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Re: [xmca] Hello Other Brain, how are you?

In the following piece, we show how emotion (as evidenced in prosody) is a resource for the coordination of social action. Michael

Cult Stud of Sci Educ
DOI 10.1007/s11422-009-9203-8
Solidarity and conflict: aligned and misaligned prosody
as a transactional resource in intra- and intercultural
communication involving power differences
Wolff-Michael Roth Æ Kenneth Tobin

On 2009-11-14, at 6:55 AM, Martin Packer wrote:

I'm going to ignore Andy's request to ignore his message to Mabel, because I'm sure Mabel is not the only person being told this sort of thing. The claim, I suppose, is that emotion is a subjective experience, and therefore something mental, internal, personal, private and so inaccessible to other people, including the researcher, who has access only to the external 'expression' of that emotion, on the face, in movements, etc.

Nonsense. How to argue against that view? Take a look at Joe de Rivera's work on emotions as interpersonal movements, towards or away from people on three interpersonal dimensions of intimacy, openness, and status. Read Hall and Cobey (1976) on emotion as transformation of the world. Read Mead's Mind, Self and Society where he challenges Darwin, insisting that "we cannot approach them [emotions] from the point of view of expressing a content in the mind of the individual" (p. 17) because to do so presumes a dualism between consciousness and the biological organism.

These are some resources that come immediately to my mind. What can others out there recommend?


On Nov 14, 2009, at 4:42 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:

You have good muses Mabel (Vygotsky and Marx), pity you
don't have better supervisors. Your approach, studying
microsituations as social, is Vygotsky's approach too, I
think, and excellent one, that is often, I fear, not well
understood. I am probably the last person to ask about that
kind of problem as I have a devil of a problem making myself
understood. Others will know the answers to your questions
better than me, too. But I will mention a few suggestions.

Mabel Encinas wrote:
My supervisors are questioning now, that I do not study emotions, but "the expression of emotions". I know how to solidify my argument in this bit, but could you please give me some references of where should I read about the difference-relation between ontological and methodological dualism?

I guess you have already read Vygotsky's comments on
ontological vs methodological/epistemological dualism:

If you use Google on this one, you will probably find a page
where I am being attacked by someone called Neville for
failing to make this distinction. I am far from sure of the
value of that exchange but you are welcome to read it. I
would not attempt a short summary of this issue.

I am not sure what you are being accused of about emotions.
Martha Nussbaum is a Critical Theorist who writes good stuff
about emotions. And of course everyone reads Antonio
Damassio, with his distinction between feelings and
emotions. Certainly, emotions are only present in
consciousness thanks to their "interpretation" by culturally
acquired concepts.

""the expression of emotions" is a strange expression to me.
Are they using "emotions" to refer to forms of consciousness
which are "expressed" in high blood pressure, etc? Or are
they using "emotions" to refer to physiological conditions,
which are "expressed" in the character of behavior. I don't
understand. I am sure others will know. Sounds like a
template accusation.


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