's "being and time", I believe is the
>>>> proper place to start if we want to understand intersubjectivity and
>>>> empathy.  The attempt should be to synthesize heideggerian phenomenology
>>>> with structural Marxism.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe
>>>> President
>>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc.
>>>> www.mocombeian.com
>>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com
>>>>
>>>> -------- Original message --------
>>>> From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com
>>>> Date: 11/30/2013  8:19 PM  (GMT-05:00)
>>>> To: ablunden@mira.net,"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <
>>>> xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>>>> Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: intersubjectivity and perspective taking, po
>>>> russkii
>>>>
>>>> Charles, and I. Addition to getting smith via Hegel, pretty certain
>>>> that mead would have had fairly direct contact with smith's looking glass
>>>> theory of the self (from Theory of MorAl Sentiments) from Charles Horton
>>>> Cooley (who is often cited as the origi ator of the looking glass theory of
>>>> the self). Is the looking glass theory of the self an example of
>>>> perspective taking?
>>>> Still no closer to an answer to mikes original question!
>>>> Greg
>>>>
>>>> Sent from my iPhone
>>>>
>>>> On Nov 30, 2013, at 4:14 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> > Yes, Charles, it is well known that Hegel read and admired the work
>>>> of the political economists and he also gave prominant place to the Scots
>>>> in his History of Philosophy, namely, Reid, Beattie, Oswald and Douglas
>>>> Stewart.
>>>> > And Mead wrote in a letter that his I/Me dialectic was based on Hegel.
>>>> >
>>>> > Andy
>>>> >
>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>> > *Andy Blunden*
>>>> > http://home.mira.net/~andy/
>>>> >
>>>> >
>>>> > Charles Bazerman wrote:
>>>> >> Do any of you scholarly folk also know if there is a line of
>>>> influence from the Scottish moralists to Hegel's views on perspective
>>>> taking? Given the influence of the Scottish Enlightenment on U.S.
>>>> education, I wouldn't be  surprised if that work got to Mead as well.  Chuck
>>>> >>
>>>> >> ----- Original Message -----
>>>> >> From: Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>
>>>> >> Date: Saturday, November 30, 2013 1:27 pm
>>>> >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: intersubjectivity and perspective taking, po
>>>> russkii
>>>> >> To: Mike Cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>, "eXtended Mind, Culture,
>>>> Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>>>> >>
>>>> >>
>>>> >>> Mike,
>>>> >>> Not so dumb, I would think, since this is a very central part of
>>>> Hegel's
>>>> >>> social ontology of the subject. (Too) Simply put,
>>>> self-consciousness arises
>>>> >>> from our awareness that others are subjects just like ourselves.
>>>> Here is
>>>> >>> what I take to be Hegel's description of perspective-taking:
>>>> >>> "It must cancel this its other. To do so is the sublation of that
>>>> first
>>>> >>> double meaning, and is therefore a second double meaning. First, it
>>>> must
>>>> >>> set itself to sublate the other independent being, in order thereby
>>>> to
>>>> >>> become certain of itself as true being, secondly, it thereupon
>>>> proceeds to
>>>> >>> sublate its own self, for this other is itself."
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>> This is, of course, the second paragraph in the introduction to
>>>> Hegel's
>>>> >>> Master/Slave dialectic (all 5 paragraphs of the intro are below).
>>>> In that
>>>> >>> tale, perspective-taking fails b.c. although the slave takes the
>>>> >>> perspective of the master, the master has no reason to take the
>>>> perspective
>>>> >>> of the slave. This is imperfect recognition and does not allow for
>>>> the full
>>>> >>> constitution (consummation, following Bakhtin) of the subjects as
>>>> fully
>>>> >>> self-conscious.
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>> [There is good evidence that this was part of G. H. Mead's
>>>> inspiration in
>>>> >>> his development of perspective taking (but this is both debatable
>>>> and, to
>>>> >>> my mind, of little consequence).]
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>> I also wonder if some variant of perspective taking can be found in
>>>> Marx's
>>>> >>> early concept of species being, or perhaps in the idea of the
>>>> relations of
>>>> >>> persons one to another. It would seem that Marx's writings on the
>>>> commodity
>>>> >>> fetish are precisely a problem of perspective taking - the
>>>> individual
>>>> >>> participants no longer see that there are others who are full and
>>>> rich
>>>> >>> individuals like themselves; instead, other people become tools for
>>>> >>> accomplishing MY aims. And it is this that communism is supposed to
>>>> >>> reconcile - bringing all people into a deep appreciation of not
>>>> just our
>>>> >>> deep dependence upon one another, but also of our universal
>>>> kinship, i.e.
>>>> >>> our "mutuality of being" as Rupert Stasch has so eloquently put it.
>>>> >>> Mutuality of being requires an understanding that other people are
>>>> "just
>>>> >>> like us".
>>>> >>> Isn't that perspective taking?
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>> But I have no clue how or in what linguistic forms this would have
>>>> made its
>>>> >>> way from Hegel's and Marx's German to Vygotsky's Russian (if at
>>>> all...).
>>>> >>> -greg
>>>> >>> p.s. psychological anthropologist Doug Hollan has been seriously
>>>> looking
>>>> >>> into "empathy" along with fellow psyc anth scholar C. Jason Throop.
>>>> One of
>>>> >>> Doug's pieces is listed in the email that just I'll forward in just
>>>> a
>>>> >>> minute to XMCA.
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>> Full text of paras 179-184 from Phenomenology of Spirit:
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>> Φ <
>>>> >>> 179 <
>>>> >>> . Self-consciousness has before it another self-consciousness; it
>>>> has come
>>>> >>> outside itself. This has a double significance. First it has lost
>>>> its own
>>>> >>> self, since it finds itself as an *other* being; secondly, it has
>>>> thereby
>>>> >>> sublated that other, for it does not regard the other as
>>>> essentially real,
>>>> >>> but sees its own self in the other.
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>> Φ <
>>>> >>> 180 <
>>>> >>> . It must cancel this its other. To do so is the sublation of that
>>>> first
>>>> >>> double meaning, and is therefore a second double meaning. First, it
>>>> must
>>>> >>> set itself to sublate the other independent being, in order thereby
>>>> to
>>>> >>> become certain of itself as true being, secondly, it thereupon
>>>> proceeds to
>>>> >>> sublate its own self, for this other is itself.
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>> Φ <
>>>> >>> 181 <
>>>> >>> . This sublation in a double sense of its otherness in a double
>>>> sense is at
>>>> >>> the same time a return in a double sense into its self. For,
>>>> firstly,
>>>> >>> through sublation, it gets back itself, because it becomes one with
>>>> itself
>>>> >>> again through the cancelling of *its *otherness; but secondly, it
>>>> likewise
>>>> >>> gives otherness back again to the other self-consciousness, for it
>>>> was
>>>> >>> aware of being in the other, it cancels this its own being in the
>>>> other and
>>>> >>> thus lets the other again go free.
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>> Φ <
>>>> >>> 182 <
>>>> >>> . This process of self-consciousness in relation to another
>>>> >>> self-consciousness has in this manner been represented as the
>>>> action of one
>>>> >>> alone. But this action on the part of the one has itself the double
>>>> >>> significance of being at once its own action and the action of that
>>>> other
>>>> >>> as well. For the other is likewise independent, shut up within
>>>> itself, and
>>>> >>> there is nothing in it which is not there through itself. The first
>>>> does
>>>> >>> not have the object before it only in the passive form
>>>> characteristic
>>>> >>> primarily of the object of desire, but as an object existing
>>>> independently
>>>> >>> for itself, over which therefore it has no power to do anything for
>>>> its own
>>>> >>> behalf, if that object does not *per se *do what the first does to
>>>> it. The
>>>> >>> process then is absolutely the double process of both
>>>> self-consciousnesses.
>>>> >>> Each sees the other do the same as itself; each itself does what it
>>>> demands
>>>> >>> on the part of the other, and for that reason does what it does,
>>>> only so
>>>> >>> far as the other does the same. Action from one side only would be
>>>> useless,
>>>> >>> because what is to happen can only be brought about by means of
>>>> both.
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>> Φ <
>>>> >>> 183 <
>>>> >>> . The action has then a *double entente* not only in the sense that
>>>> it is
>>>> >>> an act done to itself as well as to the other, but also in the
>>>> sense that
>>>> >>> the act *simpliciter* is the act of the one as well as of the other
>>>> >>> regardless of their distinction.
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>> Φ <
>>>> >>> 184 <
>>>> >>> . In this movement we see the process repeated which came before us
>>>> as the
>>>> >>> play of forces; in the present case, however, it is found in
>>>> consciousness.
>>>> >>> What in the former had effect only for us [contemplating
>>>> experience], holds
>>>> >>> here for the terms themselves. The middle term is
>>>> self-consciousness which
>>>> >>> breaks itself up into the extremes; and each extreme is this
>>>> interchange of
>>>> >>> its own determinateness, and complete transition into the opposite.
>>>> While
>>>> >>> *qua* consciousness, it no doubt comes outside itself, still, in
>>>> being
>>>> >>> outside itself, it is at the same time restrained within itself, it
>>>> exists
>>>> >>> for itself, and its self-externalization is for consciousness.
>>>> >>> *Consciousness *finds that it immediately is and is not another
>>>> >>> consciousness, as also that this other is for itself only when it
>>>> cancels
>>>> >>> itself as existing for itself , and has self-existence only in the
>>>> >>> self-existence of the other. Each is the mediating term to the
>>>> other,
>>>> >>> through which each mediates and unites itself with itself; and each
>>>> is to
>>>> >>> itself and to the other an immediate self-existing reality, which,
>>>> at the
>>>> >>> same time, exists thus for itself only through this mediation. They
>>>> >>> recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another.
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>> On Sat, Nov 30, 2013 at 10:08 AM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>>> Hi Larry-- You are almost certainly way ahead of me on these
>>>> issues.
>>>> >>> My
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>>> interest at present is on the development of social and relational
>>>> >>>> perspective taking. From, say, a Vygotskian, or Bakhtinian point
>>>> of
>>>> >>> view
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>>> (perspective!) what are the socio-cultural contributions to
>>>> interpersonal
>>>> >>>> understanding that we associated with psychological perspective
>>>> taking,
>>>> >>>> perhaps just the ability to "stand in someone else's shoes"?
>>>> Empathy
>>>> >>> has to
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>>> be one potential contributor, and...... (in the Russian
>>>> traditionS
>>>> >>> we often
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>>> discuss)?
>>>> >>>>
>>>> >>>> Perhaps just a really dumb question. Wouldn't be the first time!!
>>>> >>>> mike
>>>> >>>>
>>>> >>>>
>>>> >>>>
>>>> >>>>
>>>> >>>> On Sat, Nov 30, 2013 at 6:37 AM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com
>>>> >
>>>> >>> wrote:
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>>>> Mike,
>>>> >>>>> I am wondering if you could expand on your question that
>>>> is
>>>> >>> referring to
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>>>> perspective taking and its possible meanings. I believe
>>>> this
>>>> >>> question of
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>>>> perspective taking is also converging with your other question
>>>> on
>>>> >>> *kinds*
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>>>> or *types* of persons. [personhood like childhood]
>>>> >>>>>
>>>> >>>>> I am asking for more clarity on your *bad question* which seems
>>>> to
>>>> >>> be
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>>>> central to the multiple discourses on *sociocultural* theory and
>>>> practice
>>>> >>>>> This *space* or *zone* of  questioning which opens up a
>>>> clearing
>>>> >>> for the
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>>>> multiple notions of the concept *intersubjectivity* and its
>>>> convergence
>>>> >>>>> with the concept of *perspective-taking* and how this topic is
>>>> explored
>>>> >>>> in
>>>> >>>>
>>>> >>>>> Russian translation is a topic I want to explore further.
>>>> >>>>>
>>>> >>>>> I wanted to offer a quote which I found interesting
>>>> exploring
>>>> >>> notions of
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>>>> *identity* AS KINDS [categories]
>>>> >>>>>
>>>> >>>>> Oakeshott argues that "This distinction, then, between 'goings-on'
>>>> >>>>> identified as themselves
>>>> >>>>>
>>>> >>>>> exhibitions of intelligence and 'goings-on' which may be made
>>>> >>>> intelligible
>>>> >>>>
>>>> >>>>> but are not themselves
>>>> >>>>>
>>>> >>>>> intelligent, is not a distinction between mental and physical or
>>>> between
>>>> >>>>> minds and bodies regarded
>>>> >>>>>
>>>> >>>>> as entities. It is a distinction within the engagement of
>>>> understanding,
>>>> >>>> a
>>>> >>>>
>>>> >>>>> distinction between
>>>> >>>>>
>>>> >>>>> 'sciences' (that is, ideal characters) and the identities
>>>> with
>>>> >>> which they
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>>>> are concerned. And in
>>>> >>>>>
>>>> >>>>> calling it a categorial distinction what is being asserted is
>>>> that
>>>> >>> the
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>>>> understanding of identities
>>>> >>>>>
>>>> >>>>> recognized as themselves exhibitions of intelligence cannot be
>>>> 'reduced'
>>>> >>>>> to the understanding of
>>>> >>>>>
>>>> >>>>> identities no so recognized", *On Human Conduct*, pp. 14-15.
>>>> >>>>>
>>>> >>>>>
>>>> >>>>> I was intrigued by Oakeshott's understanding of *sciences*
>>>> >>> [multiple] AS
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>>>> RESPRESENTING IDEAL KINDS [categorical distinctions]. This
>>>> realm
>>>> >>> of KINDS
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>>>> AS perspective taking moves the question of intersubjectivity to
>>>> converge
>>>> >>>>> with *culture* and *history*.
>>>> >>>>>
>>>> >>>>> I will pause, but this topic is endlessly fascinating.
>>>> >>>>>
>>>> >>>>> Larry Purss
>>>> >>>>>
>>>> >>>>>
>>>> >>>>>
>>>> >>>>>
>>>> >>>>> On Fri, Nov 29, 2013 at 10:21 AM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>> >>>>>
>>>> >>>>>
>>>> >>>>>> Dear Russian experts on XMCA
>>>> >>>>>>
>>>> >>>>>> I have been reading about the development of intersubjectivity
>>>> and
>>>> >>>>>> perspective taking, including an article by scholars who say
>>>> they
>>>> >>> are
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>>>>> working in the "sociocultural perspective." It got me
>>>> to
>>>> >>> wondering how
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>>>>> Russian scholars discuss these topics. No Russians are cited in
>>>> the
>>>> >>>> work I
>>>> >>>>
>>>> >>>>>> am reading, but Mead and
>>>> >>>>>> Piaget.
>>>> >>>>>>
>>>> >>>>>> When looking at suggested translations into Russian from
>>>> English
>>>> >>> for
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>>> these
>>>> >>>>
>>>> >>>>>> terms, the cognate
>>>> >>>>>> perspectiv seems to appear almost everywhere. The phrase
>>>> for
>>>> >>> "point of
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>>>>> view" is literally that,
>>>> >>>>>> tochka-point  zreniya-seeing, genetive case.
>>>> >>>>>>
>>>> >>>>>> I figure I am blind to something obvious here, but darned if
>>>> I
>>>> >>> know what
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>>>>> it
>>>> >>>>>> is. Any help out there??
>>>> >>>>>> mike
>>>> >>>>>>
>>>> >>>>>> P
>>>> >>>>>> S-- Eugene wrote an interesting article in MCA a while back on
>>>> >>>>>> intersubjectivity and there are Vygotsky
>>>> >>>>>> refs but they do not seem to go to the question I am
>>>> asking.
>>>> >>> Perhaps its
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>>>>> just my bad question!
>>>> >>>
>>>> >>> --
>>>> >>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
>>>> >>> Visiting Assistant Professor
>>>> >>> Department of Anthropology
>>>> >>> 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
>>>> >>> Brigham Young University
>>>> >>> Provo, UT 84602
>>>> >>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
>>>> >
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
>
Status: O