RE: [xmca] Paradigms, Hyperdigms, Hypodigms

["David H Kirshner" <dkirsh@lsu.edu>]

Tony, Andy, thanks for kind words. 

Andy, there's no book, but there are various versions of a draft
Educational Researcher article I've been working on for a while. I'll
gussy up a recent version and send it to you. The basic shape of the
pedagogical genres has been in place for a couple of years. More
recently, I've been working on the sociology of science aspects, as
discussed in my recent posts, as a way to help me deal with the
deafening indifference or active resistance the approach has provoked in
colleagues. This set of exchanges has been reassuring that perhaps I'm
getting to the point where it can become compelling for Educators and
Psychologists to take a fresh look at their relationship in historical
terms, and better understand the limitations of that relationship for
making learning a usable construct for teachers. 

The central theoretical work of the genres approach is to marshal
perspectives from the various branches of psychology that help us to
understand skills, concepts, and dispositions as separate and distinct
learning accomplishments against the counter momentum of psychology, in
its varied schools, pushing toward an integrated mutual interdependence
of all learning forms. This work is the vital foundation for
articulating genres of teaching that treat each of the three learning
goals as distinct pedagogical enterprises. This is interesting work,
that I think I've made some good progress on; though once I get past the
first hurdle of being heard may provoke a whole new round of calumny
from psychologists.

Andy, I'd be interested to hear more about the project you are working
on that provokes your interest in the interaction between theories of
mind.

David



-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
On Behalf Of Tony Whitson
Sent: Monday, January 17, 2011 9:28 PM
To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] Paradigms, Hyperdigms, Hypodigms

If I may just comment from the side, here:

David has been working on these ideas for almost a decade now. They have

been getting sharper and clearer with each iteration.

On Tue, 18 Jan 2011, Andy Blunden wrote:

> All absolutely fascinating, David HK!
>
> I would like to read more of your project. *Have you written a book*
covering 
> all the material you  have been talking about in this series of
emails? 
> Otherwise, I have a series of further questions I'd like to ask, but
we may 
> be stretching what is possible via email.
>
> Your project is a little different from mine. I am not particularly
oriented 
> to teacher training, and I do aim to enlist people as partners in my
own 
> theoretical landscape, I guess. But I am very much interested in the 
> interaction between theories of mind which inevitably happens because
we 
> inhabit the same real world, even if in academia we inhabit distinct 
> theoretical landscapes. :)
>
> andy
>
> David H Kirshner wrote:
>> Sorry, Andy.
>> 
>> I guess I didn't get what your question was driving at. Yes, this
started 
>> out as an exercise of examining the varying ways
>> learning is construed in the broad range of psychological schools.
After
>> models involving 7, later 5 versions of learning, I ended up with a
>> simplified set of 3 learning metaphors that seemed to me to capture
the
>> basic learning objectives of education: "habituation" of skills,
>> "construction" of concepts, and "enculturation" of dispositions.
>> Coincidently these corresponded well with the trio of learning
>> objectives promulgated by NCATE (an accrediting agency for colleges
of
>> education). In my view, this is the universe of educational
aspirations
>> for student learning. 
>> Part of what I struggled with in your previous clarification of the
>> framing question was your suggestion that once we "have a clear
concept
>> of the class of problems" this is where "the messy competition
between
>> currents of thinking could be presented [to teachers] in a way which
was
>> productive." The genres approach, as I'm developing it, does not seek
to
>> enlist teachers as colleagues in the sociology of science, rather to
>> marshal (selected) perspectives from within specific paradigms that
make
>> coherent the prescribed methods of teaching for that genre. Perhaps
>> there is an analogy to physicists sparing engineers from
controversies
>> in string theory. We in education have not previously had a way to
>> organize psychological knowledge in a way that constitutes a coherent
>> knowledge base for teachers. Our instinct is to make teachers
partners
>> with us in making sense of the theoretical landscapes we inhabit.
>> Thoughts of prescriptive methods for teaching are uncomfortable. But,
in
>> fact, that's how a professional knowledge base should work.
>> 
>> David
>> 
>> 
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
[mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
>> On Behalf Of Andy Blunden
>> Sent: Monday, January 17, 2011 6:34 PM
>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Paradigms, Hyperdigms, Hypodigms
>> 
>> David, I think (sic!) that what you are suggesting is consistent with
what 
>> I was suggesting with my question about framing. You have analysed
the 
>> existing range of genres by claiming that there are exactly 3
concepts of 
>> education, which are each legitimate objectives for a teacher. And
you 
>> make an assessment (presumably) of a theory of psychology according
to 
>> whether it satisfactorily responds to one of these frames. Is that
right?
>> 
>> Andy
>> 
>> David H Kirshner wrote:
>> 
>>> Robert, I'm not sure which David K you intended, but the "Jack of
all
>>> trades" issue is an important one to me. 
>>> There is a way to respond to the multi-paradigmatic status of
learning
>>> theory that might be thought of as eclectic, perhaps also as
>>> pluralistic. Educational Psychologists--those who teach Educational
>>> Psychology courses, rather than psychologists whose work is applied
to
>>> education--often take a tool-box approach to applying psychology to
>>> teaching: figure out what kind of problem you're facing, look around
>>> 
>> in
>> 
>>> your psychology tool box, and in the spirit of bricolage select some
>>> appropriate theories you can figure out how to apply. Perhaps this
is
>>> the conception of a Jack of all trades that David Kellogg warned
>>> against. 
>>> The genres approach, as I am framing it, is not like that at all. A
>>> genre of teaching is a sculpted teaching methodology, informed by
>>> learning theory, and intended to support learning in one of 3
distinct
>>> senses: habituation of skills; construction of concepts; or
>>> enculturation of dispositions. The whole package of genres is
proposed
>>> as a professional knowledge base for teaching in relation to the
>>> teacher's responsibility to support learning (there are other
>>> responsibilities, requiring other resources). In this sense, the
>>> 
>> teacher
>> 
>>> is expected to understand and be competent in a variety of
pedagogies,
>>> but in quite well-defined and exact senses--I think this is not in
the
>>> spirit of the Jack of all trades.
>>> 
>>> David 
>>> 
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
[mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
>>> On Behalf Of Robert Lake
>>> Sent: Monday, January 17, 2011 8:21 AM
>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Paradigms, Hyperdigms, Hypodigms
>>> 
>>> Happy MLK day to David K. and Everyone!
>>> 
>>> Does pluralism equate with a reduction to the lowest common
>>> 
>> denominator
>> 
>>> or
>>> does it mean  an interdependent yet distinct set of approaches that
>>> welcomes
>>> difference without expecting each practitioner to be a "jack of all
>>> trades"?
>>> 
>>> RL
>>> On Sun, Jan 16, 2011 at 10:08 PM, David Kellogg
>>> <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com>wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> I'm with him; with the other David K. The generic approach really
>>>> 
>>> demands
>>> 
>>>> too much Jack-of-all-tradesmanship of the teacher, and the Jack of
>>>> 
>> all
>> 
>>>> trades, while very useful in pioneer times, is ultimately a master
of
>>>> 
>>> none.
>>> 
>>>> Yes, in Chapter ONE of T&S Vygotsky is defining the problem and the
>>>> approach. But even there he doesn't exactly want to let a hundred
>>>> 
>>> flowers
>>> 
>>>> blossom and a hundred schools of thought content. The problem he
>>>> 
>>> addresses
>>> 
>>>> is quite specific, and within this problem there is really only
>>>> 
>>> legitimate
>>> 
>>>> method, and it's not the tried and true method of analysis into
>>>> 
>>> elements
>>> 
>>>> that forms the basis of the extant genre.
>>>> 
>>>> In Chapter TWO Vygotsky is even less eclectic, if possible. He
BEGINS
>>>> 
>>> by
>>> 
>>>> saying that Piaget (actually Claparede) associates himself with
>>>> 
>> Freud,
>> 
>>>> Blondel, and Levy-Bruhl as a great pioneer of an entirely new
field.
>>>> 
>>> But
>>> 
>>>> then he says that this is not at all an enviable position: Freud,
>>>> 
>>> Blondel,
>>> 
>>>> and Levy-Bruhl created their psychologies from problem to paradigm,
>>>> 
>>> and this
>>> 
>>>> is exactly what is wrong with them, and why their psychologies
>>>> 
>>> inevitably
>>> 
>>>> end up with that peculiarly metaphysical smell imparted by an
>>>> 
>>> overambitious
>>> 
>>>> bottom-upmanship. (It's a familiar problem for painters: when you
>>>> 
>>> frame the
>>> 
>>>> painting according to the subject you end up making your picture
too
>>>> 
>>> small,
>>> 
>>>> but when you want to include enough background to make sense of it,
>>>> 
>>> you
>>> 
>>>> always end up making your picture too big.)
>>>> 
>>>> When LSV talks about "general" psychology and the necessity to
>>>> 
>> "unify"
>> 
>>>> psychology, he's not just making the point that individual
psychology
>>>> 
>>> has to
>>> 
>>>> be seen, contra Wundt, as an instantiation of social psychology.
He's
>>>> 
>>> also
>>> 
>>>> calling for what in applied linguistics has come to be called
"theory
>>>> culling", the falsification and the destruction of some entirely
>>>> 
>> wrong
>> 
>>>> paradigms (e.g. Bergson, elan vital, Mach, Freud, Levy-Bruhl,
>>>> 
>> Blondel,
>> 
>>>> 
>>> and
>>> 
>>>> Piaget too.).
>>>> 
>>>> I think he would say that "general psychology", in which he would
>>>> 
>>> include
>>> 
>>>> sociology (see Chapter Four) and semiology, must become the
>>>> 
>> hyperdigm.
>> 
>>>> 
>>> What
>>> 
>>>> we now call psychology is really what he calls "individual
>>>> 
>>> psychology", and
>>> 
>>>> that is the paradigm. Education would be a hypodigm of psychology
>>>> 
>>> dealing
>>> 
>>>> with teaching/learning and microgenetic change.
>>>> 
>>>> One way to look at this is to think of the subordination of
paradigms
>>>> 
>>> to
>>> 
>>>> hyperdigms and their superordination to hypodigms in terms of the
>>>> 
>> TIME
>> 
>>>> variable. Social psychology, the hyperdigm, is really the study of
>>>> sociogenesis, the functional differentiation of societies and their
>>>> resultant structure, just as biology is the study of biogenesis,
the
>>>> evolutionary differentiation of species, and the resulting
>>>> 
>> structures.
>> 
>>>> Individual psychology, for Vygotsky, is the study of ontogenesis,
>>>> functional differentiation between and within individuals, and the
>>>> psychological structures that come out of this, and of course the
>>>> hypodigm, education, is the study of microgenesis. That's OUR cue;
>>>> it's where we (teachers) come in!
>>>> 
>>>> David Kellogg
>>>> Seoul National University of Education
>>>> 
>>>> --- On Sun, 1/16/11, David H Kirshner <dkirsh@lsu.edu> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> From: David H Kirshner <dkirsh@lsu.edu>
>>>> Subject: RE: [xmca] Brains, Computer, and the Future of Education
>>>> To: ablunden@mira.net, "eXtended Mind, Culture,Activity" <
>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>>> Date: Sunday, January 16, 2011, 10:43 AM
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Andy,
>>>> 
>>>> The question of whether you, Vygotsky, I, or anyone else thinks
>>>> 
>>> multiple
>>> 
>>>> paradigms are a good idea needs to be separated from the question
of
>>>> whether psychology is preparadigmatic in the sense of questing
toward
>>>> paradigmatic consensus. Kuhn's sociology of science analysis does
not
>>>> imply that every, or indeed any, particular scientist interprets
>>>> 
>> their
>> 
>>>> work in terms of this sociological imperative. But in the case of
>>>> psychology, we can see certain historical processes that are not
easy
>>>> 
>>> to
>>> 
>>>> account for otherwise. I'm thinking, particularly, of the dynamic
of
>>>> paradigmatic ambitions presented as solid (or immanent)
>>>> 
>>> accomplishments,
>>> 
>>>> only to be beaten back by proponents of other schools. Think for
>>>> Skinner's (1958) attempt to extend behavioral psychology from
>>>> 
>>> unmediated
>>> 
>>>> response conditioning to verbal behavior beaten back by Chomsky's
>>>> 
>>> (1959)
>>> 
>>>> famous book review, or the counterattack of Anderson, Reder, and
>>>> 
>> Simon
>> 
>>>> (1996) in the face of defections by notable cognitivists like
Brown,
>>>> Collins, and Duguid (1989), Greeno (1993), Hirst and Manier (1995)
>>>> dissatisfied with cognitivist attempts to account for the problem
of
>>>> "context." I argue this kind of discourse is not characteristic of
>>>> paradigmatic science, but instead supports the thesis that
psychology
>>>> 
>>> is
>>> 
>>>> preparadigmatic.
>>>> 
>>>> If, as you suggest, multiple paradigms--not competing, but
>>>> 
>> co-existing
>> 
>>>> peacefully--is a happy steady-state for psychology, then we'd
expect
>>>> 
>> a
>> 
>>>> genres approach for education to have arisen long ago as an
>>>> 
>>> alternative
>>> 
>>>> to saddling educational practitioners with the need to grapple with
>>>> dialectical syntheses across paradigms. On the other hand, if
>>>> preparadigmatic psychology is ever questing toward paradigmatic
>>>> consensus, then expect psychologists to resist a genres approach
>>>> 
>>> through
>>> 
>>>> many different sorts of explanations, including, possibly, denying
>>>> 
>> the
>> 
>>>> preparadigmatic status of their science.
>>>> 
>>>> David
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>> 
>> [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
>> 
>>>> On Behalf Of Andy Blunden
>>>> Sent: Sunday, January 16, 2011 7:12 AM
>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture,Activity
>>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Brains, Computer, and the Future of Education
>>>> 
>>>> I certainly don't see the problematic you pose, David, as
indicating
>>>> 
>> a
>> 
>>>> need for us to "grow up" and actually I find "genre" as you present
>>>> 
>>> it,
>>> 
>>>> a very fruitful way of characterising the problem. Shortly before
>>>> 
>> your
>> 
>>>> earlier message arrived I had been reading LSV's "Thinking and
>>>> 
>>> Speech,"
>>> 
>>>> Chapter 1. I can't for the life of me find a suitable succinct
quote,
>>>> but as I recall it, he was saying that Psychology was, as you say,
>>>> 
>> not
>> 
>>>> yet able to form a unified theory, and that (something like) every
>>>> 
>> new
>> 
>>>> observation or problem launched a new theory. Now, I don't read
>>>> 
>>> Vygotsky
>>> 
>>>> as attempting to create a master theory. On the contrary he argues
>>>> against this, as I see it. His piece about the "unit" in that
chapter
>>>> says that we have to form a concept of the class of phenomena or
>>>> *problem* that we want to solve and unfold a theory from there, as
>>>> opposed to subordinating that definite class of problem to a more
>>>> general one which lacks the special characteristics of the special
>>>> probem we want to solve.Confusion has arisen I think from trying to
>>>> 
>>> read
>>> 
>>>> LSV's theory of the relation of thinking and speaking as a grand
>>>> 
>>> theory
>>> 
>>>> of consciousness.
>>>> 
>>>> So it seems to me that in any very general field of phenomena
>>>> 
>> multiple
>> 
>>>> genre are quite OK, fruitful and just as useful as they are in
>>>> 
>>> everyday
>>> 
>>>> life. (Imagine trying to get by in everyday life with one genre!)
>>>> 
>> Only
>> 
>>>> each "genre" needs to have a clear concept of the class of problems
>>>> 
>>> that
>>> 
>>>> it covers. That's why I raise the question of stepping back one
step
>>>> from a genre and ask: how does this genre frame the phenomena, as a
>>>> problem, as a unit or concept of its subject matter.
>>>> 
>>>> I think if we do that the messy competition between currents of
>>>> 
>>> thinking
>>> 
>>>> could be presented in a way which was productive.
>>>> 
>>>> What do you think?
>>>> Andy
>>>> 
>>>> David H Kirshner wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>> Larry and Andy,
>>>>> 
>>>>> Thanks for kind words.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Andy, I don't have the philosophical background to be able to
>>>>> 
>>> address
>>> 
>>>>> your question as formulated. But I read the intent of the question
>>>>> 
>>> as
>>> 
>>>>> probing the utility of the paradigm construct, and hence the
genres
>>>>> solution: If all differences of opinion are ultimately paradigm
>>>>> differences, then shouldn't we just grow up, accept differences in
>>>>> framing as inevitable, and get on with debating issues and acting
on
>>>>> 
>>>> the
>>>> 
>>>>> basis of our best judgment following from the debate? Why should
we
>>>>> regard differences of opinion that emerge in psychological
framings
>>>>> 
>>> of
>>> 
>>>>> learning as different from other disagreements, and requiring its
>>>>> 
>>> own
>>> 
>>>>> new kind of solution, namely a "genres" solution?
>>>>> 
>>>>> Let me address that concern directly. Take as a major instance the
>>>>> difference between sociogenetic and ontogenetic (i.e.,
>>>>> 
>>> individualist)
>>> 
>>>>> approaches to learning. These approaches construe the world of
>>>>> 
>>>> learning
>>>> 
>>>>> in very different terms, each highlighting certain questions as
>>>>> 
>>>> crucial,
>>>> 
>>>>> while other questions are incidental. Not coincidently, each can
>>>>> 
>>>> answer
>>>> 
>>>>> certain questions, to wit the ones it considers important, much
more
>>>>> effectively than the other questions.
>>>>> 
>>>>> We have the following usual choices: Adopt one perspective based
on
>>>>> 
>>>> the
>>>> 
>>>>> promise that it (eventually) will be able to answer the full set
of
>>>>> questions adequately; or construct a new theory as a dialectical
>>>>> synthesis of the original two. (I think socioculturalists straddle
>>>>> 
>>> the
>>> 
>>>>> two choices by sometimes claiming they are sociogenetic and other
>>>>> 
>>>> times
>>>> 
>>>>> that they are inherently dialectic.)
>>>>> 
>>>>> In the behaviorist era and subsequently the cognitive area, the
>>>>> 
>>> first
>>> 
>>>>> choice was more appealing. The desire to be "scientific" (i.e.,
>>>>> uni-paradigmatic), in conjunction with shameless hawking by
>>>>> 
>>>> proponents,
>>>> 
>>>>> gave those approaches some time to adequately address the concerns
>>>>> 
>>> of
>>> 
>>>>> the other school. As neither succeeded in unifying the field, in
>>>>> 
>>> this
>>> 
>>>>> post-cognitive era, we opt more for dialectical approaches.
>>>>> 
>>>>> The problem is that these dialectical alternatives, rather like
the
>>>>> particle/wave dialectic of quantum physics, don't really help us
>>>>> 
>>> make
>>> 
>>>>> sense of the world in a way that is actionable. Our intuitions
about
>>>>> learning are not able to encompass both sides of the dialectic in
>>>>> 
>>> such
>>> 
>>>> a
>>>> 
>>>>> way as to constitute a synthesis. As a result, a dialectic
approach
>>>>> 
>>>> puts
>>>> 
>>>>> on the table the diverse and discordant pieces that somehow have
to
>>>>> 
>>> be
>>> 
>>>>> coordinated. Paul Cobb (1994) addressed this problem of
>>>>> 
>>> constructivist
>>> 
>>>>> and sociocultural approaches in a widely read ER piece
recommending
>>>>> precisely that: a coordination of perspectives.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Well, obviously a coordination of perspectives is exactly what is
>>>>> needed. The issue at hand is who does the coordinating? In Cobb's
>>>>> approach--as in all other academic approaches that have been
>>>>> 
>>>> offered--it
>>>> 
>>>>> is the researcher's challenge to figure out the coordination. In
>>>>> 
>>> this
>>> 
>>>>> way, the work of coordination can take place in the academy in
>>>>> 
>>> concert
>>> 
>>>>> with efforts to forge a dialectical synthesis that eventually
could
>>>>> serve to unify the science of learning under a single
theorization.
>>>>> 
>>>> This
>>>> 
>>>>> is why a genres approach is so disruptive. A genres approach says,
>>>>> instead, let's focus within each paradigm on figuring out what
that
>>>>> framing has to offer teaching. Then leave it to teachers, to the
>>>>> 
>>> world
>>> 
>>>>> of professional practice, to figure out how (or if) to coordinate.
>>>>> 
>>>>> For the researcher, this genres approach is a disaster. It
>>>>> 
>>> constructs
>>> 
>>>>> what is most important for researchers--an eventual dialectical
>>>>> synthesis that unites the field--as irrelevant to the world of
>>>>> 
>>>> practice.
>>>> 
>>>>> Our theoretical musing no longer are projected into the world of
>>>>> educational practice as relevant, they become just our private
>>>>> 
>>>> concern,
>>>> 
>>>>> with possible long-term payoff for the world, but no immediate
>>>>> relevance. For teachers, the genres approach finally provides for
>>>>> emancipation from the intellectual tyranny of theory. Because the
>>>>> individual paradigms are grounded in accessible metaphors for
>>>>> 
>>>> learning,
>>>> 
>>>>> it becomes possible to articulate pedagogical principles in ways
>>>>> 
>>> that
>>> 
>>>>> are coherently available to teachers. And then it becomes the
>>>>> 
>>> purview
>>> 
>>>> of
>>>> 
>>>>> professional practice to determine how best to coordinate the
genres
>>>>> 
>>>> of
>>>> 
>>>>> teaching.
>>>>> 
>>>>> This is truly a moral dilemma for researchers.
>>>>> 
>>>>> David
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>> 
>>> [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
>>> 
>>>>> On Behalf Of Andy Blunden
>>>>> Sent: Saturday, January 15, 2011 6:51 PM
>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Brains, Computer, and the Future of Education
>>>>> 
>>>>> Thank you David for your truly enlightening post.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Can I ask this question: when two subjects are engaged in a
dialogue
>>>>> over some issue, and are positing the issue in two different
genres,
>>>>> 
>>>> is
>>>> 
>>>>> it true to say that they are explicitly or implicitly asserting
>>>>> different frames. For example, if two parties are arguing over
>>>>> 
>>> whether
>>> 
>>>>> to increase unemployment benefit, they may disagree over the frame
>>>>> 
>>>> being
>>>> 
>>>>> lazy people ripping off the community or disadvantaged people who
>>>>> deserve the support of the community. So isn't there always a
frame
>>>>> around a genre where rational contest is possible? Every
specialism
>>>>> exists within a lingua franca of shared concepts, doesn't it?
>>>>> 
>>>>> Andy
>>>>> 
>>>>> David H Kirshner wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> Larry, Andy, Michael, and Monica.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Sorry for the delay in responding. Let me first address the
>>>>>> 
>>>> technology
>>>> 
>>>>>> tie-in, and then turn to the pedagogical question about how to 
>>>>>> deal
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> with
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> the multi-paradigmatic theorization of learning.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> I'm sympathetic to the perspective that it is "the current
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> technologies
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> being used and developed which transforms our guiding metaphors
>>>>>> 
>>> [for
>>> 
>>>>>> learning] and not the internal debates among scholars." If we
look
>>>>>> 
>>> at
>>> 
>>>>>> the whole ball of wax, psychology certainly does seem a chaotic
>>>>>> 
>>>> tangle
>>>> 
>>>>>> that may well be led by technological happenstance rather than by
>>>>>> intellectual coherence. But the proliferation of new schools and
>>>>>> 
>>> new
>>> 
>>>>>> approaches based on technological developments should not obscure
>>>>>> 
>>> the
>>> 
>>>>>> kinds of processes of development that go within each
paradigmatic
>>>>>> school. Certainly, paradigmatic differences are not settled by
>>>>>> 
>>>> debate.
>>>> 
>>>>>> As Kuhn pointed out, the competitive process is inescapably
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> sociological
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> rather than purely intellectual. What about within a paradigm? As
>>>>>> sociohistorical institutions schools of research persist over
time
>>>>>> because of mutually shared projects that often are experienced as
>>>>>> intellectually coherent. Certainly technological developments can
>>>>>> influence the basic understandings pursued within a school. For
>>>>>> instance, psychologists moved on from the telephone switchboard
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> metaphor
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> of cognitive processing to the serial digital computer metaphor
>>>>>> 
>>> which
>>> 
>>>>>> afforded much more dynamic possibilities for theorization, but 
>>>>>> with
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> much
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> basic conceptual continuity. I don't think it's "wrong" to regard
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> intra
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> paradigmatic development as led by technological developments.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> However,
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> I imagine most of the time, for example in thinking about our own
>>>>>> progress as sociocultural or CHAT researchers, we find it useful 
>>>>>> to
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> view
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> progress in terms of intellectual coherence. In any case, in my
>>>>>> 
>>> work
>>> 
>>>>> in
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> harvesting insights from the diverse branches of psychology for 
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> purpose of framing a multi-paradigmatic pedagogy, I find it
useful
>>>>>> 
>>> to
>>> 
>>>>>> regard the work within paradigms as progressing through rational
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> debate
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> (or at least attempting to).
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> A Multi-paradigmatic Pedagogical Framework:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> How do we advance pedagogical theory taking seriously the
>>>>>> multi-paradigmatic status of learning theory?
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Let me warn that this is a theme I've pursued before on xmca
>>>>>> 
>>> without
>>> 
>>>>>> much uptake--I think for very good reasons. The path leads to
>>>>>> delegitimization of education as a co-participant with psychology
>>>>>> 
>>> in
>>> 
>>>>> the
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> scientific enterprise. Alternatively, it leads to the repudiation
>>>>>> 
>>> by
>>> 
>>>>>> education of psychology's scientific pretensions. Given how
deeply
>>>>>> enmeshed educational and psychological communities are with one
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> another
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> (e.g., xmca) this is not an easy or appealing path for either
>>>>>> 
>>> party.
>>> 
>>>>>> The first step on this path is the hardest to take, though it is
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> simple
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> to articulate. If we accept that learning is diversely conceived
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> across
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> varied paradigms, and we also regard the purpose of teaching as
>>>>>> promoting learning, then there is only one sensible path to take 
>>>>>> if
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> one
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> desires pedagogical theory to be grounded in learning theory: A
>>>>>> 
>>>> genres
>>>> 
>>>>>> approach to pedagogical theorizing, with each genre of teaching
>>>>>> addressing learning in a particular paradigmatic sense. To date,
a
>>>>>> genres approach has not been advanced. However, there are two
>>>>>> alternative approaches that have been attempted, in each case
with
>>>>>> disastrous consequences. One method is to focus on a single
>>>>>> 
>>> paradigm
>>> 
>>>>> and
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> deny the legitimacy of any others (e.g., the behaviorist era in
>>>>>> education). The other is to fashion a holistic vision of "good
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> teaching"
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> that somehow is to address learning in its various 
>>>>>> interpretations.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> This
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> is the current Zeitgeist in educational theorizing, and I'll 
>>>>>> devote
>>>>>> 
>>> a
>>> 
>>>>>> couple of paragraphs, below, to explaining its multifaceted ill
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> effects
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> on education, the most immediate and debilitating of which is
>>>>>> 
>>>> systemic
>>>> 
>>>>>> de-intellectualization of pedagogy. For if teaching practice is
to
>>>>>> 
>>> be
>>> 
>>>>>> understood in terms of learning theory, it can only be in terms
of
>>>>>> 
>>> a
>>> 
>>>>>> single theory at a time, given the multi-paradigmatic character
of
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> this
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> branch of knowledge.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> I have been teaching an Education doctoral course on the genres
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> approach
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> for about 15 years, and I've ALMOST NEVER succeeded in making
this
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> first
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> step comprehensible. So entrenched in our discourse are the ideas
>>>>>> 
>>> of
>>> 
>>>>>> holistic pedagogy--"good teaching" as a set of practices that
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> addresses
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> learning conceived as a complex and multifaceted whole--that the
>>>>>> language of genres just doesn't register for my students.
>>>>>> 
>>> Typically,
>>> 
>>>>>> when I present a framework for teaching for Skills, Concepts, and
>>>>>> Dispositions as distinct genres of teaching, this gets
assimilated
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> into
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> a "learning styles" frame in which the different pedagogical
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> approaches
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> provide different routes to learning conceived as a complex and
>>>>>> multi-faceted whole. Indeed, our discourse typically intermixes
>>>>>> 
>>> these
>>> 
>>>>>> learning goals as we talk of "understanding the skill," 
>>>>>> "practicing
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> the
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> concept," or "inculcating thinking skills." Students almost never
>>>>>> 
>>>> come
>>>> 
>>>>>> to grasp the motive of differentiating, rather than integrating,
>>>>>> 
>>>> these
>>>> 
>>>>>> notions of learning as a comprehensible agenda.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> The cost we pay for maintaining an integrative or holistic
>>>>>> 
>>> discourse
>>> 
>>>>>> about "good teaching" in education is staggeringly high. First,
is
>>>>>> 
>>>> the
>>>> 
>>>>>> impossibility of articulating pedagogical principles, which, as
>>>>>> discussed above would require that learning be conceived locally,
>>>>>> relative to the independently conceived notions of learning.
>>>>>> 
>>> Because
>>> 
>>>>> in
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> the standard discourse "good teaching" is somehow simultaneously 
>>>>>> to
>>>>>> address learning in its many various senses, we end up instead 
>>>>>> with
>>>>>> generalities and platitudes, with intractably dense dialectical
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> analyses
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> attempting to span disparate local theories, and with vignettes
>>>>>> 
>>> that
>>> 
>>>>> are
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> meant to illustrate good teaching, but that don't articulate its
>>>>>> principles. In short, we provide almost no usable intellectual
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> resources
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> that can serve to guide development of teaching practice.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Second is the politicized character of our pedagogical discourse
>>>>>> stemming from the interpenetration of values issues with issues
of
>>>>>> efficacy. Given the varied notions of learning that motivate
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> educators,
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> it is to be expected that values issues will arise as to which
>>>>>> 
>>>> sort(s)
>>>> 
>>>>>> of learning ought to be pursued with students. But since our
>>>>>> 
>>>> discourse
>>>> 
>>>>>> constructs good teaching as a holistic set of practices, there's 
>>>>>> no
>>>>>> discursive space for this variation. One's opponent's
construction
>>>>>> 
>>> of
>>> 
>>>>>> good teaching is not just wrong on values, but also misguided 
>>>>>> about
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> what
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> is effective practice (e.g., the Reading Wars and the Math Wars).

>>>>>> A
>>>>>> discourse framed in genres of teaching would enable values issues
>>>>>> 
>>> to
>>> 
>>>>> be
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> separated from issues of efficacy, thereby protecting the
>>>>>> 
>>>> professional
>>>> 
>>>>>> integrity of the field of teaching practice.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Finally, with so little to offer professional teaching practice,
>>>>>> learning theory is easily subject to being dismissed as 
>>>>>> irrelevant.
>>>>>> 
>>>> If
>>>> 
>>>>>> Teaching is defined in terms of promoting Learning, then learning
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> theory
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> ought to be THE theoretical discourse through which teaching
>>>>>> 
>>> practice
>>> 
>>>>> is
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> articulated. We see our growing irrelevance in the current
>>>>>> 
>>> prominence
>>> 
>>>>> of
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> "brain" perspectives on teaching--which is what started this
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> thread--but
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> also in other cognitive mechanisms approaches like "learning
>>>>>> 
>>> styles"
>>> 
>>>>>> research, as well as in pedagogical framings based on critical
>>>>>> 
>>>> theory,
>>>> 
>>>>>> values theory, philosophical commitments, or metaphysical or
>>>>>> 
>>>> spiritual
>>>> 
>>>>>> bases. In the end what we have is an open-ended pedagogical
>>>>>> 
>>> discourse
>>> 
>>>>> in
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> which each new proposal for "good teaching" can create its own
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> universe
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> of discourse within which it is to be analyzed and evaluated. The
>>>>>> marketplace of pedagogical ideas resembles much more a bazaar
than
>>>>>> 
>>> a
>>> 
>>>>>> professional knowledge base. A genres approach, while featuring a
>>>>>> theoretically heterogeneous set of framings for learning,
>>>>>> 
>>> nonetheless
>>> 
>>>>>> would enable us to capture the essential interests that motivate
>>>>>> 
>>> the
>>> 
>>>>>> pedagogical enterprise within a finite and determinate set of
>>>>>> theoretical approaches.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Genres: Why Not?
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> One excellent reason to dismiss the genres approach is because it
>>>>>> 
>>> is
>>> 
>>>>> so
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> obvious. After all, it is immediately apparent that learning is
>>>>>> diversely conceived in varied psychological paradigms. So
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> theorizations
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> of good teaching that really come to grips with learning theory
>>>>>> 
>>> would
>>> 
>>>>>> need to be constructed locally, relative to a specific notion of
>>>>>> learning. Surely, if a genres approach had any merit it would
have
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> been
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> adopted, or at least explored, a long time ago.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> The alternative is that there are powerful interests arrayed
>>>>>> 
>>> against
>>> 
>>>>>> recognizing and dealing with the preparadigmatic status of
>>>>>> 
>>>> psychology.
>>>> 
>>>>> I
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> propose that the genres approach has not previously been advanced
>>>>>> because it is in psychologists' self interest that it not be.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> To understand these interests, we need to delve a bit into how
>>>>>> preparadigmatic science functions. Preparadigmatic science 
>>>>>> consists
>>>>>> 
>>>> of
>>>> 
>>>>>> multiple schools each in competition with the others to the unify
>>>>>> 
>>> the
>>> 
>>>>>> field under its own banner. However, paradigmatic differences are
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> never
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> settled by debate. As Kuhn pointed out, the competitive process
is
>>>>>> inescapably sociological rather than purely intellectual. Viewed
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> through
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> divergent paradigmatic lenses, different aspects of observed
>>>>>> 
>>>> phenomena
>>>> 
>>>>>> become highlighted as problematic. So one paradigm cannot
>>>>>> 
>>> invalidate
>>> 
>>>>> the
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> perspectives of another. Instead, a paradigm succeeds against
>>>>>> 
>>> others
>>> 
>>>>> by
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> addressing the concerns of the other paradigms in ways that are
>>>>>> sufficiently appealing and powerful as to attract established
>>>>>> researchers from other schools, and especially new researchers 
>>>>>> just
>>>>>> entering the field. Like old soldiers, old paradigms never die,
>>>>>> 
>>> they
>>> 
>>>>>> just fade away.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Viewed in this way, we see that psychologists must lead double
>>>>>> 
>>> lives.
>>> 
>>>>>> Within their paradigm, the psychologist's life is similar to that
>>>>>> 
>>> of
>>> 
>>>>>> most other scientists. They are involved in deliberate and
careful
>>>>>> elaboration and extension of the basic perspectives that
initiated
>>>>>> 
>>>> the
>>>> 
>>>>>> school. However, externally, they are hucksters extraordinaire.
>>>>>> 
>>>> Claims
>>>> 
>>>>>> are exaggerated. Hoped for/planned developments are presented as
>>>>>> 
>>>> faits
>>>> 
>>>>>> accomplis. After all, one wins in the broader game by attracting
>>>>>> researchers, especially neophyte researchers, to your school.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> One could castigate psychologists for being duplicitous or
>>>>>> 
>>> dishonest,
>>> 
>>>>>> but I think this freights individual psychology too heavily. What
>>>>>> 
>>> we
>>> 
>>>>>> have is best viewed not as individual misrepresentation, but a
>>>>>> discursive form reflecting the sociological imperative of
>>>>>> preparadigmatic science to achieve paradigmatic consensus. The
>>>>>> 
>>> ironic
>>> 
>>>>>> result is that across the broad diversity of psychology, there is
>>>>>> 
>>>> only
>>>> 
>>>>>> one tenet espoused by learning theorists of every persuasion: a
>>>>>> 
>>>> single
>>>> 
>>>>>> perspective (eventually) encompasses all of the relevant
phenomena
>>>>>> 
>>> of
>>> 
>>>>>> learning. Thus a genres approach to pedagogy, building on
discrete
>>>>>> accomplishments across paradigmatic divisions, would subvert
>>>>>> psychologists' active self-interest in promoting the problem of
>>>>>> paradigmatic division as (imminently) solved.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> But what about educators? If psychologists prefer to deny the
>>>>>> preparadigmatic status of their field, why is it that educators
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> haven't
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> pressed on with a genres approach on their own? Again, a
>>>>>> 
>>> sociological
>>> 
>>>>>> perspective can help, this time explaining the client status of
>>>>>> Education with respect to Psychology. One of the first
>>>>>> 
>>> preoccupations
>>> 
>>>>> of
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> Psychology, dating back to its emergence as a scientific
>>>>>> 
>>> enterprise,
>>> 
>>>>> was
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> investigation of the transfer of training assumptions of faculty
>>>>>> psychology (e.g., Thorndike & Woodworth, 1901). These early 
>>>>>> studies
>>>>>> found the prevailing belief in broad transfer of learning to be
>>>>>> unwarranted. Through preceding centuries, the classical
>>>>>> 
>>>> (Aristotelian)
>>>> 
>>>>>> theory of faculty psychology, and its associated theory of
>>>>>> mental-disciplines, had served as the basis for pedagogical
>>>>>> 
>>> thought.
>>> 
>>>>> So,
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> psychology's attack upon transfer of training effectively 
>>>>>> dislodged
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> the
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> existing foundations for educational practice. As a result,
>>>>>> 
>>> education
>>> 
>>>>>> attached itself to the new science, not as a separate and
>>>>>> 
>>> independent
>>> 
>>>>>> field of inquiry, but as a client discipline, dependent upon
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> psychology
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> for our legitimacy and intellectual authority. In that role, we
>>>>>> 
>>> have
>>> 
>>>>>> tended to see the world as the psychologists do. We have not
>>>>>> 
>>>> construed
>>>> 
>>>>>> psychology independently, as we would need to do to adopt a
genres
>>>>>> approach.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Marshalling Preparadigmatic Psychology for Educational Purposes:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> I'm going to conclude this post with a description of how
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> psychological
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> theory gets appropriated and reworked in genres scholarship.
(This
>>>>>> really is where the psychologists get mad.) I mentioned, above,
>>>>>> 
>>> that
>>> 
>>>>>> "Within their paradigm, the psychologist's life is similar to
that
>>>>>> 
>>> of
>>> 
>>>>>> most other scientists." Similar, but not identical. I want to 
>>>>>> argue
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> that
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> paradigmatic science develops more organically based on insights
>>>>>> 
>>> that
>>> 
>>>>>> bubble up from within the paradigm, in comparison with
>>>>>> 
>>>> preparadigmatic
>>>> 
>>>>>> science that is more teleologically driven by a felt need to
>>>>>> 
>>> address
>>> 
>>>>>> concerns that have emerged in other schools. For instance,
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> cognitivists
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> exploring the computational metaphor might eventually have 
>>>>>> decided,
>>>>>> 
>>>> on
>>>> 
>>>>>> their own, to extend from decontextualized problem solving to
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> encompass
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> social and cultural context. But the need to be positioned as
>>>>>> competitive with sociogenetic approaches like sociocultural
>>>>>> 
>>>> psychology
>>>> 
>>>>>> forced this development earlier. In this respect, we can see a
>>>>>> trajectory of preparadigmatic science that is not quite parallel
>>>>>> 
>>> with
>>> 
>>>>>> paradigmatic science. Preparadigmatic schools tends to evolve
from
>>>>>> simple and powerful, but local, initial insights toward complex 
>>>>>> and
>>>>>> opaque interpretations intended to bridge disparate intuitions. 
>>>>>> And
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> then
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> again, some preparadigmatic schools--e.g., social constructivism
>>>>>> 
>>> and
>>> 
>>>>>> perhaps situated cognition theory, in psychology--initially are
>>>>>> 
>>>> formed
>>>> 
>>>>>> as a synthesis of diverse perspectives precisely in order to be
>>>>>> competitive players in the preparadigmatic game, but without a
>>>>>> 
>>> clear
>>> 
>>>>> and
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> simple local insight. The result is that use of psychology to
>>>>>> 
>>> inform
>>> 
>>>> a
>>>> 
>>>>>> genres approach must be highly selective, calling only on those
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> theories
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> that most effectively highlight a single metaphorical notion of
>>>>>> learning, often relying on earlier, more narrow, versions of the
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> theory
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> over contemporary forms.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> In my own "crossdisciplinary"* effort to found a genres approach
>>>>>> 
>>> for
>>> 
>>>>>> education that builds on insights from diverse psychological
>>>>>> 
>>> schools,
>>> 
>>>>>> I've found it convenient to identify the metaphors for learning
>>>>>> 
>>> that
>>> 
>>>> I
>>>> 
>>>>>> see as framing education's diverse interests, and then to hunt
>>>>>> 
>>> around
>>> 
>>>>>> for psychological approaches that help to fill out that
>>>>>> 
>>> metaphorical
>>> 
>>>>>> interpretation. In this approach, I am guided by the perspective
>>>>>> 
>>> that
>>> 
>>>>>> psychology often draws from our culturally shared metaphors for 
>>>>>> its
>>>>>> basic images and intuitions (Fletcher, 1995; Leary, 1994; Olson &
>>>>>> Bruner, 1996; Sternberg, 1997). For instance, my "habituation"
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> metaphor
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> for learning-as-skill-attainment draws somewhat on behaviorist
>>>>>> psychology, but also on a branch of cognitive theory known as
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> "implicit
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> learning theory." My "construction" metaphor for
>>>>>> learning-as-concept-attainment draws somewhat on the Piagetian
>>>>>> 
>>> based
>>> 
>>>>>> radical constructivist, but also on the conceptual change
>>>>>> 
>>> literature.
>>> 
>>>>> My
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> "enculturation" metaphor for learning-as-disposition-attainment
>>>>>> 
>>> draws
>>> 
>>>>>> partly on sociocultural theory, but also on social psychology.
For
>>>>>> although sociocultural theory is predominantly sociogenetic
>>>>>> 
>>> Vygotsky,
>>> 
>>>>>> along with those who have undertaken to extend his legacy, 
>>>>>> resisted
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> the
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> complete social determinism that I see as needed to articulate a
>>>>>> coherent "enculturation pedagogy." As Penuel and Wertsch (1995) 
>>>>>> put
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> it:
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> "Sociocultural processes on the one hand and individual 
>>>>>> functioning
>>>>>> 
>>>> on
>>>> 
>>>>>> the other [exist] in a dynamic, irreducible tension rather than a
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> static
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> notion of social determination. A sociocultural approach ...
>>>>>> 
>>>> considers
>>>> 
>>>>>> these poles of sociocultural processes and individual functioning
>>>>>> 
>>> as
>>> 
>>>>>> interacting moments in human action, rather than as static
>>>>>> 
>>> processes
>>> 
>>>>>> that exist in isolation from one another" (p. 84). (Emphasizing
>>>>>> 
>>>> social
>>>> 
>>>>>> determinism, my prototypical exemplar of enculturational learning
>>>>>> 
>>> is
>>> 
>>>>>> "proxemics" drawn from social psychology, the study of how
>>>>>> 
>>> individual
>>> 
>>>>>> comes to embody the "personal body space" conventions of their
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> national
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> culture.)
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> I think this serves to establish how psychological science is
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> marshaled
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> within a genres agenda. Resisting what is everywhere present in
>>>>>> psychology--the attempt to develop a comprehensive account of
>>>>>> 
>>>> learning
>>>> 
>>>>>> that suffices for all purposes--the genres approach seeks after
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> partial
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> accounts that correspond with what I see as coherently forming
the
>>>>>> discrete interest of educators in teaching skills, concepts, and
>>>>>> dispositions. It's not "wrong" for socioculturalists to agree, as
>>>>>> 
>>> did
>>> 
>>>>>> Larry a couple of posts ago, "that we must account for processes 
>>>>>> at
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> the
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> neurological level from a CHAT perspective." Indeed, such
>>>>>> 
>>> initiatives
>>> 
>>>>>> are vital to enable CHAT/sociocultural psychology to remain 
>>>>>> viable,
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> and
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> perhaps eventually prevail, within the competitive game of
>>>>>> preparadigmatic psychology. But the broader designs of the
various
>>>>>> schools will not help us, today, to support educational practice.
>>>>>> 
>>> The
>>> 
>>>>>> psychology of TODAY is a preparadigmatic psychology, and that
>>>>>> 
>>> reality
>>> 
>>>>>> must be embraced in order to discern and support the discrete
>>>>>> 
>>> agendas
>>> 
>>>>>> for learning that motivate education.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> *I use the term crossdisciplinary in contrast with
>>>>>> 
>>> interdisciplinary
>>> 
>>>>> to
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> signal the coordination, rather than integration, of existing
>>>>>> theoretical frameworks.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> David
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>>> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>> 
>>>> [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
>>>> 
>>>>>> On Behalf Of Larry Purss
>>>>>> Sent: Wednesday, January 12, 2011 7:35 AM
>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Brains, Computer, and the Future of Education
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> David
>>>>>> Another quick thought on the competing models of learning and how
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> these
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> models become common sense or taken for granted folk
psychological
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> ways
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> of
>>>>>> orienting to the world. The  power of metaphors to
conventionalize
>>>>>> 
>>> a
>>> 
>>>>>> cultural imaginary seems to be  central to this transformative
>>>>>> 
>>>> process
>>>> 
>>>>>> that
>>>>>> develops various cognitive models at the implicit or tacit level.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> Andy
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> points to the historical processes that lead to a particular
>>>>>> 
>>> metaphor
>>> 
>>>>>> structuring our cognition [the zeitgeist]. As I read his comments
>>>>>> he suggests it is the current technologies being used and 
>>>>>> developed
>>>>>> which
>>>>>> transforms our guiding metaphors and not the internal debates 
>>>>>> among
>>>>>> scholars.  If technological transformation  "constitutes"
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> metaphorical
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> transformation [stronger term than influences] then how do we
>>>>>> consciously
>>>>>> engage with these transformative technological processes to
>>>>>> 
>>> influence
>>> 
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> zeitgeist [as a dialogue among models] ? At the level of common
>>>>>> 
>>> sense
>>> 
>>>>>> folk
>>>>>> psychological metaphors of learning are university debates
leading
>>>>>> 
>>>> the
>>>> 
>>>>>> way
>>>>>> or charting where the technology has taken us?
>>>>>> The underlying question is, How do we get teachers to incorporate
>>>>>> alternative models of learning and cognition which run counter to
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> common
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> sense
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Larry
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> On Wed, Jan 12, 2011 at 4:37 AM, Michael Glassman
>>>>>> <MGlassman@ehe.osu.edu>wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Hi David,
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> I sort of feel like the human relationship with information has
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> changed in
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> very fundemental ways over the last ten years.  Phenomena like 
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Web,
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Google, FaceBook, the Open Source movement have moved incredibly
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> quickly.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>  Some academic urban legends are rising up, such as the idea 
>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>> 
>>>> the
>>>> 
>>>>>>> computer in some way changes the structure of wiring of the 
>>>>>>> brain
>>>>>>> (absolutely no evidence, or even proto-evidence for this I can.)
>>>>>>> 
>>>> But
>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> I
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> think it is a combination of fear and confusion.  You have first
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> amendment
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> lawyers like Floyd Abrams arguing against free speech on the
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>> Internet.
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> You
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> have brutal authoritarians like Putin signing executive orders
>>>>>>> 
>>>> making
>>>> 
>>>>>>> Russian government completely Open Source by 2015 (my guess is 
>>>>>>> he
>>>>>>> 
>>>> has
>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> no
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> idea what Open Source actually is).  The whole thing is mind
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>> boggling.
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>>> I think of cognitivist, behaviorists socio cultural theorists,
>>>>>>> 
>>> etc,
>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> etc.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> arguing over who bats next, not realizing that the rules of the
