Re: [xmca] Peter Smagorinsky on concepts

[Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>]

Huw Lloyd wrote:
>  My interpretation is that equating thought (the business of thinking) 
> or a thought (singular consideration) and concept is a form of 
> metonymy -- perfectly adequate in most circumstances.  I would say 
> that the thought (in this form, if the talk is regarding logical 
> material) is making use of a (scientific) concept, or more likely many 
> (scientific) concepts, in a similar way to how I can behold a scene 
> and describe it. I am happy equating "The thought" with a conception, 
> idea, a conceiving, or even 'my concept' (short for my conception), 
> but not a (scientific) concept.  If we were to call 'a thought'  'a 
> scientific concept' it would seem, to me, to be an incredible fudge.
   I can't agree, Huw. To do justice to explaining a 
scientific or any
   actual (developed) concept would always require holding 
that concept
   in mind for a protracted period of time. Of course, if 
you just
   presented a definition, that would be over in a 
sentence, but a
   definition marks only the beginning of the process of 
development of
   a true concept.

> It's been a while since reading T&S etc.  Does Vygotsky talk about 
> concepts that are not scientific concepts, that would lead you to 
> believe that his use of the term 'concept' is referring to anything 
> other than a scientific concept?
   The main thing, in my view, is that Vygotsky is not an 
empiricist.
   He does not analyse objects and list their properties. 
Vygotsky
   deals (1) with /lines of development/ and (2) /ideal 
types/. Any
   actual concept (whether scientific or religious or 
everyday) is a
   process, not an entity, and its process includes both 
the ideal type
   of a true concept and the ideal type of an everyday concept.
   Otherwise it is a poor concept. He takes not only scientific
   concepts as the ideal type for a "true" concept, but a 
concepts of
   /Marxist social science/. Such concepts are the most 
pure of the
   type of true concept, inasmuch as they can begin only 
from book
   knowledge. Piaget took as his ideal type the concepts of 
physics.
   But these are not pure scientific concepts because they 
contain an
   element of development via sensorimotor practical 
experience, prior
   to scientific development. The scientific concept is 
/essentially/
   book knowledge /alone/. Further, there are many types of 
true
   concept, not only scientific - eg the concepts of the 
Orthodox
   Christian Church, soccer, Astrology, etc., but Vygotsky 
was not an
   empiricist. Like Pavlov, he chose to investigate just 
one type of
   relation, confident that by so doing he would unlock the 
key to all
   concepts. Most important to know is that Vyvgotsky did 
not believe
   that concepts were /things /which could be categorised 
into this or
   that type (pseudoconcepts). His program was to 
investigate the
   various ideal types of development of (all) actual concepts.


> BTW, in accord with Peter, my thinking on these lines has all come 
> from personal (auto-didactic) understanding and consideration.  Much 
> of Vygtosky resonated (and still resonates) with my appreciation of 
> these different problems, but I do not go to the texts as the source.  
> I think this helps with the fact that I am, to date, only competent 
> with English literature, for I'm always reading between the lines and 
> reflecting on my understanding which frees me, a little, from the 
> vagaries of translation.
    From one audo-didact psychologist to another (most of 
us on xmca are).

Andy
> Huw


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