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Re: [xmca] The Interpersonal Is Not the Sociocultural

mike cole wrote:
That zoped is specifically meant to apply to the problem of moving from
everyday to scientific concepts (using locally politically incorrect terminology) and does NOT apply to development out of school.
> I like David's use of "academic concepts."

OK. It sounds to me like the view is that zopeds are restricted to acquisition of (true) conceptual knowledge. My view is that in the context of the USSR, "scientific" had a certain connotation (which we would not share) arising from the fact that the official ideology was (scientific) marxism and there was in a sense only one institution (and one ideology), which also totally penetrated everyday life, at least insofar as it could be talked and written about. Our Russian colleagues of course may know better. I personally don't think "academic" is right either, because the academy is a specific kind of institution (in which many of us live) but the academy does not have a monopoly on the creation and transmission of conceptual knowledge.

My view remains that concepts arise in and are transmitted through institutions. "Institutions" is a word which of course opens up a whole new domain of debate, but I think we are a step closer with that debate. The cultural products of institutions penetrate everyday life and in everyday life they interpenetrate one another in the thinking and activity of all adults engaged in public life.


I do not understand fully the objection to perceptual versus semiotic
understanding of concepts David mentions and that you apparently
agree with.

No I didn't agree with David on this. I agreed that I have an Activity perspective, but for me Activity is *artefact- (read sign)-mediated activity*. Semiosis may also refer to a particular current of theory (Peirce et al) and as an idea, semiosis certainly has distinct roots, separately from Activity (whose roots are Herder, Fichte, Hess, Marx) but of these only Marx (and Goethe) developed any semiotic ideas, and in both cases these were philosophically undeveloped. In my view Vygotsky represents the confluence of these two currents, thus "artefact-mediated actions."

agree with. I pointed to Davydov because he so clearly DOEs draw on Hegel, right up to the point of arguing, in his interpretation, that primitives think like children (a scandalous assertion at LCHC!) as well as the apparently contradictory assertion that one will never observe educational activity in a school. (He sins here, apparently, again, along with Engestrom, who refers to most educational "activity" as "school going activity"). But a la normal XMCA discourse, my late note appeared in a different discourse context so got interpreted (naturally!) as advocacy of a view i am still trying to work out.

I share with Davydov an activity-reading of Hegel. I differ with him on several points to do with the understanding of everyday life and institutions I think. My guess is that Davydov was well aware of the limitations he was subject to.


Apparently germ cells are out and something else is in. Seemed to me that Davydov was no fool, even when he played the part, and that the evidence vis a vis math education indicated that when it was possible to implement his ideas, even in American schools (cf Schmittau), they worked just as he said they would.(Or David B of constitutional fame?)

My concern with these methods is that they are designed to produce kind of "nerds," i.e., people who have a Sheldon-like knowledge of specialized disciplines, but don't understand everyday life. A crude formula, but I hope that it will do amongst friends. If you want mathematicians (or jihadists), then Davydov can tell you how to do it. If you want them to make good decisions about voting and marriage as well, well, I would not ban spontaneous concepts from the classroom.

If Peter M was reading all this, what would he say? Or Jean? Will whatever they had to say come through in a review on MCA?

Khwoo nose?

On Thu, Mar 25, 2010 at 9:11 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:

    Mike, what particular issues do your Russians raise against your
    thought that zopeds extend beyond schooling:

    * age levels?
    * trained teachers?
    * learning as the leading activity?
    * instituional framework?
    * formal structure of schooling?


    mike cole wrote:

        Have these very stimulating ideas been taken up by Minerva or
        the Owl,

        I turns out that in the past week, while not observing Iguanas,
        I have been
        reading Brothers Karamazov. Perezhivanie land. And thinking
        about issues of
        learning outside of schools, historically or culturally "before
        where issues of emotion, broadly construed, come to the fore.

        I have been excoriated by Russians for thinking that the idea of
        a zoped
        extends beyond schooling, but this line of discussion and the
        way it has
        been re-posed in the discussion brings starkly to mind the kinds
        of emotions
        that kids ordinarily experience in classrooms. How often, under what
        conditions, could these emotions be considered conducive to
        development or
        the creation of a zoped?

        Sometime, but can we generalize about the conditions?
        Does Franklin in the blocks.... an example from a preschool, count?
        And in the second language learning conditions that you so
        and intricately seek to instruct us with?

        This line of discussion seems important, even if i cannot tie it
        to all the
        threads swirling around xmca's version of Pandora.


        On Sun, Mar 21, 2010 at 4:37 PM, David Kellogg
        <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com <mailto:vaughndogblack@yahoo.com>>wrote:

            A while ago someone (perhaps the author himself) circulated
            Michael G.
            Levykh's remarkable "The Affective Establishment and
            Maintenance of
            Vygotsky's Zone of Proximal Development" (Eductional Theory
            58 [1]: 83-101)
            on this list, but I didn't get around to reading it until
            this weekend.

            It seems to me that the paper makes three points that are
            germane to the
            "Play" thread (and also to Beth and Robert's paper, if that
            is still under
            discussion), but FAILS to make one point which I think is
            really important
            enough to change the subject line (besides which the "Owl of
            Minerva" is
            really a joke that probably only Andy fully understands even
            though I was
            the one who originally made it; I often make jokes that I
            don't really
            understand, just to see if I will laugh).

            First of all, Michael's paper points out that the fashion
            for "extending"
            the ZPD in an "affective" direction is just reinventing the
            wheel; the ZPD
            never excluded affective factors in the first place, and in
            the first
            chapter of Thinking and Speech we are clearly told that
            affective factors
            are part parcel of every meaningful word and gesture. They
            are an enabling
            condition--nay, a precondition--not only for communicative
            speech but also
            for reflective verbal thinking.

            Secondly, Michael's paper differentiates between shared
            emotions and
            private ones, and argues that it's really not enough to have
            the latter in
            our classrooms. So there is an important sense in which
            every successful
            class is an artwork, that is, a work of social emotion. He
            gives an example
            from my own field, foreign language learning, on pp. 98-99
            (and in fact the
            example he gives, of learners (re)producing some of Carolyn
            Graham's jazz
            chants in a doctor's ofice, is both positive and a negative
            example of

            Thirdly, Michael's paper applies this idea of shared emotion
            to the
            distinction between "obuchenie" on the one hand and the various
            misinterpretations, both teaching-learning (Soviet) and
            (Western) given Vygotsky's teachings on teaching. The key
            and unexplored
            precondition that differentiates "obuchenie" from the
            "instruction" is the creation of shared emotion. The key and
            precondition that differentiates "obuchenie" from the
            "learning" (which Mike points out in his MCA editorial) is
            the sharing of
            propositional ATTITUDES and not simply the sharing of

            This is powerful stuff, and reading it I was quite envious,
            because I
            always fancied that I was going to be the one who argued
            that Vygotsky had
            in mind a whole 'nother side to his work, a set of higher
            functions that included concepts such as fairness, justice,
            altruism...you know, the sort of emotional function that
            makes it more
            necessary to develop somebody else's idea than to be first
            in line to take
            credit for a new one.

            These higher emotional functions, that have both an ethical
            (altruistic) and an aesthetic (realist) element are as much
            the foundation
            of moral and artistic education as logical memory or
            conceptual thinking are
            the foundations of science and mathematical education. They
            are also every
            bit as much culturally produced and socially shared.

