[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

Re: [xmca] The Interpersonal Is Not the Sociocultural

Mike, what particular issues do your Russians raise against your thought that zopeds extend beyond schooling:

* age levels?
* trained teachers?
* learning as the leading activity?
* instituional framework?
* formal structure of schooling?


mike cole wrote:
Have these very stimulating ideas been taken up by Minerva or the Owl,

I turns out that in the past week, while not observing Iguanas, I have been
reading Brothers Karamazov. Perezhivanie land. And thinking about issues of
learning outside of schools, historically or culturally "before schools,"
where issues of emotion, broadly construed, come to the fore.

I have been excoriated by Russians for thinking that the idea of a zoped
extends beyond schooling, but this line of discussion and the way it has
been re-posed in the discussion brings starkly to mind the kinds of emotions
that kids ordinarily experience in classrooms. How often, under what
conditions, could these emotions be considered conducive to development or
the creation of a zoped?

Sometime, but can we generalize about the conditions?
Does Franklin in the blocks.... an example from a preschool, count?
And in the second language learning conditions that you so eloquently
and intricately seek to instruct us with?

This line of discussion seems important, even if i cannot tie it to all the
threads swirling around xmca's version of Pandora.


On Sun, Mar 21, 2010 at 4:37 PM, David Kellogg <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com>wrote:

A while ago someone (perhaps the author himself) circulated Michael G.
Levykh's remarkable "The Affective Establishment and Maintenance of
Vygotsky's Zone of Proximal Development" (Eductional Theory 58 [1]: 83-101)
on this list, but I didn't get around to reading it until this weekend.

It seems to me that the paper makes three points that are germane to the
"Play" thread (and also to Beth and Robert's paper, if that is still under
discussion), but FAILS to make one point which I think is really important
enough to change the subject line (besides which the "Owl of Minerva" is
really a joke that probably only Andy fully understands even though I was
the one who originally made it; I often make jokes that I don't really
understand, just to see if I will laugh).

First of all, Michael's paper points out that the fashion for "extending"
the ZPD in an "affective" direction is just reinventing the wheel; the ZPD
never excluded affective factors in the first place, and in the first
chapter of Thinking and Speech we are clearly told that affective factors
are part parcel of every meaningful word and gesture. They are an enabling
condition--nay, a precondition--not only for communicative speech but also
for reflective verbal thinking.

Secondly, Michael's paper differentiates between shared emotions and
private ones, and argues that it's really not enough to have the latter in
our classrooms. So there is an important sense in which every successful
class is an artwork, that is, a work of social emotion. He gives an example
from my own field, foreign language learning, on pp. 98-99 (and in fact the
example he gives, of learners (re)producing some of Carolyn Graham's jazz
chants in a doctor's ofice, is both positive and a negative example of

Thirdly, Michael's paper applies this idea of shared emotion to the
distinction between "obuchenie" on the one hand and the various
misinterpretations, both teaching-learning (Soviet) and learning-leaning
(Western) given Vygotsky's teachings on teaching. The key and unexplored
precondition that differentiates "obuchenie" from the mistranslation
"instruction" is the creation of shared emotion. The key and unexplored
precondition that differentiates "obuchenie" from the mistranslation
"learning" (which Mike points out in his MCA editorial) is the sharing of
propositional ATTITUDES and not simply the sharing of propositions.

This is powerful stuff, and reading it I was quite envious, because I
always fancied that I was going to be the one who argued that Vygotsky had
in mind a whole 'nother side to his work, a set of higher EMOTIONAL
functions that included concepts such as fairness, justice, solidarity,
altruism...you know, the sort of emotional function that makes it more
necessary to develop somebody else's idea than to be first in line to take
credit for a new one.

These higher emotional functions, that have both an ethical
(altruistic) and an aesthetic (realist) element are as much the foundation
of moral and artistic education as logical memory or conceptual thinking are
the foundations of science and mathematical education. They are also every
bit as much culturally produced and socially shared.

But I am not at all convinced that they are esssentially interpersonal,
that is, that they can arise from what we in Korean call the "Neo-Na"
(I-thou) or "Jugeoni-Padgeoni" (Give and Accept) relationship between
individuals, not even generalized into an abstract universal. I don't think
that they can simply be arrived at by a kind of Piagetian reversibility in
relations (wash my back and I'll wash yours, as we say in the Korean

Even Bakhtin, who in many places seems to utterly reduce the sociocultural
to the interpersonal, emphasizes that it is the JOURNEY to the other's point
of view, and above all the RETURN which is transformative. In Moby Dick,
Starbuck remonstrates with Ahab, protesting that the whale is only a dumb
creature, and to hate the animal is blasphemous, because it means treating
it as man's equal. Ahab responds by making Vygotsky's distinction between
empirical, everyday concepts and scientific ones:

"Hark ye yet again--the little lower layer. All visible objects, man,are
but as pasteboard masks. But in each event--in the living act, the undoubted
deed--there, some unknown but still reasoning thing puts forth the mouldings
of its features from behind the unreasoning mask.If man will strike, strike
through the mask! How can the prisoner reach outside except by thrusting
through the wall?"

Ahab realizes that by his own argument, he could be committing another type
of blasphemy; the white whale might be SUPERhuman rather than subhuman, and
he, Ahab, might be engaged in a personal war with God.

So, like a dextrous politician, Ahab shifts his argument: "Now it's
personal", he tells Starbuck.

"Talk not to me of blasphemy,man; I'd strike the sun if it insulted me. For
could the sun do that,then could I do the other; since there is ever a sort
of fair play herein, jealousy presiding over all creations."

The word "jealousy" brings him up short. And then he ends, rather lamely,

"But not my master, man,is even that fair play. Who's over me? Truth hath
no confines."

David Kellogg
Seoul National University of  Education

--- On Sun, 3/21/10, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu> wrote:

From: Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu>
Subject: Re: [xmca] Re: Play and the Owl of Minerva
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Date: Sunday, March 21, 2010, 3:41 PM


This is what is called, in hermeneutic theory, the characteristic of
"projection." All understanding of an object, event, or situation, and hence
all interpretation (which is the articulation of understanding) is its
projection, in three senses. First, in terms of a practical project. Second,
as a projectile has been thrown forward from the past into the future.
Third, it is projected onto a background (rather as a film is 'projected' in
a screen), so that what shows itself is always in the terms (loosely
speaking) that this background makes possible.

I don't know whether this will rid you of puzzlement! But yes it's better
than crosswords.


On Mar 21, 2010, at 5:11 PM, Larry Purss wrote:

Martin, Andy, Luiz
Thank you for your reflections on tnis topic which I have to admit leaves
me more puzzled than ever (but it is more interesting than doing crossword
I wanted to add a few more thoughts from Ingrid Joseph's notions on this
topic and the dimension of TIME in self-development.
She points out that polyvalent symbolic networks are dynamic and FUTURE
oriented as social PERSPECTIVES and TIME are dynamically interwoven.
The PRESENT as-IS functions as an intersection BETWEEN as-WAS and future
as-if-could-be states. STABILITY of meaning is provided by the fact that
that the past is projected into the future, whereas CHANGE results from the
TRANSFORMATION of the past by the future as-if-could-be. Ingrid states,
"possible futures are nourished by the past, but at the same time the past
is changed by the ANTICIPATED future" (Crites 1986  as quoted by Ingrid,
1998  p. 192) Through this DOUBLE MOVEMENT in the present AS-IS, the present
moves towards its immediate future, and becomes a NEW PRESENT. and the
process begins again.
If the role of either past (as-was) or future (as-if-could be) becomes
DOMINANT in a one sided manner, sel-development becomes blocked and movement
becomes stuck (emotions also become stuck)
Food for continuing thought


----- Original Message -----,
From: Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu>
Date: Sunday, March 21, 2010 11:51 am
Subject: Re: [xmca] Re: Play and the Owl of Minerva
To: ablunden@mira.net, "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <
Big topic, Andy, and I can't afford to get distracted from
trying to figure out LSV on concepts! But it has to be said that
science is hermeneutic too. There is not a single science that
is not concerned with understanding traces, signs, indices, even
symbols. That's to say, science is all about "taking something
*as* something" (as Heidegger put it) and so "saying something
of something," (as Aristotle had it, in his On Interpretation).


