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Re: [xmca] Interpreting Leontiev: functionalism and Anglo Finnish Insufficiences
Greg -- mediation through culture begins only after emergence of the state?
Mike
On Dec 25, 2011, at 7:40 AM, Victor Friedlander <victor@kfar-hanassi.org.il> wrote:
> On 25 December 2011 10:10, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>
>> I don't know Markell, but I read Williams as what I call billiard table
>> recognition. As you correctly say, individuals in the modern state get
>> recognition first of all through Right, and then on top of all that
>> through participation in a whole variety of mediating projects.
>> Mediation is the alpha and omega of Hegel and I don't see a single
>> glimmer of understanding of this in the writers I mentioned. Why? They
>> express the spirit of their age, in which individuals bang around like
>> billiard balls on a level playing field. They want to do away with
>> religion, but all they have to replace it with is individualism.
>>
>> There is a lot of be said for Mead and his rendering of the master-slave
>> narrative, but I think he remained unclear, and his subjects seem to be
>> able to generate the means of mediation from within themselves. OK up to
>> a point, but as Hegel says ...
>>
>> Also, what is overlooked is that the subjects of Hegel's narratives are
>> not first of all individuals, but are social subjects, and only
>> derivatively from that, persons.
>>
>>
>>
>> Andy
>>
>> Greg Thompson wrote:
>>
>>> Yes, Andy, your quote from Hegel makes clear that Hegel is tracing out
>>> subjective spirit as it emerges through recognition in phylogenetic
>>> history. But this is not to say that the process of recognition is all
>>> said and done once human social life has developed past this state.
>>> What does follow from this historical transformation, imho, is that
>>> recognition will take on a new quality with the emergence of civil
>>> society and the State - recognition becomes mediated in a whole new
>>> way; recognition becomes mediated through culture. This is not your
>>> father's recognition. It is not about struggle and battle, but it is
>>> about gaining rich individuality through the complex macrosocial array
>>> of identities that are on offer in society (and which are realized
>>> with respect to the complex metapragmatics of exhibiting and,
>>> critically, being recognized as having had exhibited, the signs and
>>> symbols of having had been such and such type of person in a given
>>> moment). To put it in a slightly different idiom, identity is like a
>>> right - it exists consequentially only through the recognition of
>>> others (writ large, i.e. recognition via thirdness (Peirce) or, if you
>>> prefer, a generalized other (Mead), in short, through recognition
>>> through culture). And just as property creates possibilities for
>>> agentive action, e.g. raising cattle or raising capital, so too do
>>> various identities create possibilities for agentive action (something
>>> that the con-man is well aware of, but which most of the rest of us
>>> seem too stuck in our "own" skin to realize).
>>>
>>> I also happen to think that this importance of culture to mediation
>>> comes through in both Markell's and Williams' readings of Hegel,
>>> although I think it is more clearly articulated in the former than in
>>> the latter (though I do have some issues with both). And I will need
>>> to go back through my notes and through your writings on Williams,
>>> Andy, to see where I think that you've got Williams wrong (but I'm not
>>> about to make a similar claim about your reading of Hegel - you're way
>>> out of my league in that regard!).
>>>
>>> But that will have to wait as there are more pressing matters right
>>> now (presents to wrap and cookies to eat and notes to leave!).
>>>
>>> And a very merry Christmas to you Andy.
>>> And to all a good night.
>>> -greg
>>>
>>> p.s., to mike I'm not sure at all how to connect this to Leontiev.
>>> Have much work to do in that connection... Motivation maybe?
>>>
>>> On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 6:24 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>> To let Hegel speak for himself. In The Subjective Spirit, after the
>>>> "master-servant" narrative, he says:
>>>>
>>>> "To prevent any possible misunderstandings with regard to the
>>>> standpoint just outlined, we must here remark that the fight for
>>>> recognition pushed to the extreme here indicated can only occur in
>>>> the natural state, where men exist only as single, separate
>>>> individuals; but it is absent in civil society and the State because
>>>> here the recognition for which the combatants fight already exists.
>>>> For although the State may originate in violence, it does not rest
>>>> on it" (1830/1971 §432n).
>>>>
>>>> Andy
>>>>
>>>> Andy Blunden wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> I have written/spoken eslewhere and at length on R R Williams (as well
>>>>> as
>>>>> Robert Brandom, Axel Honneth and others) and I regard their postmodern
>>>>> interpretation of recognition-without-culture. I regard it as the main
>>>>> barrier to an understanding of CHAT or Hegel of our times.
>>>>>
>>>>> Functionalism is interesting in the way you mentioned, in that it
>>>>> prefigured more contemporary currents which also do away with any
>>>>> centre of
>>>>> power but cast power as flowing through "capillaries" - a more radical
>>>>> conception of power-wthout-a-centre actually.
>>>>>
>>>>> Andy
>>>>>
>>>>> mike cole wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> Thanks for providing a link back to the Leontiev/functionalism
>>>>>> discussion, Andy.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The links appear to go right through your home hegelian territory and
>>>>>> link us up
>>>>>> to current discussions of "recognition." They also link up with ideas
>>>>>> linked to
>>>>>> Zygmund Bauman's "Liquid Modernity." And to the many other people whose
>>>>>> work
>>>>>> I know too little of.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> With respect to functionalism, casting national aspersions aside :-))
>>>>>> , it never occurred to me during my years getting trained to be a
>>>>>> learning
>>>>>> theorist in the
>>>>>> Skinnerian tradition, to consider the question of "where does the
>>>>>> function come from" or "who is exerting power here?" We starved the
>>>>>> rats
>>>>>> and they ran or died. Or coerced sophomores using grades as "part of
>>>>>> their
>>>>>> education."
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Then I went to Moscow. Where the caste of characters under discussion
>>>>>> were my hosts. Like I said. I am a slow learner on all these
>>>>>> complicated
>>>>>> matters. At the rate I am going I am never going to figure it all out!
>>>>>>
>>>>>> :-)
>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 23, 2011 at 9:05 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
>>>>>> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In my view, Mike, there were some basic questions asked and
>>>>>> answered by A N Leontyev in launching the enquiry we know as
>>>>>> "Activity Theory" are uneliminable, that is, he took a step which
>>>>>> has to be valued and continued. But it was a step at an extremely
>>>>>> fundamental level. It absolutely left open Stalinist-functionalist
>>>>>> directions and well as emancipatory directions. Personally, I
>>>>>> think the impact of the "planned economy" and the "leadership"
>>>>>> which understood "the laws of history" and the state which
>>>>>> represented a "higher stage of society" and so on, left a mark on
>>>>>> the whole current. But its basics, its fundamentals remain intact.
>>>>>> It only remains to agree on what those were.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> By-the-by, the home of "functionalism" is the USA.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> By-the-by again, in the early 80s I was a member of a Trotskyist
>>>>>> party which put Ilyenkov on a pedastal, and published new
>>>>>> translations of his work in English, which also came very close to
>>>>>> endorsing Lamarkism. It debated it, but the Party perished before
>>>>>> the debate was resolved.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>
>>>>>> mike cole wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I am being very slow here. How does this discussion resolve
>>>>>> or help me to
>>>>>> think more clearly about the issues in the subject line? the
>>>>>> issues over
>>>>>> different interpretations of Leontiev, their relation to
>>>>>> functionalism,
>>>>>> stalinism, fascism, etc?
>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 23, 2011 at 3:34 PM, Greg Thompson
>>>>>> <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com
>>>>>> <mailto:greg.a.thompson@gmail.**com <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Larry,
>>>>>> IMHO, you're hitting the heart of the matter with
>>>>>> recognition and
>>>>>> agency - self-assertion vs. self-emptying seems a nice way
>>>>>> to think
>>>>>> about the central problematic (and I agree with your
>>>>>> preference for
>>>>>> the latter). If you are interested in developing a more more
>>>>>> self-emptying Kyoto-like notion of recognition, I've got a
>>>>>> couple of
>>>>>> suggestions (and I'm sure I've made these suggestions in a
>>>>>> different
>>>>>> context before, so apologies for redundancy).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> First, I'd strongly encourage a read of Robert Williams'
>>>>>> Ethics of
>>>>>> Recognition. In Williams' read of Hegel, you find an
>>>>>> articulation of
>>>>>> recognition that is much more like the Kyoto understanding of
>>>>>> recognition and which is against the crass version you get
>>>>>> from the
>>>>>> existentialists where recognition always about a fight or
>>>>>> struggle for
>>>>>> recognition. As evidence of the cultural tendency toward
>>>>>> self-assertion, it is very telling that one small
>>>>>> paragraph in Hegel's
>>>>>> oeuvre would get picked up as the thing that most people
>>>>>> for most of
>>>>>> the 20th century would equate with Hegel's notion of
>>>>>> "recognition."
>>>>>> But that approach is shortsighted and Williams really
>>>>>> nails this
>>>>>> point. (although I am persuaded by Willaims'
>>>>>> interpretation, I don't
>>>>>> have any skin in the game of whether or not this is a more
>>>>>> or less
>>>>>> "authentic" interpretation of Hegel - I just happen to
>>>>>> believe that
>>>>>> the position Williams articulates is far more productive
>>>>>> than the
>>>>>> struggle-for-recognition model that has been on offer from
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> existentialists).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Second, to provide some further support for this claim,
>>>>>> I'd also
>>>>>> suggest checking out Johann Georg Hamann, who is said to
>>>>>> have been a
>>>>>> significant influence on Hegel (but don't read Isaiah
>>>>>> Berlin's stuff
>>>>>> on Hamann, he misses the point). Hamann didn't really
>>>>>> publish much. He
>>>>>> was most noted for his letters to his friend, Immanuel
>>>>>> Kant and in
>>>>>> which he repeatedly tells Kant that he's got it all wrong
>>>>>> (and does it
>>>>>> in a style that makes the point through medium as well as,
>>>>>> if not more
>>>>>> than, message - a point which itself speaks to one of his
>>>>>> central
>>>>>> points about the importance of poetics). In these letters,
>>>>>> Hamann has
>>>>>> a wonderful sense of the intractability of human life, and
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> fundamental wrong-headedness of the desire for sovereign
>>>>>> agency. I'd
>>>>>> be happy to share more if there is any interest.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Oh, and I forgot there is a third author of interest in
>>>>>> this regard,
>>>>>> Patchen Markell's Bound by Recognition gives a compelling
>>>>>> portrait of
>>>>>> what he calls "the impropriety of action" - the sense in
>>>>>> which our
>>>>>> actions are not our property alone. Markell's book argues
>>>>>> that tragedy
>>>>>> (and its twin, comedy) derives from this very human
>>>>>> problem. Also
>>>>>> great stuff.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> All three of these readings I suggest as a way of pointing
>>>>>> out that
>>>>>> within Western traditions there is a trope that is closer to
>>>>>> self-emptying than self-asserting. Unfortunately it
>>>>>> doesn't articulate
>>>>>> as well with Enlightenment perspectives because it is
>>>>>> often, as with
>>>>>> Hamann, articulated through Christianity. This presents
>>>>>> something of a
>>>>>> marketing problem since the Enlightenment put Christianity
>>>>>> as a thing
>>>>>> of the past and as the kind of believing that small minded
>>>>>> people do
>>>>>> (the kind that tote guns and don't believe in evolution),
>>>>>> and thus a
>>>>>> not very appealing thing for most Westerner's "natural" (i.e.
>>>>>> "cultural") inclination to self-assertion. So I think that
>>>>>> as a matter
>>>>>> of packaging, Buddhism, with its stripped down religious
>>>>>> ideology,
>>>>>> probably has more appeal to most post-Enlightenment
>>>>>> Western thinkers.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> And I wanted to add that I feel like your posts are
>>>>>> speaking directly
>>>>>> to me and maybe we can carry on this conversation in more
>>>>>> detail
>>>>>> somewhere down the road (in a different thread, I
>>>>>> suspect). So many
>>>>>> thanks for your words (even if they weren't "intended" for
>>>>>> me - a
>>>>>> fortuitous impropriety to be sure!).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Anyway, hope all is well,
>>>>>> greg
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 23, 2011 at 1:02 PM, Larry Purss
>>>>>> <lpscholar2@gmail.com <mailto:lpscholar2@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>>>>> I'm enjoying this line [circle? spiral?] of
>>>>>> inquiry.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> David, you wrote
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The mind is a highly parsimonious thing; it is very
>>>>>> tiring to believe one
>>>>>> thing and say another. Vygotsky's genetic law predicts
>>>>>> that eventually it
>>>>>> is the former that shall cede to the latter.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I want to go out on a speculative limb that tries to
>>>>>> weave together some
>>>>>> of
>>>>>> Wittgenstein's notions that are also
>>>>>> expressed in John
>>>>>> Shotter's
>>>>>> exploration of conversation.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The question of the relation and distinction between
>>>>>> "taking a position"
>>>>>> and "developing dispositions" In David's quote above
>>>>>> "believing" one
>>>>>> thing
>>>>>> [a position] and "saying" [practicing
>>>>>> another] will
>>>>>> over time eventually
>>>>>> lead to the practice winning out over the belief.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Their are a group of scholars in Japan referred to as
>>>>>> "the kyoto school"
>>>>>> who are engaged in the project of having an indepth
>>>>>> conversation between
>>>>>> Buddhism and German Continental philosophy.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A central difference the authors of the Kyoto school
>>>>>> are articulating is
>>>>>> different notions [and values] of "intersubjectivity"
>>>>>> as epressed in the
>>>>>> contrasting concepts
>>>>>> "self-assertion" and "self-emptying".
>>>>>>
>>>>>> They suggest many Western notions of intersubjectivity
>>>>>> and recognition
>>>>>> are
>>>>>> in pursuit of recognizing our assertoric
>>>>>> stance or
>>>>>> position towards
>>>>>> words,
>>>>>> self, other, & world. This assertive
>>>>>> position can be
>>>>>> expressed in
>>>>>> emancipatory notions of "finding one's VOICE" and
>>>>>> overcoming being
>>>>>> "silenced". Anger and conflict leading to overcoming
>>>>>> resistance from
>>>>>> within classes, races, genders. Through recognition
>>>>>> [being seen and
>>>>>> listened to develops the capacity to move from a
>>>>>> silenced "voice" to an
>>>>>> assertive "voice"] one stands up and speaks back to
>>>>>> the dominating
>>>>>> constraints and the shame and humiliation that
>>>>>> silences voices.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> As Shotter [in Christine's quotes above shows] the
>>>>>> assertoric position of
>>>>>> challenging dominant structures and power can be seen
>>>>>> as expressing a
>>>>>> particular "attitude" or "style" or "posture".
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This style or attitude valorizes "the assertoric
>>>>>> stance" in the world"
>>>>>> which develops into an enduring "disposition" if we
>>>>>> keep "saying" this
>>>>>> form
>>>>>> of recognition and emancipation.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> However, the Kyoto School, in deep conversation with
>>>>>> this assertoric
>>>>>> "position" and "disposition" suggests or gestures
>>>>>> toward an "alternative"
>>>>>> [not truer, more real, but an alternative]
>>>>>> They suggest Buddhist practice and "saying" can guide
>>>>>> or mediate another
>>>>>> in*formation of "self" that they express in the
>>>>>> concept of "self-emptying
>>>>>> This is NOT a passive or resigned form of agency but
>>>>>> rather an active
>>>>>> intentional positioning of self that attempts to
>>>>>> foreground the
>>>>>> "fallibility" and "uncertainty" of ALL positioning and
>>>>>> assertoric
>>>>>> stances.
>>>>>> This is a deeply intersubjective practice
>>>>>> of
>>>>>> valuing
>>>>>> "emergence" and
>>>>>> "openning spaces" in which to INVITE the other to
>>>>>> exist by the practice
>>>>>> of
>>>>>> mving our self from center stage. Finding
>>>>>> one's
>>>>>> "voice" from this
>>>>>> position
>>>>>> of ACTIVE INTENTIONAL self-emptying [and
>>>>>> creating the
>>>>>> openning space for
>>>>>> the other's "voice" to emerge] is a very different
>>>>>> "attitude" or "stance"
>>>>>> or "posture" to take leading to a very different
>>>>>> "disposition" from
>>>>>> within
>>>>>> a very different form of "saying" and
>>>>>> "practice".
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I "read" scholars such as Wittgenstein, Shotter,
>>>>>> Gadamer, Buber, Levinas,
>>>>>> as exploring this alternative in*formation of "self"
>>>>>> that is less
>>>>>> assertoric in finding one's "voice" and moving towards
>>>>>> a posture of
>>>>>> self-emptying that embraces FALLIBILITY, UNCERTAINTY,
>>>>>> AMBIVALENCE, NOT
>>>>>> KNOWING, at the heart of this particular way of
>>>>>> becoming human.
>>>>>> I do believe this is an historically guided
>>>>>> perspective that embraces
>>>>>> multiple perspectives and multiple practices.
>>>>>> Intersubjectivity and dialogical hermeneutical
>>>>>> perspectives and the
>>>>>> multiple formations this conversation can take
>>>>>> [expressing alternative
>>>>>> moral committments] is the concept at the center of
>>>>>> this possible
>>>>>> inquiry.
>>>>>> I'm not sure how "possible" it is for
>>>>>> persons in North
>>>>>> America to
>>>>>> consider
>>>>>> such alternative moral compasses as
>>>>>> explored
>>>>>> by the
>>>>>> Kyoto School. [it may
>>>>>> be beyond our horizon of understanding to envision as
>>>>>> a possibility].
>>>>>> It is also difficult to grasp Wittgenstein's attempt
>>>>>> to "see through"
>>>>>> theoretical positions as a practice and disposition.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Self-asserion is often viewed as the only path to
>>>>>> intentional stances and
>>>>>> postures in finding one's voice to participate in
>>>>>> GENERATIVE
>>>>>> conversations. Is there merit in engaging with
>>>>>> another tradition
>>>>>> exploring
>>>>>> agentic ACTORS actively practising
>>>>>> "self-emptying"
>>>>>> motivated by the deep
>>>>>> disposition and committment to generative dialogical
>>>>>> ways of practice.??
>>>>>> As I said in my opening remarks, this is going "out on
>>>>>> a limb". Is
>>>>>> conflict
>>>>>> and anger the ONLY motivators that can be
>>>>>> harnessed to
>>>>>> transform the
>>>>>> world??
>>>>>> I'm also aware that my position as a "white male" with
>>>>>> a secure job may
>>>>>> be
>>>>>> calling me to take a naive "utopian"
>>>>>> perspective.
>>>>>> At the minimum I want to suggest that it is these types
>>>>>> of
>>>>>> "conversations"
>>>>>> across "traditions" such as the Kyoto
>>>>>> School
>>>>>> scholars
>>>>>> are engaged in
>>>>>> which
>>>>>> invite us into a world conversation which
>>>>>> puts into
>>>>>> play the monolithic
>>>>>> bias towards the assertoric stance in the world.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I'm preparing for "challenges" to this alternative
>>>>>> "attitude" but am
>>>>>> putting it out there in a spirit of the holiday season
>>>>>> to think outside
>>>>>> our
>>>>>> Western notions of "self-assertion" and
>>>>>> finding one's
>>>>>> voice.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Larry
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 23, 2011 at 12:04 AM, David Kellogg <
>>>>>> vaughndogblack@yahoo.com
>>>>>> <mailto:vaughndogblack@yahoo.**com<vaughndogblack@yahoo.com>
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>> Ivan:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> At the beginning of the Philosophical
>>>>>> Investigations, Wittgenstein
>>>>>> quotes
>>>>>> Augustine, who describes the
>>>>>> indescribable
>>>>>> experience of learning a
>>>>>> first
>>>>>> language in Latin, and remarks that his
>>>>>> model of
>>>>>> language (a big bag of
>>>>>> names) is OK, but only for a very restricted
>>>>>> application; there are many
>>>>>> things we call language for which it is not
>>>>>> appropriate. And thence to
>>>>>> his
>>>>>> famous discussion of complexes, in the
>>>>>> form of
>>>>>> games and language games.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I think what I said was that Wittgenstein's
>>>>>> account of language is
>>>>>> pragmatic in a linguistic sense. Pragmatics is
>>>>>> about the use of
>>>>>> language,
>>>>>> as opposed to its usage (which is more
>>>>>> or less
>>>>>> what Augustine is
>>>>>> describing, language as a dictionary written in
>>>>>> some form of mentalese,
>>>>>> where every language is necessarily a foreign
>>>>>> language).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> And I think what Wittgenstein says about language
>>>>>> applies to every
>>>>>> account
>>>>>> of language, even his own; it is
>>>>>> appropriate, but
>>>>>> ony for a very
>>>>>> restricted
>>>>>> application. In that way it is like a
>>>>>> metaphor (as
>>>>>> we see in the
>>>>>> language
>>>>>> games section, and the tool box
>>>>>> section,
>>>>>> it really
>>>>>> IS a metaphor). So I
>>>>>> think we need to ask the question where it stops
>>>>>> being appropriate.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> As Andy points out, it doesn't describe conceptual
>>>>>> thinking very well.
>>>>>> But
>>>>>> that is not because the pragmatic
>>>>>> account of
>>>>>> language is a subset of
>>>>>> some
>>>>>> larger conceptual account; I think that
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> relationship is quite the
>>>>>> other
>>>>>> way around: scientific concepts are a
>>>>>> rarefied,
>>>>>> specialized subset of
>>>>>> semantic meaning, and of course semantic meaning
>>>>>> took many centuries of
>>>>>> billions of daily interactions to be precipitated
>>>>>> from everyday
>>>>>> pragmatics.
>>>>>> Now it seems to me that on this scale
>>>>>> of
>>>>>> things,
>>>>>> the cultural individual
>>>>>> really is quite unchanging and hidebound, rather
>>>>>> like a bottle. We
>>>>>> rejoice
>>>>>> that Western women do not bind their
>>>>>> feet--and
>>>>>> instead mutilate their
>>>>>> chests with silicon implants. We rejoice in not
>>>>>> stoning women for
>>>>>> adultery
>>>>>> and congratulate ourselves on no longer
>>>>>> insisting
>>>>>> on the male ownership
>>>>>> of
>>>>>> sexuality that this entails, but we so
>>>>>> stigmatize
>>>>>> child sexual abuse
>>>>>> that
>>>>>> children's lives, and not simply their
>>>>>> putative
>>>>>> purity, are now at risk
>>>>>> from pedophiles, and nobody reflects that what is
>>>>>> really threatened
>>>>>> here is
>>>>>> the parental ownership of sexual access
>>>>>> to their
>>>>>> children.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This morning's New York Times, just for example,
>>>>>> has a thoroughly silly
>>>>>> article on North Korea by one Nicolas Kristof. We
>>>>>> are told that
>>>>>> apartments in Pyeongyang are all equipped with
>>>>>> telescreens that
>>>>>> make propaganda announcements of, e.g., the
>>>>>> leaders' golf scores. We
>>>>>> have a
>>>>>> similar telescreen in our apartment in
>>>>>> Seoul,
>>>>>> which announces municipal
>>>>>> elections and tells where to find the local leader
>>>>>> of the anti-communist
>>>>>> militia. The difference is that when we do it is
>>>>>> feels normal.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Kristof certainly does not feel hidebound; he is
>>>>>> quite comfortable in
>>>>>> his
>>>>>> own skin. Nevertheless, he tells a
>>>>>> wildly
>>>>>> brainwashed account of the
>>>>>> way in
>>>>>> which North Korea developed nuclear
>>>>>> weapons. He
>>>>>> correctly remembers
>>>>>> that in
>>>>>> 1994 an agreement was negotiated to
>>>>>> build nuclear
>>>>>> power plants in North
>>>>>> Korea (he carefully omits to say that these would
>>>>>> be non-weaponizable
>>>>>> and built by South Korean companies). Now,
>>>>>> according to Kristof, the
>>>>>> Clinton administration only did this because they
>>>>>> fooishly assumed that
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> regime would collapse before the
>>>>>> reactors were
>>>>>> actually built! Wisely,
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> Bush administration caught the North
>>>>>> Koreans
>>>>>> "cheating", and tore up the
>>>>>> agreement.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> What really happened, as anybody with a memory
>>>>>> longer than the Bush
>>>>>> adminstration will tell you, was that the North
>>>>>> Koreans asked for, and
>>>>>> got,
>>>>>> a codicil that would supply them with
>>>>>> fuel oil for
>>>>>> energy as a stopgap
>>>>>> measure (if you look at the widely circulated
>>>>>> satellite picture of North
>>>>>> Korea at night you will see why they insisted on
>>>>>> this). The Clinton
>>>>>> Administration always boasted that the fuel oil
>>>>>> they supplied was
>>>>>> unusably
>>>>>> poor, but that was not enough for the
>>>>>> Bush
>>>>>> adminstration. They simply
>>>>>> reneged on the agreement. But the North did not
>>>>>> renege: they had
>>>>>> promised
>>>>>> they would develop nuclear weapons if
>>>>>> the deal
>>>>>> fell through, and that is
>>>>>> what they did.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Why does Kristof tell this transparent lie?
>>>>>> Doesn't it go against the
>>>>>> usual NYT ethos of telling the truth about
>>>>>> checkable and trivial
>>>>>> matters so
>>>>>> as to be able to deceive with the
>>>>>> necessary
>>>>>> authority when it comes to
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> essentials? I think, alas, Mr. Kristof
>>>>>> simply
>>>>>> cannot control himself any
>>>>>> more (see his WILDLY improbable tale about a
>>>>>> husband executing his own
>>>>>> wife
>>>>>> for writing a highly implausible letter
>>>>>> to Kim
>>>>>> Jeong-il himself). The
>>>>>> leather mask has become a face.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> And I think that is probably what happened to poor
>>>>>> Leontiev as well. The
>>>>>> mind is a highly parsimonious thing; it is very
>>>>>> tiring to believe one
>>>>>> thing
>>>>>> and say another. Vygotsky's genetic law
>>>>>> predicts
>>>>>> that eventually it is
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> former that shall cede to the latter.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It is that sense in which what Mike says is true:
>>>>>> Vygotsky's psychology,
>>>>>> as a scientific system, describes the development
>>>>>> of institutionalized
>>>>>> lying just as accurately as it describes the
>>>>>> development of higher
>>>>>> concepts. What I wanted to say was that his
>>>>>> earlier sense that ideas are
>>>>>> always embodied, and some bodies are gifted with
>>>>>> an extraordinary
>>>>>> foresight, is also true. I think Vygotsky knew
>>>>>> that he would die, but he
>>>>>> also knew that his ideas, so long as they were
>>>>>> true ones, would live.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> --- On Wed, 12/21/11, Ivan Rosero
>>>>>> <irosero@ucsd.edu <mailto:irosero@ucsd.edu>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> From: Ivan Rosero <irosero@ucsd.edu
>>>>>> <mailto:irosero@ucsd.edu>>
>>>>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Interpreting Leontiev:
>>>>>> functionalism and Anglo
>>>>>> Finnish
>>>>>> Insufficiences
>>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
>>>>>> <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>>
>>>>>> Date: Wednesday, December 21, 2011, 6:50 PM
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> David, if you agree with the summary Larry has
>>>>>> presented, I remain
>>>>>> confused
>>>>>> by your analogy. I read Larry's
>>>>>> presentation of
>>>>>> Kitching/Pleasant as
>>>>>> saying that action cobbles together further sense
>>>>>> within already-given
>>>>>> sense that is simultaneously ideal-material, and
>>>>>> therefore subject to
>>>>>> culturally and historically specific constraints
>>>>>> and possibilities. But
>>>>>> surely, this includes the bottle and the person
>>>>>> too, both as moving
>>>>>> entities (the bottle, unless highly heated, a much
>>>>>> more slowly moving
>>>>>> entity). I am not invested in any particular
>>>>>> reading of Leontiev, but
>>>>>> your
>>>>>> analogy as presented suggests a kind of
>>>>>> essential
>>>>>> fixity to the person
>>>>>> which I want to believe you don't really mean.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> To be fair, your emphasis is on the wine in the
>>>>>> bottle. But, in this
>>>>>> case,
>>>>>> a slowly moving bottle is rather less
>>>>>> interesting
>>>>>> than a human being,
>>>>>> with
>>>>>> a rather less historically complex
>>>>>> relationship to
>>>>>> the liquid it gives
>>>>>> shape to.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Does what Andy refer to help here? What kind of
>>>>>> concept-complex (is it
>>>>>> enough to call it Stalinism?) helps to explain the
>>>>>> Leontiev at issue
>>>>>> here?
>>>>>> Or, if the critique was there from
>>>>>> early
>>>>>> on, what
>>>>>> kind of
>>>>>> concept-complex
>>>>>> would help to explain his writings'
>>>>>> wide
>>>>>> acceptance?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Or, do we forgo all this and just grab Leontiev,
>>>>>> as you say, "on a good
>>>>>> day"?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Ivan
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Wed, Dec 21, 2011 at 3:55 PM, David Kellogg <
>>>>>> vaughndogblack@yahoo.com
>>>>>> <mailto:vaughndogblack@yahoo.**com <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com>>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>> Mike wrote that as he grows older, he
>>>>>> becomes less attached to his
>>>>>> position (expressed in his editorial
>>>>>> commentary to Luria's
>>>>>> autobiography,
>>>>>> "The Making of Mind") that ideas
>>>>>> really are
>>>>>> highly embodied things.
>>>>>> Mike
>>>>>> says that as he grows older, he
>>>>>> becomes more
>>>>>> and more attached to
>>>>>> Luria's
>>>>>> position that only ideas matter.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But as I grow older, I become more and more
>>>>>> attached to Mike's
>>>>>> original
>>>>>> position that individuals really
>>>>>> matter. Wine
>>>>>> has no shape of its
>>>>>> own; it
>>>>>> really depends on what bottle we
>>>>>> put
>>>>>> it in,
>>>>>> and the form of ideas
>>>>>> depends
>>>>>> very much on the character of the
>>>>>> individuals
>>>>>> wo carry them.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On paper, the theoretical positions of
>>>>>> Vygotsky and Leontiev are not
>>>>>> that
>>>>>> far apart. So when Mike asks what
>>>>>> presents
>>>>>> Vygotsky's ideas from being
>>>>>> pressed into service by the Stalinist state, I
>>>>>> think the answer has
>>>>>> to be
>>>>>> referred to the individual who
>>>>>> carried this
>>>>>> idea after all.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I think it is not accidental that one was
>>>>>> amenable and the other was
>>>>>> not,
>>>>>> that one's ideas were deformed and
>>>>>> degenerated, and the others still
>>>>>> amaze
>>>>>> by their freshness and
>>>>>> color. Nor is it
>>>>>> accidental that one lived and
>>>>>> one
>>>>>> died.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But of course death is simply the moment when
>>>>>> our thinking and spoken
>>>>>> speech must come to an end, and our written
>>>>>> speech, like a hermit
>>>>>> crab,
>>>>>> must find a new home in the minds
>>>>>> and mouths
>>>>>> of others. And by that
>>>>>> measure, it was Vygotsky who lived on, yea,
>>>>>> even in the mind and the
>>>>>> mouth
>>>>>> of Leontiev. Well,
>>>>>> Leontiev on a good day!
>>>>>>
>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>>>>>>
>>>>>> PS; I think I am (once again) with Larry. I
>>>>>> think that if we read
>>>>>> (late)
>>>>>> Wittgenstein as a linguistic (not a
>>>>>> philosophical) pragmatist, that
>>>>>> is,
>>>>>> as
>>>>>> someone who believes
>>>>>> that meaning in language
>>>>>> comes from sense in
>>>>>> activity,
>>>>>> Wittgenstein is
>>>>>> perfectly consistent with what
>>>>>> Marx writes in the
>>>>>> German
>>>>>> Ideology (that language is
>>>>>> practical
>>>>>> consciousness, real for myself
>>>>>> because
>>>>>> real for others).
