Re: [xmca] Double Stimulation?

[Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>]

Typo
Monastic should be monistic [moving to more universal levels of abstraction
before returning to the concrete]

In contrast the notion of poly/multi implies experiences and being
possessed [being moved] as interpreted not at  the most universal level,
but are more pragmatically useful as poly semantic meanings
larry


On Thu, Jun 6, 2013 at 6:06 AM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:

> Greg,
> Your phrase
> *which in a sense chooses them*
>
> This *qualia* or process of  *being chosen* is an interpreted as a *type*
> or *kind* of mediation.
> Now this seems to be an expansion of the concept *mediation* to explain
> the *forces* or energies which *possess* not just *I* but *possess US*.
> I would like to put this into context with Jussi's paper where he
> articulated three *types* or *kinds* of mediation [tools, signs, and social
> interaction]
>
> Greg, my question, generated by reading jussi and your reflections on
> *mediation* is to ask what all these multiple or poly versions of the
> expanded concept of *mediation* have in *general* which can be abstracted
> theoretically?
> Or is it more useful and practical to stay at the level of *experience*
> where mediation is poly or multiple and not monastic?
> For example [examples as poly or multi] 1] picking up or putting down a
> tool [instrumental]  2] signs as socio-genetic meaning INTERPRETATION, 3]
> social interaction which is showing and gesture and may not express verbal
> interaction but is communication, and 4]becoming chosen by some force or
> energy or process existing as qualia?
>
> Greg, can all these multiple and poly examples be sharing a common
> qualia?  The qualia of being possessed by some ??? that is not-self?
> The experiments with deaf, blind, and mute children used a unit of
> analysis of *self-care* which included being possessed by some qualia of
> not-self. In this PARTICULAR instance I read *mediation* as fundamentally
> *social interaction* which emphasizes showing and demonstration that is
> being possessed by some qualia of not-self which is *other* or *alterity*.
>
> This brings in your question of culture as analogy or metaphor or the
> pivot and hinge BETWEEN identity and not-identity [what is other than
> identity]
>
> I apologize for my stream of consciousness or possibly chaining. The
> central question of monistic or poly/multi interpretations [including
> questions of mediation or medial BETWEENESS as qualia or possession] moves
> into the realm of *medial voice* which is neither active or passive,
> neither doer or done to, but moving into the concept of play as archetypal
> possession which posits a medial *space* of possession.
>
>
> I will pause, but your question of *agency* [that which *acts*] circling
> and turning around notions of voluntary *free acts* in a *positivist*
> version of self as contained identity, and the tension with notions of
> mediation as possession [a qualia of being participants in play] is the way
> I *read* and *interpreted* your reflections [a double movement] of the
> topic of agency as the qualia of being moved [e-motion] AS an emergent
> mediational qualia.
>
> Christine, I interpret your questions to this chat community as asking
> similar questions.
>
> Larry
>
>
>
> On Wed, Jun 5, 2013 at 8:49 PM, Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>wrote:
>
>> Antti and Achilles,
>> Thanks for this. I have a pretty poor understanding of "double
>> stimulation", so your suggestions are very helpful.
>>
>> I think I'm seeing the difference between the Strathern quote and double
>> stimulation. Let me see if I can push my point a bit further because what
>> I
>> am trying to understand is close to Eric's question about unit of
>> analysis.
>> Here I am thinking in terms of individual vs. group level mediation.
>>
>> Achilles, as you describe it, it seems like double stimulation is
>> primarily
>> concerned with individual agency. In the description you give (and perhaps
>> Engestrom as well?), mediation happens between a stimulus and a response
>> and puts distance (X) between the stimulus and the response such that the
>> individual can act in an agentic fashion. This is agency at the level of
>> the individual.
>>
>> So what I'm wondering is if it makes any sense to think about double
>> stimulation (and agency) at the level of the group.
>>
>> As an example, I recently came across work done by Aihwa Ong with factory
>> workers in Malaysia. She describes how when factory workers were faced
>> with
>> a sort of dilemma of being over-worked or quitting their jobs, they would
