[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

Re: [xmca] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers: Special Issue on Mindreading, Review of Philosophy and Psychology



Larry, with "trans situated" do you mean that you accept "metaphor", which
is been considered as a constructivist argument?
Katerina Plakitsi
Assistant Professor of Science Education
Department of Early Childhood Education
School of Education
University of Ioannina
45110
Greece
tel.: +302651005771 office
fax: +302651005842
tel.: +6972898463 mobile
e-mail: kplakits@cc.uoi.gr
http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits
http://users.uoi.gr/5conns
http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr
http://www.edife.gr/school/5oschool.html

--------------------------------------------------
From: "Larry Purss" <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
Sent: Tuesday, August 03, 2010 8:43 PM
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Subject: Re: [xmca] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers: Special Issue on
Mindreading, Review of Philosophy and Psychology

Hi Martin

This topic of "mind-reading" vs  "non-mind reading" models of young
infants
CAPACITY for attending to and ENGAGING with other "minds" [persons] is a
fascinating topic which has been discussed previously in CHAT
conversations
on this listserve.
I recently read V. Reddy's book which recommends a 2nd person societal
interactional microgenetic model of non-mind reading. I have sympathy for
this particular perspective. However, I would like to read more widely on
this particular topic.

Do you or others on this listserve have any recommendations for further
articles which  engage with the pros and cons of the various models in a
spirit similar to the proposed intent of the special issue of the Review
of
Philosophy and Psychology?

I'm curious about the various theories of young infants capacity for
engaging with others within sociogenesis, ontogenesis, and microgenesis.
However, I'm also interested in how the various  models of "infants
engaging
with others" become transformed in the transition to
TRANS-situational understandings  [the development of "higher" mental
functions.]

Larry

On Mon, Aug 2, 2010 at 12:57 PM, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu> wrote:

Begin forwarded message:

> From: Victoria Southgate <v.southgate@bbk.ac.uk>
> Date: August 2, 2010 4:22:07 AM GMT-05:00
> To: cogdevsoc@virginia.edu
> Subject: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers: Special Issue on Mindreading,
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
>
> Social Cognition: Mindreading and Alternatives
>
>
>
> Special issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology
>
>
>
> Guest Editors:
>
> Daniel D Hutto, University of Hertfordshire
>
> Mitchell Herschbach, University of California, San Diego
>
> Victoria Southgate, University of London
>
>
>
>
>
>           CALL FOR PAPERS
>
>           Deadline for submissions: 1 December 2010
>
>
>
>
>
> Human beings, even very young infants, exhibit remarkable capacities
> for
attending to, and engaging with, other minds. A prevalent account of such
abilities is that they involve “theory of mind” or “mindreading”: the
ability to represent mental states as mental states of specific kinds
(i.e.,
to have concepts of “belief,” “desire,” etc.) and the contents of such
mental states. A number of philosophers and psychologists question the
standard mindreading and wider representationalist framework for
characterizing and explaining our everyday modes and methods of
understanding other people. One possibility is that infants may be
exhibiting sophisticated yet non-conceptual, and possibly
non-representational, mind tracking abilities that do not equate to any
sort
of mindreading.
>
>
>
> Proponents on both sides of this debate must adequately accommodate
recent work in developmental psychology. Experiments involving a variety
of
nonverbal tasks — e.g., the “violation of expectation” paradigm and
anticipatory looking tasks, as well as nonverbal tasks involving more
active
responses —suggest that young infants can understand others’ goals,
intentions, desires, knowledge/ignorance, and beliefs. Perhaps most
prominent are studies suggesting infants as young as 13 months of age are
selectively responsive to the false beliefs of others, well before they
are
able to reliably pass standard verbal false belief tasks around 4 years
of
age.
>
> This special issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology aims to
create a dialogue between the mindreading and non-mindreading approaches
to
basic social cognition. Contributors are asked to clarify their
theoretical
commitments; explain how their accounts compare with rivals; and how they
propose to handle the emerging empirical data, particularly that from
human
developmental psychology. Themes and questions to be addressed include
but
are not limited to:
>
>
>
> -       Infants as young as 13 months old display a systematic
sensitivity to the beliefs of others. Does it follow that they must be
operating with a concept of belief, or indeed, any concepts at all?
>
> -       Normally developing children become able to attribute false
beliefs to others between the ages of 3 and 5. Does it follow that they
must
be operating with a “theory of mind” or the equivalent?
>
> -       What does mental attribution minimally involve? What exactly
distinguishes mindreading from non-mindreading approaches to early social
cognition? Are there theoretical reasons to prefer one over the other?
>
> -       What exact roles are mental representations thought to play in
mindreading approaches? What kind of mental representations might be
involved? Can a principled dividing line be drawn between
representational
and non-representational approaches?
>
> -       How precisely should we understand the explicit/implicit
distinction as invoked by certain theorists?
>
>
>
> Invited contributors
>
> -       José Luis Bermúdez, Texas A&M University
>
> -       Pierre Jacob, Institut Jean Nicod
>
> -       Andrew Meltzoff, University of Washington
>
>
>
> Important dates
>
> -       Submission deadline: 1 December 2010
>
> -       Target publication date: July 2011
>
>
>
>
>
> How to submit
>
> Prospective authors should register at:
https://www.editorialmanager.com/ropp to obtain a login and select
“Social
Cognition: Mindreading and Alternatives” as an article type to submit a
manuscript. Manuscripts should be no longer than 8,000 words. Submissions
should follow the author guidelines available on the journal's website:
http://www.springer.com/13164  Any questions? Please email the guest
editors: d.d.hutto@herts.ac.uk, mherschb@ucsd.edu, v.southgate@bbk.ac.uk
>
>
>
> About the journal
>
> The Review of Philosophy and Psychology (ISSN: 1878-5158; eISSN:
1878-5166) is a peer-reviewed journal published quarterly by Springer and
focusing on philosophical and foundational issues in cognitive science.
The
aim of the journal is to provide a forum for discussion on topics of
mutual
interest to philosophers and psychologists and to foster
interdisciplinary
research at the crossroads of philosophy and the sciences of the mind,
including the neural, behavioural and social sciences.
>
>  The journal publishes theoretical works grounded in empirical research
as well as empirical articles on issues of philosophical relevance. It
includes thematic issues featuring invited contributions from leading
authors together with articles answering a call for paper.
>
>
>
> Editorial board
>
> Editor-in-Chief: Dario Taraborelli, Surrey. Executive Editors: Roberto
Casati, CNRS; Paul Egré, CNRS, Christophe Heintz, CEU.
> Scientific advisors: Clark Barrett, UCLA; Cristina Bicchieri, Penn; Ned
Block, NYU; Paul Bloom, Yale; John Campbell, Berkeley; Richard Breheny,
UCL;
Susan Carey, Harvard; David Chalmers, ANU; Martin Davies, ANU; Vittorio
Girotto, IUAV; Alvin Goldman, Rutgers; Daniel Hutto, Hertfordshire; Ray
Jackendoff, Tufts; Marc Jeannerod, CNRS; Alan Leslie, Rutgers; Diego
Marconi, Turin; Kevin Mulligan, Geneva; Alva Noë, Berkeley; Christopher
Peacocke, Columbia; John Perry, Stanford; Daniel Povinelli,
Louisiana-Lafayette; Jesse Prinz, CUNY; Zenon Pylyshyn, Rutgers; Brian
Scholl, Yale; Natalie Sebanz, Nijmegen; Corrado Sinigaglia, Milan; Barry
C.
Smith, Birkbeck; Elizabeth Spelke, Harvard; Achille Varzi, Columbia;
Timothy
Williamson, Oxford; Deirdre Wilson, UCL
>
>
>
> Dr. Victoria Southgate
> Wellcome Trust Research Career Development Fellow
> Centre for Brain and Cognitive Development
> Henry Wellcome Building
> Birkbeck, University of London
> Malet Street
> London, WC1E 7HX.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>

_______________________________________________
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca

_______________________________________________
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca

_______________________________________________
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca