[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
Re: [xmca] Peter Smagorinsky on concepts
Dear Huw,
Limelight then! Thank you for the invitation - though I'm reminded of an
occasion when I was included in playing football amongst the football
playing relatives in a family reunion. The recognition -(or acknowledgement
Greg ??) was shown by being offered the ball right in front of the goal,
and instead of the graceful placing by artful touch - I came out with a too
hard kick which sent the ball over the garden fence:)) with a feeling of
being really brutish in nature.
Mike has started another thread, and also the discussion of rising from the
abstrat to concrete and concepts forming in activity, hasn't had the
expansion of Vasilyuk on another thread. So maybe this one, to acknowledge
Peter Smagorinky's video referencing education of future teachers ( as I
remember mention), might use this discussion between andy and your self to
revisit what is so difficult, that Peter has as 'gegenstand'.
My tentative questions :
Is it that in teacher education there aren't yet those 'narrowing'
abstractions ( as you discussed in Economics e.g narrowing focus and
abstractions refined from 'imagined population' ) 'to begin enquiry from'?
Is it the case that each student needs to go through that 'narrowing' and
find their own personalised ' meaningful/ contentful abstractions', albeit
drawing from historical sources ?
Is it maybe that this analytic process needs to make sense in a students
biography, as Vasilyuks schemas might help support? [ other threads maybe
help with that]
Is it that conditions of emotional 'safe' places to explore (as Larry
suggests) are limited in practical settings for 'practice-learning' , and
so students are 'obliged' to adapt to what vasilyuk terms 'realistic
experiencing', rather than reaching 'creative experiencing'?/
I'm not 'in' teacher training , so can't pursue these with Peter very
closely, but many professional education 'courses' have been enthused by
'The Reflective Practitioner' from the 80's - yet find that they reach
limits, students feel exposed in the 'frameworks' supported and 'withdraw'
again. [ I am using my recent contact with a 'professional doctoral course
in Engineering researcher' as my source in this, and also workshops in Law
educator contexts] . My 'curiosity' is in the 'scientific thinking' aspect
possible in relations here.
As you can hear, I'm taken with reading Vasilyuk at the moment - so that's
my football:)
Christine.
On Thu, Jan 19, 2012 at 7:44 PM, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>wrote:
> On 19 January 2012 18:06, Christine Schweighart <schweighartc@gmail.com
> >wrote:
>
> > Hi Huw,
> >
> > I was distinguishing two forms of using a 'systems concept' - happy to
> go
> > to another thread with that. 'Using' the notion systems in two different
> > ways.
> > When you mention 'perceive systems', is where I find useful to bring in
> > distinction of 'life-world' .
>
>
> That's fine by me, Christine. I am not too fussed at this level of
> discussion whether you prefer to say within or through.
>
> My referring to system, material, form, structure and rising to the
> concrete was serving to respond to Andy, which I think we've concluded.
> Though I'm happy to see where you take the conversation.
>
> Huw
>
>
> > Here in our cognition we somehow 'see' the
> > world as if 'outside' , yet as a fruit of science and philosophy, we can
> > become aware that this is 'an appearance' our cognition creates. ( There
> is
> > much mainstream discussion of this 'trick' of mind). I encountered this
> > through Maturana's work in science, following upon my study of an enquiry
> > approach identified as in the 'footsteps' of Husserl through Checkland at
> > Lancaster ( both Maturana and Checkland are UK Systems Society
> medallists).
> >
> > Now I am identifying resemblances of this distinction ( of Maturana's)
> in
> > Vasilyuk's writing, in the pages Andy posted in 'varying definitions of
> > perezhivanie' thread. You can read through and on p86 second last para
> > '"If, then, we consider the formula that the motive of activity is an
> > object which corresponds to a need of the individual as an attempt
> > to*generalise
> > * from the entire fund of empirical observations on stimulation of
> > activity - then it would appear that the formula will not stand up to
> > criticism.
> > But the whole point is that this formula is of quite another order. Its
> > claims are quite different, its statud in logic is quite different, from
> > those attributed to it by criticisms of the sort just described. That is
> to
> > say: it does not claim to take in the full variety of possible facts
> > pertaining to stimulation of individual activity; its logical nature is
> > that of an abstraction, and an abstraction of a fairly high order at
> that,
> > i.e. a statement from which a long road of theoretical 'ascent must be
> > travelled to bring us to concrete cases. That is not to say that the
> > statement itself, before any 'ascent' is made, does not contain some
> > concrete truth; the formula under discussion, like any abstract law, does
> > coincide with the actual or concrete state of affairs, but only when
> > certain conditions are fulfilled'" ( my italics)
> >
> > The 'whole point of another order' here is set out on Vasilyuk p85 2nd
> para
> > ' The most direct cause of this lack of acceptance was that commentators
> > saw the thesis not as a *meaningful* abstraction [ i.e. in lived-world my
> > italic] but as a generalisation from empirically observed facts on
> > stimulation of activity, to be verified by direct reference to those
> > facts."
> >
> > This is the distiction that Maturana makes between 'objectivity without
> > parenthesis' and his 'objectivity with parenthesis' in my earlier
> weblink,
> > i.e the without parenthesis is subject and object separate as entities .
> > Maturana's scientific work expands his argument from a different
> > perspective - his claim is that the domain of 'living' is not accessible
> to
> > us and our nervous 'system' is 'closed', although psychic 'systems' are
> > open and in the domain of our relational 'observing'. So here naming
> > 'system' does not 'correspond' to a separate entity 'in the world' - the
> > domains 'relate' but our naming does not reduce to pysiology - even
> though
> > achieved through physiological living they are two different domains.
> >
> > Here you comment:
> > > Just to say that this does
> > >> not reduce to the domain of our physiological living, actuality is
> > >> experienced 'in between'.
> > >>
> > >
> > On this I disagree.
> >
> >
> > >> Second on systems: I find helpful that 'system' as notion is in our
> > >> 'thought experiment domain' , not existing 'in the world' , so I'm
> > >> confused
> > >> trying to interpret
> > >>
> > >> "All systems comprise of material relations".
> > >>
> > >>
> > Because the "thought experiment domain" takes place within such a system.
> >
> >
> > So - on Maturana's work on cognition - 'through' rather than 'within'
> and
> > we have no direct access. System has significance which 'collapses' into
> > explanation. p38 Maturana expands this
> > "
> >
> > 1. Since a scientific explanation is the proposition of a generative
> > mechanism that gives rise as a consequence of its operation to the
> > phenomenon to be explained in a different phenomenal domain than the
> one
> > in
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > ------------------------------
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > *Page 38*
> >
> >
> >
> > which it takes place, a scientific explanation constitutes and validates
> > the existence of completely different nonintersecting phenomenal domains
> > that are intrinsically not reducible to each other.
> >
> > ..........Both the phenomenon to be explained and the generative
> mechanism
> > proposed are proposed by the observer in the flow of his or her praxis of
> > living, and as such they happen to him, and he or she lives them as
> > experience that arise in him out of nowhere. In his or her actual living,
> > the observer brings them forth *a priori*, even if afterwards he or she
> can
> > construct rational justifications for them.....
> > In fact, scientific explanations do not explain an independent world,
> they
> > explain the experience of the observer, and that is the world that he or
> > she lives. "
> >
> > http://www.enolagaia.com/M88Reality.html#Conversations
> >
> > So - someplace in these 'explanations' - which I'm open - or affirm- and
> > use criteria of acceptability with - there is perception of situation (
> our
> > created/imagined 'real') and perception ( as thought experiment) of a
> > corresponding 'generative ' explanation. There is also the biological
> > somatic feeling 'physiology' , with another sense of 'actuality'
> closely
> > related to that ( before analysis of awareness).
> >
> > As this unravels like spaghettis and macaronis, it might help to return
> to
> > Peter's video talk and think about azaleas he was killing in sunshine...
> I
> > will 'think it through' before I sketch it out - I 'kill many plants, but
> > am not too familiar with azaleas as they like acidic soil and in my bit
> of
> > Warwickshire that's another 'necesity' for flourishing in life they would
> > lack....
> > Christine.
> >
> > On Thu, Jan 19, 2012 at 1:32 PM, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
> > >wrote:
> >
> > > On 19 January 2012 12:32, Christine Schweighart <
> schweighartc@gmail.com
> > > >wrote:
> > >
> > > > Hello Huw, Andy
> > > >
> > > > I'd use 'generate' rather than 'works' - and I wouldn't use
> 'mirror'.
> > > The
> > > > two domains ( of the thought experiment and that of actuality in
> praxis
> > > > ,living) are relate not through 'complete description of particulars
> of
> > > > actuality' (we cannot fully capture all detail of living)
> corroborating
> > > > some image 'mirrored' -; but the relation is through 'operational
> > > > coherences' ( to use Maturana's expression) of praxis of living , or
> > > > 'criterion of acceptability' that we use in listening to accounts in
> > our
> > > > 'languaging' in conversations about experience. Just to say that this
> > > does
> > > > not reduce to the domain of our physiological living, actuality is
> > > > experienced 'in between'.
> > > >
> > > > Second on systems: I find helpful that 'system' as notion is in our
> > > > 'thought experiment domain' , not existing 'in the world' , so I'm
> > > confused
> > > > trying to interpret
> > > >
> > > > "All systems comprise of material relations".
> > > >
> > > > I am distinguishing a 'static' use of system , where to talk of parts
> > and
> > > > whole is not a dynamic analysis ; and a relational use - where
> > relations
> > > > afford identity ( not parts ). Is the identify affording capacity
> > > > 'material' in your sense?
> > > >
> > >
> > > I am referring to all systems, Christine. Distinguishing between them
> > > would probably be another thread.
> > >
> > > We use and perceive systems because we have finite minds. If we were
> > > omniscient we wouldn't need them, but then we wouldn't need words
> either.
> > >
> > > I am not sure in what sense you're using identity here. A sensible way
> > to
> > > proceed in identifying parts is to examine how they change over time
> with
> > > respect to other parts, if this is your drift?
> > >
> > > Huw
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > >
> > > > Apologies for the interruption both..
> > > > Christine
> > > >
> > > > Relevant Maturana paper:
> > > > http://www.enolagaia.com/M88Reality.html
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > On Thu, Jan 19, 2012 at 11:49 AM, Huw Lloyd <
> huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
> > > > >wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > On 19 January 2012 11:33, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > > Mmmm, hard to keep track of whatever it was we disagreed about
> > here,
> > > > Huw,
> > > > > > but my reaction to what you say would be that an abstract concept
> > > also
> > > > > > mirrors reality, but in a different way. The task of the thinker
> is
> > > to
> > > > > > "reconstruct the real in thought" and that begins from an
> > abstraction
> > > > > which
> > > > > > best encapsulates the whole Gestalt, but lacks concreteness, and
> > must
> > > > > > therefore mark the beginning point of a mental reconstruction of
> > the
> > > > > real.
> > > > > > Yes?
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Andy
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > The abstract system, in the sense portrayed by Marx, could not be
> > > > > implemented. It would not work. It would not be a system in its
> own
> > > > > right.
> > > > >
> > > > > Thought inheres within a material system. One is never outside
> > > > > materiality. Although the system of thought allows us to mentally
> > > > > construct pseudo systems that would not work if implemented.
> > > > >
> > > > > I think there can be value in beginning with abstractions (in this
> > > > sense),
> > > > > although Marx in the passage quoted seemed against it.
> > > > >
> > > > > Huw
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Huw Lloyd wrote:
> > > > > >
> > > > > >> My understanding is that a concrete conception, as referred to
> > here,
> > > > by
> > > > > >> Marx, refers to conceptions that authentically mirror the
> > concrete,
> > > > the
> > > > > >> material, the phenomena.
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >> All systems comprise of material relations.
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >> I refer to material here because this is directly related to
> > > > structure.
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >> Concrete is not merely a concentration of abstractions, it is a
> > > > > >> concentration that mirrors the phenomena of interest in the
> > concrete
> > > > > world.
> > > > > >> Alternatively if we were to implement our concrete conceptions
> we
> > > > would
> > > > > >> also have a concrete system.
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >> Huw
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > ______________________________**____________
> > > > > > _____
> > > > > > xmca mailing list
> > > > > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > > > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<
> > > > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
> > > > > >
> > > > > __________________________________________
> > > > > _____
> > > > > xmca mailing list
> > > > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > > > >
> > > > __________________________________________
> > > > _____
> > > > xmca mailing list
> > > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > > >
> > > __________________________________________
> > > _____
> > > xmca mailing list
> > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > >
> > __________________________________________
> > _____
> > xmca mailing list
> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >
> __________________________________________
> _____
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
__________________________________________
_____
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca