Mike and Larry and others, I thought what Vygotsky said was interesting (maybe a bit too much of the neural flexibility stuff) but what I think is somewhat controversial is the way he seems to suggest a seamless transition between imagination and creativity. I think this is at least partially the result of his developmental roots, and his desire to tie early imagination to the types of creativity that allows for development. What you imagine becomes what you use to help you ease your way into society. It's kind of brilliant when you think about it. I think of Fernald and the whole idea in language of welcoming the new born into society. Is Vygotsky saying that imagination is our built in engine that allows us to start experimenting with being a part of society at an early age. Could you also say that for Vygotsky semiotic mediation is the transom that allows what you imagine to become the product that you create? Am I reading him right here? But then I think back to Peirce and his abduction and how focused he was on only exploring now only what is observable, but what is observable as a problem solving activity. Does the imagination exist in some netherworld where most of what we imagine is lost, and what we are able to reclaim we can only see in creative action, suggesting more of a differentiation (to the point where we really don't have ground on which to talk about imagination - perhaps something we believe is there in others because we know it is there in us). Don't know if I have this right, but that is my take, Michael ________________________________ From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu on behalf of mike cole Sent: Wed 8/11/2010 8:19 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: Re: [xmca] Abduction, Creativity and Imagination Larry and Michael-- I was working from the far beyond when i sent around the Vygotsky article on creativity and imagination in which he makes what seems to me to be a sound arguement. It written before any of us was born!. Did it not get through? His differentiations make sense to me. What am i missing here? Do I need to re-send? I am notorious for think I sent some attachment when I failed to!! mike On Wed, Aug 11, 2010 at 7:19 AM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote: > Michael > I've been reflecting on your question of differentiating between creativity > and imagination. I agree the question of the procedure of how the imaginal > becomes actualized and changes the "order of things" [Bateson] in > lifeworlds > is the central question of this topic. > Your comment that "Imagination" may be located more INSIDE THE HEAD and > less > directly related to "problem solving" is where I sense a slight difference > of emphasis. This "inside the head" or "JUST imagination" as somehow less > legitimate than "problem solving" is where I'm at the edge of my horizon of > understanding in my ZPD. It is also why I'm also curious about RELATIONAL > psychoanalysis as a tradition. INscapes and LANDscapes are somehow linked > and abduction as a topic is exploring these linkages. I recognize that > people take strong positions on one side or the other of this > Inscape/Landscape dialectic but I'm contnually fascinated with the tension. > As an orientation in my work [and life] I'm wondering if it's possible to > delight in the continuing fluidity and dance between subjectivity/self and > intersubjectivity that is both imaginal and creative with the teleological > end goal of creating "COMMON sense". I do strongly support that Inscapes > are a developmental achievement grounded in previous societal situations of > development but "AGENTIC capacity" and "self-determination" are also > key constructs which I believe have continuing relevance within > sociocultural theory. [though "post modern perspectives challenge this > view] > > Michael, a last comment that creativity can be "observed". When I have > given students an opportunity to share their imaginal Inscapes [that are > usually kept private] in a space where these deeply personal reflections > are > recognized and validated [shared in OPEN spaces] I OBSERVE a transformation > in the intersubjective affiliation within the group. There is a quality of > "intimacy" that is generated which leads to an EXPANSION of learning and a > sharing of multiple perspectives. > Larry > > On Mon, Aug 9, 2010 at 5:04 AM, Michael Glassman <MGlassman@ehe.osu.edu > >wrote: > > > Hi Larry and All, > > > > I wonder if it might be worthwhile making a differentiation between > > creativity and imagination. Creativity it seems to be is more active and > > can be observed, is process oriented, and is, or can be directly related > to > > problem solving. Imagination is maybe more inside the head and less > > directly related to problem solving. I sort of think of John Lennon's > song > > Imagine and the old song "Just my Imagination." Well anyway, maybe > > abduction is more related to creativity than imagination. > > > > Michael > > > > > > ________________________________ > > > > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu on behalf of Larry Purss > > Sent: Sun 8/8/2010 9:45 AM > > To: lchcmike@gmail.com; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: Re: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts > > > > > > > > Hi Mike and Denise and Michael [and others engaged in this expanding > > conversation] > > > > Mike, this topic's multi-voicedness has definitely gone ballistic and > I've > > been sent into orbit. However, without coordinates I'm confused about > which > > constellation I'm circling. Hard to get my bearings when moving at warp > > speed. > > > > I struggle with reading and understanding Peirce, but I do recognize the > > depth and profound intuitive insights which he generates from a lifetime > of > > reflecting. > > > > Valsiner's "translation" of Peirce's concept "abduction" as ABSOLUTELY > > FOUNDATIONAL to the other generative functions of "inferencing" > [deduction > > and induction] articulates the ABSOLUTE CENTRALITY OF IMAGINATION as > > implicated in the formation of mind, "self" "culture" "history". > > > > Your mentioning the influence of prior discussions about LSV and > > imagination > > [and playworlds] led me back to a CHAT discussion in 2006 on these > topics. > > In that thread you were discussing John Dewey's Chapter 1 of "Art & > > Experience" > > > > Within that thread on Dewey the topic of "learning by expanding" was > being > > discussed and you posted the following quote from Dewey. > > > > "... if life continues and in continuing it expands there is an > overcoming > > of factors of opposition and conflict; there is a transformation of them > > into different aspects of a higher powered and more SIGNIFICANT life. The > > marvel of organic, of vital, adaptation through expansion (instead of by > > contraction and passive accomodation) actually takes place. Here in germ > > are > > balance and harmony attained through rhythm. Equilibrium comes about not > > mechanically and inertly but out of and because of tension." (p.13) > > > > Mike, I decided to repost this quote you previously posted to express the > > centrality of this theme of abduction and imagination for Peirce, Dewey, > > and > > Mead. > > Michael mentioned the central value of instrumental pragmatism was in > the > > empirical putting into practice abductive processes. However as I read > > Valsiner's translation of Peirce I want to suggest that instrumental > > pragmatism is GROUNDED IN IMAGINATION [abduction] and without imagination > > there is no LEARNING BY EXPANDING. > > > > I believe Mead's contribution to pragmatism was his focus on expanding > SELF > > formation and developing the "agentic capacity" to ACTUALIZE imaginal > > expansions within a community of dialogical inquiry. What Mead brings to > > the conversation is a focus on "intersubjectivity" and SHARED imagination > > as the ground of emerging subjectivity. The terms "perspective-taking" > and > > "social acts" and "SIGNIFICANT [shared] SYMBOLS" are key concepts in his > > emphasis on learning by EXPANDING. Coordinating multiple perspectives is > > the procedural process of abduction [as I understand abduction from > > Valsiner's translation] > > > > Denise, > > I want to once more thank you for Valsiner's article which I hope EXPANDS > > our learning in our playworld. When I asked for other readings > contrasting > > "mind reading" and "non-mind reading" theories I had no idea of the orbit > I > > would be sent into. > > > > Larry > > > > This > > > > > > > > On Sat, Aug 7, 2010 at 10:21 AM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > > Thanks Denis > > > This time of year (in northern hemisphere) everyone is moving around in > > > every which direction. And when lots of people get into the discussion. > > > multi-voicedness goes ballistic!! > > > > > > Will read Valsiner on abduction with interest. Mulling over the > > abduction/ > > > imagination connection which intuitively works, although I had not > > connect > > > the two ideas before (the influence, too, of prior discussions about > LSV > > > and > > > imagination). > > > > > > Sure a lot of threads entangled here. very interesting. > > > mike > > > > > > On Fri, Aug 6, 2010 at 6:46 AM, Denise Newnham <dsnewnham@bluewin.ch> > > > wrote: > > > > > > > Dear Michael, > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I wrote to Jaan about your question as no where was it clearly > > stipulated > > > > in > > > > the earlier works and he has just replied so I forward his words and > > text > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Denise > > > > > > > > Dear Denise, > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Good question! In 1998 I was somewhat naively optimistic about Peirce > > > cand > > > > abduction (see Pizarroso & V 2009 on overcoming that optimism). > > > > > > > > But the 1998 quote from my book is indeed an embryonic form of what > > later > > > > (2001 in Potsdam, and more thoroughly in my 2007 book CULTURE IN > MINDS > > > AND > > > > SOCIETIES became clear-- words as POINT-LIKE CONCEPTS cannot be the > > > highest > > > > level of semiotic mediation as they would close up further creativity > > of > > > > meaning-making. So Vygotsky was basically limited. > > > > > > > > Instead, the pseudo-concept translates in my terminology into > > field-type > > > > sign (Level 4 in my system of semiotic mediation) > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Jaan > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] > > > On > > > > Behalf Of Michael Glassman > > > > Sent: 05 August 2010 15:22 > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > Subject: RE: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Hi Denise, > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I was wondering, does Valsiner have an argument as to how and why > > > > pseudo-concepts actally aids in Peirces ilogic of abduction. I am > > > > currently > > > > under the impresson that abduction is primarily about hypothesis > > > generation > > > > - the ability to develop new hypotheses in response to unique > problems. > > > So > > > > I'm wondering what role pseudo-concepts, if we are going by > Vygotsky's > > > > definition, might play in all this. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Michael > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > _____ > > > > > > > > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu on behalf of Denise Newnham > > > > Sent: Thu 8/5/2010 5:26 AM > > > > To: ablunden@mira.net; 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' > > > > Subject: RE: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts > > > > > > > > Hello Andy, the reference as you saw to pseudoconcepts is in his book > > > 'The > > > > guided mind' 1998 and the other is : The development of the concept > of > > > > development: Historical and epistemological perspectives. In W. > Damon, > > & > > > R. > > > > Lerner(Eds), Handbook of child psychology. 5th Ed. VOl.1. Theoretical > > > > models > > > > of human development (pp. 189-232). New York: Wiley. > > > > > > > > I quote (1998): 'Vygotsky and his colleagues (Luria would be the > > closest > > > > example) attributed and overly idealized role to the role of concepts > > in > > > > human reasoning. The role fitted with his emphasis on the hierarchy > of > > > > mental functions (i.e. higher mental functions regulating lower > ones), > > > yet > > > > by this exaggerated emphasis the focus on the process of semiogenesis > > is > > > > actually diminished. In contrast, it could be claimed that > > > pseudo-concepts > > > > (i.e. specific unified conglomerates of concept and complex > qualities) > > > are > > > > the core (and highest form) of human psychological functioning. The > > claim > > > > would fit with the unity of representational fields (of Karl Buhler, > > > > described and extended earlier) and with the central focus of > abduction > > > > (rather than induction or deduction) in the process of making sense > > > (along > > > > the lines of Pierce). > > > > > > > > I read you paper 'when is a concept really a concept' and heard that > > > there > > > > was a debate on XMCA but as I was not connected at that time have not > > > heard > > > > or read this debate. > > > > > > > > Denise > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] > > > On > > > > Behalf Of Andy Blunden > > > > Sent: 05 August 2010 10:22 > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > Subject: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts > > > > > > > > Can you give us the full reference for "see Valsiner, > > > > 1997d", Denise, and maybe even the context? I just find it > > > > incredible that someone could know as much about Vygotsky as > > > > Valsiner does and place pseduoconcepts at the top of the > > > > development hierarchy. > > > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > > > Denise Newnham wrote: > > > > > Dear Larry and others, > > > > > > > > > > I am new to this game so perhaps am doing something out of turn so > if > > > so > > > > let > > > > > me know. Larry I read your reply and this extract below made me > think > > > of > > > > > Valsiner's work on semiotic mediators and concepts where he states > > that > > > > > pseudoconcepts (1998, p.278-279) should be placed at the top to the > > > > > developmental hierarchy as the hierarchy should be seen as 'open to > > > > changes > > > > > or formation of intrasensitive order- [see Valsiner, 1997d]' (2001, > > p. > > > > > 85).This brings ot my mind Markova's discussion on the spontaneous > of > > > > > intuitive in knowledge formation (2003) and I think that Cole's > fifth > > > > > dimension attests to this argument. There is an interesting paper > by > > > > > Galligan (2008) "using Valsiner" on the web. > > > > > > > > > > Denise > > > > > > > > > > 'These reflections of linking up multiple perspectives lead to the > > > > > developmental question of how socially situated microgenetic > > > experiences > > > > > get "generalized" into "higher" levels of organization that > organize > > > > > experience across situations [and organize the relation of the > > "lower" > > > > and > > > > > "higher" > > > > > functions]?' > > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > > > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] > > > > On > > > > > Behalf Of Larry Purss > > > > > Sent: 04 August 2010 19:04 > > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > > Subject: Re: [xmca] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers: Special Issue > > on > > > > > Mindreading, Review of Philosophy and Psychology > > > > > > > > > > Hi Leif and Katerina > > > > > > > > > > Leif, > > > > > I have recently read Daniel Stern's latest book "The Present > Moment" > > > and > > > > I > > > > > agree that he has a fascinating perspective on the topic of > > > "engagement" > > > > > that emphasizes a "non-mind reading interpretation" of engaging > with > > > > > others. I will look up his earlier work discussing Vygotsky and > > Glick. > > > > It > > > > > is also interesting that you mention Joseph Glick. Glick's articles > > on > > > > > Werner are also fascinating as they suggest that Werner was also > > > focused > > > > on > > > > > "microgenesis" as central to developmental accounts. > > > > > > > > > > Katerina, > > > > > I'm not sure exactly what you mean by "accept metaphor" but > generally > > I > > > > > accept metaphor as a central way of understanding "human science" > as > > > > > interpretive and "perspectival". As I read Glick's interpretation > > of > > > > > Werner's microgenetic developmental theory, I was also REFLECTING > on > > > Mike > > > > & > > > > > Natalia's focus on the microgenetic social situation of > development, > > > and > > > > > also my attempt to link these perspectives with neo-Meadian notions > > of > > > > > social ACTS [interchangeability of actual social positions]. These > > > > > reflections of linking up multiple perspectives lead to the > > > developmental > > > > > question of how socially situated microgenetic experiences get > > > > > "generalized" into "higher" levels of organization that organize > > > > experience > > > > > across situations [and organize the relation of the "lower" and > > > "higher" > > > > > functions]? > > > > > > > > > > Glick's article "Werner's Relevance for Contemporary Developmental > > > > > Psychology" points out that Werner thought developmental processes > > got > > > > > organized "at one of three different levels: the sensorimotor, the > > > > > perceptual, or the symbolic." (p.562) Metaphor organizes > experience > > at > > > > the > > > > > 3rd symbolic level and at this level we can have metaphoric models > of > > > > "mind" > > > > > [for example: conversation, text, computers, dance, orchestra, > etc.] > > > > > However, this still leaves us with questioning the RELATIONAL > > process > > > of > > > > > linking language and metaphor to the other levels of organization > at > > > the > > > > > sensorimotor and perceptual levels. > > > > > Stern, Reddy, Werner, Glick, Gillespie & Martin, Mike and Natalia, > > and > > > > > others are exploring the possible dynamic fluidity of the capacity > > for > > > > > organizing and structuring the 3 levels of experience that may be > > more > > > > > reciprocal [and possibly simultaneous assemby] than a linear > > > teleological > > > > > dynamic. The question becomes, how central are the sensorimotor > and > > > > > perceptual ways of "constructing" or "forming" experience once > social > > > > > situations of development are symbolic [and metaphorical]? As > Glick > > > > points > > > > > out, Werner believed these language and symbolic functions "undergo > a > > > > > differentiation process from deeper sensorimotor roots." (p.562) > > > However > > > > > these deeper roots are NOT TRANSCENDED but continue to organize > > > > experience. > > > > > The notion of "leading activity" implies an INVARIANT linear > process > > > > where > > > > a > > > > > specific leading activity DOMINATES each stage of development. An > > > > > alternative perspective emphasizes the fluidity of these "leading > > > > > activities" as continuing to remain central for development. For > > > > > example functions such as "affiliation" are not only dominant in > one > > > > > specific stage of developmentand then recede into the background, > but > > > > > ACTUALLY continue to ACTIVELY organize experience [depending on the > > > > societal > > > > > microgenetic situation of development]. Whether the previous > > "leading > > > > > activity" recedes or remains active is dependent, not on the stage > of > > > > > development [age determined] but rather on the particular social > > > > situation > > > > > of development. Mike's point that particular school contexts > > correlate > > > > with > > > > > particular ages of students allows 2 alternative models of > > development. > > > > > Stage theory that is age "determined" or layered development that > is > > > > > socially situated [schools CONSTRAIN affiliative activity which > > recedes > > > > into > > > > > the background] If the 2nd alternative guided how we structured > > > schools > > > > and > > > > > affiliation and interchangeability of social positions was VALUED, > > > > identity > > > > > and concept development would be altered. > > > > > My personal fascination, working in schools, is the idea of the > > > > possibility > > > > > of creating institutional structures which promote the > > > > "interchangeability > > > > > of social positions in social acts" and how to facilitate social > > spaces > > > > > which nurture this interchangeability. An example of this is the > > > creation > > > > of > > > > > the 5th dimension METAPHORICAL SPACES where interchangeability of > > > > positions > > > > > is fluid and dynamic and leads to the