>>>>>>> 
>>> game
>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> are
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> completely changing.  Changing in ways we don't even have a
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>> vocabulary
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> to
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> talk about yet.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> ________________________________
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu on behalf of David H Kirshner
>>>>>>> Sent: Tue 1/11/2011 10:45 PM
>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>>>>> Subject: RE: [xmca] Brains, Computer, and the Future of 
>>>>>>> Education
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Larry,
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Here's my sociology of science account of the rise of brain
>>>>>>> 
>>> studies
>>> 
>>>>> as
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> a
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> substitute for learning theory.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 1. In Kuhnian terms, psychology is a preparadigmatic science. 
>>>>>>> For
>>>>>>> instance, learning is variously studied in behavioral, 
>>>>>>> cognitive,
>>>>>>> developmental, and sociocultural schools that conceive of 
>>>>>>> learning
>>>>>>> 
>>>> in
>>>> 
>>>>>>> fundamentally distinct ways.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 2. The grand motive of preparadigmatic science is establishment 
>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>> paradigmatic consensus. Each school is in competition with the
>>>>>>> 
>>>> others
>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> to
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> unify the field under its umbrella by coming to accommodate the
>>>>>>> interests of the other schools while still preserving the 
>>>>>>> essence
>>>>>>> 
>>> of
>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> its
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> own unique perspective. Most often this competition is implicit,
>>>>>>> 
>>> but
>>> 
>>>>>>> periodically it leads to open conflict as in Chomsky's 
>>>>>>> repudiation
>>>>>>> 
>>>> of
>>>> 
>>>>>>> Skinner's effort to account for "Verbal Behavior," or in the 
>>>>>>> flare
>>>>>>> 
>>>> up
>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> in
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> the late '90s between James Greeno and John Anderson and company
>>>>>>> 
>>>> over
>>>> 
>>>>>>> cognitivist efforts to account for the situated character of
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>> learning.
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 3. The dominant paradigm in any period always is the one to most
>>>>>>> strenuously pursue hegemonic designs on the field. The
>>>>>>> 
>>> cognitivists'
>>> 
>>>>>>> embracing of the rhetoric of situativity has cost them dearly:
>>>>>>> 
>>> they
>>> 
>>>>> no
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>>> longer can forefront the technical machinery of information
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>> processing
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>>> theory and artificial intelligence computer simulation as their
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> central
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> technical method and theoretical thrust. This is really a crisis
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>> point
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>>> for cognitivists. They gained prominence through the Information
>>>>>>> Processing approach, and are coasting along on their reputation.
>>>>>>> Embracing brain science enables them to maintain the surface
>>>>>>> 
>>>> features
>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> of
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> dynamic "science," while providing a convenient disguise for the
>>>>>>> 
>>>> fact
>>>> 
>>>>>>> that there's no longer a central metaphor for learning that is
>>>>>>> 
>>> being
>>> 
>>>>>>> elaborated and developed by that community.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 4. Projecting this forward a decade or so, we have the 
>>>>>>> likelihood
>>>>>>> 
>>> of
>>> 
>>>>>>> diminishment of the importance of the cognitivist umbrella, and
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> renewed
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> opportunity for the other schools to push toward the front of 
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> pack.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> ...should be lots of fun.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> David
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>>>> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>> [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>>> On Behalf Of Larry Purss
>>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, January 11, 2011 7:37 AM
>>>>>>> To: lchcmike@gmail.com; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Brains, Computer, and the Future of 
>>>>>>> Education
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Mike,
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> The band wagon may not be a strong enough metaphor.  The image 
>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>> 
>>> a
>>> 
>>>>>>> steam
>>>>>>> roller seems more accurate.  I mentioned earlier that the term 
>>>>>>> ZPD
>>>>>>> 
>>>> is
>>>> 
>>>>>>> now a
>>>>>>> recognized term in many school settings [as scaffolding]. 
>>>>>>> However
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> this
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> alternative metaphor of mind as computer or mind  as brain is a
>>>>>>> 
>>> far
>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> more
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> powerful metaphor in schools. Often school staffs are fascinated
>>>>>>> 
>>>> with
>>>> 
>>>>>>> these
>>>>>>> explanations and believe that neuroscience is finally getting to
>>>>>>> 
>>> the
>>> 
>>>>>>> "heart"
>>>>>>> of the matter [couldn't resist the contradictary metaphor]. 
>>>>>>> Brain
>>>>>>> science as
>>>>>>> an explanation of learning is becoming   the dominant narrative 
>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>> many school debates.  I was wondering if there are any
>>>>>>> 
>>> "simplified'
>>> 
>>>>>>> articles
>>>>>>> for a general audience that engage with these neuro/brain
>>>>>>> 
>>> metaphors
>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> that
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> would lead to school staffs possibly having a dialogue [by
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>> introducing
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>>> dought]  I have shared a few articles with interested staff who
>>>>>>> 
>>> love
>>> 
>>>>>>> ideas
>>>>>>> but they were too "theoretical" for a staff discussion.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> With this steam roller comes the call for justifying your 
>>>>>>> practice
>>>>>>> 
>>>> in
>>>> 
>>>>>>> schools by using "best practices" which are "evidence based".
>>>>>>> 
>>> This
>>> 
>>>>>>> evidence often is dominated by evidence from neuroscience
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>  I have attempted to introduce sociocultural perspectives into 
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> debate in
>>>>>>>  response to the neuro/brain social representations of learning
>>>>>>> 
>>> but
>>> 
>>>> I
>>>> 
>>>>>>> would
>>>>>>> appreciate an  article for a general audience that I could hand
>>>>>>> 
>>> out
>>> 
>>>>> to
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>>> start
>>>>>>> a dialogue among school staffs.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Mike, I believe this frame of reference is not a "fad" or a 
>>>>>>> "band
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> wagon"
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> but is developing into a "conventionalized" metaphor which most
>>>>>>> educators
>>>>>>> may use to explain "learning" in  schools.  Fad indicates a
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>> transitory
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>>> phenomena and neuroscience seems a longer lasting  phenomena.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> I am looking for an article that does not refute or contradict 
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> neuroscience explanations but rather LINKS the  ideas to
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>> sociocultural
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>>> concepts.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> One of the principals in a school I work in is attending this
>>>>>>> conference,
>>>>>>> and principals do have influence in school cultures.  I hope to
>>>>>>> influence
>>>>>>> her.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Larry
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> On Mon, Jan 10, 2011 at 8:07 PM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> The bandwagon is visible coming over the horizon!
>>>>>>>> Check it out at 
>>>>>>>> http://www.learningandthebrain.com/brain28.html.
>>>>>>>> Join for just the price of a click and a clack.
>>>>>>>> mike
>>>>>>>> __________________________________________
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>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
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>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> __________________________________________
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>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> __________________________________________
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>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>> --
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>
------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> 
>>> 
>>>> Hegel Summer School: The New Atheism: Just Another Dogma?
>>>> <http://ethicalpolitics.org/seminars/hss2011.htm>
>>>> 
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>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
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>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> 
>> 
>> 
>
> -- 
>
------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Hegel Summer School: The New Atheism: Just Another Dogma? 
> <http://ethicalpolitics.org/seminars/hss2011.htm>
>
> __________________________________________
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> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
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>

Tony Whitson
UD School of Education
NEWARK  DE  19716

twhitson@udel.edu
_______________________________

"those who fail to reread
  are obliged to read the same story everywhere"
                   -- Roland Barthes, S/Z (1970)
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