On Mar 20, 2010, at 9:11 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:

A while ago I was obliged to deal with the work of Roy
Bhaskar. What Bhaskar does is insist on the ontology of natural
science in every aspect of life, including for example, literary
criticism and cultural anthropology. The editor makes a nice
point with an anecdote: he is at a seminar on J-P Sartre. A
student in the audience calls out "Do you really think that
someone called J-P Sartre existed?" Obivously an inappropriate
application of relativism, which then opens the way for his own
I was drawn to the conclusion that it is dogmatism to insist
on one true ontology (here I mean ontology the general,
classical, not the Sartrean sense) for all activities at all
times. Natural science is an activity which by its very nature
must assume that there is a natural world out there whose
properties and forms can be known. This is not true of any
activity where reality is in a significant degree formed by and
interconnected with, human activity and in the case of the
natural sciences breaks down in certain circumstances at certain
So I don't accept that naturalistic ontology is a *myth* of
the natural sciences. It is an essential part of natural
science. But it is not universal. It is just as dogmatic to
insist on hermeneutic relativism in natural science as it is to
insist on naturalistic realism in hermeneutics, etc.

Martin Packer wrote:
Yes, it has for a long time been part of the myth of modern
science that it discloses things as they 'really are,' not as
they 'appear' to be. LSV falls into this way of speaking (or at
least his translators do). The most powerful analyses of
science, philosophical, historical and sociological, in my
opinion, show that it is thoroughly enchanted. Science involves
seeing (and thinking of) things 'as if.' So Kuhn explained
paradigms in terms of 'seeing as' - a duck or a rabbit. So every
introduction I have seen of gravity in relativity theory uses
the image of space sagging like a rubber sheet around masses,
even though this image is inadequate once one gets deeper into
the math. Seeing space 'as if' it were rubber is a necessary
step into this branch of science. Each science has/is its own
imaginary.>> Martin
On Mar 20, 2010, at 10:20 AM, Larry Purss wrote:
That was an interesting thread you sent on play and games
and the tension between the concepts.
It is a fascinating topic.
I want to bring into the conversation a fascinating
perspective on the place of the fictional and imaginary in play
(and other activity).
First for some context.
I've always been curious about the antinomy often reflected
in the tension between imagination/reality and the literature on
modernity as the disenchantment of the world and the reaction to
this privleging the as-IS reality over the as-IF reality.
There is a counter literature on finding ways to re-enchant the world.
Often science is seen as the villan who is responsible for
the loss of the as-IF reality, as children move beyond playful
imagination into the real world.
Piaget's notions of animism as indicating immature thinking.
INGRID E. JOSEPHS takes a radically different perspective on
the tension between the imaginary as-IF constructions and the
figure-ground type relation to as-IS reality.
She wrote an article in HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 1198, Volume 41,
pages 180-195  which explains very clearly this alternative
interpretation of the as-IS and as-IF dialectic and how it
infuses meaning with e-motion and explains the process of
Vygotsky's internalization and Mead's I-ME dialectic.
Following is a quick summary of Ingrid's perspective on the
imaginary in our devlopment.
Symbol formation implies a TRANSCENDENCE of the here-and-now
as-IS world by construction of the imaginary as-IF world.
Ingrid's standpoint is an extension of Hans Vaihinger's [1911-
1986] "philosophy of the "AS-IF" as his notion of FICTIONALISM
as an independent version of PRAGMATISM. (as an aside Alfred
Adler said this book transformed his life).
Vaihinger believed as-If thinking was foundational for
scientific reasoning.
Ingrid makes a further distinction between static
nondevelopmental and dynamic/developmental accounts of as-
IF.  "BEING as-if" is static, whereas "BEING-AS-IF-COULD-
BE" is dynamic. She points out this is similar to Bretherton's
distinction of AS-IF and WHAT-IF. In dynamic notions, the as-IF
is a step in the process of forward oriented preadaptation to
the next MOMENTARY context. Development is based on as-IF types
of apperception as each person participates in their own
development. Rather than being MORE adaptive or BETTER Ingrid's
position is that developmental transformations cannot be
prejudged before the act. Whether it is better or worse is an
evaluative question.
In summary imagination always begins in the known world of
present and past and then one's horizon of understanding is
stretched into the realm of the as-IF.. Ingrid points out this
notion of as-IF is close to Cole's [1992, 1995] notions of
personal duration. Ingrid states, "In imagination, not only do
present, past, and future become MUTUALLY RELATED (and
constructed), but both the person and world are transformed." p.184
Now to the more specific topic of SYMBOLIC PLAY that is
being explored on this thread. Piaget understood play as pure
assimilation that is necessary until developmentally the child
can transcend this immature level of reality and with
development SUBORDINATE the as-IF reality by the rational
logical, and DECENTERED modes of entering reality.  The as-
If is not ascribed any PRODUCTIVE future oriented function in
development. In contrast the position Ingrid (and Cole,
Vygotsky, Mead,) are elaborating is that the AS-IF-COULD-BE
operates throughout the lifespan.
[Note] I'm emailing this section because my software
sometimes crashes
----- Original Message -----
From: Wagner Luiz Schmit <mcfion@gmail.com>
Date: Thursday, March 18, 2010 8:11 pm
Subject: Re: [xmca] Re: Play and the Owl of Minerva
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>

