Re: [xmca] Folk Psychology from a narrative perspective

[mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>]

An interesting elaboration of the idea of the retrospective construction of
meaning, Greg. I had not thought about it in these terms before.
mike

On Fri, Jan 28, 2011 at 11:55 PM, Gregory Allan Thompson <
gathomps@uchicago.edu> wrote:

> Yes, and the insistence on ascribing motive to practice starts early. My
> favorite is the parent that looks at his two year old who has just torn half
> the pages out of a cherished book of his (substitute lipstick all over the
> dining room table or paint on the new carpet) and chastises the child "Why
> did you do that?" or better "What were you thinking?"
>
> As if the child has some complex motivation and thought behind what they
> did. The child can only stare back in shock wondering what is happening.
>
> But there is important work being done in those ridiculous questions. Put
> together enough of these moments and by the time they are 7 or so, they get
> it - "It was an accident" and "I didn't mean to do it" become stock
> responses regardless of what happened. And by 12 they have become nearly
> fully competent at manipulating the situation, intentions and all, e.g. "I
> was trying to help my sister... and...". For each event, they are able to
> reconstruct a philosophy of the act, so to speak.
>
> -greg
>
> >
> >------------------------------
> >
> >Message: 2
> >Date: Fri, 28 Jan 2011 11:53:27 -0600
> >From: "David H Kirshner" <dkirsh@lsu.edu>
> >Subject: RE: [xmca] Folk Psychology from a narrative perspective
> >To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >Message-ID:
> >       <731CECC23FB8CA4E9127BD399744D1EC02E0CDFD@email001.lsu.edu>
> >Content-Type: text/plain;      charset="us-ascii"
> >
> >As with Tollefsen, who reviewed Hutto's book, I'm not quite sure what
> >kinds of specialized narrative practices are supposed to be needed to
> >establish our folk psychology's rational ascriptions. The ascription of
> >motive to behavior is ubiquitous. Admittedly, it may take one a long
> >time to get good at ascribing particular motives to particular actions.
> >But our social/cultural frame demands such ascription, so presumably we
> >all are going to get a lot of practice.
> >
> >It is one thing to look to narrative as a site for development of a
> >particular cultural practice--the folk psychology ascription of
> >motives--quite another to associate narrative with the fundamental
> >process of enculturation, itself. My approach to enculturation does not
> >take narrativization of one's identity as fundamental. That only kicks
> >in in the specialized process of "acculturation"--intentional emulation
> >of cultural practices to fulfill goals of cultural membership. But
> >enculturation functions more fundamentally as a spontaneous adaption to
> >the culture in which one is enmeshed.
> >
> >David
> >
> >
> >
> >-----Original Message-----
> >From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> >On Behalf Of Larry Purss
> >Sent: Wednesday, January 26, 2011 7:21 PM
> >To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >Subject: Re: [xmca] Folk Psychology from a narrative perspective
> >
> >Hi David Ke
> >
> >David
> >Your distinction between history and narrative is interesting.  Do you
> >think
> >Bruner collapses the distinction. Hutto's framework on narratives is
> >that
> >they are forms of story-telling that give "reasons for actions" in terms
> >of
> >beliefs and desires which are the folk psychological frameworks that are
> >culturally grounded frames of reference.  He suggests this form of
> >explanation is socioculturally grounded.  My recollection of Bruner's
> >work
> >is he suggests it is one of the two basic forms of constructing meaning.
> >Therefore, for Bruner, history would be a particular form of narrative.
> >
> >David, if Hutto's work interests you, I would also google his edited
> >book
> >"Folk Psychology Reassessed" which gives alternative theoretical
> >approaches
> >which are challenging the "theory theory" model and "simulation" model
> >of
> >folk psychology.  The edited volume situates Hutto's work in a larger
> >stream
> >of thought.
> >
> >On this topic of folk psycholgy I'm currently reading a book "Philosophy
> >in
> >the Flesh" by Lakoff & Johnson that posits BASIC or PRIMARY forms of
