Re: [xmca] Interpreting Leontiev: functionalism and Anglo Finnish Insufficiences

[Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>]

Larry,
IMHO, you're hitting the heart of the matter with recognition and
agency - self-assertion vs. self-emptying seems a nice way to think
about the central problematic (and I agree with your preference for
the latter). If you are interested in developing a more more
self-emptying Kyoto-like notion of recognition, I've got a couple of
suggestions (and I'm sure I've made these suggestions in a different
context before, so apologies for redundancy).

First, I'd strongly encourage a read of Robert Williams' Ethics of
Recognition. In Williams' read of Hegel, you find an articulation of
recognition that is much more like the Kyoto understanding of
recognition and which is against the crass version you get from the
existentialists where recognition always about a fight or struggle for
recognition. As evidence of the cultural tendency toward
self-assertion, it is very telling that one small paragraph in Hegel's
oeuvre would get picked up as the thing that most people for most of
the 20th century would equate with Hegel's notion of "recognition."
But that approach is shortsighted and Williams really nails this
point. (although I am persuaded by Willaims' interpretation, I don't
have any skin in the game of whether or not this is a more or less
"authentic" interpretation of Hegel - I just happen to believe that
the position Williams articulates is far more productive than the
struggle-for-recognition model that has been on offer from the
existentialists).

Second, to provide some further support for this claim, I'd also
suggest checking out Johann Georg Hamann, who is said to have been a
significant influence on Hegel (but don't read Isaiah Berlin's stuff
on Hamann, he misses the point). Hamann didn't really publish much. He
was most noted for his letters to his friend, Immanuel Kant and in
which he repeatedly tells Kant that he's got it all wrong (and does it
in a style that makes the point through medium as well as, if not more
than, message - a point which itself speaks to one of his central
points about the importance of poetics). In these letters, Hamann has
a wonderful sense of the intractability of human life, and the
fundamental wrong-headedness of the desire for sovereign agency. I'd
be happy to share more if there is any interest.

Oh, and I forgot there is a third author of interest in this regard,
Patchen Markell's Bound by Recognition gives a compelling portrait of
what he calls "the impropriety of action" - the sense in which our
actions are not our property alone. Markell's book argues that tragedy
(and its twin, comedy) derives from this very human problem. Also
great stuff.

All three of these readings I suggest as a way of pointing out that
within Western traditions there is a trope that is closer to
self-emptying than self-asserting. Unfortunately it doesn't articulate
as well with Enlightenment perspectives because it is often, as with
Hamann, articulated through Christianity. This presents something of a
marketing problem since the Enlightenment put Christianity as a thing
of the past and as the kind of believing that small minded people do
(the kind that tote guns and don't believe in evolution), and thus a
not very appealing thing for most Westerner's "natural" (i.e.
"cultural") inclination to self-assertion. So I think that as a matter
of packaging, Buddhism, with its stripped down religious ideology,
probably has more appeal to most post-Enlightenment Western thinkers.

And I wanted to add that I feel like your posts are speaking directly
to me and maybe we can carry on this conversation in more detail
somewhere down the road (in a different thread, I suspect). So many
thanks for your words (even if they weren't "intended" for me - a
fortuitous impropriety to be sure!).

Anyway, hope all is well,
greg


On Fri, Dec 23, 2011 at 1:02 PM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:
> I'm enjoying this line [circle? spiral?] of inquiry.
>
> David,  you wrote
>
>
> The mind is a highly parsimonious thing; it is very tiring to believe one
> thing and say another. Vygotsky's genetic law predicts that eventually it
> is the former that shall cede to the latter.
>
> I want to go out on a speculative limb that tries to weave together some of
> Wittgenstein's notions that are also expressed in John Shotter's
> exploration of conversation.
>
> The question of the relation and distinction between "taking a position"
> and "developing dispositions"  In David's quote above "believing" one thing
> [a position] and "saying" [practicing another]  will over time eventually
> lead to the practice winning out over the belief.
>
> Their are a group of scholars in Japan referred to as "the kyoto school"
> who are engaged in the project of having an indepth conversation between
> Buddhism and German Continental philosophy.
>
> A central difference the authors of the Kyoto school are articulating is
> different notions [and values] of "intersubjectivity" as epressed in the
> contrasting concepts
> "self-assertion" and "self-emptying".
>
> They suggest many Western notions of intersubjectivity and recognition are
> in pursuit of recognizing our assertoric stance or position towards words,
> self, other, & world. This assertive position can be expressed in
> emancipatory notions of "finding one's VOICE" and overcoming being
> "silenced".  Anger and conflict leading to overcoming resistance from
> within classes, races, genders. Through recognition [being seen and
> listened to develops the capacity to move from a silenced "voice" to an
> assertive "voice"] one stands up and speaks back to the dominating
> constraints and the shame and humiliation that silences voices.
>
> As Shotter [in Christine's quotes above shows] the assertoric position of
> challenging dominant structures and power can be seen as expressing a
> particular "attitude" or "style" or "posture".
>
> This style or attitude valorizes "the assertoric stance" in the world"
> which develops into an enduring "disposition" if we keep "saying" this form
> of recognition and emancipation.
>
> However, the Kyoto School, in deep conversation with this assertoric
> "position" and "disposition" suggests or gestures toward an "alternative"
> [not truer, more real, but an alternative]
> They suggest Buddhist practice and "saying" can guide or mediate another
> in*formation of "self" that they express in the concept of "self-emptying
> This is NOT a passive or resigned form of agency but rather an active
> intentional positioning of self that attempts to foreground the
> "fallibility" and "uncertainty" of ALL positioning and assertoric stances.
> This is a deeply intersubjective practice of valuing "emergence" and
> "openning spaces" in which to INVITE the other to exist by the practice of
> mving our self from center stage.  Finding one's "voice" from this position
> of ACTIVE INTENTIONAL self-emptying [and creating the openning space for
> the other's "voice" to emerge] is a very different "attitude" or "stance"
> or "posture" to take leading to a very different "disposition" from within
> a very different form of "saying" and "practice".
>
> I "read" scholars such as Wittgenstein, Shotter, Gadamer, Buber, Levinas,
> as exploring this alternative in*formation of "self" that is less
> assertoric in finding one's "voice" and moving towards a posture of
> self-emptying that embraces FALLIBILITY, UNCERTAINTY, AMBIVALENCE, NOT
> KNOWING, at the heart of this particular way of becoming human.
> I do believe this is an historically guided perspective that embraces
> multiple perspectives and multiple practices.
> Intersubjectivity and dialogical hermeneutical perspectives and the
> multiple formations this conversation can take  [expressing alternative
> moral committments] is the concept at the center of this possible inquiry.
>
> I'm not sure how "possible" it is for persons in North America to consider
> such alternative moral compasses as explored by the Kyoto School. [it may
> be beyond our horizon of understanding to envision as a possibility].
> It is also difficult to grasp Wittgenstein's attempt to "see through"
> theoretical positions as a practice and disposition.
>
>
> Self-asserion is often viewed as the only path to intentional stances and
> postures in finding one's voice to participate in GENERATIVE
> conversations.  Is there merit in engaging with another tradition exploring
> agentic ACTORS actively practising "self-emptying" motivated by the deep
> disposition and committment to generative dialogical ways of practice.??
> As I said in my opening remarks, this is going "out on a limb". Is conflict
> and anger the ONLY motivators that can be harnessed to transform the
> world??
> I'm also aware that my position as a "white male" with a secure job may be
> calling me to take a naive "utopian" perspective.
> At the minimum I want to suggest that it is these types of "conversations"
> across "traditions" such as the Kyoto School scholars are engaged in  which
> invite us into a world conversation which puts into play the monolithic
> bias towards the assertoric stance in the world.
