RE: [xmca] Question

["Monica Hansen" <monica.hansen@vandals.uidaho.edu>]

Your last question, Steve is what I have been playing with for a while and
one of the reasons I asked the question about the differentiation of the
terms motivation and volition. Is "will" a high mental process? I have  been
thinking about the possibility of part of "will" as being a disposition of
an intermediate process, maybe a neurobiological process, a somatic state
(Damasio) that cannot be disentangled from our conscious subjective
experience of situations associated with it in early development. I am
interested to see what other ideas and connections come from this
discussion.

-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
Behalf Of Steve Gabosch
Sent: Friday, July 30, 2010 1:29 PM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] Question

Elina, you ask many intriguing and very good questions!  The symposium  
you are developing will be very interesting.  A side point in your  
discussion here on the nature of self-consciousness or reflection  
struck me - you suggest that will may not be a higher psychological  
function.  I happen to have some Vygotsky quotes handy to think about  
that with.

In studying Vol 4 The History of the Development of the Higher Mental  
Functions - a difficult but rewarding book - I have been struck by how  
much emphasis Vygotsky puts on will, self-mastery, self-control as an  
essential aspect of the development of all the higher mental functions.

Some of this is new to me and quite fascinating.  So here is a quick  
synopsis of what I am getting from this so far.    See what you think.

According the Vygotsky, the higher mental functions themselves (e.g.  
attention, perception, memory, imitation, thinking, speech, counting,  
personality, world view) are the psychological aspect of cultural  
behavior. The development of the higher mental functions is an  
essential aspect of cultural behavior, they are part and parcel of  
cultural behavior.  They are all, without exception, derived from  
social processes - encountered first externally as a relationship with  
another person, and then internalized.  They are by no means fixed,  
but develop historically, based on the society, social relations,  
forms of culture, etc.

The concept of "the mastery of behavior through internal processes" is  
a core theme for Vygotsky's theory of the higher mental functions.   
This is the essence of will.  He emphasizes that human freedom and  
freedom of the will can be found in the recognition of necessity (per  
Hegel, Engels, etc.), and that "Human freedom consists specifically of  
man's ability to think."   Vol 4 p 209.  But humans can only control  
their behavior by controlling their stimuli and situations.  So he  
says ": the great uniqueness of the will consists of man having no  
power over his own behavior other than the power that things have over  
his behavior. But man subjects to himself the power of things over  
behavior, makes them serve his own purposes and controls that power as  
he wants. He changes the environment with his external activity and in  
this way affects his own behavior, subjecting it to his own  
authority." p 212

One way to describe his concept of will might be to say that will is  
not a direct two-step process of willing-getting, but a mediated three  
step process of willing-creating-getting.  "... will is never a  
direct, unmediated process." p217 "We ... [can] not bring forth any  
process of behavior and control it other that by creating an  
appropriate stimulus." p 210

So with those ideas in mind, I am curious what the concept of the  
higher mental functions might look like if we view will as being  
something other than a higher mental process.  Thoughts?

- Steve




Elina said:
Part of this conversation was discussion of the nature of higher
psychological functions. I am still puzzled with what Vygotsky meant by
function ( Seth Chaiklin and I posed this question in 2002 and as we
discussed recently and are still looking for an answer...:-), but  
Gennadi
and I believe that reflection and will are not higher psychological
functions. We are in the process of developing a proposal for the ISCAR
symposium on these issues.



On Jul 30, 2010, at 11:11 AM, Elina Lampert-Shepel wrote:

> Dear Achilles,
> Thank you very much for the contribution. There can't be an  
> interruption as
> it is a polylogical space I suppose.If we connect the Vygotskian  
> description
> of development of self/ "ya" in the ontogenesis, then it points to the
> important connections between reflexivity and self consciousness.
> - Crisis of seven years. Generalization of "perezivaniya" or as  
> Vygotsky
> calls it logic of feelings. The dual position of the child in play (
> Imaginary situation:" I am a soldier in pain as I was wounded " and  
> Real
> situation: My Mom is calling me for dinner and I am hungry) allows  
> the child
> to reflect on one of this "perezivanij' as the other, as object of
> reflection. In the process of the crisis of seven years as it is  
> noted in
> your last quote, the child because of the ability to distinguish  
> external
> and internal, evaluate her own success and failure develops self- 
> esteem and
> self -evaluation. It seems to me that reflection as a psychological  
> tool of
> experiencing imaginary and real position in play as well as the
> psychological tool that helps the child to look at herself as the  
> other is
> the condition for the development of the initial forms of self- 
> evaluation
> and self esteem through the crises of seven years.
>
> Interestingly enough in the research of Alexander Dusavitskii it was  
> argued
> that when elementary school students in Davydov-El'konin classrooms  
> were
> asked to evaluate themselves, they would always evaluate their work  
> lower
> that it was, because the self-evaluation that emerged through the  
> crisis of
> seven years was not developed in the context of learning activity.  
> How to
> evaluate my own learning was "terra incognita" for them.
>
> *But the question is what is the role of "perezivaniye' in the  
> development
> of self-consciousness? * "Perezhivaniye" captures the unity of  
> affect and
> intellect and this unity seems very important for the development of
> self-consciousness.
>
> These are my thoughts so far...
>
>
>
>
> 2010/7/30 Achilles Delari Junior <achilles_delari@hotmail.com>
>
>>
>> Hi Mike and Elina,
>> This will not so deep as all you are talking about, but when I was  
>> reading
>> here I remember of your discussion, I made a little connection,  
>> because an
>> "auto-consciousness" influx for "auto-concept" (see the text about  
>> the
>> Crisis of Seven Years), and the first consciousness of child own
>> perezhivaniia, etc... Then this influx for me to the problem of the  
>> concept
>> of our own "Ya" ... Please if this could seems much extemporaneous,  
>> by my
>> part, delete this message... But, let me try:
>> I - From Slovar' L.S. Vigoskogo (ed. A.A. Leont'ev, 2007):
>> Я - Понятие о <<Я>> развивается у
>> ребенка из понятия о других. (31.1, 163) Тот факт, что с дошкольного
>> возраста человек начинает по-мнить
>> последовательность событий, -- это то, что
>> старые психологи называли единством и тождеством <<Я>>. (5.2, 130)
>> <...> ребенок учит-ся в игре своему <<Я>>: создавая фиктивные точки
>> идентификации -- центры <<Я>>: irde социальная
>> природа <<Я>>. Ср. Rollenspiel (ролевая игра). <...> ребенок имеет
>> уже <<Я>>, но не осознает его, имеет внутренние процессы, но не  
>> сознает их --
>> в игре prise de conscience о себе и своем сознании <...>  
>> Обозначение <<Я>> в
>> игре, осознание мысли, <<я хочу>> -- в игре <."> Парадокс <<Я>>: в  
>> игре то
>> радует, что я хочу,
>> эгоцентри-ческая деятельность; но здесь же ограничение изнутри от  
>> своего
>> мо-ментального
>> <<Я>>. (23.1, 291)
>>
>> См. Возраст, Игра, Понятие
>> See: "prise de conscience о себе"
>>
>> The actual references:
>> * 33.1: Эйдетика // Хрестоматия по ощущению и восприятию. М., 1975.  
>> С.
>> 275-281 (1930)
>> * 5.2: Обучение и развитие в дошкольном
>> возрасте // Выготский. М.,1.С. 123-134
>> (1933)
>> * 23.1: Из записок-конспекта Л.С.
>> Выготского к лекциям по психоло-гии детей дошкольного возраста //  
>> Эльконин
>> Д.Б. Психология игры. М., 1978. С. 289-294 (1933)
>> ************************
>>
>> II - From "Seven Years Crisis" (Tom IV):
>> "В 7-летнем возрасте мы имеем дело с началом возникновения такой  
>> структуры
>> переживаний, когда ребенок начинает понимать, что значит <<я  
>> радуюсь>>, <<я
>> огорчен>>, <<я сердит>>, <<я добрый>>, <<я злой>>, т. е. у него  
>> возникает
>> осмысленная ориентировка в собственных переживаниях. Точно так, как  
>> ребенок
>> 3 лет открывает свое отношение с другими людьми, так семилетка  
>> открывает сам
>> факт своих переживаний. Благодаря этому выступают некоторые  
>> особенности,
>> характеризующие кризис семи лет.
>> 1. Переживания приобретают смысл (сердящийся ребенок понимает, что он
>> сердит), благодаря этому у ребенка возникают такие новые отношения  