> >cognition as fundamentally metaphorical. We imaginally compare a source
> >concept to a target concept.   The SOURCE concept of these primary
> >cognitive
> >structures are ALWAYS based in our physical bodies. Lakoff & Johnson
> >suggest
> >from these primary metaphors more complex metaphorical meanings develop.
> >If
> >this perspective is accurate, then language is not the SOURCE of our
> >most
> >basic metaphors. The source is in the sensory-motor or somatic embodied
> >cognition. Language expresses these basic metaphors.  If there is some
> >merit
> >in this position then education and developmental science should engage
> >with
> >basic primary metaphors as foundational in the emergence of cognitive
> >capacity and in how these basic metaphors IMPLICITLY structure our folk
> >psychology.
> >
> >>From this perspective of primary metaphor as embodied  it is not too
> >big a
> >step  to reflect on primary intersubjectivity as a precursor to
> >secondary
> >intersubjectivity.  I have a hunch these 2 constructs are intimately
> >related.
> >
> >Larry
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >On Wed, Jan 26, 2011 at 4:14 PM, David Kellogg
> ><vaughndogblack@yahoo.com>wrote:
> >
> >> Wow--I have to get that book! Thanks, Larry.
> >>
> >> The way I understand David Kirshner's work is this: there is really
> >only
> >> ONE of the three meta-discourses in education that is narrative, at
> >least
> >> narrative in the sense of oriented towards the action of a hero in a
> >problem
> >> space who evaluates and achieves some kind of resolution.
> >>
> >> That's his THIRD meta-discourse, the one which sees education as a
> >process
> >> of becoming a participant, a member, a practioner and as mastering a
> >> particular set of discourses that accompany membership.
> >>
> >> It seems to me that his first meta-discourse, which sees education as
> >a
> >> process of mastering skills, is not narrativist, because it focuses on
> >> problem solutions and pretty much ignores the hero and the evaluation
> >of the
> >> problem space.
> >>
> >> His second meta-discourse, which sees education as a process of
> >acquiring
> >> conceptual knowledge, is not narrativist either, because it sees this
> >> knowledge as being not embodied in a particular hero and because it
> >sees the
> >> knowledge as being quite separable from the solution of problems.
> >>
> >> I don't think this means that DHK would consider the third
> >meta-discourse
> >> the most complete. I think it's only the most complete if we view it
> >from a
> >> narrativist point of view, and that is no coincidence, since it
> >co-evolved
> >> with a lot of Bruner's work.
> >>
> >> I have a question about the difference between narrative and history
> >(as in
> >> "cultural historical"). It seems to me that everything we say about
> >> narrative (its structure, it's "I-ness" and even its past-to-present
> >> orientation) is radically UNTRUE of history (because history is not
> >> structured around heroes in problem spaces, it is not "I" shaped, and
> >it is
> >> oriented present-to-past). Why, then, do people of our peculiar
> >historical
> >> epoch treat the two as synonymous?
> >>
> >> David Kellogg
> >> Seoul National University of Education
> >>
> >> --- On Wed, 1/26/11, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >> From: Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> >> Subject: [xmca] Folk Psychology from a narrative perspective
> >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >> Date: Wednesday, January 26, 2011, 2:38 PM
> >>
> >>
> >> I have attached a book review for others interested in a perspective
> >on
> >> folk
> >> psychology that assumes a perspective inspired by Jerome Bruner's work
> >on
> >> narrative practices,  Hutto is positing a 2nd person dialogical
> >grounding
> >> for understanding "reasons for actions"  He suggests this mode of
> >> understanding is most pronounced when actions are unpredictable.
> >Hutto
> >> suggests there are other more direct embodied forms of recognition and
> >> engagement that are not narrative based.
> >>
> >> I see some affinity in this perspective to David Kirschner's approach
> >to
> >> learning theory as narrative based genres.
> >>
> >> Larry
> >>
> >> -----Inline Attachment Follows-----
> >>
> >>
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