>
> I'm preparing for "challenges" to this alternative "attitude" but am
> putting it out there in a spirit of the holiday season to think outside our
> Western notions of "self-assertion" and finding one's voice.
>
> Larry
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Fri, Dec 23, 2011 at 12:04 AM, David Kellogg <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com>wrote:
>
>> Ivan:
>>
>> At the beginning of  the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein quotes
>> Augustine, who describes the indescribable experience of learning a first
>> language in Latin, and remarks that his model of language (a big bag of
>> names) is OK, but only for a very restricted application; there are many
>> things we call language for which it is not appropriate. And thence to his
>> famous discussion of complexes, in the form of games and language games.
>>
>> I think what I said was that Wittgenstein's account of language is
>> pragmatic in a linguistic sense. Pragmatics is about the use of language,
>> as opposed to its usage (which is more or less what Augustine is
>> describing, language as a dictionary written in some form of mentalese,
>> where every language is necessarily a foreign language).
>>
>> And I think what Wittgenstein says about language applies to every account
>> of language, even his own; it is appropriate, but ony for a very restricted
>> application. In that way it is like a metaphor (as we see in the language
>> games section, and the tool box section, it really IS a metaphor). So I
>> think we need to ask the question where it stops being appropriate.
>>
>> As Andy points out, it doesn't describe conceptual thinking very well. But
>> that is not because the pragmatic account of language is a subset of some
>> larger conceptual account; I think that the relationship is quite the other
>> way around: scientific concepts are a rarefied, specialized subset of
>> semantic meaning, and of course semantic meaning took many centuries of
>> billions of daily interactions to be precipitated from everyday pragmatics.
>>
>> Now it seems to me that on this scale of things, the cultural individual
>> really is quite unchanging and hidebound, rather like a bottle. We rejoice
>> that Western women do not bind their feet--and instead mutilate their
>> chests with silicon implants. We rejoice in not stoning women for adultery
>> and congratulate ourselves on no longer insisting on the male ownership of
>> sexuality that this entails, but we so stigmatize child sexual abuse that
>> children's lives, and not simply their putative purity, are now at risk
>> from pedophiles, and nobody reflects that what is really threatened here is
>> the parental ownership of sexual access to their children.
>>
>> This morning's New York Times, just for example, has a thoroughly silly
>> article on North Korea by one Nicolas Kristof. We are told that
>> apartments in Pyeongyang are all equipped with telescreens that
>> make propaganda announcements of, e.g., the leaders' golf scores. We have a
>> similar telescreen in our apartment in Seoul, which announces municipal
>> elections and tells where to find the local leader of the anti-communist
>> militia. The difference is that when we do it is feels normal.
>>
>> Kristof certainly does not feel hidebound; he is quite comfortable in his
>> own skin. Nevertheless, he tells a wildly brainwashed account of the way in
>> which North Korea developed nuclear weapons. He correctly remembers that in
>> 1994 an agreement was negotiated to build nuclear power plants in North
>> Korea (he carefully omits to say that these would be non-weaponizable
>> and built by South Korean companies). Now, according to Kristof, the
>> Clinton administration only did this because they fooishly assumed that the
>> regime would collapse before the reactors were actually built! Wisely, the
>> Bush administration caught the North Koreans "cheating", and tore up the
>> agreement.
>>
>> What really happened, as anybody with a memory longer than the Bush
>> adminstration will tell you, was that the North Koreans asked for, and got,
>> a codicil that would supply them with fuel oil for energy as a stopgap
>> measure (if you look at the widely circulated satellite picture of North
>> Korea at night you will see why they insisted on this). The Clinton
>> Administration always boasted that the fuel oil they supplied was unusably
>> poor, but that was not enough for the Bush adminstration. They simply
>> reneged on the agreement. But the North did not renege: they had promised
>> they would develop nuclear weapons if the deal fell through, and that is
>> what they did.
>>
>> Why does Kristof tell this transparent lie? Doesn't it go against the
>> usual NYT ethos of telling the truth about checkable and trivial matters so
>> as to be able to deceive with the necessary authority when it comes to the
>> essentials? I think, alas, Mr. Kristof simply cannot control himself any
>> more (see his WILDLY improbable tale about a husband executing his own wife
>> for writing a highly implausible letter to Kim Jeong-il himself). The
>> leather mask has become a face.
>>
>> And I think that is probably what happened to poor Leontiev as well. The
>> mind is a highly parsimonious thing; it is very tiring to believe one thing
>> and say another. Vygotsky's genetic law predicts that eventually it is the
>> former that shall cede to the latter.
>>
>> It is that sense in which what Mike says is true: Vygotsky's psychology,
>> as a scientific system, describes the development of institutionalized
>> lying just as accurately as it describes the development of higher
>> concepts. What I wanted to say was that his earlier sense that ideas are
>> always embodied, and some bodies are gifted with an extraordinary
>> foresight, is also true. I think Vygotsky knew that he would die, but he
>> also knew that his ideas, so long as they were true ones, would live.
>>
>> David Kellogg
>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>>
>>
>>
>> --- On Wed, 12/21/11, Ivan Rosero <irosero@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>>
>>
>> From: Ivan Rosero <irosero@ucsd.edu>
>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Interpreting Leontiev: functionalism and Anglo Finnish
>> Insufficiences
>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>> Date: Wednesday, December 21, 2011, 6:50 PM
>>
>>
>> David, if you agree with the summary Larry has presented, I remain confused
>> by your analogy.  I read Larry's presentation of Kitching/Pleasant as
>> saying that action cobbles together further sense within already-given
>> sense that is simultaneously ideal-material, and therefore subject to
>> culturally and historically specific constraints and possibilities.  But
>> surely, this includes the bottle and the person too, both as moving
>> entities (the bottle, unless highly heated, a much more slowly moving
>> entity).  I am not invested in any particular reading of Leontiev, but your
>> analogy as presented suggests a kind of essential fixity to the person
>> which I want to believe you don't really mean.
>>
>> To be fair, your emphasis is on the wine in the bottle.  But, in this case,
>> a slowly moving bottle is rather less interesting than a human being, with
>> a rather less historically complex relationship to the liquid it gives
>> shape to.
>>
>> Does what Andy refer to help here?  What kind of concept-complex (is it
>> enough to call it Stalinism?) helps to explain the Leontiev at issue here?
>> Or, if the critique was there from early on, what kind of concept-complex
>> would help to explain his writings' wide acceptance?
>>
>> Or, do we forgo all this and just grab Leontiev, as you say, "on a good
>> day"?
>>
>> Ivan
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Dec 21, 2011 at 3:55 PM, David Kellogg <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com
>> >wrote:
>>
>> > Mike wrote that as he grows older, he becomes less attached to his
>> > position (expressed in his editorial commentary to Luria's autobiography,
>> > "The Making of Mind") that ideas really are highly embodied things. Mike
>> > says that as he grows older, he becomes more and more attached to Luria's
>> > position that only ideas matter.
>> >
>> > But as I grow older, I become more and more attached to Mike's original
>> > position that individuals really matter. Wine has no shape of its own; it
>> > really depends on what bottle we put it in, and the form of ideas depends
>> > very much on the character of the individuals wo carry them.
>> >
>> > On paper, the theoretical positions of Vygotsky and Leontiev are not that
>> > far apart. So when Mike asks what presents Vygotsky's ideas from being
>> > pressed into service by the Stalinist state, I think the answer has to be
>> > referred to the individual who carried this idea after all.
>> >
>> > I think it is not accidental that one was amenable and the other was not,
>> > that one's ideas were deformed and degenerated, and the others still
>> amaze
>> > by their freshness and color. Nor is it accidental that one lived and one
>> > died.