>> к себе,
>> которые были невозможны до обобщения переживаний. Как на шахматной  
>> доске,
>> когда с каждым ходом возникают совершенно новые связи между  
>> фигурками, так и
>> здесь возникают совсем новые связи между переживаниями, когда они
>> приобретают известный смысл. Следовательно, весь характер переживаний
>> ребенка к 7 годам перестраивается, как перестраивается шахматная  
>> доска,
>> когда ребенок научился играть в шахматы.
>> 2. К кризису семи лет впервые возникает обобщение переживаний, или
>> аффективное обобщение, логика чувств. Есть глубоко отсталые дети,  
>> которые на
>> каждом шагу переживают неудачи: обычные дети играют, ненормальный  
>> ребенок
>> пытается присоединиться к ним, но ему отказывают, он идет по улице,  
>> и над
>> ним смеются. Одним словом, он на каждом шагу проигрывает. В каждом  
>> отдельном
>> случае у него есть реакция на собственную недостаточность, а через  
>> минуту
>> смотришь -- он совершенно доволен собой. Тысячи отдельных неудач, а  
>> общего
>> чувства своей малоценности нет, он не обобщает того, что случалось  
>> уже много
>> раз. У ребенка школьного возраста возникает обобщение чувств, т.  
>> е., если с
>> ним много раз случалась какая-то ситуация, у него" (page 379, S.S.  
>> Tom. IV -
>> 1984)
>> "возникает аффективное образование, характер которого так же  
>> относится к
>> единичному переживанию или аффекту, как понятие относится к  
>> единичному
>> восприятию или воспоминанию. Например, у ребенка дошкольного  
>> возраста нет
>> настоящей самооценки, самолюбия. Уровень наших запросов к самим  
>> себе, к
>> нашему успеху, к нашему положению возникает именно в связи с  
>> кризисом семи
>> лет.
>> Ребенок дошкольного возраста любит себя, но самолюбия как обобщенного
>> отношения к самому себе, которое остается одним и тем же в разных  
>> ситуациях,
>> но самооценки как таковой, но обобщенных отношений к окружающим и  
>> понимания
>> своей ценности у ребенка этого возраста нет. Следовательно, к 7 годам
>> возникает ряд сложных образований, которые и приводят к тому, что  
>> трудности
>> поведения резко и коренным образом меняются, они принципиально  
>> отличны от
>> трудностей дошкольного возраста.
>> Такие новообразования, как самолюбие, самооценка, остаются, а  
>> симптомы
>> кризиса (манерничанье, кривляние) преходящи. В кризисе семи лет  
>> благодаря
>> тому, что возникает дифференциация внутреннего и внешнего, что  
>> впервые
>> возникает смысловое переживание, возникает и острая борьба  
>> переживаний.
>> Ребенок, который не знает, какие взять конфеты -- побольше или  
>> послаще, не
>> находится в состоянии внутренней борьбы, хотя он и колеблется.  
>> Внутренняя
>> борьба (противоречия переживаний и выбор собственных переживаний)  
>> становится
>> возможна только теперь. (etc.)"(page 380. S.S. Tom IV - 1984)
>> *********************
>> Well, here in this second quote, I'm no so insecure as about the  
>> "concept
>> of Ya". Because I understand that there is something related to your
>> discussion, in important ontogenetic terms... I only remain don't
>> contributing about the own "name" that you search for... But the  
>> process
>> itself seems to be within the same semantic field.
>> Thank you, and forgive me the interruption.
>> Best wishes.Achilles,from Brazil
>> *************
>>> Date: Thu, 29 Jul 2010 21:03:45 -0400
>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Question
>>> From: ellampert@gmail.com
>>> To: lchcmike@gmail.com; xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>> CC:
>>>
>>> Mike -
>>> I can relate to a LOT of trouble. Both notions are used in many  
>>> different
>>> ways in the contexts of development and learning. A few weeks ago,  
>>> during
>>> Vygotsky Summer School, Gennadiy Kravtsov and I had a long  
>>> conversation
>>> about my cross-cultural research on reflection or as you say  
>>> "reflexia".
>> He
>>> talked about reflection/reflexivity in the context of
>> "self-consciousness"
>>> and we discussed reflexivity as a condition for the development of
>>> self-consciousness. He believes that the notion of "self- 
>>> consciousness" (
>>> that I distinguish from reflexivity) was never developed fully in
>>> cultural-historical tradition. Knowing that there is still lack of  
>>> bridge
>>> between Russian and the rest of the world cultural-historical  
>>> research, I
>>> wanted to learn whether there are studies that connect reflection (
>>> "reflexia") and self-consciousness. It is interesting that you  
>>> mentioned
>>> both "reflexia" and "self-consciousness' in the context of
>> meta-cognition.
>>> It seems to me that learning activity theory conceptualized  
>>> reflection as
>> a
>>> metacognitive process, although Vygotsky never discussed it as a
>> cognitive,
>>> or metacognitive process. There is also an important language  
>>> difference,
>>> Russian language doesn't have an everyday use of the word  
>>> reflection, it
>>> only exists as a philosophical or psychological notion.
>>>
>>> Part of this conversation was discussion of the nature of higher
>>> psychological functions. I am still puzzled with what Vygotsky  
>>> meant by
>>> function ( Seth Chaiklin and I posed this question in 2002 and as we
>>> discussed recently and are still looking for an answer...:-), but  
>>> Gennadi
>>> and I believe that reflection and will are not higher psychological
>>> functions. We are in the process of developing a proposal for the  
>>> ISCAR
>>> symposium on these issues.
>>>
>>> In any case, I was just wondering if there are studies on the  
>>> development
>> of
>>> self-consciousness and/or reflexivity that are not necessarily  
>>> rooted in
>>> Russian philosophical thought.
>>>
>>> As you can see, I am in the state of questioning, so directions for
>> further
>>> questioning will be highly appreciated.
>>>
>>> Elina
>>>
>>> On Thu, Jul 29, 2010 at 7:49 PM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>  
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Elina--
>>>>
>>>> I spent a great many sessions with Russian grad students who were
>>>> interested
>>>> in this issue. We had a LOT of trouble with the fact that there  
>>>> seem to
>> be
>>>> a
>>>> whole lot of words that appear to refer in overlapping ways with
>>>> "self-consciousness."  Terms in the family of reflectivity,  
>>>> reflexivity
>>>> came
>>>> up a lot among the Russian students, but they were trying hard to
>> figure
>>>> out
>>>> what the right English words were for whatever Russian term was  
>>>> being
>> used.
>>>> Not just "samo-soznanie" was used in their conversations as well,  
>>>> with
>>>> meta-cognition slipping in along with "reflexia."
>>>>
>>>> I am unsure what to suggest. What is occasion for the question?
>>>> mike
>>>>
>>>> On Thu, Jul 29, 2010 at 9:14 AM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Elina
>>>>>
>>>>> I wanted to express my appreciation of the quote you sign off  
>>>>> with by
>>>>> Tagore.  It  captures the central imperative of foregrounding
>> context
>>>> and
>>>>> traditions in the emergence of self-consciousness [the string] BUT
>> that
>>>>> without the string there is no violin.
>>>>> I find myself often reflecting on the implications this  
>>>>> perspective
>>>>> elaborates.
>>>>>
>>>>> One suggestion I would like to suggest on the emergence of
>>>>> self-consciousness is Andy's vimeo podcast on the Historical  
>>>>> roots of
>>>>> cultural-historical theory. [Hegel is central]
>>>>>
>>>>> Larry
>>>>> On Thu, Jul 29, 2010 at 6:23 AM, Elina Lampert-Shepel
>>>>> <ellampert@gmail.com>wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Hi, everyone,
>>>>>> I would appreciate if anyone can recommend publications on
>>>>>> self-consciousness in cultural-historical tradition. I am
>> interested in
>>>>> any
>>>>>> references on this issue.
>>>>>> Thanks in advance,
>>>>>> Elina
>>>>>>
>>>>>> --
>>>>>> I have on my table a violin string. It is free. I twist one end  
>>>>>> of
>> it
>>>> and
>>>>>> it
>>>>>> responds. It is free. But it's not free to do what a violin  
>>>>>> string
>> is
>>>>>> supposed to do - to produce music. So I take it, fix it in my
>> violin
>>>> and
>>>>>> tighten it until it is taut. Only then is it free to be a violin
>>>> string.
>>>>>> -Sir Rabindranath Tagore
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
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>>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>> I have on my table a violin string. It is free. I twist one end of  
>>> it and
>> it
>>> responds. It is free. But it's not free to do what a violin string  
>>> is
>>> supposed to do - to produce music. So I take it, fix it in my  
>>> violin and
>>> tighten it until it is taut. Only then is it free to be a violin  
>>> string.
>>> -Sir Rabindranath Tagore
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> xmca mailing list
>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> xmca mailing list
>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>
>
>
>
> -- 
> I have on my table a violin string. It is free. I twist one end of  
> it and it
> responds. It is free. But it's not free to do what a violin string is
> supposed to do - to produce music. So I take it, fix it in my violin  
> and
> tighten it until it is taut. Only then is it free to be a violin  
> string.
> -Sir Rabindranath Tagore
> _______________________________________________
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca

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