[xmca] Paradigms, Hyperdigms, Hypodigms

[David Kellogg <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com>]

I'm with him; with the other David K. The generic approach really demands too much Jack-of-all-tradesmanship of the teacher, and the Jack of all trades, while very useful in pioneer times, is ultimately a master of none.
 
Yes, in Chapter ONE of T&S Vygotsky is defining the problem and the approach. But even there he doesn't exactly want to let a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought content. The problem he addresses is quite specific, and within this problem there is really only legitimate method, and it's not the tried and true method of analysis into elements that forms the basis of the extant genre. 
 
In Chapter TWO Vygotsky is even less eclectic, if possible. He BEGINS by saying that Piaget (actually Claparede) associates himself with Freud, Blondel, and Levy-Bruhl as a great pioneer of an entirely new field. But then he says that this is not at all an enviable position: Freud, Blondel, and Levy-Bruhl created their psychologies from problem to paradigm, and this is exactly what is wrong with them, and why their psychologies inevitably end up with that peculiarly metaphysical smell imparted by an overambitious bottom-upmanship. (It's a familiar problem for painters: when you frame the painting according to the subject you end up making your picture too small, but when you want to include enough background to make sense of it, you always end up making your picture too big.)
 
When LSV talks about "general" psychology and the necessity to "unify" psychology, he's not just making the point that individual psychology has to be seen, contra Wundt, as an instantiation of social psychology. He's also calling for what in applied linguistics has come to be called "theory culling", the falsification and the destruction of some entirely wrong paradigms (e.g. Bergson, elan vital, Mach, Freud, Levy-Bruhl, Blondel, and Piaget too.). 
 
I think he would say that "general psychology", in which he would include sociology (see Chapter Four) and semiology, must become the hyperdigm. What we now call psychology is really what he calls "individual psychology", and that is the paradigm. Education would be a hypodigm of psychology dealing with teaching/learning and microgenetic change.
 
One way to look at this is to think of the subordination of paradigms to hyperdigms and their superordination to hypodigms in terms of the TIME variable. Social psychology, the hyperdigm, is really the study of sociogenesis, the functional differentiation of societies and their resultant structure, just as biology is the study of biogenesis, the evolutionary differentiation of species, and the resulting structures.
 
Individual psychology, for Vygotsky, is the study of ontogenesis, functional differentiation between and within individuals, and the psychological structures that come out of this, and of course the hypodigm, education, is the study of microgenesis. That's OUR cue; it's where we (teachers) come in!
 
David Kellogg
Seoul National University of Education

--- On Sun, 1/16/11, David H Kirshner <dkirsh@lsu.edu> wrote:


From: David H Kirshner <dkirsh@lsu.edu>
Subject: RE: [xmca] Brains, Computer, and the Future of Education
To: ablunden@mira.net, "eXtended Mind, Culture,Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Date: Sunday, January 16, 2011, 10:43 AM


Andy,

The question of whether you, Vygotsky, I, or anyone else thinks multiple
paradigms are a good idea needs to be separated from the question of
whether psychology is preparadigmatic in the sense of questing toward
paradigmatic consensus. Kuhn's sociology of science analysis does not
imply that every, or indeed any, particular scientist interprets their
work in terms of this sociological imperative. But in the case of
psychology, we can see certain historical processes that are not easy to
account for otherwise. I'm thinking, particularly, of the dynamic of
paradigmatic ambitions presented as solid (or immanent) accomplishments,
only to be beaten back by proponents of other schools. Think for
Skinner's (1958) attempt to extend behavioral psychology from unmediated
response conditioning to verbal behavior beaten back by Chomsky's (1959)
famous book review, or the counterattack of Anderson, Reder, and Simon
(1996) in the face of defections by notable cognitivists like Brown,
Collins, and Duguid (1989), Greeno (1993), Hirst and Manier (1995)
dissatisfied with cognitivist attempts to account for the problem of
"context." I argue this kind of discourse is not characteristic of
paradigmatic science, but instead supports the thesis that psychology is
preparadigmatic. 

If, as you suggest, multiple paradigms--not competing, but co-existing
peacefully--is a happy steady-state for psychology, then we'd expect a
genres approach for education to have arisen long ago as an alternative
to saddling educational practitioners with the need to grapple with
dialectical syntheses across paradigms. On the other hand, if
preparadigmatic psychology is ever questing toward paradigmatic
consensus, then expect psychologists to resist a genres approach through
many different sorts of explanations, including, possibly, denying the
preparadigmatic status of their science. 

David 



-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
On Behalf Of Andy Blunden
Sent: Sunday, January 16, 2011 7:12 AM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture,Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] Brains, Computer, and the Future of Education

I certainly don't see the problematic you pose, David, as indicating a 
need for us to "grow up" and actually I find "genre" as you present it, 
a very fruitful way of characterising the problem. Shortly before your 
earlier message arrived I had been reading LSV's "Thinking and Speech," 
Chapter 1. I can't for the life of me find a suitable succinct quote, 
but as I recall it, he was saying that Psychology was, as you say, not 
yet able to form a unified theory, and that (something like) every new 
observation or problem launched a new theory. Now, I don't read Vygotsky

as attempting to create a master theory. On the contrary he argues 
against this, as I see it. His piece about the "unit" in that chapter 
says that we have to form a concept of the class of phenomena or 
*problem* that we want to solve and unfold a theory from there, as 
opposed to subordinating that definite class of problem to a more 
general one which lacks the special characteristics of the special 
probem we want to solve.Confusion has arisen I think from trying to read

LSV's theory of the relation of thinking and speaking as a grand theory 
of consciousness.

So it seems to me that in any very general field of phenomena multiple 
genre are quite OK, fruitful and just as useful as they are in everyday 
life. (Imagine trying to get by in everyday life with one genre!) Only 
each "genre" needs to have a clear concept of the class of problems that

it covers. That's why I raise the question of stepping back one step 
from a genre and ask: how does this genre frame the phenomena, as a 
problem, as a unit or concept of its subject matter.

I think if we do that the messy competition between currents of thinking

could be presented in a way which was productive.

What do you think?
Andy

David H Kirshner wrote:
> Larry and Andy,
>
> Thanks for kind words.
>
> Andy, I don't have the philosophical background to be able to address
> your question as formulated. But I read the intent of the question as
> probing the utility of the paradigm construct, and hence the genres
> solution: If all differences of opinion are ultimately paradigm
> differences, then shouldn't we just grow up, accept differences in
> framing as inevitable, and get on with debating issues and acting on
the
> basis of our best judgment following from the debate? Why should we
> regard differences of opinion that emerge in psychological framings of
> learning as different from other disagreements, and requiring its own
> new kind of solution, namely a "genres" solution?
>
> Let me address that concern directly. Take as a major instance the
> difference between sociogenetic and ontogenetic (i.e., individualist)
> approaches to learning. These approaches construe the world of
learning
> in very different terms, each highlighting certain questions as
crucial,
> while other questions are incidental. Not coincidently, each can
answer
> certain questions, to wit the ones it considers important, much more
> effectively than the other questions. 
>
> We have the following usual choices: Adopt one perspective based on
the
> promise that it (eventually) will be able to answer the full set of
> questions adequately; or construct a new theory as a dialectical
> synthesis of the original two. (I think socioculturalists straddle the
> two choices by sometimes claiming they are sociogenetic and other
times
> that they are inherently dialectic.)
>
> In the behaviorist era and subsequently the cognitive area, the first
> choice was more appealing. The desire to be "scientific" (i.e.,
> uni-paradigmatic), in conjunction with shameless hawking by
proponents,
> gave those approaches some time to adequately address the concerns of
> the other school. As neither succeeded in unifying the field, in this
> post-cognitive era, we opt more for dialectical approaches.
>
> The problem is that these dialectical alternatives, rather like the
> particle/wave dialectic of quantum physics, don't really help us make
> sense of the world in a way that is actionable. Our intuitions about
> learning are not able to encompass both sides of the dialectic in such
a
> way as to constitute a synthesis. As a result, a dialectic approach
puts
> on the table the diverse and discordant pieces that somehow have to be
> coordinated. Paul Cobb (1994) addressed this problem of constructivist
> and sociocultural approaches in a widely read ER piece recommending
> precisely that: a coordination of perspectives.
>
> Well, obviously a coordination of perspectives is exactly what is
> needed. The issue at hand is who does the coordinating? In Cobb's
> approach--as in all other academic approaches that have been
offered--it
> is the researcher's challenge to figure out the coordination. In this
> way, the work of coordination can take place in the academy in concert
> with efforts to forge a dialectical synthesis that eventually could
> serve to unify the science of learning under a single theorization.
This
> is why a genres approach is so disruptive. A genres approach says,
> instead, let's focus within each paradigm on figuring out what that
> framing has to offer teaching. Then leave it to teachers, to the world
> of professional practice, to figure out how (or if) to coordinate.
>
> For the researcher, this genres approach is a disaster. It constructs
> what is most important for researchers--an eventual dialectical
> synthesis that unites the field--as irrelevant to the world of
practice.
> Our theoretical musing no longer are projected into the world of
> educational practice as relevant, they become just our private
concern,
> with possible long-term payoff for the world, but no immediate
> relevance. For teachers, the genres approach finally provides for
> emancipation from the intellectual tyranny of theory. Because the
> individual paradigms are grounded in accessible metaphors for
learning,
> it becomes possible to articulate pedagogical principles in ways that
> are coherently available to teachers. And then it becomes the purview
of
> professional practice to determine how best to coordinate the genres
of
> teaching.
>
> This is truly a moral dilemma for researchers.
>
> David
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> On Behalf Of Andy Blunden
> Sent: Saturday, January 15, 2011 6:51 PM
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: Re: [xmca] Brains, Computer, and the Future of Education
>
> Thank you David for your truly enlightening post.
>
> Can I ask this question: when two subjects are engaged in a dialogue 
> over some issue, and are positing the issue in two different genres,
is 
> it true to say that they are explicitly or implicitly asserting 
> different frames. For example, if two parties are arguing over whether

> to increase unemployment benefit, they may disagree over the frame
being
>
> lazy people ripping off the community or disadvantaged people who 
> deserve the support of the community. So isn't there always a frame 
> around a genre where rational contest is possible? Every specialism 
> exists within a lingua franca of shared concepts, doesn't it?
>
> Andy
>
> David H Kirshner wrote:
>   
>> Larry, Andy, Michael, and Monica.
>>
>> Sorry for the delay in responding. Let me first address the
technology
>> tie-in, and then turn to the pedagogical question about how to deal
>>     
> with
>   
>> the multi-paradigmatic theorization of learning.
>>
>> I'm sympathetic to the perspective that it is "the current
>>     
> technologies
>   
>> being used and developed which transforms our guiding metaphors [for
>> learning] and not the internal debates among scholars." If we look at
>> the whole ball of wax, psychology certainly does seem a chaotic
tangle
>> that may well be led by technological happenstance rather than by
>> intellectual coherence. But the proliferation of new schools and new
>> approaches based on technological developments should not obscure the
>> kinds of processes of development that go within each paradigmatic
>> school. Certainly, paradigmatic differences are not settled by
debate.
>> As Kuhn pointed out, the competitive process is inescapably
>>     
> sociological
>   
>> rather than purely intellectual. What about within a paradigm? As
>> sociohistorical institutions schools of research persist over time
>> because of mutually shared projects that often are experienced as
>> intellectually coherent. Certainly technological developments can
>> influence the basic understandings pursued within a school. For
>> instance, psychologists moved on from the telephone switchboard
>>     
> metaphor
>   
>> of cognitive processing to the serial digital computer metaphor which
>> afforded much more dynamic possibilities for theorization, but with
>>     
> much
>   
>> basic conceptual continuity. I don't think it's "wrong" to regard
>>     
> intra
>   
>> paradigmatic development as led by technological developments.
>>     
> However,
>   
>> I imagine most of the time, for example in thinking about our own
>> progress as sociocultural or CHAT researchers, we find it useful to
>>     
> view
>   
>> progress in terms of intellectual coherence. In any case, in my work
>>     
> in
>   
>> harvesting insights from the diverse branches of psychology for the
>> purpose of framing a multi-paradigmatic pedagogy, I find it useful to
>> regard the work within paradigms as progressing through rational
>>     
> debate
>   
>> (or at least attempting to). 
>>
>> A Multi-paradigmatic Pedagogical Framework:
>>
>> How do we advance pedagogical theory taking seriously the
>> multi-paradigmatic status of learning theory? 
>>
>> Let me warn that this is a theme I've pursued before on xmca without
>> much uptake--I think for very good reasons. The path leads to
>> delegitimization of education as a co-participant with psychology in
>>     
> the
>   
>> scientific enterprise. Alternatively, it leads to the repudiation by
>> education of psychology's scientific pretensions. Given how deeply
>> enmeshed educational and psychological communities are with one
>>     
> another
>   
>> (e.g., xmca) this is not an easy or appealing path for either party.
>>
>> The first step on this path is the hardest to take, though it is
>>     
> simple
>   
>> to articulate. If we accept that learning is diversely conceived
>>     
> across
>   
>> varied paradigms, and we also regard the purpose of teaching as
>> promoting learning, then there is only one sensible path to take if
>>     
> one
>   
>> desires pedagogical theory to be grounded in learning theory: A
genres
>> approach to pedagogical theorizing, with each genre of teaching
>> addressing learning in a particular paradigmatic sense. To date, a
>> genres approach has not been advanced. However, there are two
>> alternative approaches that have been attempted, in each case with
>> disastrous consequences. One method is to focus on a single paradigm
>>     
> and
>   
>> deny the legitimacy of any others (e.g., the behaviorist era in
>> education). The other is to fashion a holistic vision of "good
>>     
> teaching"
>   
>> that somehow is to address learning in its various interpretations.
>>     
> This
>   
>> is the current Zeitgeist in educational theorizing, and I'll devote a
>> couple of paragraphs, below, to explaining its multifaceted ill
>>     
> effects
>   
>> on education, the most immediate and debilitating of which is
systemic
>> de-intellectualization of pedagogy. For if teaching practice is to be
>> understood in terms of learning theory, it can only be in terms of a
>> single theory at a time, given the multi-paradigmatic character of
>>     
> this
>   
>> branch of knowledge.
>>
>> I have been teaching an Education doctoral course on the genres
>>     
> approach
>   
>> for about 15 years, and I've ALMOST NEVER succeeded in making this
>>     
> first
>   
>> step comprehensible. So entrenched in our discourse are the ideas of
>> holistic pedagogy--"good teaching" as a set of practices that
>>     
> addresses
>   
>> learning conceived as a complex and multifaceted whole--that the
>> language of genres just doesn't register for my students. Typically,
>> when I present a framework for teaching for Skills, Concepts, and
>> Dispositions as distinct genres of teaching, this gets assimilated
>>     
> into
>   
>> a "learning styles" frame in which the different pedagogical
>>     
> approaches
>   
>> provide different routes to learning conceived as a complex and
>> multi-faceted whole. Indeed, our discourse typically intermixes these
>> learning goals as we talk of "understanding the skill," "practicing
>>     
> the
>   
>> concept," or "inculcating thinking skills." Students almost never
come
>> to grasp the motive of differentiating, rather than integrating,
these
>> notions of learning as a comprehensible agenda.
>>
>> The cost we pay for maintaining an integrative or holistic discourse
>> about "good teaching" in education is staggeringly high. First, is
the
>> impossibility of articulating pedagogical principles, which, as
>> discussed above would require that learning be conceived locally,
>> relative to the independently conceived notions of learning. Because
>>     
> in
>   
>> the standard discourse "good teaching" is somehow simultaneously to
>> address learning in its many various senses, we end up instead with
>> generalities and platitudes, with intractably dense dialectical
>>     
> analyses
>   
>> attempting to span disparate local theories, and with vignettes that
>>     
> are
>   
>> meant to illustrate good teaching, but that don't articulate its
>> principles. In short, we provide almost no usable intellectual
>>     
> resources
>   
>> that can serve to guide development of teaching practice.
>>
>> Second is the politicized character of our pedagogical discourse
>> stemming from the interpenetration of values issues with issues of
>> efficacy. Given the varied notions of learning that motivate
>>     
> educators,
>   
>> it is to be expected that values issues will arise as to which
sort(s)
>> of learning ought to be pursued with students. But since our
discourse
>> constructs good teaching as a holistic set of practices, there's no
>> discursive space for this variation. One's opponent's construction of
>> good teaching is not just wrong on values, but also misguided about
>>     
> what
>   
>> is effective practice (e.g., the Reading Wars and the Math Wars). A
>> discourse framed in genres of teaching would enable values issues to
>>     
> be
>   
>> separated from issues of efficacy, thereby protecting the
professional
>> integrity of the field of teaching practice.
>>
>> Finally, with so little to offer professional teaching practice,
>> learning theory is easily subject to being dismissed as irrelevant.
If
>> Teaching is defined in terms of promoting Learning, then learning
>>     
> theory
>   
>> ought to be THE theoretical discourse through which teaching practice
>>     
> is
>   
>> articulated. We see our growing irrelevance in the current prominence
>>     
> of
>   
>> "brain" perspectives on teaching--which is what started this
>>     
> thread--but
>   
>> also in other cognitive mechanisms approaches like "learning styles"
>> research, as well as in pedagogical framings based on critical
theory,
>> values theory, philosophical commitments, or metaphysical or
spiritual
>> bases. In the end what we have is an open-ended pedagogical discourse
>>     
> in
>   
>> which each new proposal for "good teaching" can create its own
>>     
> universe
>   
>> of discourse within which it is to be analyzed and evaluated. The
>> marketplace of pedagogical ideas resembles much more a bazaar than a
>> professional knowledge base. A genres approach, while featuring a
>> theoretically heterogeneous set of framings for learning, nonetheless
>> would enable us to capture the essential interests that motivate the
>> pedagogical enterprise within a finite and determinate set of
>> theoretical approaches.
>>
>> Genres: Why Not?
>>
>> One excellent reason to dismiss the genres approach is because it is
>>     
> so
>   
>> obvious. After all, it is immediately apparent that learning is
>> diversely conceived in varied psychological paradigms. So
>>     
> theorizations
>   
>> of good teaching that really come to grips with learning theory would
>> need to be constructed locally, relative to a specific notion of
>> learning. Surely, if a genres approach had any merit it would have
>>     
> been
>   
>> adopted, or at least explored, a long time ago. 
>>
>> The alternative is that there are powerful interests arrayed against
>> recognizing and dealing with the preparadigmatic status of
psychology.
>>     
> I
>   
>> propose that the genres approach has not previously been advanced
>> because it is in psychologists' self interest that it not be. 
>>
>> To understand these interests, we need to delve a bit into how
>> preparadigmatic science functions. Preparadigmatic science consists
of
>> multiple schools each in competition with the others to the unify the
>> field under its own banner. However, paradigmatic differences are
>>     
> never
>   
>> settled by debate. As Kuhn pointed out, the competitive process is
>> inescapably sociological rather than purely intellectual. Viewed
>>     
> through
>   
>> divergent paradigmatic lenses, different aspects of observed
phenomena
>> become highlighted as problematic. So one paradigm cannot invalidate
>>     
> the
>   
>> perspectives of another. Instead, a paradigm succeeds against others
>>     
> by
>   
>> addressing the concerns of the other paradigms in ways that are
>> sufficiently appealing and powerful as to attract established
>> researchers from other schools, and especially new researchers just
>> entering the field. Like old soldiers, old paradigms never die, they
>> just fade away.
>>
>> Viewed in this way, we see that psychologists must lead double lives.
>> Within their paradigm, the psychologist's life is similar to that of
>> most other scientists. They are involved in deliberate and careful
>> elaboration and extension of the basic perspectives that initiated
the
>> school. However, externally, they are hucksters extraordinaire.
Claims
>> are exaggerated. Hoped for/planned developments are presented as
faits
>> accomplis. After all, one wins in the broader game by attracting
>> researchers, especially neophyte researchers, to your school. 
>>
>> One could castigate psychologists for being duplicitous or dishonest,
>> but I think this freights individual psychology too heavily. What we
>> have is best viewed not as individual misrepresentation, but a
>> discursive form reflecting the sociological imperative of
>> preparadigmatic science to achieve paradigmatic consensus. The ironic
>> result is that across the broad diversity of psychology, there is
only
>> one tenet espoused by learning theorists of every persuasion: a
single
>> perspective (eventually) encompasses all of the relevant phenomena of
>> learning. Thus a genres approach to pedagogy, building on discrete
>> accomplishments across paradigmatic divisions, would subvert
>> psychologists' active self-interest in promoting the problem of
>> paradigmatic division as (imminently) solved.
>>
>> But what about educators? If psychologists prefer to deny the
>> preparadigmatic status of their field, why is it that educators
>>     
> haven't
>   
>> pressed on with a genres approach on their own? Again, a sociological
>> perspective can help, this time explaining the client status of
>> Education with respect to Psychology. One of the first preoccupations
>>     
> of
>   
>> Psychology, dating back to its emergence as a scientific enterprise,
>>     
> was
>   
>> investigation of the transfer of training assumptions of faculty
>> psychology (e.g., Thorndike & Woodworth, 1901). These early studies
>> found the prevailing belief in broad transfer of learning to be
>> unwarranted. Through preceding centuries, the classical
(Aristotelian)
>> theory of faculty psychology, and its associated theory of
>> mental-disciplines, had served as the basis for pedagogical thought.
>>     
> So,
>   
>> psychology's attack upon transfer of training effectively dislodged
>>     
> the
>   
>> existing foundations for educational practice. As a result, education
>> attached itself to the new science, not as a separate and independent
>> field of inquiry, but as a client discipline, dependent upon
>>     
> psychology
>   
>> for our legitimacy and intellectual authority. In that role, we have
>> tended to see the world as the psychologists do. We have not
construed
>> psychology independently, as we would need to do to adopt a genres
>> approach.
>>
>> Marshalling Preparadigmatic Psychology for Educational Purposes:
>>
>> I'm going to conclude this post with a description of how
>>     
> psychological
>   
>> theory gets appropriated and reworked in genres scholarship. (This
>> really is where the psychologists get mad.) I mentioned, above, that
>> "Within their paradigm, the psychologist's life is similar to that of
>> most other scientists." Similar, but not identical. I want to argue
>>     
> that
>   
>> paradigmatic science develops more organically based on insights that
>> bubble up from within the paradigm, in comparison with
preparadigmatic
>> science that is more teleologically driven by a felt need to address
>> concerns that have emerged in other schools. For instance,
>>     
> cognitivists
>   
>> exploring the computational metaphor might eventually have decided,
on
>> their own, to extend from decontextualized problem solving to
>>     
> encompass
>   
>> social and cultural context. But the need to be positioned as
>> competitive with sociogenetic approaches like sociocultural
psychology
>> forced this development earlier. In this respect, we can see a
>> trajectory of preparadigmatic science that is not quite parallel with
>> paradigmatic science. Preparadigmatic schools tends to evolve from
>> simple and powerful, but local, initial insights toward complex and
>> opaque interpretations intended to bridge disparate intuitions. And
>>     
> then
>   
>> again, some preparadigmatic schools--e.g., social constructivism and
>> perhaps situated cognition theory, in psychology--initially are
formed
>> as a synthesis of diverse perspectives precisely in order to be
>> competitive players in the preparadigmatic game, but without a clear
>>     
> and
>   
>> simple local insight. The result is that use of psychology to inform
a
>> genres approach must be highly selective, calling only on those
>>     
> theories
>   
>> that most effectively highlight a single metaphorical notion of
>> learning, often relying on earlier, more narrow, versions of the
>>     
> theory
>   
>> over contemporary forms.
>>
>> In my own "crossdisciplinary"* effort to found a genres approach for
>> education that builds on insights from diverse psychological schools,
>> I've found it convenient to identify the metaphors for learning that
I
>> see as framing education's diverse interests, and then to hunt around
>> for psychological approaches that help to fill out that metaphorical
>> interpretation. In this approach, I am guided by the perspective that
>> psychology often draws from our culturally shared metaphors for its
>> basic images and intuitions (Fletcher, 1995; Leary, 1994; Olson &
>> Bruner, 1996; Sternberg, 1997). For instance, my "habituation"
>>     
> metaphor
>   
>> for learning-as-skill-attainment draws somewhat on behaviorist
>> psychology, but also on a branch of cognitive theory known as
>>     
> "implicit
>   
>> learning theory." My "construction" metaphor for
>> learning-as-concept-attainment draws somewhat on the Piagetian based
>> radical constructivist, but also on the conceptual change literature.
>>     
> My
>   
>> "enculturation" metaphor for learning-as-disposition-attainment draws
>> partly on sociocultural theory, but also on social psychology. For
>> although sociocultural theory is predominantly sociogenetic Vygotsky,
>> along with those who have undertaken to extend his legacy, resisted
>>     
> the
>   
>> complete social determinism that I see as needed to articulate a
>> coherent "enculturation pedagogy." As Penuel and Wertsch (1995) put
>>     
> it:
>   
>> "Sociocultural processes on the one hand and individual functioning
on
>> the other [exist] in a dynamic, irreducible tension rather than a
>>     
> static
>   
>> notion of social determination. A sociocultural approach ...
considers
>> these poles of sociocultural processes and individual functioning as
>> interacting moments in human action, rather than as static processes
>> that exist in isolation from one another" (p. 84). (Emphasizing
social
>> determinism, my prototypical exemplar of enculturational learning is
>> "proxemics" drawn from social psychology, the study of how individual
>> comes to embody the "personal body space" conventions of their
>>     
> national
>   
>> culture.)
>>
>> I think this serves to establish how psychological science is
>>     
> marshaled
>   
>> within a genres agenda. Resisting what is everywhere present in
>> psychology--the attempt to develop a comprehensive account of
learning
>> that suffices for all purposes--the genres approach seeks after
>>     
> partial
>   
>> accounts that correspond with what I see as coherently forming the
>> discrete interest of educators in teaching skills, concepts, and
>> dispositions. It's not "wrong" for socioculturalists to agree, as did
>> Larry a couple of posts ago, "that we must account for processes at
>>     
> the
>   
>> neurological level from a CHAT perspective." Indeed, such initiatives
>> are vital to enable CHAT/sociocultural psychology to remain viable,
>>     
> and
>   
>> perhaps eventually prevail, within the competitive game of
>> preparadigmatic psychology. But the broader designs of the various
>> schools will not help us, today, to support educational practice. The
>> psychology of TODAY is a preparadigmatic psychology, and that reality
>> must be embraced in order to discern and support the discrete agendas
>> for learning that motivate education. 
>>
>> *I use the term crossdisciplinary in contrast with interdisciplinary
>>     
> to
>   
>> signal the coordination, rather than integration, of existing
>> theoretical frameworks. 
>>
>> David
>>
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
[mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
>> On Behalf Of Larry Purss
>> Sent: Wednesday, January 12, 2011 7:35 AM
>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Brains, Computer, and the Future of Education
>>
>> David
>> Another quick thought on the competing models of learning and how
>>     
> these
>   
>> models become common sense or taken for granted folk psychological
>>     
> ways
>   
>> of
>> orienting to the world. The  power of metaphors to conventionalize a
>> cultural imaginary seems to be  central to this transformative
process
>> that
>> develops various cognitive models at the implicit or tacit level.
>>     
> Andy
>   
>> points to the historical processes that lead to a particular metaphor
>> structuring our cognition [the zeitgeist]. As I read his comments
>> he suggests it is the current technologies being used and developed
>> which
>> transforms our guiding metaphors and not the internal debates among
>> scholars.  If technological transformation  "constitutes"
>>     
> metaphorical
>   
>> transformation [stronger term than influences] then how do we
>> consciously
>> engage with these transformative technological processes to influence
>> the
>> zeitgeist [as a dialogue among models] ? At the level of common sense
>> folk
>> psychological metaphors of learning are university debates leading
the
>> way
>> or charting where the technology has taken us?
>> The underlying question is, How do we get teachers to incorporate
>> alternative models of learning and cognition which run counter to
>>     
> common
>   
>> sense
>>
>> Larry
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Jan 12, 2011 at 4:37 AM, Michael Glassman
>> <MGlassman@ehe.osu.edu>wrote:
>>
>>   
>>     
>>> Hi David,
>>>
>>> I sort of feel like the human relationship with information has
>>>     
>>>       
>> changed in
>>   
>>     
>>> very fundemental ways over the last ten years.  Phenomena like the
>>>     
>>>       
>> Web,
>>   
>>     
>>> Google, FaceBook, the Open Source movement have moved incredibly
>>>     
>>>       
>> quickly.
>>   
>>     
>>>  Some academic urban legends are rising up, such as the idea that
the
>>> computer in some way changes the structure of wiring of the brain
>>> (absolutely no evidence, or even proto-evidence for this I can.)
But
>>>     
>>>       
>> I
>>   
>>     
>>> think it is a combination of fear and confusion.  You have first
>>>     
>>>       
>> amendment
>>   
>>     
>>> lawyers like Floyd Abrams arguing against free speech on the
>>>       
> Internet.
>   
>>>     
>>>       
>> You
>>   
>>     
>>> have brutal authoritarians like Putin signing executive orders
making
>>> Russian government completely Open Source by 2015 (my guess is he
has
>>>     
>>>       
>> no
>>   
>>     
>>> idea what Open Source actually is).  The whole thing is mind
>>>       
> boggling.
>   
>>> I think of cognitivist, behaviorists socio cultural theorists, etc,
>>>     
>>>       
>> etc.
>>   
>>     
>>> arguing over who bats next, not realizing that the rules of the game
>>>     
>>>       
>> are
>>   
>>     
>>> completely changing.  Changing in ways we don't even have a
>>>       
> vocabulary
>   
>>>     
>>>       
>> to
>>   
>>     
>>> talk about yet.
>>>
>>> Michael
>>>
>>> ________________________________
>>>
>>> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu on behalf of David H Kirshner
>>> Sent: Tue 1/11/2011 10:45 PM
>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>> Subject: RE: [xmca] Brains, Computer, and the Future of Education
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Larry,
>>>
>>> Here's my sociology of science account of the rise of brain studies
>>>       
> as
>   
>>>     
>>>       
>> a
>>   
>>     
>>> substitute for learning theory.
>>>
>>> 1. In Kuhnian terms, psychology is a preparadigmatic science. For
>>> instance, learning is variously studied in behavioral, cognitive,
>>> developmental, and sociocultural schools that conceive of learning
in
>>> fundamentally distinct ways.
>>>
>>> 2. The grand motive of preparadigmatic science is establishment of
>>> paradigmatic consensus. Each school is in competition with the
others
>>>     
>>>       
>> to
>>   
>>     
>>> unify the field under its umbrella by coming to accommodate the
>>> interests of the other schools while still preserving the essence of
>>>     
>>>       
>> its
>>   
>>     
>>> own unique perspective. Most often this competition is implicit, but
>>> periodically it leads to open conflict as in Chomsky's repudiation
of
>>> Skinner's effort to account for "Verbal Behavior," or in the flare
up
>>>     
>>>       
>> in
>>   
>>     
>>> the late '90s between James Greeno and John Anderson and company
over
>>> cognitivist efforts to account for the situated character of
>>>       
> learning.
>   
>>> 3. The dominant paradigm in any period always is the one to most
>>> strenuously pursue hegemonic designs on the field. The cognitivists'
>>> embracing of the rhetoric of situativity has cost them dearly: they
>>>       
> no
>   
>>> longer can forefront the technical machinery of information
>>>       
> processing
>   
>>> theory and artificial intelligence computer simulation as their
>>>     
>>>       
>> central
>>   
>>     