            But I am not at all convinced that they are esssentially
            that is, that they can arise from what we in Korean call the
            (I-thou) or "Jugeoni-Padgeoni" (Give and Accept)
            relationship between
            individuals, not even generalized into an abstract
            universal. I don't think
            that they can simply be arrived at by a kind of Piagetian
            reversibility in
            relations (wash my back and I'll wash yours, as we say in
            the Korean

            Even Bakhtin, who in many places seems to utterly reduce the
            to the interpersonal, emphasizes that it is the JOURNEY to
            the other's point
            of view, and above all the RETURN which is transformative.
            In Moby Dick,
            Starbuck remonstrates with Ahab, protesting that the whale
            is only a dumb
            creature, and to hate the animal is blasphemous, because it
            means treating
            it as man's equal. Ahab responds by making Vygotsky's
            distinction between
            empirical, everyday concepts and scientific ones:

            "Hark ye yet again--the little lower layer. All visible
            objects, man,are
            but as pasteboard masks. But in each event--in the living
            act, the undoubted
            deed--there, some unknown but still reasoning thing puts
            forth the mouldings
            of its features from behind the unreasoning mask.If man will
            strike, strike
            through the mask! How can the prisoner reach outside except
            by thrusting
            through the wall?"

            Ahab realizes that by his own argument, he could be
            committing another type
            of blasphemy; the white whale might be SUPERhuman rather
            than subhuman, and
            he, Ahab, might be engaged in a personal war with God.

            So, like a dextrous politician, Ahab shifts his argument:
            "Now it's
            personal", he tells Starbuck.

            "Talk not to me of blasphemy,man; I'd strike the sun if it
            insulted me. For
            could the sun do that,then could I do the other; since there
            is ever a sort
            of fair play herein, jealousy presiding over all creations."

            The word "jealousy" brings him up short. And then he ends,
            rather lamely,

            "But not my master, man,is even that fair play. Who's over
            me? Truth hath
            no confines."

            David Kellogg
            Seoul National University of  Education

            --- On Sun, 3/21/10, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu
            <mailto:packer@duq.edu>> wrote:

            From: Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu <mailto:packer@duq.edu>>
            Subject: Re: [xmca] Re: Play and the Owl of Minerva
            To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
            Date: Sunday, March 21, 2010, 3:41 PM


            This is what is called, in hermeneutic theory, the
            characteristic of
            "projection." All understanding of an object, event, or
            situation, and hence
            all interpretation (which is the articulation of
            understanding) is its
            projection, in three senses. First, in terms of a practical
            project. Second,
            as a projectile has been thrown forward from the past into
            the future.
            Third, it is projected onto a background (rather as a film
            is 'projected' in
            a screen), so that what shows itself is always in the terms
            speaking) that this background makes possible.

            I don't know whether this will rid you of puzzlement! But
            yes it's better
            than crosswords.


            On Mar 21, 2010, at 5:11 PM, Larry Purss wrote:

                Martin, Andy, Luiz
                Thank you for your reflections on tnis topic which I
                have to admit leaves

            me more puzzled than ever (but it is more interesting than
            doing crossword

                I wanted to add a few more thoughts from Ingrid Joseph's
                notions on this

            topic and the dimension of TIME in self-development.

                She points out that polyvalent symbolic networks are
                dynamic and FUTURE

            oriented as social PERSPECTIVES and TIME are dynamically

                The PRESENT as-IS functions as an intersection BETWEEN
                as-WAS and future

            as-if-could-be states. STABILITY of meaning is provided by
            the fact that
            that the past is projected into the future, whereas CHANGE
            results from the
            TRANSFORMATION of the past by the future as-if-could-be.
            Ingrid states,
            "possible futures are nourished by the past, but at the same
            time the past
            is changed by the ANTICIPATED future" (Crites 1986  as
            quoted by Ingrid,
            1998  p. 192) Through this DOUBLE MOVEMENT in the present
            AS-IS, the present
            moves towards its immediate future, and becomes a NEW
            PRESENT. and the
            process begins again.

                If the role of either past (as-was) or future
                (as-if-could be) becomes

            DOMINANT in a one sided manner, sel-development becomes
            blocked and movement
            becomes stuck (emotions also become stuck)

                Food for continuing thought


                ----- Original Message -----,
                From: Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu <mailto:packer@duq.edu>>
                Date: Sunday, March 21, 2010 11:51 am
                Subject: Re: [xmca] Re: Play and the Owl of Minerva
                To: ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>,
                "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <

            xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>>

                    Big topic, Andy, and I can't afford to get
                    distracted from
                    trying to figure out LSV on concepts! But it has to
                    be said that
                    science is hermeneutic too. There is not a single
                    science that
                    is not concerned with understanding traces, signs,
                    indices, even
                    symbols. That's to say, science is all about "taking
                    *as* something" (as Heidegger put it) and so "saying
                    of something," (as Aristotle had it, in his On


                    On Mar 20, 2010, at 9:11 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:

                        A while ago I was obliged to deal with the work
                        of Roy

                    Bhaskar. What Bhaskar does is insist on the ontology
                    of natural
                    science in every aspect of life, including for
                    example, literary
                    criticism and cultural anthropology. The editor
                    makes a nice
                    point with an anecdote: he is at a seminar on J-P
                    Sartre. A
                    student in the audience calls out "Do you really
                    think that
                    someone called J-P Sartre existed?" Obivously an
                    application of relativism, which then opens the way
                    for his own

                        I was drawn to the conclusion that it is
                        dogmatism to insist

                    on one true ontology (here I mean ontology the general,
                    classical, not the Sartrean sense) for all
                    activities at all
                    times. Natural science is an activity which by its
                    very nature
                    must assume that there is a natural world out there
                    properties and forms can be known. This is not true
                    of any
                    activity where reality is in a significant degree
                    formed by and
                    interconnected with, human activity and in the case
                    of the
                    natural sciences breaks down in certain
                    circumstances at certain

                        So I don't accept that naturalistic ontology is
                        a *myth* of

                    the natural sciences. It is an essential part of natural
                    science. But it is not universal. It is just as
                    dogmatic to
                    insist on hermeneutic relativism in natural science
                    as it is to
                    insist on naturalistic realism in hermeneutics, etc.


                        Martin Packer wrote:

                            Yes, it has for a long time been part of the
                            myth of modern

                    science that it discloses things as they 'really
                    are,' not as
                    they 'appear' to be. LSV falls into this way of
                    speaking (or at
                    least his translators do). The most powerful analyses of
                    science, philosophical, historical and sociological,
                    in my
                    opinion, show that it is thoroughly enchanted.
                    Science involves
                    seeing (and thinking of) things 'as if.' So Kuhn
                    paradigms in terms of 'seeing as' - a duck or a
                    rabbit. So every
                    introduction I have seen of gravity in relativity
                    theory uses
                    the image of space sagging like a rubber sheet
                    around masses,
                    even though this image is inadequate once one gets
                    deeper into
                    the math. Seeing space 'as if' it were rubber is a
                    step into this branch of science. Each science
                    has/is its own
                    imaginary.>> Martin

                            On Mar 20, 2010, at 10:20 AM, Larry Purss wrote:

                                That was an interesting thread you sent
                                on play and games

                    and the tension between the concepts.

                                It is a fascinating topic.
                                I want to bring into the conversation a

                    perspective on the place of the fictional and
                    imaginary in play
                    (and other activity).

                                First for some context.
                                I've always been curious about the
                                antinomy often reflected

                    in the tension between imagination/reality and the
                    literature on
                    modernity as the disenchantment of the world and the
                    reaction to
                    this privleging the as-IS reality over the as-IF
                    There is a counter literature on finding ways to
                    re-enchant the world.

                                Often science is seen as the villan who
                                is responsible for

                    the loss of the as-IF reality, as children move
                    beyond playful
                    imagination into the real world.

                                Piaget's notions of animism as
                                indicating immature thinking.
                                INGRID E. JOSEPHS takes a radically
                                different perspective on

                    the tension between the imaginary as-IF
                    constructions and the
                    figure-ground type relation to as-IS reality.

                                She wrote an article in HUMAN
                                DEVELOPMENT 1198, Volume 41,

                    pages 180-195  which explains very clearly this
                    interpretation of the as-IS and as-IF dialectic and
                    how it
                    infuses meaning with e-motion and explains the
                    process of
                    Vygotsky's internalization and Mead's I-ME dialectic.

                                Following is a quick summary of Ingrid's
                                perspective on the

                    imaginary in our devlopment.

                                Symbol formation implies a TRANSCENDENCE
                                of the here-and-now

                    as-IS world by construction of the imaginary as-IF
                    Ingrid's standpoint is an extension of Hans
                    Vaihinger's [1911-
                    1986] "philosophy of the "AS-IF" as his notion of
                    as an independent version of PRAGMATISM. (as an
                    aside Alfred
                    Adler said this book transformed his life).

                                Vaihinger believed as-If thinking was
                                foundational for

                    scientific reasoning.

                                Ingrid makes a further distinction
                                between static

                    nondevelopmental and dynamic/developmental accounts
                    of as-
                    IF.  "BEING as-if" is static, whereas
                    BE" is dynamic. She points out this is similar to
                    distinction of AS-IF and WHAT-IF. In dynamic
                    notions, the as-IF
                    is a step in the process of forward oriented
                    preadaptation to
                    the next MOMENTARY context. Development is based on
                    as-IF types
                    of apperception as each person participates in their own
                    development. Rather than being MORE adaptive or
                    BETTER Ingrid's
                    position is that developmental transformations cannot be
                    prejudged before the act. Whether it is better or
                    worse is an
                    evaluative question.

                                In summary imagination always begins in
                                the known world of

                    present and past and then one's horizon of
                    understanding is
                    stretched into the realm of the as-IF.. Ingrid
                    points out this
                    notion of as-IF is close to Cole's [1992, 1995]
                    notions of
                    personal duration. Ingrid states, "In imagination,
                    not only do
                    present, past, and future become MUTUALLY RELATED (and
                    constructed), but both the person and world are
                    transformed." p.184

                                Now to the more specific topic of
                                SYMBOLIC PLAY that is

                    being explored on this thread. Piaget understood
                    play as pure
                    assimilation that is necessary until developmentally
                    the child
                    can transcend this immature level of reality and with
                    development SUBORDINATE the as-IF reality by the
                    logical, and DECENTERED modes of entering reality.
                     The as-
                    If is not ascribed any PRODUCTIVE future oriented
                    function in
                    development. In contrast the position Ingrid (and Cole,
                    Vygotsky, Mead,) are elaborating is that the
                    operates throughout the lifespan.

                                [Note] I'm emailing this section because
                                my software

                    sometimes crashes

                                ----- Original Message -----
                                From: Wagner Luiz Schmit
                                <mcfion@gmail.com <mailto:mcfion@gmail.com>>
                                Date: Thursday, March 18, 2010 8:11 pm
                                Subject: Re: [xmca] Re: Play and the Owl
                                of Minerva
                                To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"

                                    I even didn't had time to read all
                                    e-mails (lots and lots

                    of work to

                                    do), but games and development is
                                    exactly what i want to

                    study in my


                                    Do you heard about narratology
                                    David? this was used to

                    study and analisegames for a while, and them other
                    thing called
                    ludology emerged...

                                    Take a look at this article:

                                    LUDOLOGY MEETS NARRATOLOGY:
                                    Similitude and differences between
                                    (video)games and narrative.


                                    this is my two cents contribution to
                                    the discussion... and

                    i'm very very

                                    interested too in this
                                    rational/irrational discussion

                    too... but i don't

                                    have much to contribute now... Only
                                    that William James

                    already was

                                    debating this =P (being a teacher of
                                    history of Psychology

                    is very


                                    Wagner Luiz Schmit
                                    INESUL - Brazil

                                    Em Ter, 2010-03-16 às 18:13 -0700,
                                    David Kellogg escreveu:

                                        Sorry, everybody!

                                        I wrote:

                                            One of my grads tried to
                                            find the point at which a

                                    story definitively passes over into
                                    a game, and I said it

                    was a little like trying to find the point where talk
                    definitively passes over into talk. It is there, but
                    we always
                    find texts in talk, and talk in texts, no matter
                    which side of
                    the divide we may find ourselves on.

                                        I meant to write "it's a little
                                        like trying to find the


                                    where talk passes over into TEXT".
                                    Halliday remarks

                    somewhere that scientific linguistics didn't really
                    start until
                    the invention of the tape recorder.

                                        I was always puzzled by that
                                        remark until I realized that

                                    until the invention of the tape
                                    recorder, TEXT was

                    synonymous with writing and TALK was synonymous with
                    speech, and
                    only people like Bakhtin and Vygotsky knew that
                    there was a much
                    deeper, underlying difference having to do with
                    pastness and
                    presentness, finalizeability and unfinalizedness.

                                        (When we look at Piaget's work
                                        on conservation it is quite


                                    while before we realize how
                                    dependent on VISUALS it is. For

                    the child, sound is not conserved at all, and of
                    course neither
                    is time. It is only with the discovery of language
                    that the
                    child can imagine the conservation of sound at all.)

                                        I think that the distinction
                                        between text and discourse is

                                    really the fast moving line between
                                    stories and games that

                    we want: the story is past and the game is present,
                    the story is
                    finalizedness and the game is unfinalized and inherently
                    unpredictable. So the story is a text, and the game
                    is an
                    ongoing discourse.

                                        I think, Andy, that in a game
                                        the problem is not autnomy


                                    se. It's autonomy for a purpose, and
                                    purposes are almost by

                    definition not only beyond the self but even beyond
                    the present
                    moment (and this is why Mike is so right to point
                    out that EVERY
                    act of culture or even private imagination has an
                    notion of "the good life" in it).

                                        Similarly, I don't think
                                        Vygotsky ever prizes volition for


                                    own sake; it's always the freedom to
                                    produce and to create

                    and to imagine "the good life" and to master the
                    forces which deprive life of that meaning, including
                    those found
                    within the self. It is in that sense that, yes, life
                    is a game:
                    it is meaningful through and through and to the very
                    end. Not, I
                    think, what the existentialists had in mind!

                                        David Kellogg
                                        Seoul National University of

                                        Wittgenstein claimed that there
                                        is no overt over-arching

                                    and external trait between games
                                    (e.g. a common functional

                    "motive" or a "goal"). When we read Vygotsky's play
                    lectures, we
                    find TWO common points: viz. gratuitous difficulty
                    and guile-

                                    less deceit, the abstract rule and
                                    the imaginary situation.

                                            But one is always hidden
                                            when the other is abroad.

                                    After all, Wittgenstein's argument
                                    was only that there is

                    no CLEARLY VISIBLE over-arching trait. And
                    Vygotsky's reply is
                    that if the essence of things were visible on the
                    surface, as
                    overt motive, or aim, or goal, why then no scientific
                    explanation would ever be required for anything. His
                    of play is not an empiricist-functionalist but a
                    genetically, deterministic one, and the owl of
                    Minerva flies
                    only at nightfall.

                                            David Kellogg
                                            Seoul National University of
                                            --- On *Mon, 3/15/10, Andy

                    /<ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>/*

                                    wrote:> >

                                             From: Andy Blunden
                                             Subject: Re: [xmca] Dialects of

                                    Development- Sameroff

                                             To: "eXtended Mind, Culture,

                                    Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu

                                             Date: Monday, March 15,
                                            2010, 5:33 PM

                                             Way out of my depth in

                                    play, but here is my take

                                             on "what is the motivation
                                            for play?"

                                             I don't think we can or want to

                                    ascribe a motivation for

                                             participating in play *in

                                    I.e., the question of

                                             "why does a child play?" cannot

                                    sensibly be answered by the

                                             child. But this still
                                            leaves the

                                    question of the motivation

                                             for any particular play

                                    what is it that is

                                             motivating a child when
                                            they play?

                                             It seems to me that every
                                            action a

                                    child takes can be

                                             explicable in terms of its

                                    part of a project, and the

                                             "Why are you doing that?"

                                    gets the same kind of

                                             answer as it would for an
                                            adult at work.

                                             A different kind of
                                            explanation is

                                    required for why a child

                                             is drawn to participate in
                                            what is

                                    after all an "imaginary"

                                             project, then gun does not fire

                                    bullets, the money is not

                                             coin of the realm, etc. I
                                            think in

                                    answering the question at

                                             that level we look at
                                            problems the

                                    child faces in being

                                             exlcuded from the real
                                            world and

                                    their attempts to overcome

                                             that. I don't know. But
                                            from the

                                    beginning a child it trying

                                             to extricate themselves
                                            from the

                                    trap of childishness.


                                             mike cole wrote:

                                                Your helixes/helices seemed

                                    appropriate to the discussion, Martin.

                                                XXX-history is cultural-

                                    historical genesis. And, as Steve

                                                the twisted rope of many

                                    strands may be at the end of the
                                    rainbow of


                                                I have been pondering David

                                    Ke's question about the


                                    for play. It came together in my

                                             thinking with

                                                Yrjo's metaphor of being

                                    always "just over the horizon" and
                                    its dual

                                                material and ideal nature,

                                    most recently mentioned by

                                             Wolf-Michael. Might it

                                                be the dream of being

                                    coordinated with a world entirely

                                             consistent with

                                                one's own dreams? A world,

                                    extending, as Leslie White put it,

                                             that extends

                                                from infinity to infinity,

                                    in both directions?

                                                probably not, just

                                                On Mon, Mar 15, 2010 at 2:55

                                    PM, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu



                                                    I didn't mean to detract

                                    from the discussion with my playful

                                             helices. I

                                                    haven't found time
                                                    yet to

                                    read Sameroff's article, so I don't

                                             know if he is

                                                    proposing that there
                                                    is an

                                    antimony between nature and nurture

                                             in human

                                                    development, or in our

                                    *conceptions* of development. I took

                                             to be

                                                    suggesting, in his

                                    message, that when we pay attention to

                                             culture we

                                                    can transcend that

                                    antimony, since culture is a 'second
                                    nature' that

                                                    provides nurture,
                                                    and since

                                    culture is the medium in which human

                                             brains and

                                                    bodies grow, and
                                                    since all

                                    nurture offered to the growing child

                                             is mediated

                                                    by culture, and since

                                    culture has been transforming human


                                                    through its

                                    selective evolutionary pressures.

                                                    Eric, yes, I should have

                                    added phylogenesis, not just biological


                                                    What then is the "XX-

                                    genesis" term for history?


                                                    On Mar 14, 2010, at 9:55

                                    PM, Larry Purss wrote:

                                                        It seems the
                                                        double or

                                    triple helix is a significant way of

                                             trying to

                                                    configure dynamic

                                    processes.  However, what the particular

                                             specific double

                                                    helix referred to in the

                                    article is pointing to is a very

                                             specific tension

                                                    BETWEEN two specific

                                    constructs "Nature" and "nurture".  The

                                             current debates

                                                    raging about

                                    on the one side and the tension with


                                                    notions of
                                                    development on

                                    the other hand (ie the


                                    object/representation triangle)
                                    suggest a dialectical


                                                    which the article
                                                    says may

                                    be INHERENT to development.  To me

                                             this is asking

                                                    a question about how the

                                    mind constructs significant social


                                                    What is specific

                                    about this particular double helix
                                    is the


                                                    salience of this

                                    ANTIMONY through centuries of dialogue

                                             and theory.

                                                    My question is "Is there

                                    significance to the extended duration

                                             of this

                                                    specific antimony

                                    centuries. Does this historical

                                             engagement with

                                                    the specific notions of

                                    nature and nurture have relevance
                                    for CHAT

                                                    discussions.  This is

                                    not to say other double or triple helix

                                             models may not

                                                    have more
                                                    explanatory power

                                    but that is not the specific

                                             question asked in

                                                    the article. The

                                    being asked specifically is if this


                                                    antinomy is

                                    inherent to the notion of

                                             development? Other

                                                    double or triple helix's

                                    could be conceptualized within the


                                                    antinomy but the
                                                    question I

                                    believe is being asked is how relevant a

                                                    dialectical (or

                                    alternatively dialogically)

                                             antinomy is to

                                                    our primary

                                    notions of Development as a social


                                                        When I read the

                                    it seemed to capture the tension we are

                                                    exploring about the

                                    of neuroscience in our theories of


                                                    For some scholars
                                                    one side

                                    or the other side is in ascendence and

                                                    historically one side or

                                    the other is in ascendence. What the

                                             article is

                                                    asking is if we must

                                    "INTEGRATE" what is often seen as in

                                             opposition and

                                                    nature/nurture is

                                    in a figure/ground type of relational


                                                    (like the ying/yang

                                    representation) and the movement

                                             BETWEEN the two

                                                    positions is basic to

                                    development.> >      >>> Do others

                    have thoughts on the specific question Arnie has

                                             asked in his

                                                    article about the

                                    historical dynamic of the nature/nurture

                                             antinomy in

                                                    theories as

                                    well as in ontological and cultural


                                                    development. This

                                    speaks to me about the possible

                                             relevance of

                                                    Moscovici's theory of

                                    social representations.

                                                        One alternative
                                                        answer is

                                    to generate other double or triple

                                             helix models

                                                    which may become social

                                    representations over time as they are

                                             debated in a

                                                    community of inquiry but

                                    the article as written is pointing to a


                                                    salient social

                                    representation within our Western
                                    tradition. Does


                                                    recognition of its

                                    historical roots change how we view this




                                                        ----- Original
                                                        Message ----


                                                        From: Martin Packer

                                    <mailto:packer@duq.edu>> >


                        Date: Sunday, March 14, 2010 4:59 pm

                                                        Subject: Re: [xmca]

                                    Dialects of Development- Sameroff

                                                        To: "eXtended Mind,

                                    Culture, Activity"



                                                            right, Steve,

                                    though I'm pretty sure I didn't see this

                                                            title until
                                                            after I made

                                    the diagram. And of course Lewontin is

                                                            referring to

                                    factors. And, also, of course, collagen

                                                            does have a

                                    triple-helix structure, which
                                    Francis Crick

                                                            thought was more

                                    interesting than the double helix of
                                    DNA, but

                                                            which got
                                                            very little

                                    attention.> >      >>>>


                                                            On Mar 14,
                                                            2010, at 7:53

                                    PM, Steve Gabosch wrote:

                                                                On the
                                                                triple helix

                                    metaphor:  Richard Lewontin used it

                                                            in the title
                                                            of his

                                    1998/2000 collection of essays _The

                                                            Helix: Gene,
                                                            Organism and

                                    Environment_.  His core theme


                                    development is that solely
                                    considering the

                                                            between gene

                                    and organism makes for bad

                                                            biology.   The

                                    environment has decisive influence
                                    as well.

                                                                - Steve

                                                                On Mar
                                                                14, 2010, at

                                    10:20 AM, Martin Packer wrote:

                                                                    2010, at

                                    1:04 PM, Larry Purss wrote:


                                    of the double helix (and/or the other

                                                            images in the

                                    article). How central is the double

                                                            (either as
                                                            an "is Like"

                                    or "IS" objectification) to your notions

                                                            of the human


                                                                    I am

                                    I stole, I mean appropriated, this

                                                            someone; I've

                                    forgotten who...



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