Sorry, Andy.
I guess I didn't get what your question was driving at. Yes, this started
out as an exercise of examining the varying ways
learning is construed in the broad range of psychological schools. After
models involving 7, later 5 versions of learning, I ended up with a
simplified set of 3 learning metaphors that seemed to me to capture the
basic learning objectives of education: "habituation" of skills,
"construction" of concepts, and "enculturation" of dispositions.
Coincidently these corresponded well with the trio of learning
objectives promulgated by NCATE (an accrediting agency for colleges of
education). In my view, this is the universe of educational aspirations
for student learning.
Part of what I struggled with in your previous clarification of the
framing question was your suggestion that once we "have a clear concept
of the class of problems" this is where "the messy competition between
currents of thinking could be presented [to teachers] in a way which was
productive." The genres approach, as I'm developing it, does not seek to
enlist teachers as colleagues in the sociology of science, rather to
marshal (selected) perspectives from within specific paradigms that make
coherent the prescribed methods of teaching for that genre. Perhaps
there is an analogy to physicists sparing engineers from controversies
in string theory. We in education have not previously had a way to
organize psychological knowledge in a way that constitutes a coherent
knowledge base for teachers. Our instinct is to make teachers partners
with us in making sense of the theoretical landscapes we inhabit.
Thoughts of prescriptive methods for teaching are uncomfortable. But, in
fact, that's how a professional knowledge base should work.
David
-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
On Behalf Of Andy Blunden
Sent: Monday, January 17, 2011 6:34 PM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] Paradigms, Hyperdigms, Hypodigms
David, I think (sic!) that what you are suggesting is consistent with what
I was suggesting with my question about framing. You have analysed the
existing range of genres by claiming that there are exactly 3 concepts of
education, which are each legitimate objectives for a teacher. And you
make an assessment (presumably) of a theory of psychology according to
whether it satisfactorily responds to one of these frames. Is that right?
Andy
David H Kirshner wrote:
Robert, I'm not sure which David K you intended, but the "Jack of all
trades" issue is an important one to me.
There is a way to respond to the multi-paradigmatic status of learning
theory that might be thought of as eclectic, perhaps also as
pluralistic. Educational Psychologists--those who teach Educational
Psychology courses, rather than psychologists whose work is applied to
education--often take a tool-box approach to applying psychology to
teaching: figure out what kind of problem you're facing, look around
in
your psychology tool box, and in the spirit of bricolage select some
appropriate theories you can figure out how to apply. Perhaps this is
the conception of a Jack of all trades that David Kellogg warned
against.
The genres approach, as I am framing it, is not like that at all. A
genre of teaching is a sculpted teaching methodology, informed by
learning theory, and intended to support learning in one of 3 distinct
senses: habituation of skills; construction of concepts; or
enculturation of dispositions. The whole package of genres is proposed
as a professional knowledge base for teaching in relation to the
teacher's responsibility to support learning (there are other
responsibilities, requiring other resources). In this sense, the
teacher
is expected to understand and be competent in a variety of pedagogies,
but in quite well-defined and exact senses--I think this is not in the
spirit of the Jack of all trades.
David
-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
On Behalf Of Robert Lake
Sent: Monday, January 17, 2011 8:21 AM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] Paradigms, Hyperdigms, Hypodigms
Happy MLK day to David K. and Everyone!
Does pluralism equate with a reduction to the lowest common
denominator
or
does it mean an interdependent yet distinct set of approaches that
welcomes
difference without expecting each practitioner to be a "jack of all
trades"?
RL
On Sun, Jan 16, 2011 at 10:08 PM, David Kellogg
<vaughndogblack@yahoo.com>wrote:
I'm with him; with the other David K. The generic approach really
demands
too much Jack-of-all-tradesmanship of the teacher, and the Jack of
all
trades, while very useful in pioneer times, is ultimately a master of
none.
Yes, in Chapter ONE of T&S Vygotsky is defining the problem and the
approach. But even there he doesn't exactly want to let a hundred
flowers
blossom and a hundred schools of thought content. The problem he
addresses
is quite specific, and within this problem there is really only
legitimate
method, and it's not the tried and true method of analysis into
elements
that forms the basis of the extant genre.
In Chapter TWO Vygotsky is even less eclectic, if possible. He BEGINS
by
saying that Piaget (actually Claparede) associates himself with
Freud,
Blondel, and Levy-Bruhl as a great pioneer of an entirely new field.
But
then he says that this is not at all an enviable position: Freud,
Blondel,
and Levy-Bruhl created their psychologies from problem to paradigm,
and this
is exactly what is wrong with them, and why their psychologies
inevitably
end up with that peculiarly metaphysical smell imparted by an
overambitious
bottom-upmanship. (It's a familiar problem for painters: when you
frame the
painting according to the subject you end up making your picture too
small,
but when you want to include enough background to make sense of it,
you
always end up making your picture too big.)
When LSV talks about "general" psychology and the necessity to
"unify"
psychology, he's not just making the point that individual psychology
has to
be seen, contra Wundt, as an instantiation of social psychology. He's
also
calling for what in applied linguistics has come to be called "theory
culling", the falsification and the destruction of some entirely
wrong
paradigms (e.g. Bergson, elan vital, Mach, Freud, Levy-Bruhl,
Blondel,
and
Piaget too.).
I think he would say that "general psychology", in which he would
include
sociology (see Chapter Four) and semiology, must become the
hyperdigm.
What
we now call psychology is really what he calls "individual
psychology", and
that is the paradigm. Education would be a hypodigm of psychology
dealing
with teaching/learning and microgenetic change.
One way to look at this is to think of the subordination of paradigms
to
hyperdigms and their superordination to hypodigms in terms of the
TIME
variable. Social psychology, the hyperdigm, is really the study of
sociogenesis, the functional differentiation of societies and their
resultant structure, just as biology is the study of biogenesis, the
evolutionary differentiation of species, and the resulting
structures.
Individual psychology, for Vygotsky, is the study of ontogenesis,
functional differentiation between and within individuals, and the
psychological structures that come out of this, and of course the
hypodigm, education, is the study of microgenesis. That's OUR cue;
it's where we (teachers) come in!
David Kellogg
Seoul National University of Education
--- On Sun, 1/16/11, David H Kirshner <dkirsh@lsu.edu> wrote:
From: David H Kirshner <dkirsh@lsu.edu>
Subject: RE: [xmca] Brains, Computer, and the Future of Education
To: ablunden@mira.net, "eXtended Mind, Culture,Activity" <
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Date: Sunday, January 16, 2011, 10:43 AM
Andy,
The question of whether you, Vygotsky, I, or anyone else thinks
multiple
paradigms are a good idea needs to be separated from the question of
whether psychology is preparadigmatic in the sense of questing toward
paradigmatic consensus. Kuhn's sociology of science analysis does not
imply that every, or indeed any, particular scientist interprets
their
work in terms of this sociological imperative. But in the case of
psychology, we can see certain historical processes that are not easy
to
account for otherwise. I'm thinking, particularly, of the dynamic of
paradigmatic ambitions presented as solid (or immanent)
accomplishments,
only to be beaten back by proponents of other schools. Think for
Skinner's (1958) attempt to extend behavioral psychology from
unmediated
response conditioning to verbal behavior beaten back by Chomsky's
(1959)
famous book review, or the counterattack of Anderson, Reder, and
Simon
(1996) in the face of defections by notable cognitivists like Brown,
Collins, and Duguid (1989), Greeno (1993), Hirst and Manier (1995)
dissatisfied with cognitivist attempts to account for the problem of
"context." I argue this kind of discourse is not characteristic of
paradigmatic science, but instead supports the thesis that psychology
is
preparadigmatic.
If, as you suggest, multiple paradigms--not competing, but
co-existing
peacefully--is a happy steady-state for psychology, then we'd expect
a
genres approach for education to have arisen long ago as an
alternative
to saddling educational practitioners with the need to grapple with
dialectical syntheses across paradigms. On the other hand, if
preparadigmatic psychology is ever questing toward paradigmatic
consensus, then expect psychologists to resist a genres approach
through
many different sorts of explanations, including, possibly, denying
the
preparadigmatic status of their science.
