And here's the second half hopefully ... Denise Newnham wrote:
Hello everyone, I copied Valsiner (2007) which has his final ideas on abduction and specifically thinking as a cultural process Please tell me if you cannot open these pages I have a limited technology Denise -----Original Message----- From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole Sent: 07 August 2010 19:21 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: Re: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts Thanks Denise. This time of year (in northern hemisphere) everyone is moving around in every which direction. And when lots of people get into the discussion. multi-voicedness goes ballistic!! Will read Valsiner on abduction with interest. Mulling over the abduction/ imagination connection which intuitively works, although I had not connect the two ideas before (the influence, too, of prior discussions about LSV and imagination). Sure a lot of threads entangled here. very interesting. mike On Fri, Aug 6, 2010 at 6:46 AM, Denise Newnham <dsnewnham@bluewin.ch> wrote:Dear Michael, I wrote to Jaan about your question as no where was it clearly stipulated in the earlier works and he has just replied so I forward his words and text Denise Dear Denise, Good question! In 1998 I was somewhat naively optimistic about Peirce cand abduction (see Pizarroso & V 2009 on overcoming that optimism). But the 1998 quote from my book is indeed an embryonic form of what later (2001 in Potsdam, and more thoroughly in my 2007 book CULTURE IN MINDS AND SOCIETIES became clear-- words as POINT-LIKE CONCEPTS cannot be thehighestlevel of semiotic mediation as they would close up further creativity of meaning-making. So Vygotsky was basically limited. Instead, the pseudo-concept translates in my terminology into field-type sign (Level 4 in my system of semiotic mediation) Jaan From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Michael Glassman Sent: 05 August 2010 15:22 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: RE: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts Hi Denise, I was wondering, does Valsiner have an argument as to how and why pseudo-concepts actally aids in Peirces ilogic of abduction. I am currently under the impresson that abduction is primarily about hypothesisgeneration- the ability to develop new hypotheses in response to unique problems.SoI'm wondering what role pseudo-concepts, if we are going by Vygotsky's definition, might play in all this. Michael _____ From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu on behalf of Denise Newnham Sent: Thu 8/5/2010 5:26 AM To: ablunden@mira.net; 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' Subject: RE: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts Hello Andy, the reference as you saw to pseudoconcepts is in his book 'The guided mind' 1998 and the other is : The development of the concept of development: Historical and epistemological perspectives. In W. Damon, &R.Lerner(Eds), Handbook of child psychology. 5th Ed. VOl.1. Theoretical models of human development (pp. 189-232). New York: Wiley. I quote (1998): 'Vygotsky and his colleagues (Luria would be the closest example) attributed and overly idealized role to the role of concepts in human reasoning. The role fitted with his emphasis on the hierarchy of mental functions (i.e. higher mental functions regulating lower ones), yet by this exaggerated emphasis the focus on the process of semiogenesis is actually diminished. In contrast, it could be claimed that pseudo-concepts (i.e. specific unified conglomerates of concept and complex qualities) are the core (and highest form) of human psychological functioning. The claim would fit with the unity of representational fields (of Karl Buhler, described and extended earlier) and with the central focus of abduction (rather than induction or deduction) in the process of making sense (along the lines of Pierce). I read you paper 'when is a concept really a concept' and heard that there was a debate on XMCA but as I was not connected at that time have notheardor read this debate. Denise -----Original Message----- From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden Sent: 05 August 2010 10:22 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts Can you give us the full reference for "see Valsiner, 1997d", Denise, and maybe even the context? I just find it incredible that someone could know as much about Vygotsky as Valsiner does and place pseduoconcepts at the top of the development hierarchy. Andy Denise Newnham wrote:Dear Larry and others, I am new to this game so perhaps am doing something out of turn so if soletme know. Larry I read your reply and this extract below made me think of Valsiner's work on semiotic mediators and concepts where he states that pseudoconcepts (1998, p.278-279) should be placed at the top to the developmental hierarchy as the hierarchy should be seen as 'open tochangesor formation of intrasensitive order- [see Valsiner, 1997d]' (2001, p. 85).This brings ot my mind Markova's discussion on the spontaneous of intuitive in knowledge