>> >
>> > But of course death is simply the moment when our thinking and spoken
>> > speech must come to an end, and our written speech, like a hermit crab,
>> > must find a new home in the minds and mouths of others. And by that
>> > measure, it was Vygotsky who lived on, yea, even in the mind and the
>> mouth
>> > of Leontiev. Well, Leontiev on a good day!
>> >
>> > David Kellogg
>> > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>> >
>> > PS; I think I am (once again) with Larry. I think that if we read (late)
>> > Wittgenstein as a linguistic (not a philosophical) pragmatist, that is,
>> as
>> > someone who believes that meaning in language comes from sense in
>> activity,
>> > Wittgenstein is perfectly consistent with what Marx writes in the German
>> > Ideology (that language is practical consciousness, real for myself
>> because
>> > real for others). Wittgenstein is Vygotsky-compatible in other ways, too,
>> > e.g. his argument about preconceptual "families" and his argument about
>> the
>> > tool like nature of signs.
>> >
>> > dk
>> >
>> > --- On Wed, 12/21/11, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
>> >
>> >
>> > From: mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
>> > Subject: Re: [xmca] Interpreting Leontiev: functionalism and Anglo
>> Finnish
>> > Insufficiences
>> > To: "Larry Purss" <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
>> > Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>, "Morten
>> > Nissen" <Morten.Nissen@psy.ku.dk>
>> > Date: Wednesday, December 21, 2011, 2:12 PM
>> >
>> >
>> > Very helpful, Larry. Thanks.
>> >
>> > As I read the Leontiev materials what was at issue in 1949 is whether
>> there
>> > is any "third space" of the self in the "unity of consciousness and
>> > activity." I take Stalinism
>> > in these materials to refer to the way that idealism is joined with
>> belief
>> > in some sort of "autonomous" realm of thought. Zinchenko's work on
>> > micromovements of the eye and perceptual action seem to me now
>> significant
>> > in exactly this respect: they point to a rapid simulation process which
>> is
>> > not mechanically connected to externalized action (as one example). If
>> you
>> > know the future of history and what is good for everyone, all such
>> > processes risk deviation from "the true path." The motives of the
>> "healthy"
>> > individual are supposed to coincide with those of the "collective" (as
>> > represented by the general secretary of the central committee of the
>> > communist party). Functionalism as command and control statism.
>> >
>> > If we accept THIS version of CHAT, seems to me that Phillip is corrrect -
>> > Use the ideas for something called communism, fascism, ANY form of
>> > collective social project.
>> >
>> > David says this is Leontiev's (AT) problem, not Vygotsky's (CH) problem.
>> > Larry points
>> > to Wittgensteinian marxism that appears to provide a way to select wheat
>> > from chaff (or discover a different level of chaff!).
>> >
>> > My guess is that German, Russian, and other thinkers have already carried
>> > this conversation pretty far.... Morten's citation of German work points
>> to
>> > this conclusion.
>> >
>> > But how are we poor non_Russian, non_German reading unfortunates
>> wandering
>> > in the woods to find our way?
>> >
>> > mike
>> >
>> > On Wed, Dec 21, 2011 at 12:08 PM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
>> > wrote:
>> >
>> > > Hi Andy, Christine, Mike
>> > > I have been hibernating on Mayne Island, a small Island between
>> Vancouver
>> > > and Vancouver and Vancouver Island. [school break for the holidays] No
>> > > internet except at the small library]
>> > >
>> > > I was interested in this comment from Morten Nissen on Andy's book
>> > >
>> > > Blunden, as it were, attacks it from the “opposite” side: the
>> > functionalism
>> > > of Leontiev’s way of relating subject with society. This has to do with
>> > how
>> > > objects and motives appear to coincide in Leontiev’s idealized image of
>> > the
>> > > true society, that is, the society of original communism and that of
>> the
>> > > Soviet Union.
