[Xmca-l] Re: intersubjectivity and perspective taking, po russkii

[Charles Bazerman <bazerman@education.ucsb.edu>]

Do any of you scholarly folk also know if there is a line of influence from the Scottish moralists to Hegel's views on perspective taking? Given the influence of the Scottish Enlightenment on U.S. education, I wouldn't be  surprised if that work got to Mead as well.  
Chuck

----- Original Message -----
From: Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>
Date: Saturday, November 30, 2013 1:27 pm
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: intersubjectivity and perspective taking, po russkii
To: Mike Cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>, "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>

> Mike,
> Not so dumb, I would think, since this is a very central part of Hegel's
> social ontology of the subject. (Too) Simply put, self-consciousness arises
> from our awareness that others are subjects just like ourselves. Here 
> is
> what I take to be Hegel's description of perspective-taking:
> "It must cancel this its other. To do so is the sublation of that first
> double meaning, and is therefore a second double meaning. First, it must
> set itself to sublate the other independent being, in order thereby to
> become certain of itself as true being, secondly, it thereupon 
> proceeds to
> sublate its own self, for this other is itself."
> 
> This is, of course, the second paragraph in the introduction to Hegel's
> Master/Slave dialectic (all 5 paragraphs of the intro are below). In that
> tale, perspective-taking fails b.c. although the slave takes the
> perspective of the master, the master has no reason to take the perspective
> of the slave. This is imperfect recognition and does not allow for the 
> full
> constitution (consummation, following Bakhtin) of the subjects as fully
> self-conscious.
> 
> [There is good evidence that this was part of G. H. Mead's inspiration 
> in
> his development of perspective taking (but this is both debatable and, 
> to
> my mind, of little consequence).]
> 
>  I also wonder if some variant of perspective taking can be found in Marx's
> early concept of species being, or perhaps in the idea of the 
> relations of
> persons one to another. It would seem that Marx's writings on the commodity
> fetish are precisely a problem of perspective taking - the individual
> participants no longer see that there are others who are full and rich
> individuals like themselves; instead, other people become tools for
> accomplishing MY aims. And it is this that communism is supposed to
> reconcile - bringing all people into a deep appreciation of not just our
> deep dependence upon one another, but also of our universal kinship, i.e.
> our "mutuality of being" as Rupert Stasch has so eloquently put it.
> Mutuality of being requires an understanding that other people are "just
> like us".
> Isn't that perspective taking?
> 
> But I have no clue how or in what linguistic forms this would have 
> made its
> way from Hegel's and Marx's German to Vygotsky's Russian (if at all...).
> -greg
> p.s. psychological anthropologist Doug Hollan has been seriously looking
> into "empathy" along with fellow psyc anth scholar C. Jason Throop. 
> One of
> Doug's pieces is listed in the email that just I'll forward in just a
> minute to XMCA.
> 
> 
> Full text of paras 179-184 from Phenomenology of Spirit:
> 
> Φ <
> 179 <
> . Self-consciousness has before it another self-consciousness; it has 
> come
> outside itself. This has a double significance. First it has lost its 
> own
> self, since it finds itself as an *other* being; secondly, it has thereby
> sublated that other, for it does not regard the other as essentially real,
> but sees its own self in the other.
> 
> Φ <
> 180 <
> . It must cancel this its other. To do so is the sublation of that first
> double meaning, and is therefore a second double meaning. First, it must
> set itself to sublate the other independent being, in order thereby to
> become certain of itself as true being, secondly, it thereupon 
> proceeds to
> sublate its own self, for this other is itself.
> 
> Φ <
> 181 <
> . This sublation in a double sense of its otherness in a double sense 
> is at
> the same time a return in a double sense into its self. For, firstly,
> through sublation, it gets back itself, because it becomes one with itself
> again through the cancelling of *its *otherness; but secondly, it likewise
> gives otherness back again to the other self-consciousness, for it was
> aware of being in the other, it cancels this its own being in the 
> other and
> thus lets the other again go free.
> 
> Φ <
> 182 <
> . This process of self-consciousness in relation to another
> self-consciousness has in this manner been represented as the action 
> of one
> alone. But this action on the part of the one has itself the double
> significance of being at once its own action and the action of that other
> as well. For the other is likewise independent, shut up within itself, 
> and
> there is nothing in it which is not there through itself. The first does
> not have the object before it only in the passive form characteristic
> primarily of the object of desire, but as an object existing independently
> for itself, over which therefore it has no power to do anything for 
> its own
> behalf, if that object does not *per se *do what the first does to it. 
> The
> process then is absolutely the double process of both self-consciousnesses.
> Each sees the other do the same as itself; each itself does what it demands
> on the part of the other, and for that reason does what it does, only 
> so
> far as the other does the same. Action from one side only would be useless,
> because what is to happen can only be brought about by means of both.
> 
> Φ <
> 183 <
> . The action has then a *double entente* not only in the sense that it 
> is
> an act done to itself as well as to the other, but also in the sense that
> the act *simpliciter* is the act of the one as well as of the other
> regardless of their distinction.
> 
> Φ <
> 184 <
> . In this movement we see the process repeated which came before us as 
> the
> play of forces; in the present case, however, it is found in consciousness.
> What in the former had effect only for us [contemplating experience], 
> holds
> here for the terms themselves. The middle term is self-consciousness which
> breaks itself up into the extremes; and each extreme is this 
> interchange of
> its own determinateness, and complete transition into the opposite. While
> *qua* consciousness, it no doubt comes outside itself, still, in being
> outside itself, it is at the same time restrained within itself, it exists
> for itself, and its self-externalization is for consciousness.
> *Consciousness *finds that it immediately is and is not another
> consciousness, as also that this other is for itself only when it cancels
> itself as existing for itself , and has self-existence only in the
> self-existence of the other. Each is the mediating term to the other,
> through which each mediates and unites itself with itself; and each is 
> to
> itself and to the other an immediate self-existing reality, which, at 
> the
> same time, exists thus for itself only through this mediation. They
> recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another.
> 
> 
> On Sat, Nov 30, 2013 at 10:08 AM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> > Hi Larry-- You are almost certainly way ahead of me on these issues. 
> My
> > interest at present is on the development of social and relational
> > perspective taking. From, say, a Vygotskian, or Bakhtinian point of 
> view
> > (perspective!) what are the socio-cultural contributions to interpersonal
> > understanding that we associated with psychological perspective taking,
> > perhaps just the ability to "stand in someone else's shoes"? Empathy 
> has to
> > be one potential contributor, and...... (in the Russian traditionS 
> we often
> > discuss)?
> >
> > Perhaps just a really dumb question. Wouldn't be the first time!!
> > mike
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On Sat, Nov 30, 2013 at 6:37 AM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> 
> wrote:
> >
> > > Mike,
> > > I am wondering if you could expand on your question that is 
> referring to
> > > perspective taking and its possible meanings. I believe this 
> question of
> > > perspective taking is also converging with your other question on 
> *kinds*
> > > or *types* of persons. [personhood like childhood]
> > >
> > > I am asking for more clarity on your *bad question* which seems to 
> be
> > > central to the multiple discourses on *sociocultural* theory and practice
> > > This *space* or *zone* of  questioning which opens up a clearing 
> for the
> > > multiple notions of the concept *intersubjectivity* and its convergence
> > > with the concept of *perspective-taking* and how this topic is explored
> > in
> > > Russian translation is a topic I want to explore further.
> > >
> > > I wanted to offer a quote which I found interesting exploring 
> notions of
> > > *identity* AS KINDS [categories]
> > >
> > > Oakeshott argues that "This distinction, then, between 'goings-on'
> > > identified as themselves
> > >
> > > exhibitions of intelligence and 'goings-on' which may be made
> > intelligible
> > > but are not themselves
> > >
> > > intelligent, is not a distinction between mental and physical or between
> > > minds and bodies regarded
> > >
> > > as entities. It is a distinction within the engagement of understanding,
> > a
> > > distinction between
> > >
> > > 'sciences' (that is, ideal characters) and the identities with 
> which they
> > > are concerned. And in
> > >
> > > calling it a categorial distinction what is being asserted is that 
> the
> > > understanding of identities
> > >
> > > recognized as themselves exhibitions of intelligence cannot be 'reduced'
> > > to the understanding of
> > >
> > > identities no so recognized", *On Human Conduct*, pp. 14-15.
> > >
> > >
> > > I was intrigued by Oakeshott's understanding of *sciences* 
> [multiple] AS
> > > RESPRESENTING IDEAL KINDS [categorical distinctions]. This realm 
> of KINDS
> > > AS perspective taking moves the question of intersubjectivity to converge
> > > with *culture* and *history*.
> > >
> > > I will pause, but this topic is endlessly fascinating.
> > >
> > > Larry Purss
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > On Fri, Nov 29, 2013 at 10:21 AM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
> > >
> > >> Dear Russian experts on XMCA
> > >>
> > >> I have been reading about the development of intersubjectivity and
> > >> perspective taking, including an article by scholars who say they 
> are
> > >> working in the "sociocultural perspective." It got me to 
> wondering how
> > >> Russian scholars discuss these topics. No Russians are cited in the
> > work I
> > >> am reading, but Mead and
> > >> Piaget.
> > >>
> > >> When looking at suggested translations into Russian from English 
> for
> > these
> > >> terms, the cognate
> > >> perspectiv seems to appear almost everywhere. The phrase for 
> "point of
> > >> view" is literally that,
> > >> tochka-point  zreniya-seeing, genetive case.
> > >>
> > >> I figure I am blind to something obvious here, but darned if I 
> know what
> > >> it
> > >> is. Any help out there??
> > >> mike
> > >>
> > >> P
> > >> S-- Eugene wrote an interesting article in MCA a while back on
> > >> intersubjectivity and there are Vygotsky
> > >> refs but they do not seem to go to the question I am asking. 
> Perhaps its
> > >> just my bad question!
> > >>
> > >
> > >
> >
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> Visiting Assistant Professor
> Department of Anthropology
> 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> Brigham Young University
> Provo, UT 84602
> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson