Re: [xmca] Question

[Steve Gabosch <stevegabosch@me.com>]

Monica, what suggests to you that will has an early-age-based  
entanglement factor that is different from that of other functions?

On motives, we get some of Vygotsky's thoughts also in that chapter on  
will - such as "in voluntary selection [decision-making], it is not  
stimuli, but motives that are in conflict ..."  V4 p 215.

- Steve

On Jul 31, 2010, at 1:52 PM, Monica Hansen wrote:

> Your last question, Steve is what I have been playing with for a  
> while and
> one of the reasons I asked the question about the differentiation of  
> the
> terms motivation and volition. Is "will" a high mental process? I  
> have  been
> thinking about the possibility of part of "will" as being a  
> disposition of
> an intermediate process, maybe a neurobiological process, a somatic  
> state
> (Damasio) that cannot be disentangled from our conscious subjective
> experience of situations associated with it in early development. I am
> interested to see what other ideas and connections come from this
> discussion.
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca- 
> bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
> Behalf Of Steve Gabosch
> Sent: Friday, July 30, 2010 1:29 PM
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: Re: [xmca] Question
>
> Elina, you ask many intriguing and very good questions!  The symposium
> you are developing will be very interesting.  A side point in your
> discussion here on the nature of self-consciousness or reflection
> struck me - you suggest that will may not be a higher psychological
> function.  I happen to have some Vygotsky quotes handy to think about
> that with.
>
> In studying Vol 4 The History of the Development of the Higher Mental
> Functions - a difficult but rewarding book - I have been struck by how
> much emphasis Vygotsky puts on will, self-mastery, self-control as an
> essential aspect of the development of all the higher mental  
> functions.
>
> Some of this is new to me and quite fascinating.  So here is a quick
> synopsis of what I am getting from this so far.    See what you think.
>
> According the Vygotsky, the higher mental functions themselves (e.g.
> attention, perception, memory, imitation, thinking, speech, counting,
> personality, world view) are the psychological aspect of cultural
> behavior. The development of the higher mental functions is an
> essential aspect of cultural behavior, they are part and parcel of
> cultural behavior.  They are all, without exception, derived from
> social processes - encountered first externally as a relationship with
> another person, and then internalized.  They are by no means fixed,
> but develop historically, based on the society, social relations,
> forms of culture, etc.
>
> The concept of "the mastery of behavior through internal processes" is
> a core theme for Vygotsky's theory of the higher mental functions.
> This is the essence of will.  He emphasizes that human freedom and
> freedom of the will can be found in the recognition of necessity (per
> Hegel, Engels, etc.), and that "Human freedom consists specifically of
> man's ability to think."   Vol 4 p 209.  But humans can only control
> their behavior by controlling their stimuli and situations.  So he
> says ": the great uniqueness of the will consists of man having no
> power over his own behavior other than the power that things have over
> his behavior. But man subjects to himself the power of things over
> behavior, makes them serve his own purposes and controls that power as
> he wants. He changes the environment with his external activity and in
> this way affects his own behavior, subjecting it to his own
> authority." p 212
>
> One way to describe his concept of will might be to say that will is
> not a direct two-step process of willing-getting, but a mediated three
> step process of willing-creating-getting.  "... will is never a
> direct, unmediated process." p217 "We ... [can] not bring forth any
> process of behavior and control it other that by creating an
> appropriate stimulus." p 210
>
> So with those ideas in mind, I am curious what the concept of the
> higher mental functions might look like if we view will as being
> something other than a higher mental process.  Thoughts?
>
> - Steve
>
>
>
>
> Elina said:
> Part of this conversation was discussion of the nature of higher
> psychological functions. I am still puzzled with what Vygotsky meant  
> by
> function ( Seth Chaiklin and I posed this question in 2002 and as we
> discussed recently and are still looking for an answer...:-), but
> Gennadi
> and I believe that reflection and will are not higher psychological
> functions. We are in the process of developing a proposal for the  
> ISCAR
> symposium on these issues.
>
>
>
> On Jul 30, 2010, at 11:11 AM, Elina Lampert-Shepel wrote:
>
> > Dear Achilles,
> > Thank you very much for the contribution. There can't be an
> > interruption as
> > it is a polylogical space I suppose.If we connect the Vygotskian
> > description
> > of development of self/ "ya" in the ontogenesis, then it points to  
> > the
> > important connections between reflexivity and self consciousness.
> > - Crisis of seven years. Generalization of "perezivaniya" or as
> > Vygotsky
> > calls it logic of feelings. The dual position of the child in play (
> > Imaginary situation:" I am a soldier in pain as I was wounded " and
> > Real
> > situation: My Mom is calling me for dinner and I am hungry) allows
> > the child
> > to reflect on one of this "perezivanij' as the other, as object of
> > reflection. In the process of the crisis of seven years as it is
> > noted in
> > your last quote, the child because of the ability to distinguish
> > external
> > and internal, evaluate her own success and failure develops self-
> > esteem and
> > self -evaluation. It seems to me that reflection as a psychological
> > tool of
> > experiencing imaginary and real position in play as well as the
> > psychological tool that helps the child to look at herself as the
> > other is
> > the condition for the development of the initial forms of self-
> > evaluation
> > and self esteem through the crises of seven years.
> >
> > Interestingly enough in the research of Alexander Dusavitskii it was
> > argued
> > that when elementary school students in Davydov-El'konin classrooms
> > were
> > asked to evaluate themselves, they would always evaluate their work
> > lower
> > that it was, because the self-evaluation that emerged through the
> > crisis of
> > seven years was not developed in the context of learning activity.
> > How to
> > evaluate my own learning was "terra incognita" for them.
> >
> > *But the question is what is the role of "perezivaniye' in the
> > development
> > of self-consciousness? * "Perezhivaniye" captures the unity of
> > affect and
> > intellect and this unity seems very important for the development of
> > self-consciousness.
> >
> > These are my thoughts so far...
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > 2010/7/30 Achilles Delari Junior <achilles_delari@hotmail.com>
> >
> > > Hi Mike and Elina,
> > > This will not so deep as all you are talking about, but when I was
> > > reading
> > > here I remember of your discussion, I made a little connection,
> > > because an
> > > "auto-consciousness" influx for "auto-concept" (see the text about
> > > the
> > > Crisis of Seven Years), and the first consciousness of child own
> > > perezhivaniia, etc... Then this influx for me to the problem of the
> > > concept
> > > of our own "Ya" ... Please if this could seems much extemporaneous,
> > > by my
> > > part, delete this message... But, let me try:
> > > I - From Slovar' L.S. Vigoskogo (ed. A.A. Leont'ev, 2007):
> > > Я - Понятие о <<Я>> развивается у
> > > ребенка из понятия о других. (31.1, 163) Тот факт, что с дошкольного
> > > возраста человек начинает по-мнить
> > > последовательность событий, -- это то, что
> > > старые психологи называли единством и тождеством <<Я>>. (5.2, 130)
> > > <...> ребенок учит-ся в игре своему <<Я>>: создавая фиктивные точки
> > > идентификации -- центры <<Я>>: irde социальная
> > > природа <<Я>>. Ср. Rollenspiel (ролевая игра). <...> ребенок имеет
> > > уже <<Я>>, но не осознает его, имеет внутренние процессы, но не
> > > сознает их --
> > > в игре prise de conscience о себе и своем сознании <...>
> > > Обозначение <<Я>> в
> > > игре, осознание мысли, <<я хочу>> -- в игре <."> Парадокс <<Я>>: в
> > > игре то
> > > радует, что я хочу,
> > > эгоцентри-ческая деятельность; но здесь же ограничение изнутри от
> > > своего
> > > мо-ментального
> > > <<Я>>. (23.1, 291)
> > >
> > > См. Возраст, Игра, Понятие
> > > See: "prise de conscience о себе"
> > >
> > > The actual references:
> > > * 33.1: Эйдетика // Хрестоматия по ощущению и восприятию. М., 1975.
> > > С.
> > > 275-281 (1930)
> > > * 5.2: Обучение и развитие в дошкольном
> > > возрасте // Выготский. М.,1.С. 123-134
> > > (1933)
> > > * 23.1: Из записок-конспекта Л.С.
> > > Выготского к лекциям по психоло-гии детей дошкольного возраста //
> > > Эльконин
> > > Д.Б. Психология игры. М., 1978. С. 289-294 (1933)
> > > ************************
> > >
> > > II - From "Seven Years Crisis" (Tom IV):
> > > "В 7-летнем возрасте мы имеем дело с началом возникновения такой
> > > структуры
> > > переживаний, когда ребенок начинает понимать, что значит <<я
> > > радуюсь>>, <<я
> > > огорчен>>, <<я сердит>>, <<я добрый>>, <<я злой>>, т. е. у него
> > > возникает
> > > осмысленная ориентировка в собственных переживаниях. Точно так, как
> > > ребенок
> > > 3 лет открывает свое отношение с другими людьми, так семилетка
> > > открывает сам
> > > факт своих переживаний. Благодаря этому выступают некоторые
> > > особенности,
> > > характеризующие кризис семи лет.
> > > 1. Переживания приобретают смысл (сердящийся ребенок понимает, что  
> > > он
> > > сердит), благодаря этому у ребенка возникают такие новые отношения
> > > к себе,
> > > которые были невозможны до обобщения переживаний. Как на шахматной
> > > доске,
> > > когда с каждым ходом возникают совершенно новые связи между
> > > фигурками, так и
> > > здесь возникают совсем новые связи между переживаниями, когда они
> > > приобретают известный смысл. Следовательно, весь характер  
> > > переживаний
> > > ребенка к 7 годам перестраивается, как перестраивается шахматная
> > > доска,
> > > когда ребенок научился играть в шахматы.
> > > 2. К кризису семи лет впервые возникает обобщение переживаний, или
> > > аффективное обобщение, логика чувств. Есть глубоко отсталые дети,
> > > которые на
> > > каждом шагу переживают неудачи: обычные дети играют, ненормальный
> > > ребенок
> > > пытается присоединиться к ним, но ему отказывают, он идет по улице,
> > > и над
> > > ним смеются. Одним словом, он на каждом шагу проигрывает. В каждом
> > > отдельном
> > > случае у него есть реакция на собственную недостаточность, а через
> > > минуту
> > > смотришь -- он совершенно доволен собой. Тысячи отдельных неудач, а
> > > общего
> > > чувства своей малоценности нет, он не обобщает того, что случалось
> > > уже много
> > > раз. У ребенка школьного возраста возникает обобщение чувств, т.
> > > е., если с
> > > ним много раз случалась какая-то ситуация, у него" (page 379, S.S.
> > > Tom. IV -
> > > 1984)
> > > "возникает аффективное образование, характер которого так же
> > > относится к
> > > единичному переживанию или аффекту, как понятие относится к
> > > единичному
> > > восприятию или воспоминанию. Например, у ребенка дошкольного
> > > возраста нет
> > > настоящей самооценки, самолюбия. Уровень наших запросов к самим
> > > себе, к
> > > нашему успеху, к нашему положению возникает именно в связи с
> > > кризисом семи
> > > лет.
> > > Ребенок дошкольного возраста любит себя, но самолюбия как  
> > > обобщенного
> > > отношения к самому себе, которое остается одним и тем же в разных
> > > ситуациях,
> > > но самооценки как таковой, но обобщенных отношений к окружающим и
> > > понимания
> > > своей ценности у ребенка этого возраста нет. Следовательно, к 7  
> > > годам
> > > возникает ряд сложных образований, которые и приводят к тому, что
> > > трудности
> > > поведения резко и коренным образом меняются, они принципиально
> > > отличны от
> > > трудностей дошкольного возраста.
> > > Такие новообразования, как самолюбие, самооценка, остаются, а
> > > симптомы
> > > кризиса (манерничанье, кривляние) преходящи. В кризисе семи лет
> > > благодаря
> > > тому, что возникает дифференциация внутреннего и внешнего, что
> > > впервые
> > > возникает смысловое переживание, возникает и острая борьба
> > > переживаний.
> > > Ребенок, который не знает, какие взять конфеты -- побольше или
> > > послаще, не
> > > находится в состоянии внутренней борьбы, хотя он и колеблется.
> > > Внутренняя
> > > борьба (противоречия переживаний и выбор собственных переживаний)
> > > становится
> > > возможна только теперь. (etc.)"(page 380. S.S. Tom IV - 1984)
> > > *********************
> > > Well, here in this second quote, I'm no so insecure as about the
> > > "concept
> > > of Ya". Because I understand that there is something related to your
> > > discussion, in important ontogenetic terms... I only remain don't
> > > contributing about the own "name" that you search for... But the
> > > process
> > > itself seems to be within the same semantic field.
> > > Thank you, and forgive me the interruption.
> > > Best wishes.Achilles,from Brazil
> > > *************
> > > > Date: Thu, 29 Jul 2010 21:03:45 -0400
> > > > Subject: Re: [xmca] Question
> > > > From: ellampert@gmail.com
> > > > To: lchcmike@gmail.com; xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > > CC:
> > > >
> > > > Mike -
> > > > I can relate to a LOT of trouble. Both notions are used in many
> > > > different
> > > > ways in the contexts of development and learning. A few weeks ago,
> > > > during
> > > > Vygotsky Summer School, Gennadiy Kravtsov and I had a long
> > > > conversation
> > > > about my cross-cultural research on reflection or as you say
> > > > "reflexia".
> > > He
> > > > talked about reflection/reflexivity in the context of
> > > "self-consciousness"
> > > > and we discussed reflexivity as a condition for the development of
> > > > self-consciousness. He believes that the notion of "self-
> > > > consciousness" (
> > > > that I distinguish from reflexivity) was never developed fully in
> > > > cultural-historical tradition. Knowing that there is still lack of
> > > > bridge
> > > > between Russian and the rest of the world cultural-historical
> > > > research, I
> > > > wanted to learn whether there are studies that connect reflection (
> > > > "reflexia") and self-consciousness. It is interesting that you
> > > > mentioned
> > > > both "reflexia" and "self-consciousness' in the context of
> > > meta-cognition.
> > > > It seems to me that learning activity theory conceptualized
> > > > reflection as
> > > a
> > > > metacognitive process, although Vygotsky never discussed it as a
> > > cognitive,
> > > > or metacognitive process. There is also an important language
> > > > difference,
> > > > Russian language doesn't have an everyday use of the word
> > > > reflection, it
> > > > only exists as a philosophical or psychological notion.
> > > >
> > > > Part of this conversation was discussion of the nature of higher
> > > > psychological functions. I am still puzzled with what Vygotsky
> > > > meant by
> > > > function ( Seth Chaiklin and I posed this question in 2002 and as  
> > > > we
> > > > discussed recently and are still looking for an answer...:-), but
> > > > Gennadi
> > > > and I believe that reflection and will are not higher psychological
> > > > functions. We are in the process of developing a proposal for the
> > > > ISCAR
> > > > symposium on these issues.
> > > >
> > > > In any case, I was just wondering if there are studies on the
> > > > development
> > > of
> > > > self-consciousness and/or reflexivity that are not necessarily
> > > > rooted in
> > > > Russian philosophical thought.
> > > >
> > > > As you can see, I am in the state of questioning, so directions for
> > > further
> > > > questioning will be highly appreciated.
> > > >
> > > > Elina
> > > >
> > > > On Thu, Jul 29, 2010 at 7:49 PM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
> > > > wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > Elina--
> > > > >
> > > > > I spent a great many sessions with Russian grad students who were
> > > > > interested
> > > > > in this issue. We had a LOT of trouble with the fact that there
> > > > > seem to
> > > be
> > > > > a
> > > > > whole lot of words that appear to refer in overlapping ways with
> > > > > "self-consciousness."  Terms in the family of reflectivity,
> > > > > reflexivity
> > > > > came
> > > > > up a lot among the Russian students, but they were trying hard to
> > > figure
> > > > > out
> > > > > what the right English words were for whatever Russian term was
> > > > > being
> > > used.
> > > > > Not just "samo-soznanie" was used in their conversations as well,
> > > > > with
> > > > > meta-cognition slipping in along with "reflexia."
> > > > >
> > > > > I am unsure what to suggest. What is occasion for the question?
> > > > > mike
> > > > >
> > > > > On Thu, Jul 29, 2010 at 9:14 AM, Larry Purss  
> > > > > <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> > > wrote:
> > > > > > Elina
> > > > > >
> > > > > > I wanted to express my appreciation of the quote you sign off
> > > > > > with by
> > > > > > Tagore.  It  captures the central imperative of foregrounding
> > > context
> > > > > and
> > > > > > traditions in the emergence of self-consciousness [the string]  
> > > > > > BUT
> > > that
> > > > > > without the string there is no violin.
> > > > > > I find myself often reflecting on the implications this
> > > > > > perspective
> > > > > > elaborates.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > One suggestion I would like to suggest on the emergence of
> > > > > > self-consciousness is Andy's vimeo podcast on the Historical
> > > > > > roots of
> > > > > > cultural-historical theory. [Hegel is central]
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Larry
> > > > > > On Thu, Jul 29, 2010 at 6:23 AM, Elina Lampert-Shepel
> > > > > > <ellampert@gmail.com>wrote:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > Hi, everyone,
> > > > > > > I would appreciate if anyone can recommend publications on
> > > > > > > self-consciousness in cultural-historical tradition. I am
> > > interested in
> > > > > > any
> > > > > > > references on this issue.
> > > > > > > Thanks in advance,
> > > > > > > Elina
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > --
> > > > > > > I have on my table a violin string. It is free. I twist one end
> > > > > > > of
> > > it
> > > > > and
> > > > > > > it
> > > > > > > responds. It is free. But it's not free to do what a violin
> > > > > > > string
> > > is
> > > > > > > supposed to do - to produce music. So I take it, fix it in my
> > > violin
> > > > > and
> > > > > > > tighten it until it is taut. Only then is it free to be a violin
> > > > > string.
> > > > > > > -Sir Rabindranath Tagore
> > > > > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > > > > xmca mailing list
> > > > > > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > > > > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > > > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > > > xmca mailing list
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> > > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > > xmca mailing list
> > > > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > --
> > > > I have on my table a violin string. It is free. I twist one end of
> > > > it and
> > > it
> > > > responds. It is free. But it's not free to do what a violin string
> > > > is
> > > > supposed to do - to produce music. So I take it, fix it in my
> > > > violin and
> > > > tighten it until it is taut. Only then is it free to be a violin
> > > > string.
> > > > -Sir Rabindranath Tagore
> > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > xmca mailing list
> > > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > xmca mailing list
> > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> > I have on my table a violin string. It is free. I twist one end of
> > it and it
> > responds. It is free. But it's not free to do what a violin string is
> > supposed to do - to produce music. So I take it, fix it in my violin
> > and
> > tighten it until it is taut. Only then is it free to be a violin
> > string.
> > -Sir Rabindranath Tagore
> > _______________________________________________
> > xmca mailing list
> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
> _______________________________________________
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
> _______________________________________________
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
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