>> > > Andy, it is this notion of "coinciding" that I have difficulty with
>> when
>> > > reading about Activity Theory.
>> > >
>> > > Leontiev's statements such as "Education is the decisive force which
>> > forms
>> > > man intellectually. This intellectual development MUST CORRESPOND TO
>> THE
>> > > AIMS AND THE NEEDS OF THE ENTIRE SOCIETY.  It must fully agree with
>> REAL
>> > > human needs"
>> > >
>> > > I'm been browsing through an edited  book by Gavin Kitching and Nigel
>> > > Pleasant titled "Marx and Wittgenstein: Knowledge, Morality, Politics."
>> > >
>> > > These authors take an interesting perspective on materialism & idealism
>> > > that gives idealism its place in our human being [in contrast to how I
>> > read
>> > > Leontiev}
>> > > These authors are exploring a Wittgensteinian Marxism that examines
>> > Marx's
>> > > notion that "The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a
>> > > nightmare on the brain of the living" A Wittgensteinian Marxist reading
>> > > [from the authors perspective] would make 3 points.
>> > >
>> > > 1] Tradition and circumstances cannot be understood in ABSTRACTION FROM
>> > > the traditions and understandings that people have of these
>> > circumstances.
>> > > 2] WHATEVER  such varied understandings may consist (class, culture,
>> > > gender etc) nonetheless some KINDS of actions by historical subjects
>> > > [agents, actors] will prove impossible IF these actions are entered
>> into
>> > in
>> > > disregard to the traditions and circumstances directly GIVEN,
>> ENCOUNTERED
>> > > and transmitted from the past
>> > > 3] A principle WAY in which the TRADITIONS OF THE DEAD GENERATIONS
>> weighs
>> > > like a nightmare on the brain of the living is that ANTECEDENT
>> historical
>> > > circumstances often make it IMPOSSIBLE TO THINK AND FEEL (and therefore
>> > > act)in certain ways. Historically created material culture restricts
>> and
>> > > enables the making of PARTICULAR KINDS of history. People do not try to
>> > do
>> > > things and then for "material reasons" find they cannot do things. (
>> > cannot
>> > > make history as THEY PLEASE ) Such traditions and circumstances DEEPLY
>> > FORM
>> > > what it is that present generations can DESIRE TO DO. and CONCEIVE OF.
>> > (as
>> > > well as what actions they can conceive of as being possible/impossible,
>> > > feasible/unfeasible)
>> > >
>> > > It is human action in and on the world that inextricably LINKS THOUGHT
>> > > (and language) TO MATERIAL REALITY. Historical traditions and
>> > circumstances
>> > > are the outcomes of previous generations actions [intended &
>> unintended]
>> > > which place constraints on present generations. Constraints on what
>> they
>> > > can think, feel, desire (and how they act)
>> > > By keeping these 3 points in mind the authors suggest we can avoid
>> > falling
>> > > into the DEEP CONFUSIONS which have always attended the material/ideal
>> > > distinction.
>> > > The most DIRECT and comprehensible way to SEE THROUGH this
>> material/ideal
>> > > distinction is to see that all action is simultaneously mental &
>> > physical,
>> > > material & ideal.  Neither material or ideal is an "epiphenomena" of
>> the
>> > > other.
>> > >
>> > > In my reading of Leontiev in the chapter from the book posted I don't
>> see
>> > > the nuances recognizing the depths of the "ideal" within Marx's theory.
>> > >
>> > > This edited book, by putting Marx into explicit conversation is
>> > > elaborating a Wittgensteinian Marxism or a Marxist Wittgenstein.
>> > >
>> > > Larry
>> > >
>> > > On Mon, Dec 19, 2011 at 7:39 PM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
>> > >
>> > >> Below are two quotations from Morten Nissen's review of Andy Blunden's
>> > >> book
>> > >> on activity theory. Full review in
>> > >> current issue of MCA.
>> > >>
>> > >> After presenting the quotation, a comment.
>> > >> mike
>> > >> -------------------
>> > >>
>> > >> Morten Nissen on Leontiev, functionalism, and Stalinism
>> > >>
>> > >>
>> > >>
>> > >> ….behind this terminological trouble lies a deep theoretical problem
>> in
>> > >> Leontiev’s social theory. This problem was identified in the German
>> and
>> > >> Scandinavian reception (Axel & Nissen, 1993; Holzkamp, 1979;
>> Osterkamp,
>> > >> 1976) but almost completely ignored in the Anglo-Finnish (with
>> > Miettinen,
>> > >> 2005, and Kaptelinin, 2005, as the noble exceptions to the rule)—and
>> > >> Blunden, as it were, attacks it from the “opposite” side: the
>> > >> functionalism
>> > >> of Leontiev’s way of relating subject with society. This has to do
>> with
>> > >> how
>> > >> objects and motives appear to coincide in Leontiev’s idealized image
>> of
>> > >> the
>> > >> true society, that is, the society of original communism and that of
>> the
>> > >> Soviet Union.
>> > >>
>> > >>
>> > >>
>> > >> >From the perspective of this functionalist utopia, a psychology could
>> > >> become relevant only in the face of the undeveloped and the deviant:
>> as
>> > in
>> > >> fact, according to Leontiev (1978), children and disturbed provide the
>> > >> tasks of psychology in the institutions of the Soviet Union. To
>> > >> paraphrase:
>> > >> The child who puts down her book still has not grasped the harmony of
>> > >> society’s needs with the desire to learn that she *must*
>> > >>
>> > >> develop—she has not yet developed those “higher cultural needs.”
>> > Bourgeois
>> > >> society is another matter, where sense and meaning are divided in
>> > >> principle, but this matter—that of ideology and social
>> critique—Leontiev
>> > >> sets aside and forgets. An elaborate critique of Leontiev’s
>> > functionalism
>> > >> was given already in 1980 (Haug, Nemitz,& Waldhubel, 1980), and the
>> > >> background was explained by Osterkamp (1976) in her groundbreaking
>> work
>> > on
>> > >> the theory of motivation.
>> > >>
>> > >> --------------------------------
>> > >>
>> > >> Comment.
>> > >>
>> > >>
>> > >> When I first read these passages as part of the attempted "swap of
>> > ideas"
>> > >> that Morten and  I tried to organize around
>> > >>
>> > >> our reviews of Andy's book in Outlines and MCA, I commented how sad it
>> > was
>> > >> that the elaborate critique that goes back to
>> > >>
>> > >> 1980 is not in English and fully engaged by both European and
>> > >>  "Ango-Finns"
>> > >> (although how poor  Viktor got into that category
>> > >>
>> > >> I do not know!).
>> > >>
>> > >>
>> > >> Seems like real interchange around these issues is long overdue. But
>> > given
>> > >> the progress of the last couple of years, I'll not be
>> > >>
>> > >> holding my breath!
>> > >>
>> > >> --------------------------
>> > >>
>> > >>
>> > >> But thinking about the issues as well as my limited language (and
>> other)
>> > >> capacities allow.
>> > >>
>> > >> mike
>> > >> __________________________________________
>> > >> _____
>> > >> xmca mailing list
>> > >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>> > >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>> > >>
>> > >
>> > >
>> > __________________________________________
>> > _____
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>> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
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>> > __________________________________________
>> > _____
>> > xmca mailing list
>> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>> >
>> __________________________________________
>> _____
>> xmca mailing list
>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>> __________________________________________
>> _____
>> xmca mailing list
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>>
> __________________________________________
> _____
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca



-- 
Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
Sanford I. Berman Post-Doctoral Scholar
Department of Communication
University of California, San Diego
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