Well I don't know the people to whom you're referring and simply putting a
year next to their name doesn't help me much (especially Cole for whom I
know there is more than one possible 1992 citation). Generally it appears
you're trying to lump together two issues: a) the nature of the experience
of the body and b) the meaning of objective knowledge and then to parse your
answer onto names with assigned dates.
The description you gave: ("In a social ontogeny of selfhood such as that
proposed by Nsamenang (1992) as representative of a West African worldview,
the self begins with a spiritual selfhood in the prenatal phase and
culminates after the death
of the body in an ancestral selfhood." ) doesn't seem to distinguish between
the experience of self and the narrative accounting of the experience. If I
understand him correctly, Lakoff is moving at a much more basic level of
the experience of self. Food goes in/excrement comes out. Metonymical and
metaphorical associations that chain into category/attribute system: The
comparison -- Hot:involuntary action(e.g., more your away hand fast and
instinctively)::anger:involuntary action (e.g., any uncontrolled behavior
including moving your hand fast) generates the association: anger is hot.
Out of these elementary metaphorical structures given in bodily experience
secondary level meaning systems are constructred in which narratives might
be constructed. The original metaphorical levels of the experience of self
never come near the framework of narrative although perhaps a Lakoffian
structuralist could show how narratives integrate and resolve tensions in
their root metaphors.
Paul H. Dillon
-----Original Message-----
From: Robert Serpell <serpell who-is-at umbc.edu>
To: xmca who-is-at weber.ucsd.edu <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Date: Friday, October 29, 1999 2:56 PM
Subject: Re: A question of selves
>As I read your question, it had two parts "is the body that is born, lives
>and dies an encompassing system (a) that we inevitably presuppose and
>(b) whose trajectory demarcates the domain of all that can occur as
>experience of self?")
>
>I would answer Yes to (a) and No to (b).
>
>Whatever you may mean by the 'tenet' that "we can have objective
>knowledge", it seems clear to me that what people experience as self
>ranges very widely, and often includes such dimensions as relatedness to
>other persons (cf. Markus & Kitayama 1991), envisaged future trajectories
>(cf. Cole 1992), and many other frames of reference that are not in any
>easy sense "encompassed" by the body (whether that be conceptualized in
>biological or perceptual terms).
>
>If this makes me a relativist, so be it. But I am not committed to the
>notion that one cultural worldview is irredeemably insulated from all
>others. Rather I like to think of my position as one of perspectivism, as
>articulated by Lukes (1982), and Horton (1982).
>
>Robert
>
>On Fri, 29 Oct 1999, Paul Dillon wrote:
>
>> Robert,
>>
>> There's a real fundamental problem here: the status of mythological
>> worldviews v. scientific worldviews. Your example rings of a level of
>> cultural relativism that I believe to be at odds with the underlying CHAT
>> tenet that we can have objective knowledge; that, as Ilyenkov proposes,
we
>> scientific concepts take us closer to an understanding of the thing as it
is
>> in itself.
>>
>> Paul H. Dillon
>>
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Robert Serpell <serpell who-is-at umbc.edu>
>> To: xmca who-is-at weber.ucsd.edu <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>> Date: Friday, October 29, 1999 10:38 AM
>> Subject: Re: A question of selves
>>
>>
>> >Arguably, the body is just one possible delimiting frame of reference.
>> >
>> >In a social ontogeny of selfhood such as that proposed by Nsamenang
(1992)
>> >as representative of a West African worldview, the self begins with a
>> >spiritual selfhood in the prenatal phase and culminates after the death
>> >of the body in an ancestral selfhood.
>> >
>> >
>> >Robert
>> >
>> >On Thu, 28 Oct 1999, Paul Dillon
>> >wrote:
>> >
>> >> Vera,
>> >>
>> >> That was beautifully expressed and provides an answer to my question
>> insofar
>> >> as it reduces the status of the selves that Judy named to facets of a
>> >> system. I suppose that any facet itself, etc. would be capable of
>> becoming
>> >> a system of similar facets, holographic or fractal reproduction, etc.
>> But .
>> >> . . is the body that is born, lives and dies an encompassing system
that
>> we
>> >> inevitably presuppose and whose trajectory demarcates the domain of
all
>> that
>> >> can occur as experience of self? Higher mental functions still
>> embodied
>> >> mental functions?
>> >>
>> >> Paul H. Dillon
>> >>
>> >> -----Original Message-----
>> >> From: Vera P. John-Steiner <vygotsky who-is-at unm.edu>
>> >> To: xmca who-is-at weber.ucsd.edu <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>; Vera P. John-Steiner
>> >> <vygotsky who-is-at unm.edu>
>> >> Date: Thursday, October 28, 1999 2:38 PM
>> >> Subject: Re: A question of selves
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> >It seems to me that the selves of which Judy writes are different
facets
>> >> >of the functional system of self. When focusing on a coherent account
>> >> >of one's life, one aspect of remembered experiences is mobilized. In
>> >> >conversational contexts an other facet emerges, that of a very
immediate
>> >> >awareness of the otherwith whom one co-constructs utterances,
thoughts,
>> >> >and opinions. These govern the practice of voicing. Audience,
>> >> >artifacts, purpose all contribute to mobilizing the subset of
>> >> >possibilities that are part of the dynamics of the "self,
>> >> >or what Wenger refers to as "identity as a focus of social
selfhood."
>> >> >In my class on collaboration, students speak of the simultaneously
>> >> >experiencing mutuality and autonomy; they embrace Penuel and
Wertsch's
>> >> >statement about the irreducible tension of the individual and the
>> >> >social.
>> >> >Vera
>> >> >---------------------------------
>> >> >Vera P. John-Steiner
>> >> >Department of Linguistics
>> >> >Humanities Bldg. 526
>> >> >University of New Mexico
>> >> >Albuquerque, NM 87131
>> >> >(505) 277-6353 or 277-4324
>> >> >Internet: vygotsky who-is-at unm.edu
>> >> >---------------------------------
>> >> >
>> >>
>> >
>> >Robert Serpell tel: ( 410 ) 455 2417
>> >Psychology Department 455 2567
>> >University of Maryland Baltimore County
>> >1000 Hilltop Circle
>> >Baltimore MD 21250 fax: ( 410 ) 455 1055
>> >
>> >
>>
>
>Robert Serpell tel: ( 410 ) 455 2417
>Psychology Department 455 2567
>University of Maryland Baltimore County
>1000 Hilltop Circle
>Baltimore MD 21250 fax: ( 410 ) 455 1055
>
>