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Re: [xmca] Question

Elina, you ask many intriguing and very good questions! The symposium you are developing will be very interesting. A side point in your discussion here on the nature of self-consciousness or reflection struck me - you suggest that will may not be a higher psychological function. I happen to have some Vygotsky quotes handy to think about that with.
In studying Vol 4 The History of the Development of the Higher Mental Functions - a difficult but rewarding book - I have been struck by how much emphasis Vygotsky puts on will, self-mastery, self-control as an essential aspect of the development of all the higher mental functions.
Some of this is new to me and quite fascinating. So here is a quick synopsis of what I am getting from this so far. See what you think.
According the Vygotsky, the higher mental functions themselves (e.g. attention, perception, memory, imitation, thinking, speech, counting, personality, world view) are the psychological aspect of cultural behavior. The development of the higher mental functions is an essential aspect of cultural behavior, they are part and parcel of cultural behavior. They are all, without exception, derived from social processes - encountered first externally as a relationship with another person, and then internalized. They are by no means fixed, but develop historically, based on the society, social relations, forms of culture, etc.
The concept of "the mastery of behavior through internal processes" is a core theme for Vygotsky's theory of the higher mental functions. This is the essence of will. He emphasizes that human freedom and freedom of the will can be found in the recognition of necessity (per Hegel, Engels, etc.), and that "Human freedom consists specifically of man's ability to think." Vol 4 p 209. But humans can only control their behavior by controlling their stimuli and situations. So he says “… the great uniqueness of the will consists of man having no power over his own behavior other than the power that things have over his behavior. But man subjects to himself the power of things over behavior, makes them serve his own purposes and controls that power as he wants. He changes the environment with his external activity and in this way affects his own behavior, subjecting it to his own authority.” p 212
One way to describe his concept of will might be to say that will is not a direct two-step process of willing-getting, but a mediated three step process of willing-creating-getting. "... will is never a direct, unmediated process." p217 "We ... [can] not bring forth any process of behavior and control it other that by creating an appropriate stimulus." p 210
So with those ideas in mind, I am curious what the concept of the higher mental functions might look like if we view will as being something other than a higher mental process. Thoughts? 

- Steve




Elina said:
Part of this conversation was discussion of the nature of higher
psychological functions. I am still puzzled with what Vygotsky meant by
function ( Seth Chaiklin and I posed this question in 2002 and as we
discussed recently and are still looking for an answer...:-), but Gennadi 
and I believe that reflection and will are not higher psychological
functions. We are in the process of developing a proposal for the ISCAR
symposium on these issues.



On Jul 30, 2010, at 11:11 AM, Elina Lampert-Shepel wrote:


Dear Achilles,
Thank you very much for the contribution. There can't be an interruption as it is a polylogical space I suppose.If we connect the Vygotskian description 
of development of self/ "ya" in the ontogenesis, then it points to the
important connections between reflexivity and self consciousness.
- Crisis of seven years. Generalization of "perezivaniya" or as Vygotsky 
calls it logic of feelings. The dual position of the child in play (
Imaginary situation:" I am a soldier in pain as I was wounded " and Real situation: My Mom is calling me for dinner and I am hungry) allows the child 
to reflect on one of this "perezivanij' as the other, as object of
reflection. In the process of the crisis of seven years as it is noted in your last quote, the child because of the ability to distinguish external and internal, evaluate her own success and failure develops self- esteem and self -evaluation. It seems to me that reflection as a psychological tool of 
experiencing imaginary and real position in play as well as the
psychological tool that helps the child to look at herself as the other is the condition for the development of the initial forms of self- evaluation 
and self esteem through the crises of seven years.
Interestingly enough in the research of Alexander Dusavitskii it was argued that when elementary school students in Davydov-El'konin classrooms were asked to evaluate themselves, they would always evaluate their work lower that it was, because the self-evaluation that emerged through the crisis of seven years was not developed in the context of learning activity. How to 
evaluate my own learning was "terra incognita" for them.
*But the question is what is the role of "perezivaniye' in the development of self-consciousness? * "Perezhivaniye" captures the unity of affect and 
intellect and this unity seems very important for the development of
self-consciousness.

These are my thoughts so far...




2010/7/30 Achilles Delari Junior <achilles_delari@hotmail.com>



Hi Mike and Elina,
This will not so deep as all you are talking about, but when I was reading here I remember of your discussion, I made a little connection, because an "auto-consciousness" influx for "auto-concept" (see the text about the 
Crisis of Seven Years), and the first consciousness of child own
perezhivaniia, etc... Then this influx for me to the problem of the concept of our own "Ya" ... Please if this could seems much extemporaneous, by my 
part, delete this message... But, let me try:
I - From Slovar' L.S. Vigoskogo (ed. A.A. Leont'ev, 2007):
Я - Понятие о <<Я>> развивается у
ребенка из понятия о других. (31.1, 163) Тот факт, что с дошкольного
возраста человек начинает по-мнить
последовательность событий, -- это то, что
старые психологи называли единством и тождеством <<Я>>. (5.2, 130)
<...> ребенок учит-ся в игре своему <<Я>>: создавая фиктивные точки
идентификации -- центры <<Я>>: irde социальная
природа <<Я>>. Ср. Rollenspiel (ролевая игра). <...> ребенок имеет
уже <<Я>>, но не осознает его, имеет внутренние процессы, но не сознает их -- в игре prise de conscience о себе и своем сознании <...> Обозначение <<Я>> в игре, осознание мысли, <<я хочу>> -- в игре <."> Парадокс <<Я>>: в игре то 
радует, что я хочу,
эгоцентри-ческая деятельность; но здесь же ограничение изнутри от своего 
мо-ментального
<<Я>>. (23.1, 291)

См. Возраст, Игра, Понятие
See: "prise de conscience о себе"

The actual references:
* 33.1: Эйдетика // Хрестоматия по ощущению и восприятию. М., 1975. С. 
275-281 (1930)
* 5.2: Обучение и развитие в дошкольном
возрасте // Выготский. М.,1.С. 123-134
(1933)
* 23.1: Из записок-конспекта Л.С.
Выготского к лекциям по психоло-гии детей дошкольного возраста // Эльконин 
Д.Б. Психология игры. М., 1978. С. 289-294 (1933)
************************

II - From "Seven Years Crisis" (Tom IV):
"В 7-летнем возрасте мы имеем дело с началом возникновения такой структуры переживаний, когда ребенок начинает понимать, что значит <<я радуюсь>>, <<я огорчен>>, <<я сердит>>, <<я добрый>>, <<я злой>>, т. е. у него возникает осмысленная ориентировка в собственных переживаниях. Точно так, как ребенок 3 лет открывает свое отношение с другими людьми, так семилетка открывает сам факт своих переживаний. Благодаря этому выступают некоторые особенности, 
характеризующие кризис семи лет.
1. Переживания приобретают смысл (сердящийся ребенок понимает, что он
сердит), благодаря этому у ребенка возникают такие новые отношения к себе, которые были невозможны до обобщения переживаний. Как на шахматной доске, когда с каждым ходом возникают совершенно новые связи между фигурками, так и 
здесь возникают совсем новые связи между переживаниями, когда они
приобретают известный смысл. Следовательно, весь характер переживаний
ребенка к 7 годам перестраивается, как перестраивается шахматная доска, 
когда ребенок научился играть в шахматы.
2. К кризису семи лет впервые возникает обобщение переживаний, или
аффективное обобщение, логика чувств. Есть глубоко отсталые дети, которые на каждом шагу переживают неудачи: обычные дети играют, ненормальный ребенок пытается присоединиться к ним, но ему отказывают, он идет по улице, и над ним смеются. Одним словом, он на каждом шагу проигрывает. В каждом отдельном случае у него есть реакция на собственную недостаточность, а через минуту смотришь -- он совершенно доволен собой. Тысячи отдельных неудач, а общего чувства своей малоценности нет, он не обобщает того, что случалось уже много раз. У ребенка школьного возраста возникает обобщение чувств, т. е., если с ним много раз случалась какая-то ситуация, у него" (page 379, S.S. Tom. IV - 
1984)
"возникает аффективное образование, характер которого так же относится к единичному переживанию или аффекту, как понятие относится к единичному восприятию или воспоминанию. Например, у ребенка дошкольного возраста нет настоящей самооценки, самолюбия. Уровень наших запросов к самим себе, к нашему успеху, к нашему положению возникает именно в связи с кризисом семи 
лет.
Ребенок дошкольного возраста любит себя, но самолюбия как обобщенного
отношения к самому себе, которое остается одним и тем же в разных ситуациях, но самооценки как таковой, но обобщенных отношений к окружающим и понимания 
своей ценности у ребенка этого возраста нет. Следовательно, к 7 годам
возникает ряд сложных образований, которые и приводят к тому, что трудности поведения резко и коренным образом меняются, они принципиально отличны от 
трудностей дошкольного возраста.
Такие новообразования, как самолюбие, самооценка, остаются, а симптомы кризиса (манерничанье, кривляние) преходящи. В кризисе семи лет благодаря тому, что возникает дифференциация внутреннего и внешнего, что впервые возникает смысловое переживание, возникает и острая борьба переживаний. Ребенок, который не знает, какие взять конфеты -- побольше или послаще, не находится в состоянии внутренней борьбы, хотя он и колеблется. Внутренняя борьба (противоречия переживаний и выбор собственных переживаний) становится 
возможна только теперь. (etc.)"(page 380. S.S. Tom IV - 1984)
*********************
Well, here in this second quote, I'm no so insecure as about the "concept 
of Ya". Because I understand that there is something related to your
discussion, in important ontogenetic terms... I only remain don't
contributing about the own "name" that you search for... But the process 
itself seems to be within the same semantic field.
Thank you, and forgive me the interruption.
Best wishes.Achilles,from Brazil
*************

Date: Thu, 29 Jul 2010 21:03:45 -0400
Subject: Re: [xmca] Question
From: ellampert@gmail.com
To: lchcmike@gmail.com; xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
CC:

Mike -
I can relate to a LOT of trouble. Both notions are used in many different ways in the contexts of development and learning. A few weeks ago, during Vygotsky Summer School, Gennadiy Kravtsov and I had a long conversation about my cross-cultural research on reflection or as you say "reflexia". 
He

talked about reflection/reflexivity in the context of

"self-consciousness"

and we discussed reflexivity as a condition for the development of
self-consciousness. He believes that the notion of "self- consciousness" ( 
that I distinguish from reflexivity) was never developed fully in
cultural-historical tradition. Knowing that there is still lack of bridge between Russian and the rest of the world cultural-historical research, I 
wanted to learn whether there are studies that connect reflection (
"reflexia") and self-consciousness. It is interesting that you mentioned 
both "reflexia" and "self-consciousness' in the context of

meta-cognition.
It seems to me that learning activity theory conceptualized reflection as 
a

metacognitive process, although Vygotsky never discussed it as a

cognitive,
or metacognitive process. There is also an important language difference, Russian language doesn't have an everyday use of the word reflection, it 
only exists as a philosophical or psychological notion.

Part of this conversation was discussion of the nature of higher
psychological functions. I am still puzzled with what Vygotsky meant by 
function ( Seth Chaiklin and I posed this question in 2002 and as we
discussed recently and are still looking for an answer...:-), but Gennadi 
and I believe that reflection and will are not higher psychological
functions. We are in the process of developing a proposal for the ISCAR 
symposium on these issues.
In any case, I was just wondering if there are studies on the development 
of
self-consciousness and/or reflexivity that are not necessarily rooted in 
Russian philosophical thought.

As you can see, I am in the state of questioning, so directions for

further

questioning will be highly appreciated.

Elina
On Thu, Jul 29, 2010 at 7:49 PM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote: 


Elina--

I spent a great many sessions with Russian grad students who were
interested
in this issue. We had a LOT of trouble with the fact that there seem to 
be

a
whole lot of words that appear to refer in overlapping ways with
"self-consciousness." Terms in the family of reflectivity, reflexivity 
came
up a lot among the Russian students, but they were trying hard to

figure

out
what the right English words were for whatever Russian term was being 
used.
Not just "samo-soznanie" was used in their conversations as well, with 
meta-cognition slipping in along with "reflexia."

I am unsure what to suggest. What is occasion for the question?
mike

On Thu, Jul 29, 2010 at 9:14 AM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>

wrote:



Elina
I wanted to express my appreciation of the quote you sign off with by 
Tagore.  It  captures the central imperative of foregrounding

context

and

traditions in the emergence of self-consciousness [the string] BUT

that

without the string there is no violin.
I find myself often reflecting on the implications this perspective 
elaborates.

One suggestion I would like to suggest on the emergence of
self-consciousness is Andy's vimeo podcast on the Historical roots of 
cultural-historical theory. [Hegel is central]

Larry
On Thu, Jul 29, 2010 at 6:23 AM, Elina Lampert-Shepel
<ellampert@gmail.com>wrote:


Hi, everyone,
I would appreciate if anyone can recommend publications on
self-consciousness in cultural-historical tradition. I am

interested in

any

references on this issue.
Thanks in advance,
Elina

--
I have on my table a violin string. It is free. I twist one end of 
it

and

it
responds. It is free. But it's not free to do what a violin string 
is

supposed to do - to produce music. So I take it, fix it in my

violin

and

tighten it until it is taut. Only then is it free to be a violin

string.

-Sir Rabindranath Tagore
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--
I have on my table a violin string. It is free. I twist one end of it and 
it
responds. It is free. But it's not free to do what a violin string is supposed to do - to produce music. So I take it, fix it in my violin and tighten it until it is taut. Only then is it free to be a violin string. 
-Sir Rabindranath Tagore
_______________________________________________
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca


_______________________________________________
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca





--
I have on my table a violin string. It is free. I twist one end of it and it 
responds. It is free. But it's not free to do what a violin string is
supposed to do - to produce music. So I take it, fix it in my violin and tighten it until it is taut. Only then is it free to be a violin string. 
-Sir Rabindranath Tagore
_______________________________________________
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca


_______________________________________________
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca