Thanks, Andy. I think I am being a little dense here, because now I am
uncertain of both what Vygotsky meant, and what Hegel meant as well! LOL
I get the **sense** of these distinctions, of course, but I don't think
they are yet registering for me as clear **concepts**. I might even be
able to more or less correctly answer a question or two about what
Vygotsky said on a school quiz, but I can tell I would only be doing so
on the basis of pseudoconceptual reasoning, because I can memorize the
genetic order that Vygotsky says that the concept-in-itself, the
concept-for-others and the concept-for-myself appear in the child - but
not because I really understand **why** they appear in that order, or
because I understand just **what** these kinds of concepts actually
are. I couldn't, offhand, give you clear examples of these three kinds
of concepts. Your quote from Hegel is helpful, but I have not fully
conceptualized Hegel's treatment of these ideas, either. I'm not so
sure how I'd get very far on a school quiz on that! LOL
So let me refine my questions regarding Vygotsky's points. First, what
did Vygotsky mean by the terms "concept-in-itself," "concept-for-others"
and "concept-for-myself"? Second, what are some examples of these kinds
of concepts? Third, why does he claim that the first two, as a rule,
precede the latter in a child's intellectual development?
For further thought, here are some relevant quotes from the paper, from
Vygotsky, and from Kozulin.
Here is what Paula and Carol said (pg 236 in Wolves):
"It is in this respect that Vygotsky notes that the genetic
preconditions of the “concept-for-myself” are already present in the
pseudoconcept in the form of the “concept-in-itself” and the
“concept-for-others”, because these occur earlier in the child than the
“concept-for-myself”: he further asserts that this sequence is not
restricted to conceptual development because it occurs as a “rule rather
than the exception in the intellectual development of the child” (p. 124)."
Here is the passage by Vygotsky from Alex Kozulin's translation of
Thought and Language they refer to (pg 124):
"The concept-in-itself and the concept-for-others are developed in the
child earlier than the concept-for-myself. The concept-in-itself and
the concept-for-others, which are already present in the pseudoconcept,
are the basic genetic precondition for the development of real
concepts. This peculiar genetic situation is not limited to the
attainment of concepts; it is the rule rather the exception in the
intellectual development of the child." (7)
In Footnote (7) to the above passage in Thought and Language (on page
268), Kozulin comments:
"7. Vygotsky's discussion of the phenomenon of pseudoconcepts has
far-reaching philosophical implications. First of all, if the conscious
awareness of one's own intellectual operations ("concept-for-me") is
only a secondary achievement, which follows the practical use of these
operations, then the individual cannot be considered a self-conscious
center of activity. [Note from Steve: I don't grasp what Alex just
said.] The individual appears rather as a "construction" built at the
crossroads of the inner and outer realities. Second, the phenomenon of
functional equivalence between real and pseudoconcepts warns us against
taking the functional appearance of communication for its ultimate
content. The usage of "one and the same" words and subsequent
"understanding" may be illusory. Such illusion of understanding, based
on the confusion between functional and essential characteristics,
constantly emerges in child-adult communication, in the dialogue between
different social groups, and in contacts between different cultures.
For further discussion of this point, see Alex Kozulin, "Psychology and
Philosophical Anthropology: The Problem of Their Interaction," *The
Philosophical Forum*, 1984, 15(4):443-458."
<end>
On Aug 4, 2009, at 7:58 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:
Steve Gabosch wrote:
What did LSV mean by a "concept-for-myself," (a phrase, I understand,
is derived from Hegel)?
Hegel would never have used quite the phrase, "concept-for-myself",
but the way Vygotsky is using the idea: first concept in-itself, then
for-others, and only last for-myself - i.e., self-consciousness, is
quite consistent with Hegel's idea. It's really a play on Hegel.
For example from Hegel's Introduction to the History of Philosophy:
"But consciousness really implies that for myself, I am object to
myself. In forming this absolute division between what is mine and
myself, Mind constitutes its existence and establishes itself as
external to itself. It postulates itself in the externality."
Andy
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