>>> technical method and theoretical thrust. This is really a crisis
>>>       
> point
>   
>>> for cognitivists. They gained prominence through the Information
>>> Processing approach, and are coasting along on their reputation.
>>> Embracing brain science enables them to maintain the surface
features
>>>     
>>>       
>> of
>>   
>>     
>>> dynamic "science," while providing a convenient disguise for the
fact
>>> that there's no longer a central metaphor for learning that is being
>>> elaborated and developed by that community.
>>>
>>> 4. Projecting this forward a decade or so, we have the likelihood of
>>> diminishment of the importance of the cognitivist umbrella, and
>>>     
>>>       
>> renewed
>>   
>>     
>>> opportunity for the other schools to push toward the front of the
>>>     
>>>       
>> pack.
>>   
>>     
>>> ...should be lots of fun.
>>>
>>> David
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>       
> [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
>   
>>> On Behalf Of Larry Purss
>>> Sent: Tuesday, January 11, 2011 7:37 AM
>>> To: lchcmike@gmail.com; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Brains, Computer, and the Future of Education
>>>
>>> Mike,
>>>
>>> The band wagon may not be a strong enough metaphor.  The image of a
>>> steam
>>> roller seems more accurate.  I mentioned earlier that the term ZPD
is
>>> now a
>>> recognized term in many school settings [as scaffolding].  However
>>>     
>>>       
>> this
>>   
>>     
>>> alternative metaphor of mind as computer or mind  as brain is a far
>>>     
>>>       
>> more
>>   
>>     
>>> powerful metaphor in schools. Often school staffs are fascinated
with
>>> these
>>> explanations and believe that neuroscience is finally getting to the
>>> "heart"
>>> of the matter [couldn't resist the contradictary metaphor]. Brain
>>> science as
>>> an explanation of learning is becoming   the dominant narrative in
>>> many school debates.  I was wondering if there are any "simplified'
>>> articles
>>> for a general audience that engage with these neuro/brain metaphors
>>>     
>>>       
>> that
>>   
>>     
>>> would lead to school staffs possibly having a dialogue [by
>>>       
> introducing
>   
>>> dought]  I have shared a few articles with interested staff who love
>>> ideas
>>> but they were too "theoretical" for a staff discussion.
>>>
>>> With this steam roller comes the call for justifying your practice
in
>>> schools by using "best practices" which are "evidence based".  This
>>> evidence often is dominated by evidence from neuroscience
>>>
>>>  I have attempted to introduce sociocultural perspectives into the
>>> debate in
>>>  response to the neuro/brain social representations of learning but
I
>>> would
>>> appreciate an  article for a general audience that I could hand out
>>>       
> to
>   
>>> start
>>> a dialogue among school staffs.
>>>
>>> Mike, I believe this frame of reference is not a "fad" or a "band
>>>     
>>>       
>> wagon"
>>   
>>     
>>> but is developing into a "conventionalized" metaphor which most
>>> educators
>>> may use to explain "learning" in  schools.  Fad indicates a
>>>       
> transitory
>   
>>> phenomena and neuroscience seems a longer lasting  phenomena.
>>>
>>> I am looking for an article that does not refute or contradict the
>>> neuroscience explanations but rather LINKS the  ideas to
>>>       
> sociocultural
>   
>>> concepts.
>>>
>>> One of the principals in a school I work in is attending this
>>> conference,
>>> and principals do have influence in school cultures.  I hope to
>>> influence
>>> her.
>>>
>>> Larry
>>>
>>> On Mon, Jan 10, 2011 at 8:07 PM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
>>>       
> wrote:
>   
>>>     
>>>       
>>>> The bandwagon is visible coming over the horizon!
>>>> Check it out at http://www.learningandthebrain.com/brain28.html.
>>>> Join for just the price of a click and a clack.
>>>> mike
>>>> __________________________________________
>>>> _____
>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>
>>>>       
>>>>         
>>> __________________________________________
>>> _____
>>> xmca mailing list
>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
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>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
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>>>
>>>
>>> __________________________________________
>>> _____
>>> xmca mailing list
>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>
>>>
>>>     
>>>       
>> __________________________________________
>> _____
>> xmca mailing list
>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
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>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>
>>
>>   
>>     
>
>   

-- 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hegel Summer School: The New Atheism: Just Another Dogma? 
<http://ethicalpolitics.org/seminars/hss2011.htm>

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