RE: [xmca] Living metaphor and conventionalized language

["David H Kirshner" <dkirsh@lsu.edu>]

Martin,
I was referring to the issue of internalization allegedly separating you
and David Ke: namely that he embraces it (in a particular sense
"referring not to a body but as to a nation, a country, a city, a
community, a family...or some particle thereof"), whereas you find it
problematic. 
Partly my question was aimed at understanding your positions better,
partly it was intended as a meta-level probe of our variety of academic
discourse: Do we ever disagree within a common frame, or do apparent
disagreements always turn out to reflect incommensurable framings that
we've adopted for the time being, though we can still see the sense in
oppositional framings.
David


-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
On Behalf Of Martin Packer
Sent: Saturday, August 13, 2011 3:18 PM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] Living metaphor and conventionalized language

David,

Are you asking about 'consciousness' and 'thought'? My reply would be
the standard one: consciousness is the dynamic system of psychological
functions (as well as being our relationship with the world); thinking
is one of those functions.

Was it pointless to ask?  :)

Martin
 
On Aug 12, 2011, at 3:54 PM, David H Kirshner wrote:

> Are these different material processes, or different perspectives on 
> the same process, or is it pointless to ask?
> 
> David
> 
> 
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> On Behalf Of Martin Packer
> Sent: Friday, August 12, 2011 1:08 PM
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: Re: [xmca] Living metaphor and conventionalized language
> 
> Larry, David...
> 
> I don't like the word "internalization" because I can't see that 
> anything internal is involved! As LSV put it:
> 
> "Consciousness does not occur as a specific category, as a specific 
> mode of being. It proves to be a very complex structure of behaviour"
> 
> David Bakhurst describes well the 'radical realism' those guys were
> developing:
> 
> "Thought is conceived not as a barrier or interface between the self 
> and the world beyond the mind, but as the means by which the 
> individual enters into immediate cognitive contact with the material
world.
> Thought, the mode of activity of the socially defined subject, reaches

> right out to reality itself" (1991, p. 261)
> 
> If the "inner" is out there in the "outer," we've got the metaphors 
> wrong, IMHO.
> 
> Martin
> 
> On Aug 11, 2011, at 12:27 AM, David Kellogg wrote:
> 
>> Of course, BOTH "internalization" and "appropriation" are metaphors. 
>> I
> don't flee from the "internalization" metaphor the way that Martin 
> does, partly because I think of it as referring not to a body but as 
> to a nation, a country, a city, a community, a family...or some 
> particle thereof. In this sense (a sense which I suppose is better 
> captured by "interiorization" than by "internalization", just as 
> "reflection" is better captured by "refraction") there is no duality; 
> when you move from one nation to another you do not change worlds, nor

> do you change nations when you move from one city to another.
>> 
> 
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