[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

Re: [xmca] Hello Other Brain, how are you?

The discussion of the place of emotion in the developmental process is a central question.
I want to once again recommend googling  "Boston Change Process Study Group" to read articles by a group of scholars engaging in exploring the interface BETWEEN emotions (implicit knowing) and consciousness (explicit understanding).  Daniel Stern, a member of this group,  is a seminal thinker in this area of study.
They have studied the intersubjective processes of "affect attunement" within the infant/caretaker relationship. They differentiate intersubjective processes (psychological processes) from "attachment" processes.  HOWEVER what I believe is their major focus is the recognition that the processes of "implicit knowing" or "communication" that happen during infancy (implicit affective knowing) do NOT become superceded when language and symbolization is acquired. Their perspective is that this level of implicit knowing continues to develop and become more complex in the same way as cognition develops and becomes elaborated.  They take the position that relating at the implicit level may become symbolically elaborated in language in an intersubjective context and thereby become explixit understanding. However it is their position that most implicit ways of relating remain imlicit or unformulated (NOT UNCONSCIOUS because they were never conscious before. The process is relational and NOT an intrapsychic phenomena.  However one can take a phenomenological standpoint and make validity claims. However one could just as well choose to take an intersubjective communicative stance to "interpret" the processes.  Or one could take a third person stance to "construct" an explanation.  Each position taken allows one to make a validity claim one each claim is only an interpretation.
However it is at the implicit level of intersubjective contexts that " the person in "moments of meeting" experiences feeling engaged and vital. 
I believe the construct of "learning" as mediated can benefit from incorporating this level of analysis.

Andy this speaks to your statement that the "unit of analysis" should be the "subject" as elaborated by Hegel.


----- Original Message -----
From: Wolff-Michael Roth <mroth@uvic.ca>
Date: Saturday, November 14, 2009 8:17 am
Subject: Re: [xmca] Hello Other Brain, how are you?
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>

> In the following piece, we show how emotion (as evidenced in 
> prosody)  
> is a resource for the coordination of social action. Michael
> Cult Stud of Sci Educ
> DOI 10.1007/s11422-009-9203-8
> Solidarity and conflict: aligned and misaligned prosody
> as a transactional resource in intra- and intercultural
> communication involving power differences
> Wolff-Michael Roth Æ Kenneth Tobin
> On 2009-11-14, at 6:55 AM, Martin Packer wrote:
> I'm going to ignore Andy's request to ignore his message to 
> Mabel,  
> because I'm sure Mabel is not the only person being told this 
> sort of  
> thing. The claim, I suppose, is that emotion is a 
> subjective  
> experience, and therefore something mental, internal, 
> personal,  
> private and so inaccessible to other people, including the 
> researcher,  
> who has access only to the external 'expression' of that 
> emotion, on  
> the face, in movements, etc.
> Nonsense. How to argue against that view? Take a look at Joe 
> de  
> Rivera's work on emotions as interpersonal movements, towards or 
> away  
> from people on three interpersonal dimensions of intimacy, 
> openness,  
> and status. Read Hall and Cobey (1976) on emotion as 
> transformation of  
> the world. Read Mead's Mind, Self and Society where  he 
> challenges  
> Darwin, insisting that "we cannot approach them [emotions] from 
> the  
> point of view of expressing a content in the mind of the  
> individual" (p. 17) because to do so presumes a dualism 
> between  
> consciousness and the biological organism.
> These are some resources that come immediately to my mind. What 
> can  
> others out there recommend?
> Martin
> On Nov 14, 2009, at 4:42 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:
> > You have good muses Mabel (Vygotsky and Marx), pity you
> > don't have better supervisors. Your approach, studying
> > microsituations as social, is Vygotsky's approach too, I
> > think, and excellent one, that is often, I fear, not well
> > understood. I am probably the last person to ask about that
> > kind of problem as I have a devil of a problem making myself
> > understood. Others will know the answers to your questions
> > better than me, too. But I will mention a few suggestions.
> >
> > Mabel Encinas wrote:
> >> My supervisors are questioning now, that I do not study 
> emotions,  
> >> but "the expression of emotions". I know how to solidify 
> my  
> >> argument in this bit, but could you please give me some 
> references  
> >> of where should I read about the difference-relation 
> between  
> >> ontological and methodological dualism?
> >
> > I guess you have already read Vygotsky's comments on
> > ontological vs methodological/epistemological dualism:
> > http://marx.org/archive/vygotsky/works/crisis/psycri13.htm#p1367
> >
> > If you use Google on this one, you will probably find a page
> > where I am being attacked by someone called Neville for
> > failing to make this distinction. I am far from sure of the
> > value of that exchange but you are welcome to read it. I
> > would not attempt a short summary of this issue.
> >
> > I am not sure what you are being accused of about emotions.
> > Martha Nussbaum is a Critical Theorist who writes good stuff
> > about emotions. And of course everyone reads Antonio
> > Damassio, with his distinction between feelings and
> > emotions. Certainly, emotions are only present in
> > consciousness thanks to their "interpretation" by culturally
> > acquired concepts.
> >
> > ""the expression of emotions" is a strange expression to me.
> > Are they using "emotions" to refer to forms of consciousness
> > which are "expressed" in high blood pressure, etc? Or are
> > they using "emotions" to refer to physiological conditions,
> > which are "expressed" in the character of behavior. I don't
> > understand. I am sure others will know. Sounds like a
> > template accusation.
> >
> > Andy
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > xmca mailing list
> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> _______________________________________________
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> _______________________________________________
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
xmca mailing list