[Xmca-l] Re: intersubjectivity and perspective taking, po russkii

[Charles Bazerman <bazerman@education.ucsb.edu>]

thanks!

----- Original Message -----
From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
Date: Saturday, November 30, 2013 3:15 pm
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: intersubjectivity and perspective taking, po russkii
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>

> Yes, Charles, it is well known that Hegel read and admired the work of 
> 
> the political economists and he also gave prominant place to the Scots 
> 
> in his History of Philosophy, namely, Reid, Beattie, Oswald and 
> Douglas 
> Stewart.
> And Mead wrote in a letter that his I/Me dialectic was based on Hegel.
> 
> Andy
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> *Andy Blunden*
> http://home.mira.net/~andy/
> 
> 
> Charles Bazerman wrote:
> > Do any of you scholarly folk also know if there is a line of 
> influence from the Scottish moralists to Hegel's views on perspective 
> taking? Given the influence of the Scottish Enlightenment on U.S. 
> education, I wouldn't be  surprised if that work got to Mead as well.  
> 
> > Chuck
> >
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>
> > Date: Saturday, November 30, 2013 1:27 pm
> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: intersubjectivity and perspective taking, po russkii
> > To: Mike Cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>, "eXtended Mind, Culture, 
> Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> >
> >   
> >> Mike,
> >> Not so dumb, I would think, since this is a very central part of Hegel's
> >> social ontology of the subject. (Too) Simply put, 
> self-consciousness arises
> >> from our awareness that others are subjects just like ourselves. 
> Here 
> >> is
> >> what I take to be Hegel's description of perspective-taking:
> >> "It must cancel this its other. To do so is the sublation of that first
> >> double meaning, and is therefore a second double meaning. First, it 
> must
> >> set itself to sublate the other independent being, in order thereby 
> to
> >> become certain of itself as true being, secondly, it thereupon 
> >> proceeds to
> >> sublate its own self, for this other is itself."
> >>
> >> This is, of course, the second paragraph in the introduction to Hegel's
> >> Master/Slave dialectic (all 5 paragraphs of the intro are below). 
> In that
> >> tale, perspective-taking fails b.c. although the slave takes the
> >> perspective of the master, the master has no reason to take the perspective
> >> of the slave. This is imperfect recognition and does not allow for 
> the 
> >> full
> >> constitution (consummation, following Bakhtin) of the subjects as fully
> >> self-conscious.
> >>
> >> [There is good evidence that this was part of G. H. Mead's 
> inspiration 
> >> in
> >> his development of perspective taking (but this is both debatable 
> and, 
> >> to
> >> my mind, of little consequence).]
> >>
> >>  I also wonder if some variant of perspective taking can be found 
> in Marx's
> >> early concept of species being, or perhaps in the idea of the 
> >> relations of
> >> persons one to another. It would seem that Marx's writings on the commodity
> >> fetish are precisely a problem of perspective taking - the individual
> >> participants no longer see that there are others who are full and rich
> >> individuals like themselves; instead, other people become tools for
> >> accomplishing MY aims. And it is this that communism is supposed to
> >> reconcile - bringing all people into a deep appreciation of not 
> just our
> >> deep dependence upon one another, but also of our universal 
> kinship, i.e.
> >> our "mutuality of being" as Rupert Stasch has so eloquently put it.
> >> Mutuality of being requires an understanding that other people are 
> "just
> >> like us".
> >> Isn't that perspective taking?
> >>
> >> But I have no clue how or in what linguistic forms this would have 
> 
> >> made its
> >> way from Hegel's and Marx's German to Vygotsky's Russian (if at all...).
> >> -greg
> >> p.s. psychological anthropologist Doug Hollan has been seriously looking
> >> into "empathy" along with fellow psyc anth scholar C. Jason Throop. 
> 
> >> One of
> >> Doug's pieces is listed in the email that just I'll forward in just 
> a
> >> minute to XMCA.
> >>
> >>
> >> Full text of paras 179-184 from Phenomenology of Spirit:
> >>
> >> Φ <
> >> 179 <
> >> . Self-consciousness has before it another self-consciousness; it 
> has 
> >> come
> >> outside itself. This has a double significance. First it has lost 
> its 
> >> own
> >> self, since it finds itself as an *other* being; secondly, it has thereby
> >> sublated that other, for it does not regard the other as 
> essentially real,
> >> but sees its own self in the other.
> >>
> >> Φ <
> >> 180 <
> >> . It must cancel this its other. To do so is the sublation of that 
> first
> >> double meaning, and is therefore a second double meaning. First, it 
> must
> >> set itself to sublate the other independent being, in order thereby 
> to
> >> become certain of itself as true being, secondly, it thereupon 
> >> proceeds to
> >> sublate its own self, for this other is itself.
> >>
> >> Φ <
> >> 181 <
> >> . This sublation in a double sense of its otherness in a double 
> sense 
> >> is at
> >> the same time a return in a double sense into its self. For, firstly,
> >> through sublation, it gets back itself, because it becomes one with 
> itself
> >> again through the cancelling of *its *otherness; but secondly, it likewise
> >> gives otherness back again to the other self-consciousness, for it 
> was
> >> aware of being in the other, it cancels this its own being in the 
> >> other and
> >> thus lets the other again go free.
> >>
> >> Φ <
> >> 182 <
> >> . This process of self-consciousness in relation to another
> >> self-consciousness has in this manner been represented as the 
> action 
> >> of one
> >> alone. But this action on the part of the one has itself the double
> >> significance of being at once its own action and the action of that 
> other
> >> as well. For the other is likewise independent, shut up within 
> itself, 
> >> and
> >> there is nothing in it which is not there through itself. The first 
> does
> >> not have the object before it only in the passive form characteristic
> >> primarily of the object of desire, but as an object existing independently
> >> for itself, over which therefore it has no power to do anything for 
> 
> >> its own
> >> behalf, if that object does not *per se *do what the first does to 
> it. 
> >> The
> >> process then is absolutely the double process of both self-consciousnesses.
> >> Each sees the other do the same as itself; each itself does what it 
> demands
> >> on the part of the other, and for that reason does what it does, 
> only 
> >> so
> >> far as the other does the same. Action from one side only would be 
> useless,
> >> because what is to happen can only be brought about by means of both.
> >>
> >> Φ <
> >> 183 <
> >> . The action has then a *double entente* not only in the sense that 
> it 
> >> is
> >> an act done to itself as well as to the other, but also in the 
> sense that
> >> the act *simpliciter* is the act of the one as well as of the other
> >> regardless of their distinction.
> >>
> >> Φ <
> >> 184 <
> >> . In this movement we see the process repeated which came before us 
> as 
> >> the
> >> play of forces; in the present case, however, it is found in consciousness.
> >> What in the former had effect only for us [contemplating 
> experience], 
> >> holds
> >> here for the terms themselves. The middle term is 
> self-consciousness which
> >> breaks itself up into the extremes; and each extreme is this 
> >> interchange of
> >> its own determinateness, and complete transition into the opposite. 
> While
> >> *qua* consciousness, it no doubt comes outside itself, still, in being
> >> outside itself, it is at the same time restrained within itself, it 
> exists
> >> for itself, and its self-externalization is for consciousness.
> >> *Consciousness *finds that it immediately is and is not another
> >> consciousness, as also that this other is for itself only when it cancels
> >> itself as existing for itself , and has self-existence only in the
> >> self-existence of the other. Each is the mediating term to the other,
> >> through which each mediates and unites itself with itself; and each 
> is 
> >> to
> >> itself and to the other an immediate self-existing reality, which, 
> at 
> >> the
> >> same time, exists thus for itself only through this mediation. They
> >> recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another.
> >>
> >>
> >> On Sat, Nov 30, 2013 at 10:08 AM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
> >>
> >>     
> >>> Hi Larry-- You are almost certainly way ahead of me on these 
> issues. 
> >>>       
> >> My
> >>     
> >>> interest at present is on the development of social and relational
> >>> perspective taking. From, say, a Vygotskian, or Bakhtinian point 
> of 
> >>>       
> >> view
> >>     
> >>> (perspective!) what are the socio-cultural contributions to interpersonal
> >>> understanding that we associated with psychological perspective taking,
> >>> perhaps just the ability to "stand in someone else's shoes"? 
> Empathy 
> >>>       
> >> has to
> >>     
> >>> be one potential contributor, and...... (in the Russian traditionS 
> 
> >>>       
> >> we often
> >>     
> >>> discuss)?
> >>>
> >>> Perhaps just a really dumb question. Wouldn't be the first time!!
