Re: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts

[mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>]

Thanks all for making the texts available.
The Vygotsky article from Soviet psychology on creativity and imagination is
available at

http://lchc.ucsd.edu/mca/Mail/xmcamail.2008_03.dir/att-0189/Vygotsky__Imag___Creat_in_Childhood.pdf

mike

On Mon, Aug 9, 2010 at 12:44 PM, Michael Glassman <MGlassman@ehe.osu.edu>wrote:

> Hi Denise, Andy and others,
>
> Thanks for all of this.  I have been doing a good deal of thinking in this
> area so this is really interesting to me.  I've made a first pass through
> the work and thought I would offer some of my thinking and wonder if anybody
> else might have some thought.  Actually the person I have been working with
> this on is something of a deductive thinker and that sort of keeps me in
> line.  I wonder if Valsiner was a little bit too hard on deductive thinking
> and a little bit too easy on inductive thinking (and I wonder about giving
> primacy to any form of logic because they all play their role).  I see
> Peirce's great contribution (at least one of them) is that there are not
> only logics but that logics are based on relationships.  Deductive logic is
> certainly dangerous (just as I think giving primacy to any logic is) because
> it is too easy to believe that premises are static and determinate.  If you
> rely completely on deductive logic there is really the possibility of using
> it to go to an extreme and creating students who not only give primacy to
> deductive logic but have difficulty of thinking any other way.  At the same
> time Dewey for instance does posit warranted assertability.  There are times
> when we can certainly make the argument that it is possible to start from a
> basic set of premises (If you treat an object in A manner you will have B
> conclusion).  What is always important to remember is that the premises are
> malleable and that if you don't get the conclusion you expected that you
> can't really blame the experiment or experimenter but must accept that the
> premises were in some way lacking.  So it is important to remember that
> there is always a dynamic relationship between Premise A and conclusion B -
> and that this relationship is always in the context of a larger system which
> is constantly changing circumstances.
>
> Induction I think can also be dangerous though and is not necessarily the
> "good guy" in this trilogy.  David Human was I think the first to point this
> out - one that you are always only making your assumptions on a limited
> class (so system relationships really enter in here as weill) and also that
> you tend to draw conclusions too quickly and too easily.  It is interesting
> because this it seems to me is the mistake that so many economists make.
>  They put together pieces of informatiion and then reach conclusions about
> what this information means and then are able to incorporate new information
> when it emerges.
>
> But I think where I most differ is abduction.  I don't really think so much
> that it is a combination of deduction and induction, and intermingling
> and/or overlapping of the two.  That is sort of where I started as well, but
> as we have come to really explore this logic I think it is representative of
> a unique way of generating hypotheses, but one that is really difficult to
> grasp because it is the most open of the three logics as well as the most
> systems oriented.  I sort of see abduction as competing possibilities and
> the ability to use the possibility to generate a new hypothesis.  This
> usually occurs when information is readily available, any for of warranted
> assertability is low, the problem is unique or novel in some way, and there
> are strong relationships between different nodes within the system.
>  Relationships need to be strong and well defined for two reasons.  The
> first is that the different nodes need to work together without one racing
> to acheive a hegemony of ideas based on power relationships.  The second is
> that abduction represents the biggest risk - there is far less certainty in
> outcomes than there would be in deduction or even induction.  You do not
> know where you are going to end up when going through a process of
> abduction.   The reward is a higher value in the hypothesis generated.
>
> Okay, well that's my thinking.
>
> Michael
>
> ________________________________
>
> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden
> Sent: Mon 8/9/2010 10:03 AM
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: Re: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts
>
>
>
> And here's the second half hopefully ...
>
> Denise Newnham wrote:
> > Hello everyone, I copied Valsiner (2007) which has his final ideas on
> > abduction and specifically thinking as a cultural process
> >
> > Please tell me if you cannot open these pages I have a limited technology
> >
> > Denise
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> On
> > Behalf Of mike cole
> > Sent: 07 August 2010 19:21
> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > Subject: Re: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts
> >
> > Thanks Denise.
> > This time of year (in northern hemisphere) everyone is moving around in
> > every which direction. And when lots of people get into the discussion.
> > multi-voicedness goes ballistic!!
> >
> > Will read Valsiner on abduction with interest. Mulling over the
> abduction/
> > imagination connection which intuitively works, although I had not
> connect
> > the two ideas before (the influence, too, of prior discussions about LSV
> and
> > imagination).
> >
> > Sure a lot of threads entangled here. very interesting.
> > mike
> >
> > On Fri, Aug 6, 2010 at 6:46 AM, Denise Newnham <dsnewnham@bluewin.ch>
> wrote:
> >
> >> Dear Michael,
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> I wrote to Jaan about your question as no where was it clearly
> stipulated
> >> in
> >> the earlier works and he has just replied so I forward his words and
> text
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Denise
> >>
> >> Dear Denise,
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Good question! In 1998 I was somewhat naively optimistic about Peirce
> cand
> >> abduction (see Pizarroso & V 2009 on overcoming that optimism).
> >>
> >> But the 1998 quote from my book is indeed an embryonic form of what
> later
> >> (2001 in Potsdam, and more thoroughly in my 2007 book CULTURE IN MINDS
> AND
> >> SOCIETIES became clear-- words as POINT-LIKE CONCEPTS cannot be the
> > highest
> >> level of semiotic mediation as they would close up further creativity of
> >> meaning-making. So Vygotsky was basically limited.
> >>
> >> Instead, the pseudo-concept translates in my terminology into field-type
> >> sign (Level 4 in my system of semiotic mediation)
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Jaan
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> On
> >> Behalf Of Michael Glassman
> >> Sent: 05 August 2010 15:22
> >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >> Subject: RE: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Hi Denise,
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> I was wondering, does Valsiner have an argument as to how and why
> >> pseudo-concepts actally aids in Peirces ilogic of abduction.  I am
> >> currently
> >> under the impresson that abduction is primarily about hypothesis
> > generation
> >> - the ability to develop new hypotheses in response to unique problems.
> > So
> >> I'm wondering what role pseudo-concepts, if we are going by Vygotsky's
> >> definition, might play in all this.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Michael
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>  _____
> >>
> >>  From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu on behalf of Denise Newnham
> >> Sent: Thu 8/5/2010 5:26 AM
> >> To: ablunden@mira.net; 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'
> >> Subject: RE: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts
> >>
> >> Hello Andy, the reference as you saw to pseudoconcepts is in his book
> 'The
> >> guided mind' 1998 and the other is : The development of the concept of
> >> development: Historical and epistemological perspectives. In W. Damon, &
> > R.
> >> Lerner(Eds), Handbook of child psychology. 5th Ed. VOl.1. Theoretical
> >> models
> >> of human development (pp. 189-232). New York: Wiley.
> >>
> >> I quote (1998): 'Vygotsky and his colleagues (Luria would be the closest
> >> example) attributed and overly idealized role to the role of concepts in
> >> human reasoning. The role fitted with his emphasis on the hierarchy of
> >> mental functions (i.e. higher mental functions regulating lower ones),
> yet
> >> by this exaggerated emphasis the focus on the process of semiogenesis is
> >> actually diminished. In contrast, it could be claimed that
> pseudo-concepts
> >> (i.e. specific unified conglomerates of concept and complex qualities)
> are
> >> the core (and highest form) of human psychological functioning. The
> claim
> >> would fit with the unity of representational fields (of Karl Buhler,
> >> described and extended earlier) and with the central focus of abduction
> >> (rather than induction or deduction) in the process of making sense
> (along
> >> the lines of Pierce).
> >>
> >> I read you paper 'when is a concept really a concept' and heard that
> there
> >> was a debate on XMCA but as I was not connected at that time have not
> > heard
> >> or read this debate.
> >>
> >> Denise
> >>
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> On
> >> Behalf Of Andy Blunden
> >> Sent: 05 August 2010 10:22
> >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >> Subject: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts
> >>
> >> Can you give us the full reference for "see Valsiner,
> >> 1997d", Denise, and maybe even the context? I just find it
> >> incredible that someone could know as much about Vygotsky as
> >> Valsiner does and place pseduoconcepts at the top of the
> >> development hierarchy.
> >>
> >> Andy
> >>
> >> Denise Newnham wrote:
> >>> Dear Larry and others,
> >>>
> >>> I am new to this game so perhaps am doing something out of turn so if
> so
> >> let
> >>> me know. Larry I read your reply and this extract below made me think
> of
> >>> Valsiner's work on semiotic mediators and concepts where he states that
> >>> pseudoconcepts (1998, p.278-279) should be placed at the top to the
> >>> developmental hierarchy as the hierarchy should be seen as 'open to
> >> changes
> >>> or formation of intrasensitive order- [see Valsiner, 1997d]' (2001, p.
> >>> 85).This brings ot my mind Markova's discussion on the spontaneous of
> >>> intuitive in knowledge formation (2003) and I think that Cole's fifth
> >>> dimension attests to this argument. There is an interesting paper by
> >>> Galligan (2008) "using Valsiner" on the web.
> >>>
> >>> Denise
> >>>
> >>> 'These reflections of linking up multiple perspectives lead to the
> >>> developmental question of how  socially situated microgenetic
> > experiences
> >>> get "generalized" into "higher" levels of organization that organize
> >>> experience across situations [and organize the relation of the "lower"
> >> and
> >>> "higher"
> >>> functions]?'
> >>>
> >>> -----Original Message-----
> >>> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> >> On
> >>> Behalf Of Larry Purss
> >>> Sent: 04 August 2010 19:04
> >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers: Special Issue on
> >>> Mindreading, Review of Philosophy and Psychology
> >>>
> >>> Hi Leif and Katerina
> >>>
> >>> Leif,
> >>> I have recently read Daniel Stern's latest book "The Present Moment"
> and
> >> I
> >>> agree that he has a fascinating perspective on the topic of
> "engagement"
> >>> that emphasizes a "non-mind reading interpretation" of engaging with
> >>> others.  I will look up his earlier work discussing Vygotsky and Glick.
> >> It
> >>> is also interesting that you mention Joseph Glick. Glick's articles on
> >>> Werner are also fascinating as they suggest that Werner was also
> focused
> >> on
> >>> "microgenesis" as central to developmental accounts.
> >>>
> >>> Katerina,
> >>> I'm not sure exactly what you mean by "accept metaphor" but generally I
> >>> accept metaphor as a central way of understanding "human science" as
> >>> interpretive and "perspectival".  As I read  Glick's interpretation of
> >>> Werner's microgenetic developmental theory, I was also REFLECTING on
> > Mike
> >> &
> >>> Natalia's focus on the microgenetic social situation of development,
> and
> >>> also my attempt to link these perspectives with neo-Meadian notions of
> >>> social ACTS [interchangeability of actual social positions].  These
> >>> reflections of linking up multiple perspectives lead to the
> > developmental
> >>> question of how  socially situated microgenetic experiences get
> >>> "generalized" into "higher" levels of organization that organize
> >> experience
> >>> across situations [and organize the relation of the "lower" and
> "higher"
> >>> functions]?
> >>>
> >>> Glick's article "Werner's Relevance for Contemporary Developmental
> >>> Psychology"  points out that Werner thought developmental processes got
> >>> organized "at one of  three different levels: the sensorimotor, the
> >>> perceptual, or the symbolic." (p.562)  Metaphor organizes experience at
> >> the
> >>> 3rd symbolic level and at this level we can have metaphoric models of
> >> "mind"
> >>> [for example: conversation, text, computers, dance, orchestra, etc.]
> >>> However, this still leaves us with questioning  the RELATIONAL process
> > of
> >>> linking language and metaphor to the other levels of organization at
> the
> >>> sensorimotor and perceptual levels.
> >>> Stern, Reddy, Werner, Glick, Gillespie & Martin, Mike and Natalia, and
> >>> others are exploring the possible dynamic fluidity of the capacity for
> >>> organizing and structuring the 3 levels of experience that may be more
> >>> reciprocal [and possibly simultaneous assemby] than a linear
> > teleological
> >>> dynamic.  The question becomes, how central are the sensorimotor and
> >>> perceptual ways of "constructing" or "forming" experience once social
> >>> situations of development are  symbolic [and metaphorical]?  As Glick
> >> points
> >>> out, Werner believed these language and symbolic functions "undergo a
> >>> differentiation process from deeper sensorimotor roots." (p.562)
> However
> >>> these deeper roots are NOT TRANSCENDED but continue to organize
> >> experience.
> >>> The notion of "leading activity" implies an INVARIANT linear process
> >> where
> >> a
> >>> specific leading activity DOMINATES each stage of development.  An
> >>> alternative perspective emphasizes the fluidity of these "leading
> >>> activities" as continuing to remain central for development. For
> >>> example functions such as "affiliation" are not only dominant in one
> >>> specific stage of developmentand then recede into the background, but
> >>> ACTUALLY continue to ACTIVELY organize experience [depending on the
> >> societal
> >>> microgenetic situation of development].  Whether the previous "leading
> >>> activity" recedes or remains active is dependent, not on the stage of
> >>> development [age determined] but rather on the particular social
> >> situation
> >>> of development. Mike's point that particular school contexts correlate
> >> with
> >>> particular ages of students allows 2 alternative models of development.
> >>> Stage theory that is age "determined" or layered development that is
> >>> socially situated [schools CONSTRAIN affiliative activity which recedes
> >> into
> >>> the background]  If the 2nd alternative guided how we structured
> schools
> >> and
> >>> affiliation and interchangeability of social positions was VALUED,
> >> identity
> >>> and concept development would be altered.
> >>> My personal fascination, working in schools, is the idea of the
> >> possibility
> >>> of creating institutional structures which promote the
> >> "interchangeability
> >>> of social positions in social acts" and how to facilitate social spaces
> >>> which nurture this interchangeability. An example of this is the
> > creation
> >> of
> >>> the 5th dimension METAPHORICAL SPACES where interchangeability of
> >> positions
> >>> is fluid and dynamic and leads to the development of "agentic capacity"
> >>> where ALL participants experience being recognized and experiencing
> >> OTHERS
> >>> RESPONDING to their recognition.  This affiliative activity is
> formative
> >> of
> >>> particular "identity" characteristics [communal self] and also "concept
> >>> development" formed within microgenetic moments of development. The
> >> reason
> >> I
> >>> appreciate  neo-Meadian accounts of development are
> >>> there privileging the centrality of ACTUAL INTERCHANGEABILITY of social
> >>> positions [which simultaneously organize and regulate sensorimotor,
> >>> perceptual, and symbolic experiences].  I also believe this "ideal" of
> >>> actual interchangeability is fundamentally affiliative and dialogical
> as
> >> the
> >>> participants openly share perspectives.  This also creates social
> >>> spaces where cognitive development [and reflective capacity] is
> nurtured
> >> and
> >>> "grown" [cultured]
> >>>
> >>> Larry
> >>>
> >>> On Wed, Aug 4, 2010 at 7:32 AM, Katerina Plakitsi
> >> <kplakits@gmail.com>wrote:
> >>>> Larry, with "trans situated" do you mean that you accept "metaphor",
> >> which
> >>>> is been considered as a constructivist argument?
> >>>> Katerina Plakitsi
> >>>> Assistant Professor of Science Education
> >>>> Department of Early Childhood Education
> >>>> School of Education
> >>>> University of Ioannina
> >>>> 45110
> >>>> Greece
> >>>> tel.: +302651005771 office
> >>>> fax: +302651005842
> >>>> tel.: +6972898463 mobile
> >>>> e-mail: kplakits@cc.uoi.gr
> >>>> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits
> >>>> http://users.uoi.gr/5conns
> >>>> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr <http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr/>  <
> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr/>
> >>>> http://www.edife.gr/school/5oschool.html
> >>>>
> >>>> --------------------------------------------------
> >>>> From: "Larry Purss" <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> >>>> Sent: Tuesday, August 03, 2010 8:43 PM
> >>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers: Special Issue on
> >>>>
> >>>> Mindreading, Review of Philosophy and Psychology
> >>>>
> >>>> Hi Martin
> >>>>> This topic of "mind-reading" vs  "non-mind reading" models of young
> >>>>> infants
> >>>>> CAPACITY for attending to and ENGAGING with other "minds" [persons]
> is
> >> a
> >>>>> fascinating topic which has been discussed previously in CHAT
> >>>>> conversations
> >>>>> on this listserve.
> >>>>> I recently read V. Reddy's book which recommends a 2nd person
> societal
> >>>>> interactional microgenetic model of non-mind reading. I have sympathy
> >> for
> >>>>> this particular perspective. However, I would like to read more
> widely
> >> on
> >>>>> this particular topic.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Do you or others on this listserve have any recommendations for
> > further
> >>>>> articles which  engage with the pros and cons of the various models
> in
> >> a
> >>>>> spirit similar to the proposed intent of the special issue of the
> >> Review
> >>>>> of
> >>>>> Philosophy and Psychology?
> >>>>>
> >>>>> I'm curious about the various theories of young infants capacity for
> >>>>> engaging with others within sociogenesis, ontogenesis, and
> >> microgenesis.
> >>>>> However, I'm also interested in how the various  models of "infants
> >>>>> engaging
> >>>>> with others" become transformed in the transition to
> >>>>> TRANS-situational understandings  [the development of "higher" mental
> >>>>> functions.]
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Larry
> >>>>>
> >>>>> On Mon, Aug 2, 2010 at 12:57 PM, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu>
> wrote:
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Begin forwarded message:
> >>>>>>> From: Victoria Southgate <v.southgate@bbk.ac.uk>
> >>>>>>> Date: August 2, 2010 4:22:07 AM GMT-05:00
> >>>>>>> To: cogdevsoc@virginia.edu
> >>>>>>> Subject: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers: Special Issue on Mindreading,
> >>>>>> Review of Philosophy and Psychology
> >>>>>>> Social Cognition: Mindreading and Alternatives
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Special issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Guest Editors:
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Daniel D Hutto, University of Hertfordshire
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Mitchell Herschbach, University of California, San Diego
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Victoria Southgate, University of London
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>           CALL FOR PAPERS
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>           Deadline for submissions: 1 December 2010
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Human beings, even very young infants, exhibit remarkable
> capacities
> >>>>>>> for
> >>>>>> attending to, and engaging with, other minds. A prevalent account of
> >>> such
> >>>>>> abilities is that they involve "theory of mind" or "mindreading":
> the
> >>>>>> ability to represent mental states as mental states of specific
> kinds
> >>>>>> (i.e.,
> >>>>>> to have concepts of "belief," "desire," etc.) and the contents of
> > such
> >>>>>> mental states. A number of philosophers and psychologists question
> > the
> >>>>>> standard mindreading and wider representationalist framework for
> >>>>>> characterizing and explaining our everyday modes and methods of
> >>>>>> understanding other people. One possibility is that infants may be
> >>>>>> exhibiting sophisticated yet non-conceptual, and possibly
> >>>>>> non-representational, mind tracking abilities that do not equate to
> >> any
> >>>>>> sort
> >>>>>> of mindreading.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Proponents on both sides of this debate must adequately accommodate
> >>>>>> recent work in developmental psychology. Experiments involving a
> >> variety
> >>>>>> of
> >>>>>> nonverbal tasks - e.g., the "violation of expectation" paradigm and
> >>>>>> anticipatory looking tasks, as well as nonverbal tasks involving
> more
> >>>>>> active
> >>>>>> responses -suggest that young infants can understand others' goals,
> >>>>>> intentions, desires, knowledge/ignorance, and beliefs. Perhaps most
> >>>>>> prominent are studies suggesting infants as young as 13 months of
> age
> >>> are
> >>>>>> selectively responsive to the false beliefs of others, well before
> >> they
> >>>>>> are
> >>>>>> able to reliably pass standard verbal false belief tasks around 4
> >> years
> >>>>>> of
> >>>>>> age.
> >>>>>>> This special issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology aims
> > to
> >>>>>> create a dialogue between the mindreading and non-mindreading
> >> approaches
> >>>>>> to
> >>>>>> basic social cognition. Contributors are asked to clarify their
> >>>>>> theoretical
> >>>>>> commitments; explain how their accounts compare with rivals; and how
> >>> they
> >>>>>> propose to handle the emerging empirical data, particularly that
> from
> >>>>>> human
> >>>>>> developmental psychology. Themes and questions to be addressed
> > include
> >>>>>> but
> >>>>>> are not limited to:
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> -       Infants as young as 13 months old display a systematic
> >>>>>> sensitivity to the beliefs of others. Does it follow that they must
> > be
> >>>>>> operating with a concept of belief, or indeed, any concepts at all?
> >>>>>>> -       Normally developing children become able to attribute false
> >>>>>> beliefs to others between the ages of 3 and 5. Does it follow that
> >> they
> >>>>>> must
> >>>>>> be operating with a "theory of mind" or the equivalent?
> >>>>>>> -       What does mental attribution minimally involve? What
> exactly
> >>>>>> distinguishes mindreading from non-mindreading approaches to early
> >>> social
> >>>>>> cognition? Are there theoretical reasons to prefer one over the
> > other?
> >>>>>>> -       What exact roles are mental representations thought to play
> >> in
> >>>>>> mindreading approaches? What kind of mental representations might be
> >>>>>> involved? Can a principled dividing line be drawn between
> >>>>>> representational
> >>>>>> and non-representational approaches?
> >>>>>>> -       How precisely should we understand the explicit/implicit
> >>>>>> distinction as invoked by certain theorists?
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Invited contributors
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> -       José Luis Bermúdez, Texas A&M University
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> -       Pierre Jacob, Institut Jean Nicod
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> -       Andrew Meltzoff, University of Washington
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Important dates
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> -       Submission deadline: 1 December 2010
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> -       Target publication date: July 2011
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> How to submit
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Prospective authors should register at:
> >>>>>> https://www.editorialmanager.com/ropp to obtain a login and select
> >>>>>> "Social
> >>>>>> Cognition: Mindreading and Alternatives" as an article type to
> submit
> >> a
> >>>>>> manuscript. Manuscripts should be no longer than 8,000 words.
> >>> Submissions
> >>>>>> should follow the author guidelines available on the journal's
> >> website:
> >>>>>> http://www.springer.com/13164  Any questions? Please email the
> guest
> >>>>>> editors: d.d.hutto@herts.ac.uk, mherschb@ucsd.edu,
> >> v.southgate@bbk.ac.uk
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> About the journal
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> The Review of Philosophy and Psychology (ISSN: 1878-5158; eISSN:
> >>>>>> 1878-5166) is a peer-reviewed journal published quarterly by
> Springer
> >>> and
> >>>>>> focusing on philosophical and foundational issues in cognitive
> >> science.
> >>>>>> The
> >>>>>> aim of the journal is to provide a forum for discussion on topics of
> >>>>>> mutual
> >>>>>> interest to philosophers and psychologists and to foster
> >>>>>> interdisciplinary
> >>>>>> research at the crossroads of philosophy and the sciences of the
> > mind,
> >>>>>> including the neural, behavioural and social sciences.
> >>>>>>>  The journal publishes theoretical works grounded in empirical
> >>> research
> >>>>>> as well as empirical articles on issues of philosophical relevance.
> > It
> >>>>>> includes thematic issues featuring invited contributions from
> leading
> >>>>>> authors together with articles answering a call for paper.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Editorial board
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Editor-in-Chief: Dario Taraborelli, Surrey. Executive Editors:
> >> Roberto
> >>>>>> Casati, CNRS; Paul Egré, CNRS, Christophe Heintz, CEU.
> >>>>>>> Scientific advisors: Clark Barrett, UCLA; Cristina Bicchieri, Penn;
> >>> Ned
> >>>>>> Block, NYU; Paul Bloom, Yale; John Campbell, Berkeley; Richard
> >> Breheny,
> >>>>>> UCL;
> >>>>>> Susan Carey, Harvard; David Chalmers, ANU; Martin Davies, ANU;
> >> Vittorio
> >>>>>> Girotto, IUAV; Alvin Goldman, Rutgers; Daniel Hutto, Hertfordshire;
> >> Ray
> >>>>>> Jackendoff, Tufts; Marc Jeannerod, CNRS; Alan Leslie, Rutgers; Diego
> >>>>>> Marconi, Turin; Kevin Mulligan, Geneva; Alva Noë, Berkeley;
> >> Christopher
> >>>>>> Peacocke, Columbia; John Perry, Stanford; Daniel Povinelli,
> >>>>>> Louisiana-Lafayette; Jesse Prinz, CUNY; Zenon Pylyshyn, Rutgers;
> > Brian
> >>>>>> Scholl, Yale; Natalie Sebanz, Nijmegen; Corrado Sinigaglia, Milan;
> >> Barry
> >>>>>> C.
> >>>>>> Smith, Birkbeck; Elizabeth Spelke, Harvard; Achille Varzi, Columbia;
> >>>>>> Timothy
> >>>>>> Williamson, Oxford; Deirdre Wilson, UCL
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Dr. Victoria Southgate
> >>>>>>> Wellcome Trust Research Career Development Fellow
> >>>>>>> Centre for Brain and Cognitive Development
> >>>>>>> Henry Wellcome Building
> >>>>>>> Birkbeck, University of London
> >>>>>>> Malet Street
> >>>>>>> London, WC1E 7HX.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>>>> xmca mailing list
> >>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>>> xmca mailing list
> >>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>>>>
> >>>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>> xmca mailing list
> >>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>>>
> >>> _______________________________________________
> >>> xmca mailing list
> >>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>>
> >>> _______________________________________________
> >>> xmca mailing list
> >>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>>
> >>>
> >> --
> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >> *Andy Blunden*
> >> Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/><
> http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/ <http://home.mira.net/~andy/<http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/>>
> >
> >> Videos: http://vimeo.com/user3478333/videos
> >> Book: http://www.brill.nl/scss
> >>
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> xmca mailing list
> >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> xmca mailing list
> >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> xmca mailing list
> >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>
> >>
> > _______________________________________________
> > xmca mailing list
> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >
> >
> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >
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> >
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> >
> >
> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > xmca mailing list
> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
> --
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> *Andy Blunden*
> Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/>
> Videos: http://vimeo.com/user3478333/videos
> Book: http://www.brill.nl/scss
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
>
_______________________________________________
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