development of "agentic > > capacity" > > > > > where ALL participants experience being recognized and experiencing > > > > OTHERS > > > > > RESPONDING to their recognition. This affiliative activity is > > > formative > > > > of > > > > > particular "identity" characteristics [communal self] and also > > "concept > > > > > development" formed within microgenetic moments of development. The > > > > reason > > > > I > > > > > appreciate neo-Meadian accounts of development are > > > > > there privileging the centrality of ACTUAL INTERCHANGEABILITY of > > social > > > > > positions [which simultaneously organize and regulate sensorimotor, > > > > > perceptual, and symbolic experiences]. I also believe this "ideal" > > of > > > > > actual interchangeability is fundamentally affiliative and > dialogical > > > as > > > > the > > > > > participants openly share perspectives. This also creates social > > > > > spaces where cognitive development [and reflective capacity] is > > > nurtured > > > > and > > > > > "grown" [cultured] > > > > > > > > > > Larry > > > > > > > > > > On Wed, Aug 4, 2010 at 7:32 AM, Katerina Plakitsi > > > > <kplakits@gmail.com>wrote: > > > > > > > > > >> Larry, with "trans situated" do you mean that you accept > "metaphor", > > > > which > > > > >> is been considered as a constructivist argument? > > > > >> Katerina Plakitsi > > > > >> Assistant Professor of Science Education > > > > >> Department of Early Childhood Education > > > > >> School of Education > > > > >> University of Ioannina > > > > >> 45110 > > > > >> Greece > > > > >> tel.: +302651005771 office > > > > >> fax: +302651005842 > > > > >> tel.: +6972898463 mobile > > > > >> e-mail: kplakits@cc.uoi.gr > > > > >> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits > > > > >> http://users.uoi.gr/5conns > > > > >> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr <http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr/> <http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr/> < > > http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr/> > > > > >> http://www.edife.gr/school/5oschool.html > > > > >> > > > > >> -------------------------------------------------- > > > > >> From: "Larry Purss" <lpscholar2@gmail.com> > > > > >> Sent: Tuesday, August 03, 2010 8:43 PM > > > > >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> > > > > >> Subject: Re: [xmca] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers: Special > Issue > > on > > > > >> > > > > >> Mindreading, Review of Philosophy and Psychology > > > > >> > > > > >> Hi Martin > > > > >>> This topic of "mind-reading" vs "non-mind reading" models of > young > > > > >>> infants > > > > >>> CAPACITY for attending to and ENGAGING with other "minds" > [persons] > > > is > > > > a > > > > >>> fascinating topic which has been discussed previously in CHAT > > > > >>> conversations > > > > >>> on this listserve. > > > > >>> I recently read V. Reddy's book which recommends a 2nd person > > > societal > > > > >>> interactional microgenetic model of non-mind reading. I have > > sympathy > > > > for > > > > >>> this particular perspective. However, I would like to read more > > > widely > > > > on > > > > >>> this particular topic. > > > > >>> > > > > >>> Do you or others on this listserve have any recommendations for > > > further > > > > >>> articles which engage with the pros and cons of the various > models > > > in > > > > a > > > > >>> spirit similar to the proposed intent of the special issue of the > > > > Review > > > > >>> of > > > > >>> Philosophy and Psychology? > > > > >>> > > > > >>> I'm curious about the various theories of young infants capacity > > for > > > > >>> engaging with others within sociogenesis, ontogenesis, and > > > > microgenesis. > > > > >>> However, I'm also interested in how the various models of > "infants > > > > >>> engaging > > > > >>> with others" become transformed in the transition to > > > > >>> TRANS-situational understandings [the development of "higher" > > mental > > > > >>> functions.] > > > > >>> > > > > >>> Larry > > > > >>> > > > > >>> On Mon, Aug 2, 2010 at 12:57 PM, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu> > > > wrote: > > > > >>> > > > > >>> Begin forwarded message: > > > > >>>>> From: Victoria Southgate <v.southgate@bbk.ac.uk> > > > > >>>>> Date: August 2, 2010 4:22:07 AM GMT-05:00 > > > > >>>>> To: cogdevsoc@virginia.edu > > > > >>>>> Subject: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers: Special Issue on > > Mindreading, > > > > >>>> Review of Philosophy and Psychology > > > > >>>>> Social Cognition: Mindreading and Alternatives > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> Special issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> Guest Editors: > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> Daniel D Hutto, University of Hertfordshire > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> Mitchell Herschbach, University of California, San Diego > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> Victoria Southgate, University of London > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> CALL FOR PAPERS > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> Deadline for submissions: 1 December 2010 > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> Human beings, even very young infants, exhibit remarkable > > > capacities > > > > >>>>> for > > > > >>>> attending to, and engaging with, other minds. A prevalent > account > > of > > > > > such > > > > >>>> abilities is that they involve "theory of mind" or > "mindreading": > > > the > > > > >>>> ability to represent mental states as mental states of specific > > > kinds > > > > >>>> (i.e., > > > > >>>> to have concepts of "belief," "desire," etc.) and the contents > of > > > such > > > > >>>> mental states. A number of philosophers and psychologists > question > > > the > > > > >>>> standard mindreading and wider representationalist framework for > > > > >>>> characterizing and explaining our everyday modes and methods of > > > > >>>> understanding other people. One possibility is that infants may > be > > > > >>>> exhibiting sophisticated yet non-conceptual, and possibly > > > > >>>> non-representational, mind tracking abilities that do not equate > > to > > > > any > > > > >>>> sort > > > > >>>> of mindreading. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> Proponents on both sides of this debate must adequately > > accommodate > > > > >>>> recent work in developmental psychology. Experiments involving a > > > > variety > > > > >>>> of > > > > >>>> nonverbal tasks - e.g., the "violation of expectation" paradigm > > and > > > > >>>> anticipatory looking tasks, as well as nonverbal tasks involving > > > more > > > > >>>> active > > > > >>>> responses -suggest that young infants can understand others' > > goals, > > > > >>>> intentions, desires, knowledge/ignorance, and beliefs. Perhaps > > most > > > > >>>> prominent are studies suggesting infants as young as 13 months > of > > > age > > > > > are > > > > >>>> selectively responsive to the false beliefs of others, well > before > > > > they > > > > >>>> are > > > > >>>> able to reliably pass standard verbal false belief tasks around > 4 > > > > years > > > > >>>> of > > > > >>>> age. > > > > >>>>> This special issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology > > aims > > > to > > > > >>>> create a dialogue between the mindreading and non-mindreading > > > > approaches > > > > >>>> to > > > > >>>> basic social cognition. Contributors are asked to clarify their > > > > >>>> theoretical > > > > >>>> commitments; explain how their accounts compare with rivals; and > > how > > > > > they > > > > >>>> propose to handle the emerging empirical data, particularly that > > > from > > > > >>>> human > > > > >>>> developmental psychology. Themes and questions to be addressed > > > include > > > > >>>> but > > > > >>>> are not limited to: > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> - Infants as young as 13 months old display a systematic > > > > >>>> sensitivity to the beliefs of others. Does it follow that they > > must > > > be > > > > >>>> operating with a concept of belief, or indeed, any concepts at > > all? > > > > >>>>> - Normally developing children become able to attribute > > false > > > > >>>> beliefs to others between the ages of 3 and 5. Does it follow > that > > > > they > > > > >>>> must > > > > >>>> be operating with a "theory of mind" or the equivalent? > > > > >>>>> - What does mental attribution minimally involve? What > > > exactly > > > > >>>> distinguishes mindreading from non-mindreading approaches to > early > > > > > social > > > > >>>> cognition? Are there theoretical reasons to prefer one over the > > > other? > > > > >>>>> - What exact roles are mental representations thought to > > play > > > > in > > > > >>>> mindreading approaches? What kind of mental representations > might > > be > > > > >>>> involved? Can a principled dividing line be drawn between > > > > >>>> representational > > > > >>>> and non-representational approaches? > > > > >>>>> - How precisely should we understand the > explicit/implicit > > > > >>>> distinction as invoked by certain theorists? > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> Invited contributors > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> - José Luis Bermúdez, Texas A&M University > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> - Pierre Jacob, Institut Jean Nicod > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> - Andrew Meltzoff, University of Washington > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> Important dates > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> - Submission deadline: 1 December 2010 > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> - Target publication date: July 2011 > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> How to submit > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> Prospective authors should register at: > > > > >>>> https://www.editorialmanager.com/ropp to obtain a login and > > select > > > > >>>> "Social > > > > >>>> Cognition: Mindreading and Alternatives" as an article type to > > > submit > > > > a > > > > >>>> manuscript. Manuscripts should be no longer than 8,000 words. > > > > > Submissions > > > > >>>> should follow the author guidelines available on the journal's > > > > website: > > > > >>>> http://www.springer.com/13164 Any questions? Please email the > > > guest > > > > >>>> editors: d.d.hutto@herts.ac.uk, mherschb@ucsd.edu, > > > > v.southgate@bbk.ac.uk > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> About the journal > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> The Review of Philosophy and Psychology (ISSN: 1878-5158; > eISSN: > > > > >>>> 1878-5166) is a peer-reviewed journal published quarterly by > > > Springer > > > > > and > > > > >>>> focusing on philosophical and foundational issues in cognitive > > > > science. > > > > >>>> The > > > > >>>> aim of the journal is to provide a forum for discussion on > topics > > of > > > > >>>> mutual > > > > >>>> interest to philosophers and psychologists and to foster > > > > >>>> interdisciplinary > > > > >>>> research at the crossroads of philosophy and the sciences of the > > > mind, > > > > >>>> including the neural, behavioural and social sciences. > > > > >>>>> The journal publishes theoretical works grounded in empirical > > > > > research > > > > >>>> as well as empirical articles on issues of philosophical > > relevance. > > > It > > > > >>>> includes thematic issues featuring invited contributions from > > > leading > > > > >>>> authors together with articles answering a call for paper. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> Editorial board > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> Editor-in-Chief: Dario Taraborelli, Surrey. Executive Editors: > > > > Roberto > > > > >>>> Casati, CNRS; Paul Egré, CNRS, Christophe Heintz, CEU. > > > > >>>>> Scientific advisors: Clark Barrett, UCLA; Cristina Bicchieri, > > Penn; > > > > > Ned > > > > >>>> Block, NYU; Paul Bloom, Yale; John Campbell, Berkeley; Richard > > > > Breheny, > > > > >>>> UCL; > > > > >>>> Susan Carey, Harvard; David Chalmers, ANU; Martin Davies, ANU; > > > > Vittorio > > > > >>>> Girotto, IUAV; Alvin Goldman, Rutgers; Daniel Hutto, > > Hertfordshire; > > > > Ray > > > > >>>> Jackendoff, Tufts; Marc Jeannerod, CNRS; Alan Leslie, Rutgers; > > Diego > > > > >>>> Marconi, Turin; Kevin Mulligan, Geneva; Alva Noë, Berkeley; > > > > Christopher > > > > >>>> Peacocke, Columbia; John Perry, Stanford; Daniel Povinelli, > > > > >>>> Louisiana-Lafayette; Jesse Prinz, CUNY; Zenon Pylyshyn, Rutgers; > > > Brian > > > > >>>> Scholl, Yale; Natalie Sebanz, Nijmegen; Corrado Sinigaglia, > Milan; > > > > Barry > > > > >>>> C. > > > > >>>> Smith, Birkbeck; Elizabeth Spelke, Harvard; Achille Varzi, > > Columbia; > > > > >>>> Timothy > > > > >>>> Williamson, Oxford; Deirdre Wilson, UCL > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> Dr. Victoria Southgate > > > > >>>>> Wellcome Trust Research Career Development Fellow > > > > >>>>> Centre for Brain and Cognitive Development > > > > >>>>> Henry Wellcome Building > > > > >>>>> Birkbeck, University of London > > > > >>>>> Malet Street > > > > >>>>> London, WC1E 7HX. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>> _______________________________________________ > > > > >>>> xmca mailing list > > > > >>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > > > > >>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> _______________________________________________ > > > > >>> xmca mailing list > > > > >>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > > > > >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > > > > >>> > > > > >>> _______________________________________________ > > > > >> xmca mailing list > > > > >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > > > > >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > > > > >> > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > > xmca mailing list > > > > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > > > > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > > xmca mailing list > > > > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > > > > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > *Andy Blunden* > > > > Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ < > http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/ <http://home.mira.net/~andy/> <http://home.mira.net/~andy/>< > http://home.mira.net/~andy/>< > > http://home.mira.net/~andy/%3Chttp://home.mira.net/~andy/> > > > > > > > > > Videos: http://vimeo.com/user3478333/videos > > > > Book: http://www.brill.nl/scss > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > xmca mailing list > > > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > > > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > xmca mailing list > > > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > > > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > xmca mailing list > > > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > > > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > xmca mailing list > > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > xmca mailing list > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > xmca mailing list > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > > > > > _______________________________________________ > xmca mailing list > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > _______________________________________________ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
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