> >>> mike
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> On Sat, Nov 30, 2013 at 6:37 AM, Larry Purss 
> <lpscholar2@gmail.com> 
> >>>       
> >> wrote:
> >>     
> >>>> Mike,
> >>>> I am wondering if you could expand on your question that is 
> >>>>         
> >> referring to
> >>     
> >>>> perspective taking and its possible meanings. I believe this 
> >>>>         
> >> question of
> >>     
> >>>> perspective taking is also converging with your other question on 
> 
> >>>>         
> >> *kinds*
> >>     
> >>>> or *types* of persons. [personhood like childhood]
> >>>>
> >>>> I am asking for more clarity on your *bad question* which seems 
> to 
> >>>>         
> >> be
> >>     
> >>>> central to the multiple discourses on *sociocultural* theory and 
> practice
> >>>> This *space* or *zone* of  questioning which opens up a clearing 
> 
> >>>>         
> >> for the
> >>     
> >>>> multiple notions of the concept *intersubjectivity* and its convergence
> >>>> with the concept of *perspective-taking* and how this topic is explored
> >>>>         
> >>> in
> >>>       
> >>>> Russian translation is a topic I want to explore further.
> >>>>
> >>>> I wanted to offer a quote which I found interesting exploring 
> >>>>         
> >> notions of
> >>     
> >>>> *identity* AS KINDS [categories]
> >>>>
> >>>> Oakeshott argues that "This distinction, then, between 'goings-on'
> >>>> identified as themselves
> >>>>
> >>>> exhibitions of intelligence and 'goings-on' which may be made
> >>>>         
> >>> intelligible
> >>>       
> >>>> but are not themselves
> >>>>
> >>>> intelligent, is not a distinction between mental and physical or 
> between
> >>>> minds and bodies regarded
> >>>>
> >>>> as entities. It is a distinction within the engagement of understanding,
> >>>>         
> >>> a
> >>>       
> >>>> distinction between
> >>>>
> >>>> 'sciences' (that is, ideal characters) and the identities with 
> >>>>         
> >> which they
> >>     
> >>>> are concerned. And in
> >>>>
> >>>> calling it a categorial distinction what is being asserted is 
> that 
> >>>>         
> >> the
> >>     
> >>>> understanding of identities
> >>>>
> >>>> recognized as themselves exhibitions of intelligence cannot be 'reduced'
> >>>> to the understanding of
> >>>>
> >>>> identities no so recognized", *On Human Conduct*, pp. 14-15.
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> I was intrigued by Oakeshott's understanding of *sciences* 
> >>>>         
> >> [multiple] AS
> >>     
> >>>> RESPRESENTING IDEAL KINDS [categorical distinctions]. This realm 
> 
> >>>>         
> >> of KINDS
> >>     
> >>>> AS perspective taking moves the question of intersubjectivity to 
> converge
> >>>> with *culture* and *history*.
> >>>>
> >>>> I will pause, but this topic is endlessly fascinating.
> >>>>
> >>>> Larry Purss
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> On Fri, Nov 29, 2013 at 10:21 AM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> 
> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>         
> >>>>> Dear Russian experts on XMCA
> >>>>>
> >>>>> I have been reading about the development of intersubjectivity and
> >>>>> perspective taking, including an article by scholars who say 
> they 
> >>>>>           
> >> are
> >>     
> >>>>> working in the "sociocultural perspective." It got me to 
> >>>>>           
> >> wondering how
> >>     
> >>>>> Russian scholars discuss these topics. No Russians are cited in 
> the
> >>>>>           
> >>> work I
> >>>       
> >>>>> am reading, but Mead and
> >>>>> Piaget.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> When looking at suggested translations into Russian from English 
> 
> >>>>>           
> >> for
> >>     
> >>> these
> >>>       
> >>>>> terms, the cognate
> >>>>> perspectiv seems to appear almost everywhere. The phrase for 
> >>>>>           
> >> "point of
> >>     
> >>>>> view" is literally that,
> >>>>> tochka-point  zreniya-seeing, genetive case.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> I figure I am blind to something obvious here, but darned if I 
> >>>>>           
> >> know what
> >>     
> >>>>> it
> >>>>> is. Any help out there??
> >>>>> mike
> >>>>>
> >>>>> P
> >>>>> S-- Eugene wrote an interesting article in MCA a while back on
> >>>>> intersubjectivity and there are Vygotsky
> >>>>> refs but they do not seem to go to the question I am asking. 
> >>>>>           
> >> Perhaps its
> >>     
> >>>>> just my bad question!
> >>>>>
> >>>>>           
> >>>>         
> >>
> >> -- 
> >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> >> Visiting Assistant Professor
> >> Department of Anthropology
> >> 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> >> Brigham Young University
> >> Provo, UT 84602
> >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> >>     
> >
> >
> >
> >   
>