Re: [xmca] Vygotsky, Saussure, and Wolves with different dreams

[Steve Gabosch <stevegabosch@me.com>]

Thanks, Andy.  I think I am being a little dense here, because now I  
am uncertain of both what Vygotsky meant, and what Hegel meant as  
well!  LOL

I get the **sense** of these distinctions, of course, but I don't  
think they are yet registering for me as clear **concepts**.  I might  
even be able to more or less correctly answer a question or two about  
what Vygotsky said on a school quiz, but I can tell I would only be  
doing so on the basis of pseudoconceptual reasoning, because I can  
memorize the genetic order that Vygotsky says that the concept-in- 
itself, the concept-for-others and the concept-for-myself appear in  
the child - but not because I really understand **why** they appear in  
that order, or because I understand just **what** these kinds of  
concepts actually are.  I couldn't, offhand, give you clear examples  
of these three kinds of concepts.  Your quote from Hegel is helpful,  
but I have not fully conceptualized Hegel's treatment of these ideas,  
either.  I'm not so sure how I'd get very far on a school quiz on  
that!  LOL

So let me refine my questions regarding Vygotsky's points.  First,  
what did Vygotsky mean by the terms "concept-in-itself," "concept-for- 
others" and "concept-for-myself"?  Second, what are some examples of  
these kinds of concepts?  Third, why does he claim that the first two,  
as a rule, precede the latter in a child's intellectual development?

For further thought, here are some relevant quotes from the paper,  
from Vygotsky, and from Kozulin.

Here is what Paula and Carol said (pg 236 in Wolves):

"It is in this respect that Vygotsky notes that the genetic  
preconditions of the “concept-for-myself” are already present in the  
pseudoconcept in the form of the “concept-in-itself” and the “concept- 
for-others”, because these occur earlier in the child than the  
“concept-for-myself”: he further asserts that this sequence is not  
restricted to conceptual development because it occurs as a “rule  
rather than the exception in the intellectual development of the  
child” (p. 124)."

Here is the passage by Vygotsky from Alex Kozulin's translation of  
Thought and Language they refer to (pg 124):

"The concept-in-itself and the concept-for-others are developed in the  
child earlier than the concept-for-myself.  The concept-in-itself and  
the concept-for-others, which are already present in the  
pseudoconcept, are the basic genetic precondition for the development  
of real concepts.  This peculiar genetic situation is not limited to  
the attainment of concepts; it is the rule rather the exception in the  
intellectual development of the child." (7)

In Footnote (7) to the above passage in Thought and Language (on page  
268),  Kozulin comments:

"7. Vygotsky's discussion of the phenomenon of pseudoconcepts has far- 
reaching philosophical implications.  First of all, if the conscious  
awareness of one's own intellectual operations ("concept-for-me") is  
only a secondary achievement, which follows the practical use of these  
operations, then the individual cannot be considered a self-conscious  
center of activity.  [Note from Steve:  I don't grasp what Alex just  
said.]  The individual appears rather as a "construction" built at the  
crossroads of the inner and outer realities.  Second, the phenomenon  
of functional equivalence between real and pseudoconcepts warns us  
against taking the functional appearance of communication for its  
ultimate content.  The usage of "one and the same" words and  
subsequent "understanding" may be illusory.  Such illusion of  
understanding, based on the confusion between functional and essential  
characteristics, constantly emerges in child-adult communication, in  
the dialogue between different social groups, and in contacts between  
different cultures.  For further discussion of this point, see Alex  
Kozulin, "Psychology and Philosophical Anthropology: The Problem of  
Their Interaction," *The Philosophical Forum*, 1984, 15(4):443-458."

<end>



On Aug 4, 2009, at 7:58 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:

> Steve Gabosch wrote:
> > What did LSV mean by a "concept-for-myself," (a phrase, I  
> > understand, is derived from Hegel)?
>
> Hegel would never have used quite the phrase, "concept-for-myself",  
> but the way Vygotsky is using the idea: first concept in-itself,  
> then for-others, and only last for-myself - i.e., self- 
> consciousness, is quite consistent with Hegel's idea. It's really a  
> play on Hegel.
>
> For example from Hegel's Introduction to the History of Philosophy:
>
> "But consciousness really implies that for myself, I am object to  
> myself. In forming this absolute division between what is mine and  
> myself, Mind constitutes its existence and establishes itself as  
> external to itself. It postulates itself in the externality."
>
> Andy
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> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
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