Re: [xmca] Vygotsky, Saussure, and Wolves with different dreams

[Mike Cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>]

Hi vera--
The specific argument I find unsatisfactory is that the child is said to be
reaching for something. That reach is interpreted by the adult
who, through treating it as a request/pointing transforms it into a
linguistic act. There is a lot to like about social orientation, etc., but
that is not what is at issue in the specific Vygotskian example as i
understand it.
mike

On Sun, Aug 9, 2009 at 11:33 AM, Vera Steiner <vygotsky@unm.edu> wrote:

> Hi Mike at al,
> This is the material I heard Tomasello lecture on at Berkeley during the
> Linguistic Institute a couple of weeks ago I found the approach and the
> argument very convincing from a CHAT point of view. It  presupposes  the
> notion of a social orientation (I used to refer to it as the infant's
> interdependence) as a pre-
> condition of language acquisition. I think Bruner made a strong case that
> social games also contribute to the infant's turn-taking which is an other
> aspect of gestural communication being linked to the development of shared
> attention, and later speech. I have not looked at Tomasello's new book yet
> but I believe that in it  he develops the  whole argument in finer detail. I
> know Mike that you have criticized some aspect of his work but I was unclear
> whether the criticism is relevant to this issue of gesture/speech.
> Vera
> ----- Original Message ----- From: "Mike Cole" <lchcmike@gmail.com>
> To: <ablunden@mira.net>; "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> Sent: Sunday, August 09, 2009 11:26 AM
> Subject: Re: [xmca] Vygotsky, Saussure, and Wolves with different dreams
>
>
> I have raised this issue before and somone (Anna Stetsenko) said that
> current evidence contradicted me, but i could not find the contradiction in
> the sources provided, so since it is so central an argument, it may well be
> worth repeating.
>
> The claim is this:
>
> the development of a gesture [into a word (mc)] as (1) reaching for an
> object, (2) a reaction arises, but not on the part of the object, but
> another person, who completes the grasping for the child, and in being
> directed towards another person, the gesture becomes contracted, and (3)
> becomes a gesture for oneself. And I think this is as good as any a
> representation of the Hegel passage I have given the link to.
>
> One relevant article is at the following accessible url.
>
> http://mindblog.dericbownds.net/2007/06/human-infant-pointing-precursor-to.html
>
> The work of Butterworth on infant pointing, which implicates an important
> maturational ("natural line of development") component also needs to be
> considered. Easy access to this can be found via google
> using
> The child in the world: embodiment, time, and language in early ... -
> Google
> Books Result<
> http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&ct=res&cd=4&url=http%3A%2F%2Fbooks.google.com%2Fbooks%3Fid%3DiZLu3UZxV-cC%26pg%3DPA170%26lpg%3DPA170%26dq%3Dinfant%2Bpointing%2Bbutterworth%26source%3Dbl%26ots%3DdNw6epggkB%26sig%3D7rQYEZwltjSF9IAB839enjx3Y8w%26hl%3Den%26ei%3DxwV_SvWLIJKKMe_ogPgC%26sa%3DX%26oi%3Dbook_result%26ct%3Dresult%26resnum%3D4&ei=xwV_SvWLIJKKMe_ogPgC&usg=AFQjCNFQMb2V9y3zehUm62ppY1RZg6zW6g&sig2=tS1cMjgVt_poz1Jq52wZmw
> >These
>
> results do not negate the role of adult interpretation in the development
> of
> early words, or gestures, but they do complicate the picture I think. Easy
> and repeated repitetation of LSV on this point is not going to be taken
> serious without us taking seriously contemporary evidence and theoretical
> claims.
>
> mike
>
> On Thu, Aug 6, 2009 at 5:23 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>
>  Mmm, well I had a read of the relevant passage in Hegel again last night,
>> Steve, and again modified my opinion of its meaning. Here is a link to the
>> point which is the nearest Hegel comes to this relation:
>>
>> http://marx.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sp/ssconsci.htm#SS334
>>
>> I find this prettty opaque quite honestly, but I think if you read it on
>> the assumption that Hegel is talking about the differentiating out of (c)
>> individual consciousness (which is what Hegel meant by "psychology") from
>> (a) animalistic action/reaction and (b) the collective consciousness of a
>> cultural group, you might just get some sense out of it.
>>
>> LSV put it this way:
>>
>> "All cultural development of the child passes through three basic stages
>> that can be described in the following way using Hegel’s analysis." (LSV
>> CW
>> v. 4 p. 104) My paraphrase of the rest of the paragraph: the development
>> of
>> a gesture as (1) reaching for an object, (2) a reaction arises, but not on
>> the part of the object, but another person, who completes the grasping for
>> the child, and in being directed towards another person, the gesture
>> becomes
>> contracted, and (3) becomes a gesture for oneself. And I think this is as
>> good as any a representation of the Hegel passage I have given the link
>> to.
>>
>> -----------
>>
>> Vygotsky may have learnt about this passage secondhand from Lewin. But
>> everyone knew about the Hegelian phrases "thing-in-itself", "thing-for-us"
>> and "thing-for-itself", since these were part of the popular discourse
>> around Hegel in Marxist circles. So I presume "concept-in-itself," the
>> "concept-for-others" and the "concept-for-myself" is a kind of play on
>> these
>> concepts. But "concept-for-myself" is just not something you'd find in
>> Hegel. The concept is always objective for Hegel.
>>
>> -----------
>>
>> Now what Vygotsky meant by it:
>>
>> "Concept-in-itself" I take to be the unconscious use of words by a small
>> child as an indivisible part of an action, a "handle" for a thing. This is
>> close to the Hegelian idea, because the child is not yet conscious of
>> having
>> a concept or thing-name at all; it is indissolubly connected to the object
>> itself.
>>
>> "Concept-for-others" I take to mean the use of a word for communicative
>> action, e.g. asking an adult for assistance, and it is directed at the
>> adult.
>>
>> "Concept-for-myself" is the use of language by the child to control its
>> own
>> actions, speech growing in, as they say, towards silent speech. I don't
>> know
>> if I entirely concur with Kozulin in saying this, but the idea you quote
>> from Kozulin is certainly closely connnected, because the use of words to
>> achieve intelligent *control* of one's own actions is surely closely
>> connected with awareness of one's own consciousness (and behaviour). And I
>> think you can link LSV and Hegel with (a) and (b) but I can't see it with
>> (c).
>>
>> That's where I'm at with all this Steve.
>>
>> Andy
>>
>>
>>
>> Steve Gabosch wrote:
>>
>>  Thanks, Andy.  I think I am being a little dense here, because now I am
>>> uncertain of both what Vygotsky meant, and what Hegel meant as well!  LOL
>>>
>>> I get the **sense** of these distinctions, of course, but I don't think
>>> they are yet registering for me as clear **concepts**.  I might even be
>>> able
>>> to more or less correctly answer a question or two about what Vygotsky
>>> said
>>> on a school quiz, but I can tell I would only be doing so on the basis of
>>> pseudoconceptual reasoning, because I can memorize the genetic order that
>>> Vygotsky says that the concept-in-itself, the concept-for-others and the
>>> concept-for-myself appear in the child - but not because I really
>>> understand
>>> **why** they appear in that order, or because I understand just **what**
>>> these kinds of concepts actually are.  I couldn't, offhand, give you
>>> clear
>>> examples of these three kinds of concepts.  Your quote from Hegel is
>>> helpful, but I have not fully conceptualized Hegel's treatment of these
>>> ideas, either.  I'm not so sure how I'd get very far on a school quiz on
>>> that!  LOL
>>>
>>> So let me refine my questions regarding Vygotsky's points.  First, what
>>> did Vygotsky mean by the terms "concept-in-itself," "concept-for-others"
>>> and
>>> "concept-for-myself"?  Second, what are some examples of these kinds of
>>> concepts?  Third, why does he claim that the first two, as a rule,
>>> precede
>>> the latter in a child's intellectual development?
>>>
>>> For further thought, here are some relevant quotes from the paper, from
>>> Vygotsky, and from Kozulin.
>>>
>>> Here is what Paula and Carol said (pg 236 in Wolves):
>>>
>>> "It is in this respect that Vygotsky notes that the genetic preconditions
>>> of the “concept-for-myself” are already present in the pseudoconcept in
>>> the
>>> form of the “concept-in-itself” and the “concept-for-others”, because
>>> these
>>> occur earlier in the child than the “concept-for-myself”: he further
>>> asserts
>>> that this sequence is not restricted to conceptual development because it
>>> occurs as a “rule rather than the exception in the intellectual
>>> development
>>> of the child” (p. 124)."
>>>
>>> Here is the passage by Vygotsky from Alex Kozulin's translation of
>>> Thought
>>> and Language they refer to (pg 124):
>>>
>>> "The concept-in-itself and the concept-for-others are developed in the
>>> child earlier than the concept-for-myself.  The concept-in-itself and the
>>> concept-for-others, which are already present in the pseudoconcept, are
>>> the
>>> basic genetic precondition for the development of real concepts.  This
>>> peculiar genetic situation is not limited to the attainment of concepts;
>>> it
>>> is the rule rather the exception in the intellectual development of the
>>> child." (7)
>>>
>>> In Footnote (7) to the above passage in Thought and Language (on page
>>> 268),  Kozulin comments:
>>>
>>> "7. Vygotsky's discussion of the phenomenon of pseudoconcepts has
>>> far-reaching philosophical implications.  First of all, if the conscious
>>> awareness of one's own intellectual operations ("concept-for-me") is only
>>> a
>>> secondary achievement, which follows the practical use of these
>>> operations,
>>> then the individual cannot be considered a self-conscious center of
>>> activity.  [Note from Steve:  I don't grasp what Alex just said.]  The
>>> individual appears rather as a "construction" built at the crossroads of
>>> the
>>> inner and outer realities.  Second, the phenomenon of functional
>>> equivalence
>>> between real and pseudoconcepts warns us against taking the functional
>>> appearance of communication for its ultimate content.  The usage of "one
>>> and
>>> the same" words and subsequent "understanding" may be illusory.  Such
>>> illusion of understanding, based on the confusion between functional and
>>> essential characteristics, constantly emerges in child-adult
>>> communication,
>>> in the dialogue between different social groups, and in contacts between
>>> different cultures.  For further discussion of this point, see Alex
>>> Kozulin,
>>> "Psychology and Philosophical Anthropology: The Problem of Their
>>> Interaction," *The Philosophical Forum*, 1984, 15(4):443-458."
>>>
>>> <end>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Aug 4, 2009, at 7:58 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>>>
>>>  Steve Gabosch wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>  What did LSV mean by a "concept-for-myself," (a phrase, I understand,
>>>>> is
>>>>> derived from Hegel)?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> Hegel would never have used quite the phrase, "concept-for-myself", but
>>>> the way Vygotsky is using the idea: first concept in-itself, then
>>>> for-others, and only last for-myself - i.e., self-consciousness, is
>>>> quite
>>>> consistent with Hegel's idea. It's really a play on Hegel.
>>>>
>>>> For example from Hegel's Introduction to the History of Philosophy:
>>>>
>>>> "But consciousness really implies that for myself, I am object to
>>>> myself.
>>>> In forming this absolute division between what is mine and myself, Mind
>>>> constitutes its existence and establishes itself as external to itself.
>>>> It
>>>> postulates itself in the externality."
>>>>
>>>> Andy
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>>>  --
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
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>> Orders: http://www.erythrospress.com/store/main.html#books
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