formation (2003) and I think that Cole's fifth dimension attests to this argument. There is an interesting paper by Galligan (2008) "using Valsiner" on the web. Denise 'These reflections of linking up multiple perspectives lead to the developmental question of how socially situated microgeneticexperiencesget "generalized" into "higher" levels of organization that organize experience across situations [and organize the relation of the "lower"and"higher" functions]?' -----Original Message----- From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]OnBehalf Of Larry Purss Sent: 04 August 2010 19:04 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: Re: [xmca] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers: Special Issue on Mindreading, Review of Philosophy and Psychology Hi Leif and Katerina Leif, I have recently read Daniel Stern's latest book "The Present Moment" andIagree that he has a fascinating perspective on the topic of "engagement" that emphasizes a "non-mind reading interpretation" of engaging with others. I will look up his earlier work discussing Vygotsky and Glick.Itis also interesting that you mention Joseph Glick. Glick's articles on Werner are also fascinating as they suggest that Werner was also focusedon"microgenesis" as central to developmental accounts. Katerina, I'm not sure exactly what you mean by "accept metaphor" but generally I accept metaphor as a central way of understanding "human science" as interpretive and "perspectival". As I read Glick's interpretation of Werner's microgenetic developmental theory, I was also REFLECTING onMike&Natalia's focus on the microgenetic social situation of development, and also my attempt to link these perspectives with neo-Meadian notions of social ACTS [interchangeability of actual social positions]. These reflections of linking up multiple perspectives lead to thedevelopmentalquestion of how socially situated microgenetic experiences get "generalized" into "higher" levels of organization that organizeexperienceacross situations [and organize the relation of the "lower" and "higher" functions]? Glick's article "Werner's Relevance for Contemporary Developmental Psychology" points out that Werner thought developmental processes got organized "at one of three different levels: the sensorimotor, the perceptual, or the symbolic." (p.562) Metaphor organizes experience atthe3rd symbolic level and at this level we can have metaphoric models of"mind"[for example: conversation, text, computers, dance, orchestra, etc.] However, this still leaves us with questioning the RELATIONAL processoflinking language and metaphor to the other levels of organization at the sensorimotor and perceptual levels. Stern, Reddy, Werner, Glick, Gillespie & Martin, Mike and Natalia, and others are exploring the possible dynamic fluidity of the capacity for organizing and structuring the 3 levels of experience that may be more reciprocal [and possibly simultaneous assemby] than a linearteleologicaldynamic. The question becomes, how central are the sensorimotor and perceptual ways of "constructing" or "forming" experience once social situations of development are symbolic [and metaphorical]? As Glickpointsout, Werner believed these language and symbolic functions "undergo a differentiation process from deeper sensorimotor roots." (p.562) However these deeper roots are NOT TRANSCENDED but continue to organizeexperience.The notion of "leading activity" implies an INVARIANT linear processwhere aspecific leading activity DOMINATES each stage of development. An alternative perspective emphasizes the fluidity of these "leading activities" as continuing to remain central for development. For example functions such as "affiliation" are not only dominant in one specific stage of developmentand then recede into the background, but ACTUALLY continue to ACTIVELY organize experience [depending on thesocietalmicrogenetic situation of development]. Whether the previous "leading activity" recedes or remains active is dependent, not on the stage of development [age determined] but rather on the particular socialsituationof development. Mike's point that particular school contexts correlatewithparticular ages of students allows 2 alternative models of development. Stage theory that is age "determined" or layered development that is socially situated [schools CONSTRAIN affiliative activity which recedesintothe background] If the 2nd alternative guided how we structured schoolsandaffiliation and interchangeability of social positions was VALUED,identityand concept development would be altered. My personal fascination, working in schools, is the idea of thepossibilityof creating institutional structures which promote the"interchangeabilityof social positions in social acts" and how to facilitate social spaces which nurture this interchangeability. An example of this is thecreationofthe 5th dimension METAPHORICAL SPACES where interchangeability ofpositionsis fluid and dynamic and leads to the development of "agentic capacity" where ALL participants experience being recognized and experiencingOTHERSRESPONDING to their recognition. This affiliative activity is formativeofparticular "identity" characteristics [communal self] and also "concept development" formed within microgenetic moments of development. Thereason Iappreciate neo-Meadian accounts of development are there privileging the centrality of ACTUAL INTERCHANGEABILITY of social positions [which simultaneously organize and regulate sensorimotor, perceptual, and symbolic experiences]. I also believe this "ideal" of actual interchangeability is fundamentally affiliative and dialogical astheparticipants openly share perspectives. This also creates social spaces where cognitive development [and reflective capacity] is nurturedand"grown" [cultured] Larry On Wed, Aug 4, 2010 at 7:32 AM, Katerina Plakitsi<kplakits@gmail.com>wrote:Larry, with "trans situated" do you mean that you accept "metaphor",whichis been considered as a constructivist argument? Katerina Plakitsi Assistant Professor of Science Education Department of Early Childhood Education School of Education University of Ioannina 45110 Greece tel.: +302651005771 office fax: +302651005842 tel.: +6972898463 mobile e-mail: kplakits@cc.uoi.gr http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits http://users.uoi.gr/5conns http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr <http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr/> http://www.edife.gr/school/5oschool.html -------------------------------------------------- From: "Larry Purss" <lpscholar2@gmail.com> Sent: Tuesday, August 03, 2010 8:43 PM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> Subject: Re: [xmca] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers: Special Issue on Mindreading, Review of Philosophy and Psychology Hi MartinThis topic of "mind-reading" vs "non-mind reading" models of young infants CAPACITY for attending to and ENGAGING with other "minds" [persons] isafascinating topic which has been discussed previously in CHAT conversations on this listserve. I recently read V. Reddy's book which recommends a 2nd person societal interactional microgenetic model of non-mind reading. I have sympathyforthis particular perspective. However, I would like to read more widelyonthis particular topic. Do you or others on this listserve have any recommendations forfurtherarticles which engage with the pros and cons of the various models inaspirit similar to the proposed intent of the special issue of theReviewof Philosophy and Psychology? I'm curious about the various theories of young infants capacity for engaging with others within sociogenesis, ontogenesis, andmicrogenesis.However, I'm also interested in how the various models of "infants engaging with others" become transformed in the transition to TRANS-situational understandings [the development of "higher" mental functions.] Larry On Mon, Aug 2, 2010 at 12:57 PM, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu> wrote: Begin forwarded message:From: Victoria Southgate <v.southgate@bbk.ac.uk> Date: August 2, 2010 4:22:07 AM GMT-05:00 To: cogdevsoc@virginia.edu Subject: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers: Special Issue on Mindreading,Review of Philosophy and PsychologySocial Cognition: Mindreading and Alternatives Special issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology Guest Editors: Daniel D Hutto, University of Hertfordshire Mitchell Herschbach, University of California, San Diego Victoria Southgate, University of London CALL FOR PAPERS Deadline for submissions: 1 December 2010 Human beings, even very young infants, exhibit remarkable capacities forattending to, and engaging with, other minds. A prevalent account ofsuchabilities is that they involve "theory of mind" or "mindreading": the ability to represent mental states as mental states of specific kinds (i.e., to have concepts of "belief," "desire," etc.) and the contents ofsuchmental states. A number of philosophers and psychologists questionthestandard mindreading and wider representationalist framework for characterizing and explaining our everyday modes and methods of understanding other people. One possibility is that infants may be exhibiting sophisticated yet non-conceptual, and possibly non-representational, mind tracking abilities that do not equate toanysort of mindreading.Proponents on both sides of this debate must adequately accommodaterecent work in developmental psychology. Experiments involving avarietyof nonverbal tasks - e.g., the "violation of expectation" paradigm and anticipatory looking tasks, as well as nonverbal tasks involving more active responses -suggest that young infants can understand others' goals, intentions, desires, knowledge/ignorance, and beliefs. Perhaps most prominent are studies suggesting infants as young as 13 months of ageareselectively responsive to the false beliefs of others, well beforetheyare able to reliably pass standard verbal false belief tasks around 4yearsof age.This special issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology aimstocreate a dialogue between the mindreading and non-mindreadingapproachesto basic social cognition. Contributors are asked to clarify their theoretical commitments; explain how their accounts compare with rivals; and howtheypropose to handle the emerging empirical data, particularly that from human developmental psychology. Themes and questions to be addressedincludebut are not limited to:- Infants as young as 13 months old display a systematicsensitivity to the beliefs of others. Does it follow that they mustbeoperating with a concept of belief, or indeed, any concepts at all?- Normally developing children become able to attribute falsebeliefs to others between the ages of 3 and 5. Does it follow thattheymust be operating with a "theory of mind" or the equivalent?- What does mental attribution minimally involve? What exactlydistinguishes mindreading from non-mindreading approaches to earlysocialcognition? Are there theoretical reasons to prefer one over theother?- What exact roles are mental representations thought to playinmindreading approaches? What kind of mental representations might be involved? Can a principled dividing line be drawn between representational and non-representational approaches?- How precisely should we understand the explicit/implicitdistinction as invoked by certain theorists?Invited contributors - José Luis Bermúdez, Texas A&M University - Pierre Jacob, Institut Jean Nicod - Andrew Meltzoff, University of Washington Important dates - Submission deadline: 1 December 2010 - Target publication date: July 2011 How to submit Prospective authors should register at:https://www.editorialmanager.com/ropp to obtain a login and select "Social Cognition: Mindreading and Alternatives" as an article type to submitamanuscript. Manuscripts should be no longer than 8,000 words.Submissionsshould follow the author guidelines available on the journal'swebsite:http://www.springer.com/13164 Any questions? Please email the guest editors: d.d.hutto@herts.ac.uk, mherschb@ucsd.edu,v.southgate@bbk.ac.ukAbout the journal The Review of Philosophy and Psychology (ISSN: 1878-5158; eISSN:1878-5166) is a peer-reviewed journal published quarterly by Springerandfocusing on philosophical and foundational issues in cognitivescience.The aim of the journal is to provide a forum for discussion on topics of mutual interest to philosophers and psychologists and to foster interdisciplinary research at the crossroads of philosophy and the sciences of themind,including the neural, behavioural and social sciences.The journal publishes theoretical works grounded in empiricalresearchas well as empirical articles on issues of philosophical relevance.Itincludes thematic issues featuring invited contributions from leading authors together with articles answering a call for paper.Editorial board Editor-in-Chief: Dario Taraborelli, Surrey. Executive Editors:RobertoCasati, CNRS; Paul Egré, CNRS, Christophe Heintz, CEU.Scientific advisors: Clark Barrett, UCLA; Cristina Bicchieri, Penn;NedBlock, NYU; Paul Bloom, Yale; John Campbell, Berkeley; RichardBreheny,UCL; Susan Carey, Harvard; David Chalmers, ANU; Martin Davies, ANU;VittorioGirotto, IUAV; Alvin Goldman, Rutgers; Daniel Hutto, Hertfordshire;RayJackendoff, Tufts; Marc Jeannerod, CNRS; Alan Leslie, Rutgers; Diego Marconi, Turin; Kevin Mulligan, Geneva; Alva Noë, Berkeley;ChristopherPeacocke, Columbia; John Perry, Stanford; Daniel Povinelli, Louisiana-Lafayette; Jesse Prinz, CUNY; Zenon Pylyshyn, Rutgers;BrianScholl, Yale; Natalie Sebanz, Nijmegen; Corrado Sinigaglia, Milan;BarryC. Smith, Birkbeck; Elizabeth Spelke, Harvard; Achille Varzi, Columbia; Timothy Williamson, Oxford; Deirdre Wilson, UCLDr. Victoria Southgate Wellcome Trust Research Career Development Fellow Centre for Brain and Cognitive Development Henry Wellcome Building Birkbeck, University of London Malet Street London, WC1E 7HX._______________________________________________ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca _______________________________________________xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca _______________________________________________xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca_______________________________________________ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca _______________________________________________ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/> Videos: http://vimeo.com/user3478333/videos Book: http://www.brill.nl/scss _______________________________________________ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca _______________________________________________ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca _______________________________________________ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca_______________________________________________ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ _______________________________________________ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ Videos: http://vimeo.com/user3478333/videos Book: http://www.brill.nl/scss
Attachment:
valinser-thinking2.pdf
Description: Adobe PDF document
_______________________________________________ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca