Andy, That was quick!The point of my argument regarding the “nature” of tools was not that they are material and ideal, but that their materiality and ideality is a function of the mode of activity in which they are used. When we talk, write, or otherwise communicate information about them or through them they are necessarily ideal, when we use them to enhance our capacity to transform material conditions to satisfy our needs, they are material, i.e. the subjects of sensation rather than of rational consciousness. The dichotomy is not in the objects, but in the ways we use them which are of course a function of our objectives regarding their use.
As I indicated in my first communication the distinction between consciousness and matter is a combination of categories, the referents of which are too disparate to suffer pairing. Matter is a broad generalization regarding a state of being (unconscious of course) while consciousness concerns a broad range of activities all of which concern communication. Matter pairs well with spirit or essence, as EVI deftly demonstrates in his article on the Ideal and Vygotsky in his discourse on thought and speech in Thought and Language.
A search for an appropriate contrapositive to consciousness that is more or less analogous to the role of matter in the matter-essence dichotomy would be sensation. Sensation, not in the purely passive sense of reception of stimuli, but in the fuller sense used by Marx is his passage in Capital describing labour activity.
Labour is, in the first place, a process in which both man and Nature participate, and in which man of his own accord starts, regulates, and controls the material re-actions between himself and Nature. He opposes himself to Nature as one of her own forces, setting in motion arms and legs, head and hands, the natural forces of his body, in order to appropriate Nature's productions in a form adapted to his own wants. By thus acting on the external world and changing it, he at the same time changes his own nature. He develops his slumbering powers and compels them to act in obedience to his sway…. At the end of every labour-process, we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its commencement. He not only effects a change of form in the material on which he works, but he also realises a purpose of his own that gives the law to his modus operandi, and to which he must subordinate his will. And this subordination is no mere momentary act. Besides the exertion of the bodily organs, the process demands that, during the whole operation, the workman's will be steadily in consonance with his purpose. This means close attention. The less he is attracted by the nature of the work, and the mode in which it is carried on, and the less, therefore, he enjoys it as something which gives play to his bodily and mental powers, the more close his attention is forced to be.
Considering that tools and most other things fit equally well the categories of sensation or consciousness we should be able to describe the what’s when’s and how’s they are moved between them. Marx’s description of the labour process exactly describes this movement between activity informed by consciousness and by sensation that comprises human labour.
Less than a week ago I would have argued that the existence of a material world outside of and independent of human consciousness is evidenced by the ontological precedence of sensation over consciousness, however two or three days ago I came across a number of articles etc. treating the issue of the relation between classical and quantum physics, and as you put it “the nature of that world? Well that is a different matter altogether”.
Victor Friedlander 28 09 2009----- Original Message ----- From: "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net>
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> Sent: Monday, September 28, 2009 11:23 AM Subject: Re: [xmca] Consciousness: Ilyenkov Epistemology Quiz
Good to hear from you, Victor. I'll just make a couple of quick points. On this list, I think it is generally agreed (following Ilyenkov) that "ideal" is not an opposite to "material" - for example, all artefacts are both ideal and material. Secondly, I personally think a dichotomy between tools and symbols is untenable. There is a whole spectrum of ways in which an artefact is connected to its social significance. Finally, you say: "The distinction between materia and consciousness understood as things, as objects, is a hopeless task" - of course, I agree! (Well, I've never come across the word "materia" and it's not listed in the 20-volume Oxford English Dictionary, so I'm just taking it in context = objects). This is not the question at issue. The question remains how to define consciousness. My position is that consciousness is a *category* not a thing, and matter is the category indicating everything that exists outside of consciousness, not an object or collection of objects, particles or waves or any such construction of consciousness. Lenin and Ilyenkov agree on this, and I agree with both of them. The extistence of a material world outside of and independent of human consciousness is something that is not really up for a compromise position or a middle road. It is one of those things which are true or false. The nature of that world? Well that is a different matter altogether. Andy Victor wrote:I’ve been following the discussion here for some time. I am currently working on and in the interface between activities informed by consciousness, i.e. conscious thinking, and activities addressing material, i.e. sensable, conditions; hence my interest in the debate. Despite the many lines of reasoning and the wide range of subjects considered, the issues reflected upon all concern the tiresome issue of the dichotomy between the material and ideal, and an argument can be developed from almost any point in the discussion. The question of whether an object of interest is ideal or material, i.e. whether it is a symbolical representation or a sensable object, is dependent on the activity in which it is a component. If we are designing a spade or axe, discussing which tool to use for a particular practical objective, or using them as metaphors in a literary product, then they are certainly idealizations. That is to say they are abstractions (not necessarily the same abstractions as this depends on the focus of the plan, practical objective, or metaphor) represented by discrete symbolical forms such as pictorial icons, spoken words and sentences, or graphically represented speech, the significance of which is a function of their formation and use by the community of users that depends upon them for effective transmission of information. On the other hand, the axe and spade used respectively to cut up firewood and to hack a hole in the ground are in large part material, sensable objects the sensing and handling of which are concrete and continuous involving constant adjustments of bodily activity to realize the object of their use. True, as Steve, citing EVI, reminds us, the object and formation of the instruments of labour are in part the products of ideation, the conventions for the production and use of the means of production, but these are practically meaningless in the absence of concrete productive activity. A plan or discussion on the design or management of material conditions, without human labour is almost as non-existent as an unexpressed notion. The conditions and objectives of productive activity matter not a whit, be it tracking wild boar in a thicket, hammering a nail into a board, or typing out a response on the key board of a 6 year old computer, the same concrete, continuous exercise of sense and other bodily activities is a very different mode of activity than the use and management of symbolical formations. I might also add, Andy, that this kind of physically directed, hardly if at all conscious activity is no less acquired knowledge than the conscious behaviour essential for the effective use of symbolical forms and management of ideation. The distinction between materia and consciousness understood as things, as objects, is a hopeless task, and I agree with Steve that the concept of consciousness as a given, definable only in contrast to materia is too abstract to bear much if any significant information. Consciousness is an activity, while material is a state of being. If we replace materia with sensation, which is an activity, and focus on the distinction between conscious activity and activity that is in essence management of sensation, such as work activity, the distinction as well as the linkages between the two is sufficiently concrete to merit discussion. This is in a sense what Hegel attempts to describe in his presentation of the most fundamental act of consciousness, “being is.” Being is the act of awareness of existence, the issue of giveness or non-giveness is an irrelevancy. On the other hand I regard Steve’s differentiation between social and individual consciousness as trivial. The very concept of social consciousness attributes to collectivities a form of activity which is properly that of the individual participant in social interaction. Differentiation between social practice in which all participate and individual consciousness - the means whereby the individual participant gauges the effectiveness of his activity relative to the known conditions of the environment of his operations - only makes sense so long as the ontological and operational dependence of each on the other is firmly sustained. I believe this is significance of the full citation from the final paragraphs of chapter 8 of EVI’s Dialectical logic: “The ideal is nothing else than a concatenation of the general forms of human activity realised by individuals, which determine the will and aptitude of individuals to act as an aim and law”. Victor Friedlander 28 09 2009 ----- Original Message ----- From: "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> Sent: Monday, September 28, 2009 6:48 AM Subject: Re: [xmca] Consciousness: Ilyenkov Epistemology QuizYou did a reasonable summary of the debate Steve.I will conclude my case by repeating the Ilyenkov quote I sent on 25/9, p. 302 of "The Ideal in Activity," by Ilyenkov: "These concepts are matter and consciousness (psyche, the ideal, spirit, soul, will, etc. etc.). 'Consciousness' – let us take this term as Lenin did - is the most general concept which can only be defined by clearly contrasting it with the most general concept of 'matter', moreover as something secondary, produced and derived. Dialectics consists in not being able to define matter as such; it can only be defined through its opposite, and only if one of the opposites is fixed as primary, and the other arises from it." My "Cs is what is give to us" was an effort to explain this. Hegel avoided the misunderstandings that arose by using just a subject and verb without a predicate: "Being is." Andy Steve Gabosch wrote:I don't suggest that you deny that individual consciousness is derived from social consciousness, Andy. Far from it. I'm saying that phrase you brought up for discussion unfortunately obscures it. It's probably time to wind this thread down, so let me kind of summarize, and then you can cap it off. I'm suggesting that pesky phrase we are kicking around ... "what is given to us is consciousness" ... obscures the fundamental derivative relationship between social and individual consciousness. Emphasizing this derivative relationship is important in activity psychology, in my view, because social and individual consciousness have fundamentally different origins, relationships to objective reality, laws of development, etc. As Jay, Mike and many others have pointed out, the term "consciousness" by itself is fraught with confusion and conflates many different things. Now, one could argue that it is really just the same problem all over again when one tries to analyze "individual consciousness" or "social consciousness," but my optimistic answer is that we can make some important headway by making this fundamental distinction, and from there we may be able to ask better questions about origins, relations, development, etc. than we can if we lump the two together as "consciousness," as is done in so many other areas of social science.Anyway, I don't think you can find support for the epistemological claim"what is given to us is consciousness" from Ilyenkov, Lenin, or any of the classical dialectical materialists for the reasons I've mentioned. If you do come across something, please pass it along, it would be interesting. Best, - Steve On Sep 27, 2009, at 5:48 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:But Steve, in making this very point you counterpose individual and social consciousness. And tell me (or maybe you can ask Ilyenkov!), how does social consciousness exist without individual consciousness? (There are answers to this question which go to suppositions about forms of life which may have existed a million years ago, but I'm talking about real people today.) And whenever did I deny that individual consciousness is derivative of social consciousness anyway? Andy Steve Gabosch wrote:OK, I'm following your responses and points. Thanks. So, Andy, to try to narrow this down: are you purposely bundling together individual and social consciousness into this single term "consciousness"? The reason I ask is that Ilyenkov works very hard in the essay Martin is reading, The Concept of the Ideal, to distinguish individual consciousness and will from social consciousness. Moreover, he argues for a very specific relationship between the two - that individual consciousness is derived from social consciousness, and not the other way around. Just as Marx said that social being determines social consciousness, Ilyenkov argues that social consciousness determines individual consciousness. In Ilyenkov's view, social consciousness is what humans are given, or confronted with - not individual consciousness. I looked for some supporting quotes and wound up with a creative post you'll see in the Humans are Signs/Ideal thread. See quotes 4 - 7. - Steve On Sep 26, 2009, at 6:21 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:True Steve, I can find: "experience is what is given to us ..." and "the objective world given to us in consciousness ..." but the only definition of "consciousness" around this area is its contrast with matter. I tried to clarify this in this discussion by saying that (as Martin has corrected understood) "What is given us is Cs" i.e., immediately, from the material world or anywhere else. As Hegel says though, "there is nothing in Heaven, Earth or anywhere else which is not both immediate and mediated." So to say that Cs is what is given "immediately" does not deny that it is mediated. Your suggestion to define Cs as "psychic activity of animals and humans" only shifts the problem to "psychic" - what is psychic? and throws in a far-from-basic assumption about what is going on inside my pussy cat's head. I am given my own consciousness, but figuring out what and if my cat is thinking is a problem of future scientific investigation, and hardly suitable for a definition: an outcome not a starting point. You say that I "conflate different things." Yes, I put forward the category without first listing the things which count as "forms of Cs." I think this is the right way to go, from whole to parts. A definition of Cs was what Mike asked for. I don't think it suffices to make a list of things and say "Cs is all these things, ... and maybe some I forgot to mention," not for a fundamental definition. It would be better to say "Let's not define Cs." Andy Steve Gabosch wrote:Andy, Thanks for looking over those statements by Ilyenkov. What passage by Ilyenkov causes you to believe he says that **consciousness** is what is given to humans? He says material reality, social being and social consciousness are what are given. He very carefully never uses a catch-all, misleading term like "consciousness." Well, that's my reading of him. Here is my problem with the phrase: "what is given to us is consciousness". The term "consciousness," as it is used in this phrase, conflates, obscures and confuses. It conflates fundamentally different kinds of consciousness and experience (sensation, individual consciousness, social consciousness, social being - not to mention dementia, animal psychic activity, sleep, etc. etc.) It obscures the material basis of these forms of consciousness. And it confuses their relationships with each other. It might help to ask: what **is** given to humans? (at birth, and thenceforth ...) Here is the beginning of an answer, helped a bit by Ilyenkov. From birth the human is confronted by reality on multiple levels: material reality (their body, objects, gravity), sensation (hunger, hearing), social being (a system of social and material relations), and social consciousness (ideality, historical culture). Soon, another kind of reality emerges: individual human consciousness. These processes and realities, in their simultaneously material and ideal forms, reappear every moment of a human's life. The phrase "what is given to us is consciousness" seems to obscure far more than it reveals. What benefits are obtained from making such a one-sided statement that excludes referencing the material foundations and relations underlying this "consciousness"? I want to emphasize that neither Lenin nor Ilyenkov ever made such a claim. (In my humble reading, anyway). You may be able to get Hegel's solidarity with that phrase, but the classical dialectical materialists argued quite the opposite. As for a general definition of the term "consciousness", given the scope of phenomena that would have to be included, I might venture something like "the psychic activity of animals and humans." Sometime when the time is right we might revisit the dialectics of nature discussion (including problems with the Stalinized "diamat" version). There are some significant issues there. Best, - Steve On Sep 25, 2009, at 9:43 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:OK, Steve I've read through your quiz, and evaluated each claim attributed to Ilyenkov by asking myself: "Is there are a context in which I would agree with this?" The only one where I have reservations is the "dialectics of nature" one: 28. These laws [dialectics] are understood as the objective laws of development of the material world, of both the natural and socio-historical world, of objective reality in general. I remain of the view that this claim is unclear and has, over the 120 years since Engels' Dialectics of Nature was published in the 1920s, been the source of a lot of confusion and also reasons to not think. In general I am always wary of claims that have the form: "human society is like this because nature is like this," such as social Darwinism. It basically adds up to "God made man in His own image." There is an element of truth in the claim, but only by making a drastic reduction to the meaning of "dialectics" which is already verging on meaninglessness anyway. But I do NOT want to change the subject to dianat!! I want to keep focussed on: 1. How do we define consciousness? 2. What's wrong with my suggestion (21/9/2009) based on the categorical distinction referred to in the early questions in your quiz, which Ilyenkov obviously agrees with: "Consciousness is what is given to us; matter is what exists outside and independently of consciousness." Andy Steve Gabosch wrote:Ain't no answer sheet! LOL This "quiz" is nothing more than comparing Ilyenkov's actual answers to one's own views. I've simplified this thing. It did need streamlining. There are now 25 Ilyenkov propositions. If my editing is accurate, Ilyenkov's points are preserved in each numbered sentence below. I kept the numbers from the previous version. Martin's very helpful reading of these passages confirms and clarifies my interpretations. Thank you, Martin. I've added headlines (in my words) to clarify Ilyenkov's key themes. As can be seen, I've also used some of Martin's nicely worded summaries for this task (and could have used more - I'm kind of duplicating what he did). Some of these statements by Ilyenkov seem to me to be in conflict with some of the points you have been recently making, Andy. See what you think. This is an 'open book' quiz, by the way - you are welcome to consult any texts ... :-)) from **Leninist Dialectics and the Metaphysics of Positivism**, Chapter One, by EV Ilyenkov, 1979, New Park, material below edited by Steve Gabosch, Sept 2009, downloaded from http://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/positive/positi.htm Ilyenkov is addressing the epistemological question: What is the relationship between consciousness and the world itself? ********** A. << No middle path is possible.>> ********** 1. … there is no middle here … [no] middle path … ********** B. << Consciousness is derived from, produced from, and secondary to matter.>> ********** 3. These concepts [that is, the two general concepts which must be clearly differentiated] are matter and consciousness. 4. [By consciousness we are referring to the] psyche, the ideal, spirit, soul, will, etc. etc. 6. ‘Consciousness’ [in its most general sense] can only be defined by clearly contrasting it with ‘matter’ [in its most general sense.] 7. [Moreover, consciousness can only be contrasted with matter] as something that is secondary, produced and derived. 9. … [Matter] can only be defined through its opposite, and only if one of the opposites is fixed as primary, and the other arises from it. ********** C. <<For materialists, matter is the basis of epistemology. For idealists, the basis is consciousness.>> ********** 12. Lenin's position … [is as follows]: for materialism … matter – the objective reality given to us in sensation … is the basis of the theory of knowledge (epistemology) … 13. … for idealism of any type, the basis of epistemology is consciousness ... ********** D. <<Just as social being, (that is, material and economic relations) precedes and exists independently of social consciousness, social consciousness (as does matter) precedes and exists independently of individual consciousness.>> <<Btw, Martin has an interesting objection to Ilyenkov's claim that 'primary' things exist independently of 'secondary' things insofar as humans are concerned.>> ********** 15. [Social consciousness is sometimes described as] … 'collectively-organised' … experience … 16. … the relationship of matter to consciousness is complicated by the fact that social consciousness … from the very beginning precedes individual consciousness as something already given, and existing before, outside, and independent of individual consciousness. 17. Just as matter does. ********** E. <<Individual consciousness is formed to a greater degree by social consciousness than it is by the material world. At the same time, as explained by Marx, social consciousness is derived from social being, the system of material and economic relations between people.>> ********** 20. ... social consciousness ... forms ... [the individual’s] consciousness to a much greater degree than the 'material world' [does]. 22. But social consciousness, according to Marx, is not 'primary', but secondary, derived from social being, i.e. the system of material and economic relations between people. ********** F. Martin summarized the next sentences very nicely as follows: "<We are *given* the world in sensation. But it is in thought that the world is *cognised.*>" ********** 24. It is … not true that the world is cognised in our sensations. 25. In sensations the external world is only given to us, just as it is given to a dog. 26. ... [The external world] is cognised not in sensations, but in the activity of thought ... ********** G. <<Lenin explained that dialectical logic is the science of discovering the universal laws of human and natural development. These are the objective laws of development of the material world, which includes the natural world, the socio-historical world, and objective reality in general. These laws are reflected in the historical consciousness of humanity.>> ********** 27. [Dialectical] Logic is defined by Lenin … as the science of those universal laws … to which the development of the entire aggregate knowledge of mankind is objectively subordinated. 28. These laws are understood [by dialectical materialism] as the objective laws of development of the material world, of both the natural and socio-historical world, of objective reality in general. 29. ... [These laws] are reflected in the consciousness of mankind and verified by thousands of years of human practice. ********** H. <<Martin: "<Thought arises in material activity, even in animals. In humans it takes a more advanced form, in which activity is adjusted to signs.>" I continue: However, if one proceeds from the perspective of individual experience, the sign will be taken as the starting point in the theory of knowledge, which will lead to idealist-leaning errors.">> ********** 35. Thought arises within and during the process of material action as one of its features, one of its aspects, and only later is divided into a special activity (isolated in space and time), finding [the] 'sign' form only in man. 36. A completely different picture arises when, proceeding from individual experience, it is precisely the verbally formed world which is taken as the starting point in the theory of knowledge. 37. It is all the more easy to yield to such an illusion, since in individual experience, words (and signs in general) are in actual fact just as much given to sensual contemplation as are the sun, rivers and mountains, statues and paintings, etc. etc. 38. Here are the roots of idealism in its 'sign-symbolic' variation. ********** I. Martin again: "<It is a mistake to try to understand human knowledge in terms of individual consciousness or experience. But it is also a mistake to try to understand knowledge in terms of *social* consciousness.>" ********** 39. If one proceeds from individual experience, making it the point of departure and basis of the theory of knowledge, then idealism is inevitable. 40. But it is also inevitable if one relies on 'collective experience', if the latter is interpreted as something independent of being, as something existing independently, as something primary. ************ <end of 'quiz'> ************ - Steve On Sep 25, 2009, at 5:28 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:I can't understand your quiz, Steve. Could you perhaps make us a shorter version with answers at the end of the post? Andy Steve Gabosch wrote:I have something fun, entertaining and educational for everyone on xmca! It just so happens that I took a close look at the Ilyenkov passages following Andy's quotes, did a little tinkering with the text, and came up with something fun: the Ilyenkov Epistemology Quiz, which anyone can take right on their own personal computer! Ilyenkov asks some fundamental questions regarding epistemology: "Where is the clear-cut dividing line between … philosophical idealism and … philosophical materialism? … which of these two points of departure is determining the direction of all your thought, regardless of the subject of your reflection … ? Here … is the question: take your thought, your consciousness of the world, and the world itself ... what is the relationship between them?" This can also be called: The How Much Do You Agree With Ilyenkov on Consciousness? Test ... (Hmm. Somehow, it doesn't seem likely that this will become the rage on Facebook ... does it? ... LOL ...) Taking this "quiz" is very simple. It is comprised of 40 propositional statements by Ilyenkov, which I edited for clarity, about the relationship of consciousness and materiality, from the first chapter of his short book "Leninist Dialectics and the Metaphysics of Positivism" (1979, New Park). To take the quiz, simply list the propositions that you agree with, and those you don't agree with, count them all up, and give Ilyenkov a score. Read critically like this, sentence by sentence, Ilyenkov is surprisingly clear. But one still has to think pretty hard about what he is saying. Hopefully, people will find it worthwhile to do so. Here is a little explanation of the editing I did to create this (this is the fine print part - can be skipped). What I have done is edit 15 of Ilyenkov's paragraphs (starting where Andy's quotes began) into what wound up becoming 40 propositional statements. They read quite coherently. This material makes for a decent introduction to both Ilyenkov and dialectical materialism. I eliminated his references to the Machists to keep things focused on his propositional statements about epistemological issues, and took out various other (for this purpose) secondary passages for the same reason. This makes him a little easier to grasp - he has a tendency to make a lot of side points as he goes. Also, I did some sentence rearranging to help clarify the specific proposition that is being made. There are a couple sentences which could be interpreted in different ways if they are not read very closely, so I included my interpretations below them. And I spelled out one or two important implications that Ilyenkov makes but does not explicitly state. (He makes these points in many other places in his writings, so they are supportable.) Everyone will see what I did - I am trying to be completely transparent. If I have misinterpreted or muddled Ilyenkov in any way, please let me know! I would be very interesting to compare notes on what propositions, formulations, ideas etc. people agree and disagree on. Some may disagree quite sharply on some points, and others may find themselves surprisingly in agreement with Ilyenkov on some issues but didn't know it. Some might find this stimulating ideawise. Others who are bored by philosophical discourse might save this for later if they need something to put them to sleep tonight! LOL This little quiz might even help clarify aspects of this interesting discussion on consciousness. Fun for the whole family! :-)) Andy, after carefully reading your posts about the how "consciousness is what is given to us" and "the idea of matter is derived from consciousness" - as well as other things you have said from time to time - it will be very interesting to see how you "score" Ilyenkov's positions on epistemology. I would actually be quite interested in everyone's thoughts ... ********************** The Internet Ilyenkov Epistemology Quiz also known as The How Much Do You Agree With Ilyenkov on Consciousness? Test from **Leninist Dialectics and the Metaphysics of Positivism** by EV Ilyenkov, edited by Steve Gabosch, Sept 2009 downloaded from http://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/positive/positi.htm *********************** a. Where is the clear-cut dividing line between … philosophical idealism and … philosophical materialism? … b. … which of these two points of departure is determining the direction of all your thought, regardless of the subject of your reflection … ? c. Here … is the question: take your thought, your consciousness of the world, and the world itself ... what is the relationship between them? 1. … there is no middle here … [no] middle path … 2. In philosophy the 'party of the golden mean' is the 'party of the brainless', [that is, those that attempt the middle path are destined to fail if they] ... try to unite materialism with idealism in an eclectic way, by means of smoothing out the basic contradictions, and by means of muddling the most general ... and clear concepts. 3. These concepts [the two general concepts which must be clearly differentiated] are matter and consciousness. 4. [By consciousness we are referring to the] psyche, the ideal, spirit, soul, will, etc. etc. 5. 'Consciousness' – let us take this term as Lenin did – is the most general concept which can only be defined by clearly contrasting it with the most general concept of 'matter', as something secondary, produced and derived. 6. [[sg interpretation: ‘Consciousness’ [in its most general sense] can only be defined by clearly contrasting it with ‘matter’ [in its most general sense.]]] 7. [[sg interpretation: …moreover … [consciousness can only be contrasted with matter] as something that is secondary, produced and derived.]] 8. Dialectics consists in not being able to define matter as such … 9. … it [matter] can only be defined through its opposite, and only if one of the opposites is fixed as primary, and the other arises from it. 10. [[sg interpretation: Dialectics can only define things through their opposites, and furthermore can only do so if one of these opposites is fixed as primary and the other as arising from it.]] 11. [[sg interpretation of an implication made above: In dialectical materialism, the material is primary; and consciousness, its opposite, arises from it.]] 12. Lenin's position … [is as follows]: for materialism … matter – the objective reality given to us in sensation … is the basis of the theory of knowledge (epistemology) … 13. … for idealism of any type, the basis of epistemology is consciousness ... 14. [Consciousness for the idealist can take a multitude of forms and can appear] under one or another of its pseudonyms (be it the 'psychical', 'conscious' or 'unconscious', be it the 'system of forms of collectively-organised experience' or 'objective spirit', the individual or collective psyche, individual or social consciousness).] 15. [Social consciousness is sometimes described as] … 'collectively-organised' … experience … 16. … the relationship of matter to consciousness is complicated by the fact that social consciousness … from the very beginning precedes individual consciousness as something already given, and existing before, outside, and independent of individual consciousness. 17. Just as matter does. 18. [[sg interpretation: Just as social consciousness does, matter, from the very beginning, precedes individual consciousness as something already given.]] 19. [There is] … even more [to it] than that. 20. This social consciousness – forms ... [the individual’s] consciousness to a much greater degree than [does] the 'material world'. 21. [Social consciousness] of course, in its individualised form, [takes] … the form of the consciousness of one's closest teachers, and after that, of the entire circle of people who appear in the field of vision of a person … 22. But social consciousness, according to Marx, is not 'primary', but secondary, derived from social being, i.e. the system of material and economic relations between people. 23. [[sg interpretation: According to Marx, social consciousness, which is secondary, is derived from social being, which is the system of material and economic relations between people.]] 24. It is … not true that the world is cognised in our sensations. 25. In sensations the external world is only given to us, just as it is given to a dog. 26. ... [The external world] is cognised not in sensations, but in the activity of thought ... 27. [Dialectical] Logic is defined by Lenin … as the science of those universal laws … to which the development of the entire aggregate knowledge of mankind is objectively subordinated. 28. These laws are understood [by dialectical materialism] as the objective laws of development of the material world, of both the natural and socio-historical world, of objective reality in general. 29. ... [These laws] are reflected in the consciousness of mankind and verified by thousands of years of human practice. d. What is … 'thought'? 30. … [A materialist] line of thought [about what thought is] proceeds from Spinoza. He understands thinking to be an inherent capability, characteristic not of all bodies, but only of thinking material bodies. 31. With the help of this capability, a body can construct its activities in the spatially determined world, in conformity with the 'form and disposition' of all other bodies external to it, both 'thinking' and 'non-thinking'. 32. Spinoza therefore includes thinking among the categories of the attributes of substance, such as extension. 33. In this form ... [thinking] is, according to Spinoza, characteristic also of animals. 34. For him [Spinoza] even an animal possesses a soul, and this view distinguishes Spinoza from Descartes, who considered that an animal is simply an 'automaton', a very complex 'machine'. 35. Thought arises within and during the process of material action as one of its features, one of its aspects, and only later is divided into a special activity (isolated in space and time), finding [the] 'sign' form only in man. 36. A completely different picture arises when, proceeding from individual experience, it is precisely the verbally formed world which is taken as the starting point in the theory of knowledge. 37. It is all the more easy to yield to such an illusion, since in individual experience, words (and signs in general) are in actual fact just as much given to sensual contemplation as are the sun, rivers and mountains, statues and paintings, etc. etc. 38. Here are the roots of idealism in its 'sign-symbolic' variation. 39. If one proceeds from individual experience, making it the point of departure and basis of the theory of knowledge, then idealism is inevitable. 40. But it is also inevitable if one relies on 'collective experience', if the latter is interpreted as something independent of being, as something existing independently, as something primary. <Ilyenkov moves on to other questions at this point in the text.> <End of quiz.> So how did you score Ilyenkov? 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