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RE: [xmca] Folk Psychology from a narrative perspective
As with Tollefsen, who reviewed Hutto's book, I'm not quite sure what
kinds of specialized narrative practices are supposed to be needed to
establish our folk psychology's rational ascriptions. The ascription of
motive to behavior is ubiquitous. Admittedly, it may take one a long
time to get good at ascribing particular motives to particular actions.
But our social/cultural frame demands such ascription, so presumably we
all are going to get a lot of practice.
It is one thing to look to narrative as a site for development of a
particular cultural practice--the folk psychology ascription of
motives--quite another to associate narrative with the fundamental
process of enculturation, itself. My approach to enculturation does not
take narrativization of one's identity as fundamental. That only kicks
in in the specialized process of "acculturation"--intentional emulation
of cultural practices to fulfill goals of cultural membership. But
enculturation functions more fundamentally as a spontaneous adaption to
the culture in which one is enmeshed.
David
-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
On Behalf Of Larry Purss
Sent: Wednesday, January 26, 2011 7:21 PM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] Folk Psychology from a narrative perspective
Hi David Ke
David
Your distinction between history and narrative is interesting. Do you
think
Bruner collapses the distinction. Hutto's framework on narratives is
that
they are forms of story-telling that give "reasons for actions" in terms
of
beliefs and desires which are the folk psychological frameworks that are
culturally grounded frames of reference. He suggests this form of
explanation is socioculturally grounded. My recollection of Bruner's
work
is he suggests it is one of the two basic forms of constructing meaning.
Therefore, for Bruner, history would be a particular form of narrative.
David, if Hutto's work interests you, I would also google his edited
book
"Folk Psychology Reassessed" which gives alternative theoretical
approaches
which are challenging the "theory theory" model and "simulation" model
of
folk psychology. The edited volume situates Hutto's work in a larger
stream
of thought.
On this topic of folk psycholgy I'm currently reading a book "Philosophy
in
the Flesh" by Lakoff & Johnson that posits BASIC or PRIMARY forms of
cognition as fundamentally metaphorical. We imaginally compare a source
concept to a target concept. The SOURCE concept of these primary
cognitive
structures are ALWAYS based in our physical bodies. Lakoff & Johnson
suggest
from these primary metaphors more complex metaphorical meanings develop.
If
this perspective is accurate, then language is not the SOURCE of our
most
basic metaphors. The source is in the sensory-motor or somatic embodied
cognition. Language expresses these basic metaphors. If there is some
merit
in this position then education and developmental science should engage
with
basic primary metaphors as foundational in the emergence of cognitive
capacity and in how these basic metaphors IMPLICITLY structure our folk
psychology.
>From this perspective of primary metaphor as embodied it is not too
big a
step to reflect on primary intersubjectivity as a precursor to
secondary
intersubjectivity. I have a hunch these 2 constructs are intimately
related.
Larry
On Wed, Jan 26, 2011 at 4:14 PM, David Kellogg
<vaughndogblack@yahoo.com>wrote:
> Wow--I have to get that book! Thanks, Larry.
>
> The way I understand David Kirshner's work is this: there is really
only
> ONE of the three meta-discourses in education that is narrative, at
least
> narrative in the sense of oriented towards the action of a hero in a
problem
> space who evaluates and achieves some kind of resolution.
>
> That's his THIRD meta-discourse, the one which sees education as a
process
> of becoming a participant, a member, a practioner and as mastering a
> particular set of discourses that accompany membership.
>
> It seems to me that his first meta-discourse, which sees education as
a
> process of mastering skills, is not narrativist, because it focuses on
> problem solutions and pretty much ignores the hero and the evaluation
of the
> problem space.
>
> His second meta-discourse, which sees education as a process of
acquiring
> conceptual knowledge, is not narrativist either, because it sees this
> knowledge as being not embodied in a particular hero and because it
sees the
> knowledge as being quite separable from the solution of problems.
>
> I don't think this means that DHK would consider the third
meta-discourse
> the most complete. I think it's only the most complete if we view it
from a
> narrativist point of view, and that is no coincidence, since it
co-evolved
> with a lot of Bruner's work.
>
> I have a question about the difference between narrative and history
(as in
> "cultural historical"). It seems to me that everything we say about
> narrative (its structure, it's "I-ness" and even its past-to-present
> orientation) is radically UNTRUE of history (because history is not
> structured around heroes in problem spaces, it is not "I" shaped, and
it is
> oriented present-to-past). Why, then, do people of our peculiar
historical
> epoch treat the two as synonymous?
>
> David Kellogg
> Seoul National University of Education
>
> --- On Wed, 1/26/11, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
> From: Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> Subject: [xmca] Folk Psychology from a narrative perspective
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> Date: Wednesday, January 26, 2011, 2:38 PM
>
>
> I have attached a book review for others interested in a perspective
on
> folk
> psychology that assumes a perspective inspired by Jerome Bruner's work
on
> narrative practices, Hutto is positing a 2nd person dialogical
grounding
> for understanding "reasons for actions" He suggests this mode of
> understanding is most pronounced when actions are unpredictable.
Hutto
> suggests there are other more direct embodied forms of recognition and
> engagement that are not narrative based.
>
> I see some affinity in this perspective to David Kirschner's approach
to
> learning theory as narrative based genres.
>
> Larry
>
> -----Inline Attachment Follows-----
>
>
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