David
-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
[mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
On Behalf Of Andy Blunden
Sent: Sunday, January 16, 2011 7:12 AM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture,Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] Brains, Computer, and the Future of Education
I certainly don't see the problematic you pose, David, as indicating
a
need for us to "grow up" and actually I find "genre" as you present
it,
a very fruitful way of characterising the problem. Shortly before
your
earlier message arrived I had been reading LSV's "Thinking and
Speech,"
Chapter 1. I can't for the life of me find a suitable succinct quote,
but as I recall it, he was saying that Psychology was, as you say,
not
yet able to form a unified theory, and that (something like) every
new
observation or problem launched a new theory. Now, I don't read
Vygotsky
as attempting to create a master theory. On the contrary he argues
against this, as I see it. His piece about the "unit" in that chapter
says that we have to form a concept of the class of phenomena or
*problem* that we want to solve and unfold a theory from there, as
opposed to subordinating that definite class of problem to a more
general one which lacks the special characteristics of the special
probem we want to solve.Confusion has arisen I think from trying to
read
LSV's theory of the relation of thinking and speaking as a grand
theory
of consciousness.
So it seems to me that in any very general field of phenomena
multiple
genre are quite OK, fruitful and just as useful as they are in
everyday
life. (Imagine trying to get by in everyday life with one genre!)
Only
each "genre" needs to have a clear concept of the class of problems
that
it covers. That's why I raise the question of stepping back one step
from a genre and ask: how does this genre frame the phenomena, as a
problem, as a unit or concept of its subject matter.
I think if we do that the messy competition between currents of
thinking
could be presented in a way which was productive.
What do you think?
Andy
David H Kirshner wrote:
Larry and Andy,
Thanks for kind words.
Andy, I don't have the philosophical background to be able to
address
your question as formulated. But I read the intent of the question
as
probing the utility of the paradigm construct, and hence the genres
solution: If all differences of opinion are ultimately paradigm
differences, then shouldn't we just grow up, accept differences in
framing as inevitable, and get on with debating issues and acting on
the
basis of our best judgment following from the debate? Why should we
regard differences of opinion that emerge in psychological framings
of
learning as different from other disagreements, and requiring its
own
new kind of solution, namely a "genres" solution?
Let me address that concern directly. Take as a major instance the
difference between sociogenetic and ontogenetic (i.e.,
individualist)
approaches to learning. These approaches construe the world of
learning
in very different terms, each highlighting certain questions as
crucial,
while other questions are incidental. Not coincidently, each can
answer
certain questions, to wit the ones it considers important, much more
effectively than the other questions.
We have the following usual choices: Adopt one perspective based on
the
promise that it (eventually) will be able to answer the full set of
questions adequately; or construct a new theory as a dialectical
synthesis of the original two. (I think socioculturalists straddle
the
two choices by sometimes claiming they are sociogenetic and other
times
that they are inherently dialectic.)
In the behaviorist era and subsequently the cognitive area, the
first
choice was more appealing. The desire to be "scientific" (i.e.,
uni-paradigmatic), in conjunction with shameless hawking by
proponents,
gave those approaches some time to adequately address the concerns
of
the other school. As neither succeeded in unifying the field, in
this
post-cognitive era, we opt more for dialectical approaches.
The problem is that these dialectical alternatives, rather like the
particle/wave dialectic of quantum physics, don't really help us
make
sense of the world in a way that is actionable. Our intuitions about
learning are not able to encompass both sides of the dialectic in
such
a
way as to constitute a synthesis. As a result, a dialectic approach
puts
on the table the diverse and discordant pieces that somehow have to
be
coordinated. Paul Cobb (1994) addressed this problem of
constructivist
and sociocultural approaches in a widely read ER piece recommending
precisely that: a coordination of perspectives.
Well, obviously a coordination of perspectives is exactly what is
needed. The issue at hand is who does the coordinating? In Cobb's
approach--as in all other academic approaches that have been
offered--it
is the researcher's challenge to figure out the coordination. In
this
way, the work of coordination can take place in the academy in
concert
with efforts to forge a dialectical synthesis that eventually could
serve to unify the science of learning under a single theorization.
This
is why a genres approach is so disruptive. A genres approach says,
instead, let's focus within each paradigm on figuring out what that
framing has to offer teaching. Then leave it to teachers, to the
world
of professional practice, to figure out how (or if) to coordinate.
For the researcher, this genres approach is a disaster. It
constructs
what is most important for researchers--an eventual dialectical
synthesis that unites the field--as irrelevant to the world of
practice.
Our theoretical musing no longer are projected into the world of
educational practice as relevant, they become just our private
concern,
with possible long-term payoff for the world, but no immediate
relevance. For teachers, the genres approach finally provides for
emancipation from the intellectual tyranny of theory. Because the
individual paradigms are grounded in accessible metaphors for
learning,
it becomes possible to articulate pedagogical principles in ways
that
are coherently available to teachers. And then it becomes the
purview
of
professional practice to determine how best to coordinate the genres
of
teaching.
This is truly a moral dilemma for researchers.
David
-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
[mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
On Behalf Of Andy Blunden
Sent: Saturday, January 15, 2011 6:51 PM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] Brains, Computer, and the Future of Education
Thank you David for your truly enlightening post.
Can I ask this question: when two subjects are engaged in a dialogue
over some issue, and are positing the issue in two different genres,
is
it true to say that they are explicitly or implicitly asserting
different frames. For example, if two parties are arguing over
whether
to increase unemployment benefit, they may disagree over the frame
being
lazy people ripping off the community or disadvantaged people who
deserve the support of the community. So isn't there always a frame
around a genre where rational contest is possible? Every specialism
exists within a lingua franca of shared concepts, doesn't it?
Andy
David H Kirshner wrote:
Larry, Andy, Michael, and Monica.
Sorry for the delay in responding. Let me first address the
technology
tie-in, and then turn to the pedagogical question about how to
deal
with
the multi-paradigmatic theorization of learning.
I'm sympathetic to the perspective that it is "the current
technologies
being used and developed which transforms our guiding metaphors
[for
learning] and not the internal debates among scholars." If we look
at
the whole ball of wax, psychology certainly does seem a chaotic
tangle
that may well be led by technological happenstance rather than by
intellectual coherence. But the proliferation of new schools and
new
approaches based on technological developments should not obscure
the
kinds of processes of development that go within each paradigmatic
school. Certainly, paradigmatic differences are not settled by
debate.
As Kuhn pointed out, the competitive process is inescapably
sociological
rather than purely intellectual. What about within a paradigm? As
sociohistorical institutions schools of research persist over time
because of mutually shared projects that often are experienced as
intellectually coherent. Certainly technological developments can
influence the basic understandings pursued within a school. For
instance, psychologists moved on from the telephone switchboard
metaphor
of cognitive processing to the serial digital computer metaphor
which
afforded much more dynamic possibilities for theorization, but
with
much
basic conceptual continuity. I don't think it's "wrong" to regard
intra
paradigmatic development as led by technological developments.
However,
I imagine most of the time, for example in thinking about our own
progress as sociocultural or CHAT researchers, we find it useful
to
view
progress in terms of intellectual coherence. In any case, in my
work
in
harvesting insights from the diverse branches of psychology for
the
purpose of framing a multi-paradigmatic pedagogy, I find it useful
to
regard the work within paradigms as progressing through rational
debate
(or at least attempting to).
A Multi-paradigmatic Pedagogical Framework:
How do we advance pedagogical theory taking seriously the
multi-paradigmatic status of learning theory?
Let me warn that this is a theme I've pursued before on xmca
without
much uptake--I think for very good reasons. The path leads to
delegitimization of education as a co-participant with psychology
in
the
scientific enterprise. Alternatively, it leads to the repudiation
by
education of psychology's scientific pretensions. Given how deeply
enmeshed educational and psychological communities are with one
another
(e.g., xmca) this is not an easy or appealing path for either
party.
The first step on this path is the hardest to take, though it is
simple
to articulate. If we accept that learning is diversely conceived
across
varied paradigms, and we also regard the purpose of teaching as
promoting learning, then there is only one sensible path to take
if
one
desires pedagogical theory to be grounded in learning theory: A
genres
approach to pedagogical theorizing, with each genre of teaching
addressing learning in a particular paradigmatic sense. To date, a
genres approach has not been advanced. However, there are two
alternative approaches that have been attempted, in each case with
disastrous consequences. One method is to focus on a single
paradigm
and
deny the legitimacy of any others (e.g., the behaviorist era in
education). The other is to fashion a holistic vision of "good
teaching"
that somehow is to address learning in its various
interpretations.
This
is the current Zeitgeist in educational theorizing, and I'll
devote
a
couple of paragraphs, below, to explaining its multifaceted ill
effects
on education, the most immediate and debilitating of which is
systemic
de-intellectualization of pedagogy. For if teaching practice is to
be
understood in terms of learning theory, it can only be in terms of
a
single theory at a time, given the multi-paradigmatic character of
this
branch of knowledge.
I have been teaching an Education doctoral course on the genres
approach
for about 15 years, and I've ALMOST NEVER succeeded in making this
first
step comprehensible. So entrenched in our discourse are the ideas
of
holistic pedagogy--"good teaching" as a set of practices that
addresses
learning conceived as a complex and multifaceted whole--that the
language of genres just doesn't register for my students.
Typically,
when I present a framework for teaching for Skills, Concepts, and
Dispositions as distinct genres of teaching, this gets assimilated
into
a "learning styles" frame in which the different pedagogical
approaches
provide different routes to learning conceived as a complex and
multi-faceted whole. Indeed, our discourse typically intermixes
these
learning goals as we talk of "understanding the skill,"
"practicing
the
concept," or "inculcating thinking skills." Students almost never
come
to grasp the motive of differentiating, rather than integrating,
these
notions of learning as a comprehensible agenda.
The cost we pay for maintaining an integrative or holistic
discourse
about "good teaching" in education is staggeringly high. First, is
the
impossibility of articulating pedagogical principles, which, as
discussed above would require that learning be conceived locally,
relative to the independently conceived notions of learning.
Because
in
the standard discourse "good teaching" is somehow simultaneously
to
address learning in its many various senses, we end up instead
with
generalities and platitudes, with intractably dense dialectical
analyses
attempting to span disparate local theories, and with vignettes
that
are
meant to illustrate good teaching, but that don't articulate its
principles. In short, we provide almost no usable intellectual
resources
that can serve to guide development of teaching practice.
Second is the politicized character of our pedagogical discourse
stemming from the interpenetration of values issues with issues of
efficacy. Given the varied notions of learning that motivate
educators,
it is to be expected that values issues will arise as to which
sort(s)
of learning ought to be pursued with students. But since our
discourse
constructs good teaching as a holistic set of practices, there's
no
discursive space for this variation. One's opponent's construction
of
good teaching is not just wrong on values, but also misguided
about
what
is effective practice (e.g., the Reading Wars and the Math Wars).
A
discourse framed in genres of teaching would enable values issues
to
be
separated from issues of efficacy, thereby protecting the
professional
integrity of the field of teaching practice.
Finally, with so little to offer professional teaching practice,
learning theory is easily subject to being dismissed as
irrelevant.
If
Teaching is defined in terms of promoting Learning, then learning
theory
ought to be THE theoretical discourse through which teaching
practice
is
articulated. We see our growing irrelevance in the current
prominence
of
"brain" perspectives on teaching--which is what started this
thread--but
also in other cognitive mechanisms approaches like "learning
styles"
research, as well as in pedagogical framings based on critical
theory,
values theory, philosophical commitments, or metaphysical or
spiritual
bases. In the end what we have is an open-ended pedagogical
discourse
in
which each new proposal for "good teaching" can create its own
universe
of discourse within which it is to be analyzed and evaluated. The
marketplace of pedagogical ideas resembles much more a bazaar than
a
professional knowledge base. A genres approach, while featuring a
theoretically heterogeneous set of framings for learning,
nonetheless
would enable us to capture the essential interests that motivate
the
pedagogical enterprise within a finite and determinate set of
theoretical approaches.
Genres: Why Not?
One excellent reason to dismiss the genres approach is because it
is
so
obvious. After all, it is immediately apparent that learning is
diversely conceived in varied psychological paradigms. So
theorizations
of good teaching that really come to grips with learning theory
would
need to be constructed locally, relative to a specific notion of
learning. Surely, if a genres approach had any merit it would have
been
adopted, or at least explored, a long time ago.
The alternative is that there are powerful interests arrayed
against
recognizing and dealing with the preparadigmatic status of
psychology.
I
propose that the genres approach has not previously been advanced
because it is in psychologists' self interest that it not be.
To understand these interests, we need to delve a bit into how
preparadigmatic science functions. Preparadigmatic science
consists
of
multiple schools each in competition with the others to the unify
the
field under its own banner. However, paradigmatic differences are
never
settled by debate. As Kuhn pointed out, the competitive process is
inescapably sociological rather than purely intellectual. Viewed
through
divergent paradigmatic lenses, different aspects of observed
phenomena
become highlighted as problematic. So one paradigm cannot
invalidate
the
perspectives of another. Instead, a paradigm succeeds against
others
by
addressing the concerns of the other paradigms in ways that are
sufficiently appealing and powerful as to attract established
researchers from other schools, and especially new researchers
just
entering the field. Like old soldiers, old paradigms never die,
they
just fade away.
Viewed in this way, we see that psychologists must lead double
lives.
Within their paradigm, the psychologist's life is similar to that
of
most other scientists. They are involved in deliberate and careful
elaboration and extension of the basic perspectives that initiated
the
school. However, externally, they are hucksters extraordinaire.
Claims
are exaggerated. Hoped for/planned developments are presented as
faits
accomplis. After all, one wins in the broader game by attracting
researchers, especially neophyte researchers, to your school.
One could castigate psychologists for being duplicitous or
dishonest,
but I think this freights individual psychology too heavily. What
we
have is best viewed not as individual misrepresentation, but a
discursive form reflecting the sociological imperative of
preparadigmatic science to achieve paradigmatic consensus. The
ironic
result is that across the broad diversity of psychology, there is
only
one tenet espoused by learning theorists of every persuasion: a
single
perspective (eventually) encompasses all of the relevant phenomena
of
learning. Thus a genres approach to pedagogy, building on discrete
accomplishments across paradigmatic divisions, would subvert
psychologists' active self-interest in promoting the problem of
paradigmatic division as (imminently) solved.
But what about educators? If psychologists prefer to deny the
preparadigmatic status of their field, why is it that educators
haven't
pressed on with a genres approach on their own? Again, a
sociological
perspective can help, this time explaining the client status of
Education with respect to Psychology. One of the first
preoccupations
of
Psychology, dating back to its emergence as a scientific
enterprise,
was
investigation of the transfer of training assumptions of faculty
psychology (e.g., Thorndike & Woodworth, 1901). These early
studies
found the prevailing belief in broad transfer of learning to be
unwarranted. Through preceding centuries, the classical
(Aristotelian)
theory of faculty psychology, and its associated theory of
mental-disciplines, had served as the basis for pedagogical
thought.
So,
psychology's attack upon transfer of training effectively
dislodged
the
existing foundations for educational practice. As a result,
education
attached itself to the new science, not as a separate and
independent
field of inquiry, but as a client discipline, dependent upon
psychology
for our legitimacy and intellectual authority. In that role, we
have
tended to see the world as the psychologists do. We have not
construed
psychology independently, as we would need to do to adopt a genres
approach.
Marshalling Preparadigmatic Psychology for Educational Purposes:
I'm going to conclude this post with a description of how
psychological
theory gets appropriated and reworked in genres scholarship. (This
really is where the psychologists get mad.) I mentioned, above,
that
"Within their paradigm, the psychologist's life is similar to that
of
most other scientists." Similar, but not identical. I want to
argue
that
paradigmatic science develops more organically based on insights
that
bubble up from within the paradigm, in comparison with
preparadigmatic
science that is more teleologically driven by a felt need to
address
concerns that have emerged in other schools. For instance,
cognitivists
exploring the computational metaphor might eventually have
decided,
on
their own, to extend from decontextualized problem solving to
encompass
social and cultural context. But the need to be positioned as
competitive with sociogenetic approaches like sociocultural
psychology
forced this development earlier. In this respect, we can see a
trajectory of preparadigmatic science that is not quite parallel
with
paradigmatic science. Preparadigmatic schools tends to evolve from
simple and powerful, but local, initial insights toward complex
and
opaque interpretations intended to bridge disparate intuitions.
And
then
again, some preparadigmatic schools--e.g., social constructivism
and
perhaps situated cognition theory, in psychology--initially are
formed
as a synthesis of diverse perspectives precisely in order to be
competitive players in the preparadigmatic game, but without a
clear
and
simple local insight. The result is that use of psychology to
inform
a
genres approach must be highly selective, calling only on those
theories
that most effectively highlight a single metaphorical notion of
learning, often relying on earlier, more narrow, versions of the
theory
over contemporary forms.
In my own "crossdisciplinary"* effort to found a genres approach
for
education that builds on insights from diverse psychological
schools,
I've found it convenient to identify the metaphors for learning
that
I
see as framing education's diverse interests, and then to hunt
around
for psychological approaches that help to fill out that
metaphorical
interpretation. In this approach, I am guided by the perspective
that
psychology often draws from our culturally shared metaphors for
its
basic images and intuitions (Fletcher, 1995; Leary, 1994; Olson &
Bruner, 1996; Sternberg, 1997). For instance, my "habituation"
metaphor
for learning-as-skill-attainment draws somewhat on behaviorist
psychology, but also on a branch of cognitive theory known as
"implicit
learning theory." My "construction" metaphor for
learning-as-concept-attainment draws somewhat on the Piagetian
based
radical constructivist, but also on the conceptual change
literature.
My
"enculturation" metaphor for learning-as-disposition-attainment
draws
partly on sociocultural theory, but also on social psychology. For
although sociocultural theory is predominantly sociogenetic
Vygotsky,
along with those who have undertaken to extend his legacy,
resisted
the
complete social determinism that I see as needed to articulate a
coherent "enculturation pedagogy." As Penuel and Wertsch (1995)
put
it:
"Sociocultural processes on the one hand and individual
functioning
on
the other [exist] in a dynamic, irreducible tension rather than a
static
notion of social determination. A sociocultural approach ...
considers
these poles of sociocultural processes and individual functioning
as
interacting moments in human action, rather than as static
processes
that exist in isolation from one another" (p. 84). (Emphasizing
social
determinism, my prototypical exemplar of enculturational learning
is
"proxemics" drawn from social psychology, the study of how
individual
comes to embody the "personal body space" conventions of their
national
culture.)
I think this serves to establish how psychological science is
marshaled
within a genres agenda. Resisting what is everywhere present in
psychology--the attempt to develop a comprehensive account of
learning
that suffices for all purposes--the genres approach seeks after
partial
accounts that correspond with what I see as coherently forming the
discrete interest of educators in teaching skills, concepts, and
dispositions. It's not "wrong" for socioculturalists to agree, as
did
Larry a couple of posts ago, "that we must account for processes
at
the
neurological level from a CHAT perspective." Indeed, such
initiatives
are vital to enable CHAT/sociocultural psychology to remain
viable,
and
perhaps eventually prevail, within the competitive game of
preparadigmatic psychology. But the broader designs of the various
schools will not help us, today, to support educational practice.
The
psychology of TODAY is a preparadigmatic psychology, and that
reality
must be embraced in order to discern and support the discrete
agendas
for learning that motivate education.
*I use the term crossdisciplinary in contrast with
interdisciplinary
to
signal the coordination, rather than integration, of existing
theoretical frameworks.
David
-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
[mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
On Behalf Of Larry Purss
Sent: Wednesday, January 12, 2011 7:35 AM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] Brains, Computer, and the Future of Education
David
Another quick thought on the competing models of learning and how
these
models become common sense or taken for granted folk psychological
ways
of
orienting to the world. The power of metaphors to conventionalize
a
cultural imaginary seems to be central to this transformative
process
that
develops various cognitive models at the implicit or tacit level.
Andy
points to the historical processes that lead to a particular
metaphor
structuring our cognition [the zeitgeist]. As I read his comments
he suggests it is the current technologies being used and
developed
which
transforms our guiding metaphors and not the internal debates
among
scholars. If technological transformation "constitutes"
metaphorical
transformation [stronger term than influences] then how do we
consciously
engage with these transformative technological processes to
influence
the
zeitgeist [as a dialogue among models] ? At the level of common
sense
folk
psychological metaphors of learning are university debates leading
the
way
or charting where the technology has taken us?
The underlying question is, How do we get teachers to incorporate
alternative models of learning and cognition which run counter to
common
sense
Larry
On Wed, Jan 12, 2011 at 4:37 AM, Michael Glassman
<MGlassman@ehe.osu.edu>wrote:
Hi David,
I sort of feel like the human relationship with information has
changed in
very fundemental ways over the last ten years. Phenomena like
the
Web,
Google, FaceBook, the Open Source movement have moved incredibly
quickly.
Some academic urban legends are rising up, such as the idea
that
the
computer in some way changes the structure of wiring of the
brain
(absolutely no evidence, or even proto-evidence for this I can.)
But
I
think it is a combination of fear and confusion. You have first
amendment
lawyers like Floyd Abrams arguing against free speech on the
Internet.
You
have brutal authoritarians like Putin signing executive orders
making
Russian government completely Open Source by 2015 (my guess is
he
has
no
idea what Open Source actually is). The whole thing is mind
boggling.
I think of cognitivist, behaviorists socio cultural theorists,
etc,
etc.
arguing over who bats next, not realizing that the rules of the
game
are
completely changing. Changing in ways we don't even have a
vocabulary
to
talk about yet.
Michael
________________________________
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu on behalf of David H Kirshner
Sent: Tue 1/11/2011 10:45 PM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: RE: [xmca] Brains, Computer, and the Future of
Education
Larry,
Here's my sociology of science account of the rise of brain
studies
as
a
substitute for learning theory.
1. In Kuhnian terms, psychology is a preparadigmatic science.
For
instance, learning is variously studied in behavioral,
cognitive,
developmental, and sociocultural schools that conceive of
learning
in
fundamentally distinct ways.
2. The grand motive of preparadigmatic science is establishment
of
paradigmatic consensus. Each school is in competition with the
others
to
unify the field under its umbrella by coming to accommodate the
interests of the other schools while still preserving the
essence
of
its
own unique perspective. Most often this competition is implicit,
but
periodically it leads to open conflict as in Chomsky's
repudiation
of
Skinner's effort to account for "Verbal Behavior," or in the
flare
up
in
the late '90s between James Greeno and John Anderson and company
over
cognitivist efforts to account for the situated character of
learning.
3. The dominant paradigm in any period always is the one to most
strenuously pursue hegemonic designs on the field. The
cognitivists'
embracing of the rhetoric of situativity has cost them dearly:
they
no
longer can forefront the technical machinery of information
processing
theory and artificial intelligence computer simulation as their
central
technical method and theoretical thrust. This is really a crisis
point
for cognitivists. They gained prominence through the Information
Processing approach, and are coasting along on their reputation.
Embracing brain science enables them to maintain the surface
features
of
dynamic "science," while providing a convenient disguise for the
fact
that there's no longer a central metaphor for learning that is
being
elaborated and developed by that community.
4. Projecting this forward a decade or so, we have the
likelihood
of
diminishment of the importance of the cognitivist umbrella, and
renewed
opportunity for the other schools to push toward the front of
the
pack.
...should be lots of fun.
David
-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
[mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
On Behalf Of Larry Purss
Sent: Tuesday, January 11, 2011 7:37 AM
To: lchcmike@gmail.com; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] Brains, Computer, and the Future of
Education
Mike,
The band wagon may not be a strong enough metaphor. The image
of
a
steam
roller seems more accurate. I mentioned earlier that the term
ZPD
is
now a
recognized term in many school settings [as scaffolding].
However
this
alternative metaphor of mind as computer or mind as brain is a
far
more
powerful metaphor in schools. Often school staffs are fascinated
with
these
explanations and believe that neuroscience is finally getting to
the
"heart"
of the matter [couldn't resist the contradictary metaphor].
Brain
science as
an explanation of learning is becoming the dominant narrative
in
many school debates. I was wondering if there are any
"simplified'
articles
for a general audience that engage with these neuro/brain
metaphors
that
would lead to school staffs possibly having a dialogue [by
introducing
dought] I have shared a few articles with interested staff who
love
ideas
but they were too "theoretical" for a staff discussion.
With this steam roller comes the call for justifying your
practice
in
schools by using "best practices" which are "evidence based".
This
evidence often is dominated by evidence from neuroscience
I have attempted to introduce sociocultural perspectives into
the
debate in
response to the neuro/brain social representations of learning
but
I
would
appreciate an article for a general audience that I could hand
out
to
start
a dialogue among school staffs.
Mike, I believe this frame of reference is not a "fad" or a
"band
wagon"
but is developing into a "conventionalized" metaphor which most
educators
may use to explain "learning" in schools. Fad indicates a
transitory
phenomena and neuroscience seems a longer lasting phenomena.
I am looking for an article that does not refute or contradict
the
neuroscience explanations but rather LINKS the ideas to
sociocultural
concepts.
One of the principals in a school I work in is attending this
conference,
and principals do have influence in school cultures. I hope to
influence
her.
Larry
On Mon, Jan 10, 2011 at 8:07 PM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
wrote:
The bandwagon is visible coming over the horizon!
Check it out at
http://www.learningandthebrain.com/brain28.html.
Join for just the price of a click and a clack.
mike
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