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[xmca] Folk Psychology from a narrative perspective
Yes, and the insistence on ascribing motive to practice starts early. My favorite is the parent that looks at his two year old who has just torn half the pages out of a cherished book of his (substitute lipstick all over the dining room table or paint on the new carpet) and chastises the child "Why did you do that?" or better "What were you thinking?"
As if the child has some complex motivation and thought behind what they did. The child can only stare back in shock wondering what is happening.
But there is important work being done in those ridiculous questions. Put together enough of these moments and by the time they are 7 or so, they get it - "It was an accident" and "I didn't mean to do it" become stock responses regardless of what happened. And by 12 they have become nearly fully competent at manipulating the situation, intentions and all, e.g. "I was trying to help my sister... and...". For each event, they are able to reconstruct a philosophy of the act, so to speak.
-greg
>
>------------------------------
>
>Message: 2
>Date: Fri, 28 Jan 2011 11:53:27 -0600
>From: "David H Kirshner" <dkirsh@lsu.edu>
>Subject: RE: [xmca] Folk Psychology from a narrative perspective
>To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>Message-ID:
> <731CECC23FB8CA4E9127BD399744D1EC02E0CDFD@email001.lsu.edu>
>Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
>
>As with Tollefsen, who reviewed Hutto's book, I'm not quite sure what
>kinds of specialized narrative practices are supposed to be needed to
>establish our folk psychology's rational ascriptions. The ascription of
>motive to behavior is ubiquitous. Admittedly, it may take one a long
>time to get good at ascribing particular motives to particular actions.
>But our social/cultural frame demands such ascription, so presumably we
>all are going to get a lot of practice.
>
>It is one thing to look to narrative as a site for development of a
>particular cultural practice--the folk psychology ascription of
>motives--quite another to associate narrative with the fundamental
>process of enculturation, itself. My approach to enculturation does not
>take narrativization of one's identity as fundamental. That only kicks
>in in the specialized process of "acculturation"--intentional emulation
>of cultural practices to fulfill goals of cultural membership. But
>enculturation functions more fundamentally as a spontaneous adaption to
>the culture in which one is enmeshed.
>
>David
>
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
>On Behalf Of Larry Purss
>Sent: Wednesday, January 26, 2011 7:21 PM
>To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>Subject: Re: [xmca] Folk Psychology from a narrative perspective
>
>Hi David Ke
>
>David
>Your distinction between history and narrative is interesting. Do you
>think
>Bruner collapses the distinction. Hutto's framework on narratives is
>that
>they are forms of story-telling that give "reasons for actions" in terms
>of
>beliefs and desires which are the folk psychological frameworks that are
>culturally grounded frames of reference. He suggests this form of
>explanation is socioculturally grounded. My recollection of Bruner's
>work
>is he suggests it is one of the two basic forms of constructing meaning.
>Therefore, for Bruner, history would be a particular form of narrative.
>
>David, if Hutto's work interests you, I would also google his edited
>book
>"Folk Psychology Reassessed" which gives alternative theoretical
>approaches
>which are challenging the "theory theory" model and "simulation" model
>of
>folk psychology. The edited volume situates Hutto's work in a larger
>stream
>of thought.
>
>On this topic of folk psycholgy I'm currently reading a book "Philosophy
>in
>the Flesh" by Lakoff & Johnson that posits BASIC or PRIMARY forms of
>cognition as fundamentally metaphorical. We imaginally compare a source
>concept to a target concept. The SOURCE concept of these primary
>cognitive
>structures are ALWAYS based in our physical bodies. Lakoff & Johnson
>suggest
>from these primary metaphors more complex metaphorical meanings develop.
>If
>this perspective is accurate, then language is not the SOURCE of our
>most
>basic metaphors. The source is in the sensory-motor or somatic embodied
>cognition. Language expresses these basic metaphors. If there is some
>merit
>in this position then education and developmental science should engage
>with
>basic primary metaphors as foundational in the emergence of cognitive
>capacity and in how these basic metaphors IMPLICITLY structure our folk
>psychology.
>
>>From this perspective of primary metaphor as embodied it is not too
>big a
>step to reflect on primary intersubjectivity as a precursor to
>secondary
>intersubjectivity. I have a hunch these 2 constructs are intimately
>related.
>
>Larry
>
>
>
>
>
>
>On Wed, Jan 26, 2011 at 4:14 PM, David Kellogg
><vaughndogblack@yahoo.com>wrote:
>
>> Wow--I have to get that book! Thanks, Larry.
>>
>> The way I understand David Kirshner's work is this: there is really
>only
>> ONE of the three meta-discourses in education that is narrative, at
>least
>> narrative in the sense of oriented towards the action of a hero in a
>problem
>> space who evaluates and achieves some kind of resolution.
>>
>> That's his THIRD meta-discourse, the one which sees education as a
>process
>> of becoming a participant, a member, a practioner and as mastering a
>> particular set of discourses that accompany membership.
>>
>> It seems to me that his first meta-discourse, which sees education as
>a
>> process of mastering skills, is not narrativist, because it focuses on
>> problem solutions and pretty much ignores the hero and the evaluation
>of the
>> problem space.
>>
>> His second meta-discourse, which sees education as a process of
>acquiring
>> conceptual knowledge, is not narrativist either, because it sees this
>> knowledge as being not embodied in a particular hero and because it
>sees the
>> knowledge as being quite separable from the solution of problems.
>>
>> I don't think this means that DHK would consider the third
>meta-discourse
>> the most complete. I think it's only the most complete if we view it
>from a
>> narrativist point of view, and that is no coincidence, since it
>co-evolved
>> with a lot of Bruner's work.
>>
>> I have a question about the difference between narrative and history
>(as in
>> "cultural historical"). It seems to me that everything we say about
>> narrative (its structure, it's "I-ness" and even its past-to-present
>> orientation) is radically UNTRUE of history (because history is not
>> structured around heroes in problem spaces, it is not "I" shaped, and
>it is
>> oriented present-to-past). Why, then, do people of our peculiar
>historical
>> epoch treat the two as synonymous?
>>
>> David Kellogg
>> Seoul National University of Education
>>
>> --- On Wed, 1/26/11, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>
>> From: Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
>> Subject: [xmca] Folk Psychology from a narrative perspective
>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>> Date: Wednesday, January 26, 2011, 2:38 PM
>>
>>
>> I have attached a book review for others interested in a perspective
>on
>> folk
>> psychology that assumes a perspective inspired by Jerome Bruner's work
>on
>> narrative practices, Hutto is positing a 2nd person dialogical
>grounding
>> for understanding "reasons for actions" He suggests this mode of
>> understanding is most pronounced when actions are unpredictable.
>Hutto
>> suggests there are other more direct embodied forms of recognition and
>> engagement that are not narrative based.
>>
>> I see some affinity in this perspective to David Kirschner's approach
>to
>> learning theory as narrative based genres.
>>
>> Larry
>>
>> -----Inline Attachment Follows-----
>>
>>
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