>>>>>> Wittgenstein is
>>>>>> Vygotsky-compatible in other ways,
>>>>>> too,
>>>>>> e.g. his argument about
>>>>>> preconceptual
>>>>>> "families" and his argument
>>>>>> about
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> tool like nature of
>>>>>> signs.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> dk
>>>>>>
>>>>>> --- On Wed, 12/21/11, mike cole
>>>>>> <lchcmike@gmail.com
>>>>>> <mailto:lchcmike@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> From: mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com
>>>>>> <mailto:lchcmike@gmail.com>>
>>>>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Interpreting Leontiev:
>>>>>> functionalism and Anglo
>>>>>> Finnish
>>>>>> Insufficiences
>>>>>> To: "Larry Purss" <lpscholar2@gmail.com
>>>>>> <mailto:lpscholar2@gmail.com>>
>>>>>> Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
>>>>>> <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>> <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>>, "Morten
>>>>>> Nissen" <Morten.Nissen@psy.ku.dk
>>>>>> <mailto:Morten.Nissen@psy.ku.**dk<Morten.Nissen@psy.ku.dk>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>> Date: Wednesday, December 21, 2011, 2:12 PM
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Very helpful, Larry. Thanks.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> As I read the Leontiev materials what was at
>>>>>> issue in 1949 is whether
>>>>>> there
>>>>>> is any "third space" of
>>>>>> the self in the "unity
>>>>>> of consciousness and
>>>>>> activity." I take Stalinism
>>>>>> in these materials to refer to the way that
>>>>>> idealism is joined with
>>>>>> belief
>>>>>> in some sort of
>>>>>> "autonomous" realm of thought.
>>>>>> Zinchenko's work on
>>>>>> micromovements of the eye and perceptual
>>>>>> action seem to me now
>>>>>> significant
>>>>>> in exactly this
>>>>>> respect:
>>>>>> they point to a rapid
>>>>>> simulation process
>>>>>> which
>>>>>> is
>>>>>> not mechanically
>>>>>> connected to externalized
>>>>>> action (as one example). If
>>>>>> you
>>>>>> know the future of
>>>>>> history and what is good
>>>>>> for everyone, all such
>>>>>> processes risk deviation from "the true path."
>>>>>> The motives of the
>>>>>> "healthy"
>>>>>> individual are supposed
>>>>>> to coincide with those
>>>>>> of the "collective" (as
>>>>>> represented by the general secretary of the
>>>>>> central committee of the
>>>>>> communist party). Functionalism as command and
>>>>>> control statism.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If we accept THIS version of CHAT, seems to me
>>>>>> that Phillip is
>>>>>> corrrect -
>>>>>> Use the ideas for something called
>>>>>> communism,
>>>>>> fascism, ANY form of
>>>>>> collective social project.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> David says this is Leontiev's (AT) problem,
>>>>>> not Vygotsky's (CH)
>>>>>> problem.
>>>>>> Larry points
>>>>>> to Wittgensteinian marxism that appears to
>>>>>> provide a way to select
>>>>>> wheat
>>>>>> from chaff (or discover a different
>>>>>> level of
>>>>>> chaff!).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> My guess is that German, Russian, and other
>>>>>> thinkers have already
>>>>>> carried
>>>>>> this conversation pretty far....
>>>>>> Morten's
>>>>>> citation of German work
>>>>>> points
>>>>>> to
>>>>>> this conclusion.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But how are we poor non_Russian, non_German
>>>>>> reading unfortunates
>>>>>> wandering
>>>>>> in the woods to find
>>>>>> our
>>>>>> way?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Wed, Dec 21, 2011 at 12:08 PM, Larry Purss
>>>>>> <lpscholar2@gmail.com
>>>>>> <mailto:lpscholar2@gmail.com>>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Hi Andy,
>>>>>> Christine, Mike
>>>>>> I have been hibernating on Mayne Island, a
>>>>>> small Island between
>>>>>> Vancouver
>>>>>> and Vancouver and
>>>>>> Vancouver Island.
>>>>>> [school break for the holidays]
>>>>>> No
>>>>>> internet except at the small
>>>>>> library]
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I was interested in this comment from
>>>>>> Morten Nissen on Andy's book
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Blunden, as it were, attacks it from the
>>>>>> “opposite” side: the
>>>>>>
>>>>>> functionalism
>>>>>> of Leontiev’s
>>>>>> way of relating subject with
>>>>>> society. This has to do
>>>>>> with
>>>>>> how
>>>>>> objects and
>>>>>> motives appear to coincide in
>>>>>> Leontiev’s idealized
>>>>>> image of
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> true society,
>>>>>> that is, the society of
>>>>>> original communism and that of
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> Soviet Union.
>>>>>> Andy, it is this notion of "coinciding"
>>>>>> that I have difficulty with
>>>>>> when
>>>>>> reading about
>>>>>> Activity Theory.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Leontiev's statements such as "Education
>>>>>> is the decisive force which
>>>>>> forms
>>>>>> man
>>>>>> intellectually. This intellectual
>>>>>> development MUST CORRESPOND TO
>>>>>> THE
>>>>>> AIMS AND THE NEEDS
>>>>>> OF THE ENTIRE SOCIETY.
>>>>>> It must fully agree with
>>>>>> REAL
>>>>>> human needs"
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I'm been browsing through an edited book
>>>>>> by Gavin Kitching and
>>>>>> Nigel
>>>>>> Pleasant titled "Marx and
>>>>>> Wittgenstein:
>>>>>> Knowledge, Morality,
>>>>>> Politics."
>>>>>> These authors take an
>>>>>> interesting
>>>>>> perspective on materialism &
>>>>>> idealism
>>>>>> that gives idealism its place
>>>>>> in
>>>>>> our human
>>>>>> being [in contrast to
>>>>>> how I
>>>>>> read
>>>>>> Leontiev}
>>>>>> These authors are exploring a
>>>>>> Wittgensteinian Marxism that examines
>>>>>> Marx's
>>>>>> notion that
>>>>>> "The tradition of all the dead
>>>>>> generations weighs like a
>>>>>> nightmare on the brain of the living" A
>>>>>> Wittgensteinian Marxist
>>>>>> reading
>>>>>> [from the authors perspective]
>>>>>> would make
>>>>>> 3 points.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 1] Tradition and circumstances cannot be
>>>>>> understood in ABSTRACTION
>>>>>> FROM
>>>>>> the traditions and
>>>>>> understandings that
>>>>>> people have of these
>>>>>>
>>>>>> circumstances.
>>>>>> 2] WHATEVER
>>>>>> such varied understandings
>>>>>> may consist (class, culture,
>>>>>> gender etc) nonetheless some KINDS of
>>>>>> actions by historical subjects
>>>>>> [agents, actors] will prove impossible IF
>>>>>> these actions are entered
>>>>>> into
>>>>>> in
>>>>>> disregard to
>>>>>> the traditions and
>>>>>> circumstances directly GIVEN,
>>>>>> ENCOUNTERED
>>>>>> and transmitted
>>>>>> from
>>>>>> the past
>>>>>> 3] A principle WAY in which the TRADITIONS
>>>>>> OF THE DEAD GENERATIONS
>>>>>> weighs
>>>>>> like a nightmare on
>>>>>> the brain of the
>>>>>> living is that ANTECEDENT
>>>>>> historical
>>>>>> circumstances often
>>>>>> make it IMPOSSIBLE TO
>>>>>> THINK AND FEEL (and
>>>>>> therefore
>>>>>> act)in certain ways.
>>>>>> Historically created
>>>>>> material culture restricts
>>>>>> and
>>>>>> enables the making
>>>>>> of PARTICULAR KINDS of
>>>>>> history. People do not
>>>>>> try to
>>>>>> do
>>>>>> things and
>>>>>> then for "material reasons"
>>>>>> find they cannot do things. (
>>>>>> cannot
>>>>>> make history
>>>>>> as THEY PLEASE ) Such
>>>>>> traditions and circumstances
>>>>>> DEEPLY
>>>>>> FORM
>>>>>> what it is
>>>>>> that present generations can
>>>>>> DESIRE TO DO. and CONCEIVE
>>>>>> OF.
>>>>>> (as
>>>>>> well as what
>>>>>> actions they can conceive of
>>>>>> as being
>>>>>> possible/impossible,
>>>>>> feasible/unfeasible)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It is human action in and on the world
>>>>>> that inextricably LINKS
>>>>>> THOUGHT
>>>>>> (and language) TO MATERIAL
>>>>>> REALITY.
>>>>>> Historical traditions and
>>>>>>
>>>>>> circumstances
>>>>>> are the
>>>>>> outcomes of previous generations
>>>>>> actions [intended &
>>>>>> unintended]
>>>>>> which place
>>>>>> constraints on present
>>>>>> generations. Constraints on what
>>>>>> they
>>>>>> can think, feel,
>>>>>> desire (and how they act)
>>>>>> By keeping these 3 points in mind the
>>>>>> authors suggest we can avoid
>>>>>> falling
>>>>>> into the DEEP
>>>>>> CONFUSIONS which have always
>>>>>> attended the
>>>>>> material/ideal
>>>>>> distinction.
>>>>>> The most DIRECT and comprehensible way to
>>>>>> SEE THROUGH this
>>>>>> material/ideal
>>>>>> distinction is to
>>>>>> see that all action is
>>>>>> simultaneously mental &
>>>>>> physical,
>>>>>> material &
>>>>>> ideal. Neither material or
>>>>>> ideal is an "epiphenomena" of
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> other.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In my reading of Leontiev in the chapter
>>>>>> from the book posted I
>>>>>> don't
>>>>>> see
>>>>>> the nuances
>>>>>> recognizing the depths of the
>>>>>> "ideal" within Marx's
>>>>>> theory.
>>>>>> This edited book, by putting
>>>>>> Marx into
>>>>>> explicit conversation is
>>>>>> elaborating a Wittgensteinian Marxism or a
>>>>>> Marxist Wittgenstein.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Larry
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Mon, Dec 19, 2011 at 7:39 PM, mike cole
>>>>>> <lchcmike@gmail.com
>>>>>> <mailto:lchcmike@gmail.com>>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>> Below are two quotations
>>>>>> from Morten
>>>>>> Nissen's review of Andy
>>>>>> Blunden's
>>>>>> book
>>>>>> on activity theory. Full review in
>>>>>> current issue of MCA.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> After presenting the quotation, a
>>>>>> comment.
>>>>>> mike
>>>>>> -------------------
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Morten Nissen on Leontiev,
>>>>>> functionalism, and Stalinism
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ….behind this terminological trouble
>>>>>> lies a deep theoretical
>>>>>> problem
>>>>>> in
>>>>>> Leontiev’s
>>>>>> social theory. This problem
>>>>>> was identified in the German
>>>>>> and
>>>>>> Scandinavian
>>>>>> reception (Axel & Nissen,
>>>>>> 1993; Holzkamp, 1979;
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Osterkamp,
>>>>>> 1976) but
>>>>>> almost
>>>>>> completely ignored in
>>>>>> the Anglo-Finnish (with
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Miettinen,
>>>>>> 2005, and
>>>>>> Kaptelinin, 2005, as the
>>>>>> noble exceptions to the
>>>>>> rule)—and
>>>>>> Blunden, as it were,
>>>>>> attacks
>>>>>> it from
>>>>>> the “opposite” side: the
>>>>>> functionalism
>>>>>> of Leontiev’s way of relating subject
>>>>>> with society. This has to do
>>>>>> with
>>>>>> how
>>>>>> objects and motives appear to coincide
>>>>>> in Leontiev’s idealized
>>>>>> image
>>>>>> of
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> true society, that is, the society of
>>>>>> original communism and that
>>>>>> of
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> Soviet Union.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> From the perspective of this
>>>>>> functionalist utopia, a psychology
>>>>>> could
>>>>>> become relevant only in the
>>>>>> face of
>>>>>> the undeveloped and the
>>>>>> deviant:
>>>>>> as
>>>>>> in
>>>>>> fact,
>>>>>> according to Leontiev (1978),
>>>>>> children and disturbed provide
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> tasks of psychology in the
>>>>>> institutions of the Soviet Union. To
>>>>>> paraphrase:
>>>>>> The child who puts down her book still
>>>>>> has not grasped the harmony
>>>>>> of
>>>>>> society’s needs with the
>>>>>> desire to
>>>>>> learn that she *must*
>>>>>>
>>>>>> develop—she has not yet developed
>>>>>> those “higher cultural needs.”
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Bourgeois
>>>>>> society
>>>>>> is
>>>>>> another matter, where sense
>>>>>> and meaning are divided in
>>>>>> principle, but this matter—that of
>>>>>> ideology and social
>>>>>>
>>>>>> critique—Leontiev
>>>>>> sets aside and
>>>>>> forgets. An elaborate
>>>>>> critique of Leontiev’s
>>>>>>
>>>>>> functionalism
>>>>>> was given
>>>>>> already in 1980 (Haug,
>>>>>> Nemitz,& Waldhubel, 1980), and the
>>>>>> background was explained by Osterkamp
>>>>>> (1976) in her groundbreaking
>>>>>> work
>>>>>> on
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> theory
>>>>>> of motivation.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ------------------------------**--
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Comment.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> When I first read these passages as
>>>>>> part of the attempted "swap of
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ideas"
>>>>>> that
>>>>>> Morten and I tried to organize
>>>>>> around
>>>>>>
>>>>>> our reviews of Andy's book in Outlines
>>>>>> and MCA, I commented how
>>>>>> sad it
>>>>>> was
>>>>>> that the
>>>>>> elaborate critique that goes
>>>>>> back to
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 1980 is not in English and fully
>>>>>> engaged by both European and
>>>>>> "Ango-Finns"
>>>>>> (although how poor Viktor got into
>>>>>> that category
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I do not know!).
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Seems like real interchange around
>>>>>> these issues is long overdue.
>>>>>> But
>>>>>> given
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> progress of the last couple of
>>>>>> years, I'll not be
>>>>>>
>>>>>> holding my breath!
>>>>>>
>>>>>> --------------------------
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But thinking about the issues as well
>>>>>> as my limited language (and
>>>>>> other)
>>>>>> capacities
>>>>>> allow.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> mike
>>>>>> ______________________________**
>>>>>> ____________
>>>>>> _____
>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>> <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**
>>>>>> listinfo/xmca <http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ______________________________**
>>>>>> ____________
>>>>>> _____
>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
>>>>>> ______________________________**____________
>>>>>> _____
>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ______________________________**____________
>>>>>> _____
>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
>>>>>> ______________________________**____________
>>>>>> _____
>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ______________________________**____________
>>>>>> _____
>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> --
>>>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
>>>>>> Sanford I. Berman Post-Doctoral Scholar
>>>>>> Department of Communication
>>>>>> University of California, San Diego
>>>>>> ______________________________**____________
>>>>>> _____
>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ______________________________**____________
>>>>>> _____
>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> --
>>>>>> ------------------------------**------------------------------**
>>>>>> ------------
>>>>>> *Andy Blunden*
>>>>>> Joint Editor MCA: http://www.tandfonline.com/**toc/hmca20/18/1<http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/18/1>
>>>>>> Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ <
>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/**>
>>>>>> Book: http://www.brill.nl/default.**aspx?partid=227&pid=34857<http://www.brill.nl/default.aspx?partid=227&pid=34857>
>>>>>> <http://www.brill.nl/default.**aspx?partid=227&pid=34857<http://www.brill.nl/default.aspx?partid=227&pid=34857>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>> ------------------------------**------------------------------**
>>>> ------------
>>>> *Andy Blunden*
>>>> Joint Editor MCA: http://www.tandfonline.com/**toc/hmca20/18/1<http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/18/1>
>>>> Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
>>>> Book: http://www.brill.nl/default.**aspx?partid=227&pid=34857<http://www.brill.nl/default.aspx?partid=227&pid=34857>
>>>>
>>>> ______________________________**____________
>>>> _____
>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>> --
>> ------------------------------**------------------------------**
>> ------------
>> *Andy Blunden*
>> Joint Editor MCA: http://www.tandfonline.com/**toc/hmca20/18/1<http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/18/1>
>> Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
>> Book: http://www.brill.nl/default.**aspx?partid=227&pid=34857<http://www.brill.nl/default.aspx?partid=227&pid=34857>
>>
>>
>> ______________________________**____________
>> _____
>> xmca mailing list
>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
>>
>> This mail was received via Mail-SeCure System.
>>
>> <http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1908/mec/#bkV14E118>
>>
> Despite my general approach that Historical Dialectics (Marxian
> Social-Cultural theory) and Pragmatism mutually repair the lacuna in their
> respective representations of human social and cultural practice, and a
> very critical response to Leninism, Lenin's critique of American
> Pragmatism, rough as it is, is right on target.
>
> [15] <http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1908/mec/#bkV14E118> *
>> Pragmatism—*a subjective-idealist trend of bourgeois (mainly American)
>> philosophy in the imperialist era. It arose in the seven ties. of the last
>> century in the U.S.A. as a reflection of specific features of the
>> development of American capitalism, replacing the hitherto prevailing
>> religious philosophy. The main propositions of pragmatism were formulated
>> by Charles Peirce. As an independent philosophical tendency it took shape
>> at the turn of the century in the works of William James and Ferdinand
>> Schiller and was further developed in the instrumentalism of John Dewey.
>>
>> The pragmatists consider that the central problem of philosophy is the
>> attainment of true knowledge. However, they completely distort the very
>> concept of truth; already Peirce looked on cognition as a purely
>> psychological, subjective process of achieving religious belief. James
>> substituted the concept of “usefulness”, of success or advantage, for the
>> concept of truth, i.e., for the objectively true reflection of reality.
>> From his point of view, all concepts, including religious ones, are true
>> insofar as they are useful. Dewey went, even farther by declaring all
>> scientific theories, all moral principles and social institutions, to be
>> merely “instruments” for the attainment of the personal aims of the
>> individual. As the criterion of the “truth” (usefulness) of knowledge,
>> the pragmatists take experience, understood not as human social practice
>> but as the constant stream of individual experiences, of the subjective
>> phenomena of consciousness; they regard this experience as the solo
>> reality, declaring the concepts of matter and mind “obsolete”. Like the
>> Machists, the pragmatists claim to have created a “third line” in
>> philosophy; they try to place themselves above materialism and idealism,
>> while in fact advocating one of the varieties of idealism. In contrast to
>> materialist monism, the pragmatists put forward the standpoint of
>> “pluralism”, according to which there is no internal connection, no
>> conformity to law, in the universe; it is like a mosaic which each person
>> builds in his own way, out of his own individual experiences. Hence,
>> starting out from the needs of the given moment, pragmatism considers it
>> possible to give different, even contradictory, explanations of one and the
>> same phenomenon. Consistency is declared to be unnecessary; if it is to a
>> man’s advantage, he can be a determinist or an indeterminist, he can assert
>> or deny the existence of God, and so on.
>>
>> By basing themselves on the subjective-idealist tradition of English
>> philosophy from Berkeley and Hume to John Stuart Mill, by exploiting
>> particular aspects of the theories of Kant, Mach and Avenarius, Nietzsche
>> and Henri Bergson, the American pragmatists created one of the most
>> reactionary philosophical trends of modern times, a convenient form for
>> theoretically defending the interests of the imperialist bourgeoisie. It is
>> for this reason that pragmatism spread so widely in the U.S.A., becoming
>> almost the official American philosophy. There have been advocates of
>> pragmatism at various times in Italy, Germany, France, Czechoslovakia and
>> other countries. Lenin, V.I. (1908) MATERIALISM and EMPIRIO-CRITICISM: Critical
>> Comments on a Reactionary Philosophy, Chapter 4. Parties in Philosophy
>> and Philosophical Blockheads
>>
>
>
>
> --
> Victor Friedlander
> __________________________________________
> _____
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