I even didn't had time to read all e-mails (lots and lots
of work to
do), but games and development is exactly what i want to
study in my

Do you heard about narratology David? this was used to
study and analisegames for a while, and them other thing called
ludology emerged...
Take a look at this article:

Similitude and differences between (video)games and narrative.


this is my two cents contribution to the discussion... and
i'm very very
interested too in this rational/irrational discussion
too... but i don't
have much to contribute now... Only that William James
already was
debating this =P (being a teacher of history of Psychology
is very

Wagner Luiz Schmit
INESUL - Brazil

Em Ter, 2010-03-16 às 18:13 -0700, David Kellogg escreveu:
Sorry, everybody!

I wrote:

One of my grads tried to find the point at which a
story definitively passes over into a game, and I said it
was a little like trying to find the point where talk
definitively passes over into talk. It is there, but we always
find texts in talk, and talk in texts, no matter which side of
the divide we may find ourselves on.
I meant to write "it's a little like trying to find the
where talk passes over into TEXT". Halliday remarks
somewhere that scientific linguistics didn't really start until
the invention of the tape recorder.
I was always puzzled by that remark until I realized that
until the invention of the tape recorder, TEXT was
synonymous with writing and TALK was synonymous with speech, and
only people like Bakhtin and Vygotsky knew that there was a much
deeper, underlying difference having to do with pastness and
presentness, finalizeability and unfinalizedness.
(When we look at Piaget's work on conservation it is quite
while before we realize how dependent on VISUALS it is. For
the child, sound is not conserved at all, and of course neither
is time. It is only with the discovery of language that the
child can imagine the conservation of sound at all.)
I think that the distinction between text and discourse is
really the fast moving line between stories and games that
we want: the story is past and the game is present, the story is
finalizedness and the game is unfinalized and inherently
unpredictable. So the story is a text, and the game is an
ongoing discourse.
I think, Andy, that in a game the problem is not autnomy
se. It's autonomy for a purpose, and purposes are almost by
definition not only beyond the self but even beyond the present
moment (and this is why Mike is so right to point out that EVERY
act of culture or even private imagination has an implicit
notion of "the good life" in it).
Similarly, I don't think Vygotsky ever prizes volition for
own sake; it's always the freedom to produce and to create
and to imagine "the good life" and to master the irrational
forces which deprive life of that meaning, including those found
within the self. It is in that sense that, yes, life is a game:
it is meaningful through and through and to the very end. Not, I
think, what the existentialists had in mind!
David Kellogg
Seoul National University of Education

Wittgenstein claimed that there is no overt over-arching
and external trait between games (e.g. a common functional
"motive" or a "goal"). When we read Vygotsky's play lectures, we
find TWO common points: viz. gratuitous difficulty and guile-
less deceit, the abstract rule and the imaginary situation.
But one is always hidden when the other is abroad.
After all, Wittgenstein's argument was only that there is
no CLEARLY VISIBLE over-arching trait. And Vygotsky's reply is
that if the essence of things were visible on the surface, as
overt motive, or aim, or goal, why then no scientific
explanation would ever be required for anything. His explanation
of play is not an empiricist-functionalist but a historical,
genetically, deterministic one, and the owl of Minerva flies
only at nightfall.
David Kellogg
Seoul National University of Education
--- On *Mon, 3/15/10, Andy Blunden
wrote:> >
 From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
 Subject: Re: [xmca] Dialects of
Development- Sameroff
 To: "eXtended Mind, Culture,
Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
 Date: Monday, March 15, 2010, 5:33 PM

 Way out of my depth in discussing
play, but here is my take
 on "what is the motivation for play?"

 I don't think we can or want to
ascribe a motivation for
 participating in play *in general*.
I.e., the question of
 "why does a child play?" cannot
sensibly be answered by the
 child. But this still leaves the
question of the motivation
 for any particular play activity:
what is it that is
 motivating a child when they play?

 It seems to me that every action a
child takes can be
 explicable in terms of its being
part of a project, and the
 "Why are you doing that?" question
gets the same kind of
 answer as it would for an adult at work.

 A different kind of explanation is
required for why a child
 is drawn to participate in what is
after all an "imaginary"
 project, then gun does not fire
bullets, the money is not
 coin of the realm, etc. I think in
answering the question at
 that level we look at problems the
child faces in being
 exlcuded from the real world and
their attempts to overcome
 that. I don't know. But from the
beginning a child it trying
 to extricate themselves from the
trap of childishness.

 mike cole wrote:
Your helixes/helices seemed
appropriate to the discussion, Martin.
XXX-history is cultural-
historical genesis. And, as Steve suggested,
the twisted rope of many
strands may be at the end of the rainbow of

I have been pondering David
Ke's question about the
for play. It came together in my
 thinking with
Yrjo's metaphor of being
always "just over the horizon" and its dual
material and ideal nature,
most recently mentioned by
 Wolf-Michael. Might it
be the dream of being
coordinated with a world entirely
 consistent with
one's own dreams? A world,
extending, as Leslie White put it,
 that extends
from infinity to infinity,
in both directions?
probably not, just wondering.

On Mon, Mar 15, 2010 at 2:55
PM, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu

<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=packer@duq.edu>> wrote:

I didn't mean to detract
from the discussion with my playful
 helices. I
haven't found time yet to
read Sameroff's article, so I don't
 know if he is
proposing that there is an
antimony between nature and nurture
 in human
development, or in our
*conceptions* of development. I took Mike
 to be
suggesting, in his recent
message, that when we pay attention to
 culture we
can transcend that
antimony, since culture is a 'second nature' that
provides nurture, and since
culture is the medium in which human
 brains and
bodies grow, and since all
nurture offered to the growing child
 is mediated
by culture, and since
culture has been transforming human nature
anthropogenesis through its
selective evolutionary pressures.
Eric, yes, I should have
added phylogenesis, not just biological
What then is the "XX-
genesis" term for history?

On Mar 14, 2010, at 9:55
PM, Larry Purss wrote:
It seems the double or
triple helix is a significant way of
 trying to
configure dynamic
processes.  However, what the particular
 specific double
helix referred to in the
article is pointing to is a very
 specific tension
BETWEEN two specific
constructs "Nature" and "nurture".  The
 current debates
raging about neuroscience
on the one side and the tension with
notions of development on
the other hand (ie the
object/representation triangle) suggest a dialectical
which the article says may
be INHERENT to development.  To me
 this is asking
a question about how the
mind constructs significant social
What is specific
about this particular double helix is the
salience of this SPECIFIC
ANTIMONY through centuries of dialogue
 and theory.
My question is "Is there
significance to the extended duration
 of this
specific antimony through
centuries. Does this historical
 engagement with
the specific notions of
nature and nurture have relevance for CHAT
discussions.  This is
not to say other double or triple helix
 models may not
have more explanatory power
but that is not the specific
 question asked in
the article. The question
being asked specifically is if this
nature/nurture antinomy is
inherent to the notion of
 development? Other
double or triple helix's
could be conceptualized within the
antinomy but the question I
believe is being asked is how relevant a
dialectical (or
alternatively dialogically) nature/nurture
 antinomy is to
our primary (ontological??)
notions of Development as a social
When I read the article,
it seemed to capture the tension we are
exploring about the place
of neuroscience in our theories of
For some scholars one side
or the other side is in ascendence and
historically one side or
the other is in ascendence. What the
 article is
asking is if we must
"INTEGRATE" what is often seen as in
 opposition and
realize nature/nurture is
in a figure/ground type of relational
(like the ying/yang visual
representation) and the movement
 BETWEEN the two
positions is basic to
development.> >      >>> Do others
have thoughts on the specific question Arnie has
 asked in his
article about the
historical dynamic of the nature/nurture
 antinomy in
developmental theories as
well as in ontological and cultural
development. This question
speaks to me about the possible
 relevance of
Moscovici's theory of
social representations.
One alternative answer is
to generate other double or triple
 helix models
which may become social
representations over time as they are
 debated in a
community of inquiry but
the article as written is pointing to a
salient social
representation within our Western tradition. Does
recognition of its
historical roots change how we view this

----- Original Message ----
From: Martin Packer
<packer@duq.edu> >
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=packer@duq.edu>>> >
Date: Sunday, March 14, 2010 4:59 pm
Subject: Re: [xmca]
Dialects of Development- Sameroff
To: "eXtended Mind,
Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu

That's right, Steve,
though I'm pretty sure I didn't see this
title until after I made
the diagram. And of course Lewontin is
referring to different
factors. And, also, of course, collagen
actually does have a
triple-helix structure, which Francis Crick
thought was more
interesting than the double helix of DNA, but
which got very little
attention.> >      >>>>

On Mar 14, 2010, at 7:53
PM, Steve Gabosch wrote:
On the triple helix
metaphor:  Richard Lewontin used it
in the title of his
1998/2000 collection of essays _The Triple
Helix: Gene, Organism and
Environment_.  His core theme
regarding biological
development is that solely considering the
interaction between gene
and organism makes for bad
biology.   The
environment has decisive influence as well.
- Steve

On Mar 14, 2010, at
10:20 AM, Martin Packer wrote:
On Mar 14, 2010, at
1:04 PM, Larry Purss wrote:
What do others think
of the double helix (and/or the other
visual images in the
article). How central is the double helix
(either as an "is Like"
or "IS" objectification) to your notions
of the human sciences?

...and I am pretty sure
I stole, I mean appropriated, this
from someone; I've
forgotten who...

xmca mailing list
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>> >
    >>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
xmca mailing list
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>> >
    >>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
xmca mailing list
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>> >
    >>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
xmca mailing list
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>> >
    >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
xmca mailing list
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>> >
    >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
xmca mailing list
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>> >
    > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
 --     ----------
 Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
 Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel,
Leontyev, Meshcheryakov,
 Ilyenkov $20 ea

 xmca mailing list

<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>> >
-- --------------------------------------------------------
Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev,
Ilyenkov $20 ea
xmca mailing list

xmca mailing list
xmca mailing list

xmca mailing list
xmca mailing list
Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov,
Ilyenkov $20 ea
xmca mailing list
xmca mailing list

xmca mailing list
xmca mailing list

xmca mailing list

xmca mailing list

Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/ +61 3 9380 9435 Skype andy.blunden
Hegel's Logic with a Foreword by Andy Blunden:

xmca mailing list