>> become possessed by spirits and thus unable to work. Here is a mediator at
>> the level of culture that appears to be doing important work of solving a
>> dilemma (like Buridan's ass, only here the workers are faced with two bad
>> choices and they come up with a third and better choice which, in a sense,
>> chooses them). [And lets just assume that these factory workers aren't
>> "just pretending" but are really experiencing being possessed]. Does that
>> count as double stimulation? or is the concept more circumscribed (and
>> individualistic) than this?
>>
>> My question is getting at where we locate "agency". In individuals alone?
>> Or as possibly being distributed among multiple people and perhaps in a
>> manner that isn't recognizable to the individual. But maybe there is a
>> concept for that that is different from "double stimulation."
>>
>> Anyway, thanks again for these thoughtful and detailed responses. I do
>> appreciate you bearing with my limited understanding of these matters...
>>
>> Very best,
>> greg
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Jun 5, 2013 at 6:03 AM, Achilles Delari Junior <
>> achilles_delari@hotmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> > Sure, Greg,
>> > Well, seems to me that "draw analogies between different domains of
>> their
>> > worlds" is closer to "meaning construction" than to choice a "stimulus
>> > medium" to help memory tasks, for instance. The "double stimulation" is
>> > fine because introduces a kind of mediation between a stimulus and our
>> > response to the stimulus. But, following Vygotsky's formulations at that
>> > time this new series of "stimulus" (a nude, a word, etc) act also as a
>> > stimulus, a conditioned one. If you change you paradigm to the
>> proposition
>> > that all sign implies any kind of "generalization process" (meaning)
>> that
>> > differs in their structure and has a genetic construction (see the
>> studies
>> > about concepts, for instance), a sign could not be only a second series
>> of
>> > stimuli ruled by the same laws that a conditional reflex... As in
>> > "Instrumental method": S-------X-------R. Where the relation
>> S---------R is
>> > a direct stimulus response relationship, but when you introduce a second
>> > series of stimulus "X" (double stimulation) you have an indirect
>> stimulus
>> > response relationship, but the relation between S and X, and X and R
>> remain
>> > a conditioned reflex relationship... "Draw analogies between different
>> > domains of our worlds" seem to mean that we are in transit between
>> > different words of signification, and culture is a human production that
>> > involves the "generalization" from a world to another, broader, maybe
>> not
>> > exactly more precise, but "broader", in my opinion. I don't know...
>> >
>> >
>> > "In natural memory a direct associative (conditional reflex) connection
>> > A→B is established between two stimuli A and B. In artificial,
>> mnemotechnic
>> > memory of the same impression, by means of a psychological tool X (a
>> knot
>> > in a handkerchief, a mnemonic scheme) instead of the direct connection
>> A→B
>> > two new ones are established: A→X and X→B Just like the connection A→B
>> each
>> > of them is a natural conditional reflex process, determined, by the
>> > properties of the brain tissue. What is new, artificial, and
>> instrumental
>> > is the fact of the replacement of one connection A→B by two connections:
>> > A→X and X→B They lead to the same result, but by a different path. What
>> is
>> > new is the artificial direction which the instrument gives to the
>> natural
>> > process of establishing a conditional connection, i.e., the active
>> > utilization of the natural properties of brain tissue." Vygotsky "The
>> > Instumental Method" (this is 1930)
>> > http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1930/instrumental.htm
>> >
>> > But already in 1928:
>> >
>> > "Let us now compare the natural and cultural mnemonics of a child. The
>> > relation between the two forms can be graphically expressed by means of
>> a
>> > triangle: in case of natural memorization a direct associative or
>> > conditional reflexive connection is set up between two points, A and B.
>> In
>> > case of mnemotechnical memorization, utilizing some sign, instead of one
>> > associative connection AB, the others are set up AX and BX, which bring
>> us
>> > to the same result, but in a roundabout way. Each of these connections
>> AX
>> > and BX is the same kind of conditional-reflexive process of connection
>> as
>> > AB." Vygotsky (1928)
>> >
>> http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1929/cultural_development.htm
>> >
>> >
>> > See: "AX and BX is the same kind of conditional-reflexive process of
>> > connection as AB." --> The same kind... This paradigm will not be the
>> same
>> > in 1933-34...
>> >
>> > "(Introduction: the importance of the sign; its social meaning). In
>> older
>> > works we ignored that the sign has meaning. < But there is “a time to
>> cast
>> > away stones, and a time to gather stones together” (Ecclesiastes). > We
>> > proceeded from the principle of the constancy of meaning, we discounted
>> > meaning. But the problem of meaning was already present in the older
>> > investigations. Whereas before our task was to demonstrate what “the
>> knot”
>> > and logical memory have in common, now our task is to demonstrate the
>> > difference that exists between them.From our works it follows that the
>> sign
>> > changes the interfunctional relationships." (Vygotsky, 1933-34)
>> >
>> http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1934/problem-consciousness.htm
>> >
>> >
>> > And now?
>> >
>> >
>> > Thank you.
>> >
>> > Achilles.
>> >
>> > > Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2013 18:31:23 -0600
>> > > Subject: Re: [xmca] Double Stimulation?
>> > > From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com
>> > > To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>> > >
>> > > Achilles,
>> > >
>> > > Sounded interesting, but I'm not sure I followed you completely. You
>> say
>> > > that Strathern's quote seems like it has a broader application that
>> > "double
>> > > stimulation", but I could use some help with the rest of your message.
>> > >
>> > > If you have a few minutes, maybe you could try rephrasing?
>> > >
>> > > -greg
>> > >
>> > >
>> > > On Tue, Jun 4, 2013 at 4:11 PM, Achilles Delari Junior <
>> > > achilles_delari@hotmail.com> wrote:
>> > >
>> > > > In my undertanding, this is very broader and more powerful than
>> double
>> > > > stimulation... Double stimulation could be overcoming with another
>> way
>> > for
>> > > > think signs than "medium stimulus" - See "The problem of
>> consciousness"
>> > > > (1933-34), for instance. The more important will be not the
>> similarity
>> > > > between a nude and a word, but their difference, "before was
>> forgotten
>> > that
>> > > > sign had a meaning" and "now" the meaning must be take in account.
>> > Double
>> > > > stimulation, in my understanding, do not resists to this new point
>> of
>> > view.
>> > > >
>> > > > Achilles.
>> > > >
>> > > > > Date: Mon, 3 Jun 2013 06:19:04 -0600
>> > > > > From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com
>> > > > > To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu; lchcmike@gmail.com;
>> > antti.rajala@helsinki.fi
>> > > > > CC:
>> > > > > Subject: [xmca] Double Stimulation?
>> > > > >
>> > > > > I wonder if this quote by Marilyn Strathern can be productively
>> > connected
>> > > > > (not necessarily geneaologically, but ideologically) to the
>> notion of
>> > > > > "double stimulation" (which I am just now trying to figure out):
>> > > > > "Culture consists in the way people draw analogies between
>> different
>> > > > > domains of their worlds" (1992: 47).
>> > > > >
>> > > > > -greg
>> > > > >
>> > > > > --
>> > > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
>> > > > > Visiting Assistant Professor
>> > > > > Department of Anthropology
>> > > > > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
>> > > > > Brigham Young University
>> > > > > Provo, UT 84602
>> > > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
>> > > > > __________________________________________
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>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > > --
>> > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
>> > > Visiting Assistant Professor
>> > > Department of Anthropology
>> > > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
>> > > Brigham Young University
>> > > Provo, UT 84602
>> > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
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>>
>>
>> --
>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
>> Visiting Assistant Professor
>> Department of Anthropology
>> 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
>> Brigham Young University
>> Provo, UT 84602
>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
>> __________________________________________
>> _____
>> xmca mailing list
>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
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>
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