Hi,
A quick thought while I am reading the exchanges on consciousness. I
think consciousness is matter (brain cells) which become organized
as a consequence of activity, and once organized (never fully,
finally, until the moment of death) they facilitate (and that,too is
an activity) certain kinds and speeds of activity. My consciousness
of the act of writing is multi-layered, it runs ahead of the text
while it also monitors what is written, these are activities that are
facilitated by the consequences of previous, repeated, experience I
now write in English, my monitoring a text written in Hungarian is
slower, I have less current practice and thus the conscious focus
required to write in my mother tongue is differently organized, it
may require a shifting back and forth between planning and monitoring
rather than the simultaneous activities called forth if the task is
in English.
The example is to serve us to think developmentally of matter, of
differently structured matter, rather than dichotomously.
Thanks for the stimulating exchanges,
Vera
----- Original Message ----- From: "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net>
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Sent: Wednesday, September 23, 2009 9:16 AM
Subject: Re: [xmca] Consciousness
THis is indeed a tricky question which inevitably generates
seemingly contradictory positions. Please recall the context. Mike
raised the problem of multiple definitions of "consciousness" among
us - we who share a lot of agreement on these questions. I responded
that I didn't think we *should* tie Cs down to a single,
well-defined meaning. Then realizing that it was unsatisfactory, to
leave us in such an open-ended, undefined position, I thought about
it, and realized that what unified all these multiplicity of
legitimate definitions and concepts of Cs was Cs as a philosophical
category.
Descartes introduced us to the philosophical catgory of Cs, but he
did not at all solve the problem of the scientific study of
consciouness. Only Vygotsky solved this, but quite specifically he
built on Hegel and Marx.
If I ask you to accept that the dollar you think is in your pocket
and the dollar which is actually in your pocket (or not) are
categorically different, this is asking you to state the bleeding
obvious, and does not give you a program for the scientific study of
consciousness. But nor can a program for the scientific study of
consciousness forget or turn its back on this categorical difference
between Cs and matter.
The big step that Hegel took in fact was to lay to the side the
whole issue of an absolute difference between thought and thing,
between subject and object, and to look instead at the movement of
(subject/object), with the whole idea of objectified thoughts and
internalised artifacts.
So here we have these two (as you say) completely *opposite*
proposals about how to proceed, and I am advocating *both* of them.
But we can't go all the way with Hegel. Hegel basically elided the
mind/matter distinction and this proved to be very productive. But
it couldn't be maintained, could it? Feuerbach called his bluff, and
Marx agreed.
On science: I am saying that science is one of a number of possible
ways of apprehending the world (quoting Marx in the Grundrisse). It
is good for certain tasks up to a certain point. And what Kuhn means
by "ontological assumptions" is not necessarily really ontological.
Natural science does assume the existence of a material world,
outside of, independent of, and prior to consciousness. This
ontology got a bump c. 1905, but it was soon restored. But natural
science is not the only way. I don't think psychology can proceed on
the same set of ontological assumptions. If we make "Activity" a
fundamental category, we depart from natural science. And I don't
believe we can proceed by acting as if we can study the psyche on
the basis of the same metaphysical assumptions as natural science.
We are part of it; we cannot objectify the object of study.
Enough,
Andy
Martin Packer wrote:
Andy,
I am familiar with what seems to be your general line of argument.
It runs, indeed, through the philosophers you have highlighted:
Descartes, Kant, and Husserl (whose 'Cartesian mediations' was both
a criticism of Kant for being too mystical and an affirmation of
the continuity of his project with Descartes). But I am surprised
that you would follow this line for, in my reading at least, Marx
and Vygotsky took a different line, prompted in my view by Hegel's
critique of Kant.
But first, it seems to me there is a central contradiction in what
you have written, and I take this to mean that perhaps I'm not
correctly identifying your position, since you seem to affirming
and denying the same point. You write critically of natural science:
"Natural science is based on the assumption that outside of
consciousness there is a natural world, which exists independently
of consciousness and prior to consciousness"
But when you cited Lenin you explained: "Consciousness is what is
given to us; matter is what exists outside and independently of
consciousness."
Perhaps your point is that science is not *critical* of this
central assumption, which was indeed what Kant and Husserl argued?
(I think this is actually an inaccurate claim: Kuhn's work showed
us that scientists constantly question their ontological
assumptions, and also made the important point that these
assumptions are embedded in the shared, social practices of a
scientific paradigm, not in the thoughts of individual scientists.)
Where should I begin with a response to this D-K-H line? Perhaps
here: you write: "The reality is: you open your eyes, you see
things, and *then* you question whether what really exists out
there (matter) corresponds to what you think exists out there
(consciousness)."
...for this is precisely the move that Descartes, Kant and Husserl
made. They each engaged in a reflective attitude of doubt,
questioning the correspondence of (inner) thought and (external)
matter, and even the existence of the latter. The problem is that
this epistemological scepticism (Is my knowledge valid?) is
*always* a sign of an underlying ontological dualism (My thoughts
are inner; matter is outer). If one starts there, it does indeed
seem that only a God's eye view would be able to resolve the
problem. And with this dualism it seems that each individual can
form only mental representations of a reality that they can never
in fact be sure they know. Precisely the representational model of
human beings that cognitive science has accepted, at least until
recently.
But there is a different line of thinking about human being,
knowledge and consciousness. I first learned of it from studying
Heidegger, but it has been explored by Merleau-Ponty, Garfinkel,
and as I read them, Marx and Vygotsky. It is a line that gives
priority to practical activity rather than reflective thinking.
(You can see why I am puzzled that you would follow the former
line, and why, for example, you would write that post Heisenberg,
"not concsciousness but *activity* had to step in to provide a
rational foundation for even natural science." That seems to imply
that for you consciousness and activity are distinct.)
The central thrust of Heidegger's Being and Time was that the
typical and traditional philosophical move is mistaken and
unnatural. People in their everyday activity do *not* "question
what really exists out there." If I am digging in my garden, see a
strange object and have a question about it, I don't reflect on the
adequacy of my thought categories, I get down on my knees to take a
closer look at the object. I poke it, I pick it up. Heidegger
distinguished three modes of engagement (Tony mentioned them
recently). These philosophers operated in what Heidegger called the
present-at-hand mode, in which practical activity is completely
suspended. But the more fundamental mode is the ready-to-hand, in
which we are engaged in practical activity with artifacts, and
there is no separation between subject and object, mind and matter.
For Heidegger, *this* is consciousness. In this mode, Cs is not
separate from matter.
I find it particularly helpful to think in terms of children's
development, because infants have a practical engagement in the
world without the capacity for reflective thought.
There is obviously much more I could and should say to develop the
point I'm trying to make. But if I send this message now it might
reach you before night falls.
cheers
Martin
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Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov,
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